Perspectives on Performativity: Pedagogical Knowledge in Teacher Education
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Acknowledgements
A chain is only as strong as its weakest link.

Introduction and Outline

In the recent decades, the once controversially debated professionalization of the teaching vocation has also become an academization of teacher education (BREIDENSTEIN et al. 2002). In most European countries, teacher education has entered the remit of the universities. The natural and social sciences as well as the humanities are involved in their academic curricula. As a result, study programs designed to train teachers for work in university-track secondary schooling (i.e. German Gymnasia) have sharpened their focus on pedagogy. Conversely, study programs aimed towards those wishing to work in pre, primary, or vocational schools have developed their disciplinary focus more than they have ever done before.

Study programs for teachers are traditionally defined by strong interdisciplinarity (see KRAUS 2015, p.13f.). According to the objectives for teacher education as defined by the Council of Europe in 2007, teacher education should take place in three phases: the initial training (the academic study program), a phase of “early career support,” and a third phase of continued learning under supervision (“mutual monitoring support”). This third phase takes place parallel to regular professional activity in school (see COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 2007). Practical experience within the discipline or in other fields (especially abroad) is heavily encouraged during the initial training, as the European Qualification Framework focuses on “life-long learning” (see EUROPEAN COMMISSION LEARNING OPPORTUNITIES AND QUALIFICATIONSIN EUROPE 2008).

This book examines teacher education in terms of the development of the skills necessary for recognizing pedagogical situations and practically applying theories and models of teaching and learning in order to encourage and improve educational processes in schools. It examines how these abilities can be modeled theoretically and conveyed within the pedagogical-practical as well as in the scientific-transdisciplinary setting of academic courses. The focus of this book thus lies not on teaching qualifications within a discipline or on the performance of pupils and their teachers, but on pedagogical operations in the classroom and on the pedagogical knowledge applied there. Its chief interest is aligned with the central focus of the scientific discipline of Schulpädagogik, “school pedagogy.” School pedagogy investigates processes in schools and school lessons by looking at the practices of the acting persons, especially those of teachers and pupils. It also examines the
institutional and social conditions and contexts of schooling and schools, and the professionalization of teachers.

The question of practical pedagogical knowledge in the classroom lies at the core of school pedagogy. Today it is common to place research on professional development, curriculum studies, and didactics, to which the research area “educational knowledge and practices in the classroom” often belongs, in the light of empirical research on education. In this study, this will be done in the context of the educational sciences, more specifically in the context of pedagogical anthropology. Unfortunately, school pedagogical research receives much less attention than general educational science, and its theoretical models are often ignored in favor of those from psychology.

Pedagogical knowledge today thus often falls within two main discourses. There is the idea of standardization, represented mainly in psychological and psychometrical approaches. On the other hand, many different knowledge forms also partly defy articulation or objectification. This idea has its roots in the history of pedagogy and in the historic-anthropological branch of the educational sciences. In the following, both interpretations are confronted with each other in an alternating fashion that spirals from general considerations into greater detail. In constantly referring to these two realms of discourse, the idea of this book is gradually developed.

Pedagogical knowledge has only recently become the focus of empirical quantitative research, especially in psychologically and psychometrically influenced survey studies such as TEDS-LT (2008-2012), KoKoHs (2011-2019), BilWiss (2009-2013), and many others. Research based on such evidence seeks to provide scientifically new and reliable results by means of controlled and randomized intervention studies and questionnaires. From such results, a base knowledge of pedagogical practice has been generated and then applied with the aim of optimizing systems,

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1 See e.g.: https://www.erziehungswissenschaften.hu-berlin.de/de/institut/abteilungen/didaktik/forschung

2 Sieglinde JÖRNITZ (2009, p.68) defines the concept of evidence in empirical research within the educational sciences as follows: “The matter becomes so clear by a single glance that every additional inquiry or discussion is superfluous. Criticism and scepticism have no effect on the evident.” According to JÖRNITZ (2009, p.71f.) “[... ] an evidence-based [...] education no longer focuses on the ‘production’ of new research findings, but rather only the synopsis and re-analysis of completed research. Re-analysis does not denote the problematization of the validity of individual statements, which is predominantly considered as given. If the results of the studies match, they are consolidated into evidence; if they deviate from the matching tendency, they are considered non-evident and consequently disregarded. Research thus establishes evidence as a confirmation, through already existent evidence. The higher evidence draws from the conformity of the lower. This reflects the effort to yield with scientific evidence, which draws from the fact that each experiment has to be repeatable at will, and thus warrants the validity of knowledge. [...] At the same time, research aims to provide knowledge of the kind that allows the optimization of interventions in practice. Unlike the natural sciences, the educational sciences must thus negate the idea of conducting fundamental research. Evidence is intended to refer not only to the explanation context, but also directly to the usage context. It wants to be practical as an indication of what you should do, e.g., for teaching success.” Rudolf TIPPELT & Jutta REICH-CLAASSEN (2010, p.23) argue that the concept of evidence must include process-oriented approaches. They write: “Alternatives – such as the non-experience-based guidance by ideas and ideologies or by pedagogical classical authors – nowadays deliver no adequate references for opportunities for action and reform measures. What is needed is rather a rational, understanding, engaging and, in parts, evidence-based research on education and training. This may, however, not solely be based on output-oriented indicators, but also the design processes of teaching and learning and their evaluation must be kept in perspective, for the sake of a comprehensive quality assurance.” The evidence concept is thus also increasingly claimed for qualitative empirical research approaches or modified to that effect (a comprehensive critical overview of the evidence debate in the pedagogy field is provided by BELLMANN & MÜLLER 2011).
institutions, concepts, and specific cases of interest, such as the improvement of a teaching model or other best practice examples.

The theoretical starting point of such studies is not shared by this book. Instead, it contributes to the anthropologically oriented educational sciences, which examine diverse forms of knowledge and a plurality of scientific models, theories, and paradigms regarding pedagogical knowledge, as well as various possibilities for their empirical research. Christoph WULF (1994 p.7f.)\(^3\) defines pedagogical knowledge as is used in pedagogical anthropology as follows: “Pedagogical knowledge is not limited to its results. It includes many forms of knowledge, such as philosophical, scientific, aesthetic, practical symbols and sign systems standing in complex relationships to one another. [...] Anthropology as a closed normative knowledge system no longer exists. The same applies to educational anthropology. Its knowledge is, moreover, part of the theories on education, but also of practical pedagogical knowledge as a whole. Anthropological knowledge has always played an important role, not only in the educational sciences, but also in [the development of] practical pedagogical knowledge. Like every scientist, every educator possesses anthropological knowledge, without which the one could not work scientifically and the other could not act practically. In both cases, it is often a question of implicit anthropological knowledge. In its implicit form, it is difficult to reflect and modify anthropological knowledge. Therefore it is essential for the educational sciences and for professional educators to gain awareness of the anthropological assumptions that guide their work.” The acquisition of pedagogical knowledge is here directed towards explicit and implicit anthropological assumptions based on theoretical and/or on practical pedagogical approaches. Furthermore, a broad concept of knowledge must be considered, which includes various forms and logics of knowledge. Cultural studies can be employed for the scientific elaboration of this knowledge, since it considers “[...] the symbolic relationship of heterogeneous discourses that only become mutually accessibly via their contexts” (WIMMER 2002, p.117).

Research in the educational sciences has always been devoted to educational knowledge, although to date less to empirically demonstrable practical knowledge, but rather as a synonym for education in general (for example, KADE et al. 2011).

This reflects the extraordinary complexity of the situation, which this book does not seek to oversimplify. Instead, its objective is to determine the specifics of the practical knowledge of teachers in regards to their pedagogical practices in the classroom. In a second step it links this specialist knowledge to a certain form of empiricism. Seen from this perspective, scientific approaches to their subjects in the field are not primarily legitimized by research methodology. Instead, these approaches aim at corresponding with the anthropological concept of knowledge as well as with the logic of action in the field (see quotation above). The systematics of this book provide fundamental support for the empirical educational sciences, especially in their relation to pedagogical knowledge in the classroom and its meaning for teacher education. Correspondingly, in terms of professional pedagogical work in educational institutions, the question of “quality” currently has a central role: it is primarily founded on empirical-metric conceptual models of empirical research.

Nowadays, the idea of “quality” of education is connected to an evidence-based and product-oriented governance of education systems. Quality research has its origin in applied organizational theory. It is usually interpreted as quality management. Quality management, with the support of the paradigm of New Public Management ideology, seeks primarily to optimize the use of resources. In this context, resources are understood as “capital” (or types of capital); a profit increase is (originally) intended as the evidence of the marketability of a product. “Quality appears as the objective and universal, i.e. observable and universally valid, feature of a product” (HONIG 2002, p.5). Work processes and certain practices are evaluated in quality research for their results (or products) on the basis of a pre-defined quality scale. Thus, the evaluation of the results serves as an evidence-based examination of the quality of the work processes. The processes and practices associated with product creation are assessed on a scale that is result-based. No further details are provided to determine how a “good practice” can be distinguished. This kind of research is mostly concerned with the modeling of competencies and the implementation of models and forms of increasing institutionalization, incorporation, and routinization.

In the context of pedagogy, quality research evaluates results seen as pedagogically desirable: for example, learning performance. Wilfried BOS (2009, Slide 9) formulates the objective of output control for education systems as follows: “The productivity of education systems, the quality of individual educational institutions and the educational success of individuals is made measurable in order to allow for a more effective control of educational processes.” Through system-wide standardized tests, the performance results of students are collected. The performance of schools or

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4 Social practices are generally defined as regularities of action or regulated action patterns. Whether an action is actually a practice and to which social order it refers, is already the subject of an interpretive effort and not the result of an observation. At the level of observable phenomena, it is only the actions that the researchers can observe (see BUDDE in prep.).
teachers are derived from these results, as well as other rational indications of the continued development of the system (cf. MAAG MERKI 2010). Pedagogical quality, as applied here to standardized pedagogical goals and their normalization, thus coincides with the general ambition to do “[...] everything you always wanted to do better, more consistently,” (HONIG 2002, p.5), and especially to test it in an ubiquitous and comparative manner. The development and improvement of such systems is thus based on the principle of governance and according to pre-determined expectations, their standardization, and subsequent evaluation. Educational institutions today are ruled by educational standards that serve as measures for competence-based learning. These standards are expressed in governmental papers and agreements as well as within systems of school inspection. Mainly comparative empirical studies (like PISA or TIMSS) serve as a reference.

However, in this conception of quality management, little consideration is given to the fact that educational practices do not necessarily generate empirically detectable products, and that many efforts, especially regarding an increase in performances, are not even detectable. (see, as one of the first, WAHL 1975). Correspondingly, the reflective traditions of pedagogy were, for a long time, unaware of the quality question. However, in recent years the quality concept has been widely accepted, albeit with partial hesitation. This has occurred under considerable political pressure⁵ to collect and assess pedagogical quality (cf. HONIG 2002, p.2).

However, according to what studies there are, the detailed communication of such research results to schools, as well as their relevance in the development of quality of concrete classroom education, is barely detectable (ALTRICHTER & SOUKUP-ALTRICHTER 2014, p.54). Herbert ALTRICHTER & Katharina SOUKUP-ALTRICHTER (2014, p.56) see the solution to this problem in a reinforced “[...] multiperspectivity, i.e. multiple information from different sources and perspectives.” This approach is pursued here. Recent studies in ethnography indicate that good pedagogical practice does not arise from the fact that it has been evaluated: “It must moreover be known how it is produced” (NEUMANN 2012, p.37). For this purpose it is particularly necessary to recognize the “idiosyncracies of practice” and come within reach of the concrete everyday experiences of the actors (CLOOS et al. 2009, p.37). In this book, in the context of classroom education we are primarily concerned with establishing awareness for the anthropological assumptions that guide pedagogical work. Quality, in this case, does not automatically refer to

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⁵ See the “Framework Program of the Federal Ministry of Education and Research for the Promotion of Empirical Research on Education.” Here one can read: “Educational and scientific systems are increasingly becoming key factors in international competition. The new control in the education system, which is data-based and result-oriented, requires a powerful empirical educational research. The Framework Program of the BMBF will help to structurally strengthen empirical research on education in Germany, to develop it qualitatively, to strengthen its inclusion in international networks, to provide knowledge for the reform of the education and science system, and to scientifically substantiate central instruments of an output and evidence-based policy (educational standards; benchmarking; external evaluation of schools; educational reporting)” Source: http://www.empirische-bildungsforschung-bmbf.de/ [last accessed: 08/07/2012; later only quoted on: www.schulweb.de/de/seiten/drucken.html?seite=6106, last accessed: 02/06/2015].
“good quality,” it instead describes an orientation according to pedagogical objectives in the context of classroom education, whose optimal effect is described below as “choreography.”

In pursuit of the objective to model “quality of education” in terms of “choreography,” an action-theoretical approach informed by a phenomenologically and performativity-theoretical perspective has been chosen in this book. From the perspective of anthropological pedagogy, the need for practical and theoretical pedagogy to align with a conceptual model of performativity is described by Christoph WULF & Jörg ZIRFAS (2007) as follows: “Children and teenagers are not educated by the mere fact that upbringing and education are discussed, but instead by the staging and performance of educational processes” (WULF & ZIRFAS 2007, synopsis). If we take performativity-informed research on practices as the basis of the approach to teacher education unfolded here, the understanding of performativity is thus quite different from the common-sense understanding of performance. It is summarized by Nora LANDKAMMER et al. (2009, internet resource) as follows: “Performativity as a perspective reveals that reality is produced by the (re-)enactment of socially prepared possibilities for action.”

In the following, the anthropological perspective is sharpened by focusing on a central problem of pedagogical knowledge and practice, and thus also of teacher education: the gap between pedagogical theory and practice. This problem will first be described in some of its different facets. Then, in a back-and-forth movement, an argumentation will be unfolded.

In using performativity-informed research on practices as the basis of an approach to teacher education, the following theoretical considerations form the core tenets of this examination: (1) Niklas LUHMANN & Karl-Eberhard SCHORR ([1982] 2000) had already sensitized pedagogical theory formation in the 1980s to the idea that pedagogical action does not often herald what it intends.6 (2) The implications of ethnographic research on practices and heterogeneity, according to which pedagogical action and knowledge forms are involved in a variety of fields that can only be empirically determined, should be taken seriously (HONIG 2001). (3) In the context of childhood research, the high personal contribution of those who are being educated must bring to their education is further accentuated (HONIG 1999). (4) In general, pedagogy – especially within the context of pedagogical anthropology – must maintain awareness for the diversity of its paradigms. These tenets will now be considered with respect to their level of empiricism:

LUHMANN & SCHORR ([1982] 2000) pointed out that concepts of educational practices and action knowledge relevant for the professional practice of teachers are faced, virtually inevitably, with a gap between theory and practice in the teaching profession. It is repeatedly emphasized in

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6 At the same time, it proposes control opportunities and regulations from a system-theoretical perspective that promote professionalization of the occupational profile.
theoretical outlines that pedagogical practices, including teacher training, are complicated by the fact that available theoretical knowledge and professional action do not always go hand-in-hand. One should pay a closer look at this idea: quite a few scientific studies on the knowledge of teachers would seem to indicate that it is predominantly purpose-rational and explicit. It also barely exhibits references to scientific paradigms and methods. However, this is hardly plausible from a purely logical perspective. The gap between (scientifically) theoretical and practical pedagogy, i.e. between knowledge and skills, might not always be visible or noticeable in practice, but it must be bridged in manifold ways. This begins with addressing a student as a student and continues through the design of sensible educational long-term scenarios with many learners. If theory and practice in pedagogy would not be compatible, there simply would be no pedagogy.

At the same time, pedagogical action constantly requires decisions that go beyond regular knowledge and means-ends relationships. It can therefore be assumed that teachers possess many different forms of knowledge, in particular those suitable for the combination of pedagogical theories with practical action. The question is how these forms of knowledge are elicited or determined, and how they can be learned. Education is primarily dependent on the acceptance, understanding, and adoption or assimilation of knowledge by the person being educated. Education, according to Helmut HEID (1994, p.59), is “[...] not a delimitable singular real phenomenon that is existent for itself, but at best a perspective on reality constituted through communicative and social acts and made subject in problem statements.”

While the pedagogical perspective’s aim towards the assumption of responsibility for the shaping of one’s own life, of others, and of the world, is abstract, it is also clearly defined in practice. These practices unfold in dependence on the specific conditions in the field, and thus only partially. Educational practices presuppose special knowledge about pedagogy and about the circumstances of education. Correspondingly, the pedagogical forms of knowledge associated with pedagogical practices are diverse and difficult to generalize. Dieter LENZEN (1997, p.15) writes on the awareness of pedagogy for the diversity of its own paradigms: “It seems to me [...] that pedagogy [...] must be twofold: an interaction-logical science and a reflective science. What does that mean? I think that the model of technology-impact assessment is a good example of what the reflective

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7 For example, a survey of teachers by TERHART et al. (1994) shows that, by their own admission, teachers rarely refer to the content of their own academic curricula or to scientific theories in the exercise of their profession, but almost exclusively to their own practical experience.

educational sciences require: an assessment of the effects of pedagogy. In a period of dramatic differentiation in the educational and social sector, this must encompass both a reflective analysis of educational and social realities, as far as these are a result of pedagogically practical actions, as well as scientifically presented orientations for action. Countless examples could be employed to demonstrate which types of reflection may have prevented unintended implications of pedagogical or educational policies."

In this (in Germany) frequently quoted text, the educational sciences are charged quite centrally with an awareness of the relativity of its own approaches and of their possible implications for fields of educational practice. This encompasses a consideration of the diversity of knowledge forms in the pedagogical fields. 9 However, there is another school of thought that historically seen has been much stronger in Germany, one that emphasizes the gap between theory/scientific research and practice/action. Accordingly, the notion that the university stage of teacher education should only serve academic-disciplinary training was widespread in educational research for quite a long time. It was considered wrong to promote professionalization at this stage. This argumentation was supported by the significant differences between the scientific and the pedagogically practical fields of action (BREIDENSTEIN 2012, p.42ff.), as well as by theories on the sciences.

In contrast to pedagogically practical activity, scientific theories usually do not aim at providing rules applicable for acting in the field. The acquisition of scientific-reflective knowledge is understood (as opposed to knowledge in the school context) as eternally incomplete and critical; it is methodically reduced and simultaneously complex. Results, especially in the exact sciences, are often counterintuitive. Additionally, the acquisition of scientific-reflective knowledge is linked to a relief from practical decisions and compulsions to act. The text logics of scientific studies and their results are also only to a very limited extent compatible with the logic of pedagogical practices. At the universities, the intent to educate is neither tracked nor cultivated nor practiced, but, at best, researched.

Pedagogical actions, however, are undoubtedly always bound to normative objectives. Furthermore, a pedagogical relationship or situation, in contrast to a scientific research setting, does not simply exist or is produced: it always arises only situationally, it is used, maintained, and interrupted. Pedagogy not only deals with collectively shared norms, but also (often in a contradictory way) with detailed individual requirements, needs, and ideas. Pedagogically normative objectives are generated by the operating person as well as by various other instances: political provisos, socio-culturally determined requirements, environment, etc. (DEWE 1997, p.221ff.). It proves difficult to

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9 Reflexivity with respect to scientific paradigms is particularly considered at Swedish universities as a central qualification objective for scientists, e.g. within the context of post-graduate programs. (HÖGSKOPLEVERKET 2003, p.21 and SVERIGES UNIVERSITETSLÄRAREFÖRBUND 2005, p.6ff.)
consider them all simultaneously in theory. In pedagogical practices, what can be expected from them is compared with practically generated normativity. Therefore, it can be assumed that coping with the complex challenges in the educational fields cannot be scientifically-empirically detected without complications (cf. KRAUS 2015). A preparation for professional practice based only on theoretical models is thus not self-evident.

At the same time, many empirical studies prove that the implementation of educational and socio-scientific theories in the practice of professional activity is indeed possible and well-established. For example, Bernd DEWE (1997) demonstrated that teachers-to-be apply certain theories to observations and experiences made in their school practice and also theoretically justify their own practical actions. This he did on the basis of practical reports and lesson plans created by students as part of their studies on teaching practice. The agreement between theory and practice is, as Bernd DEWE (1997, p.227) explains, an integral moment of pedagogical practice. As already indicated, this study focuses on the modes of practically bridging this gap by referring to a rather simple argument: the gap between theory and practice seems to barely affect practice in the pedagogical field, and it seems to pose little irritation to the academic studies on pedagogy. One could thus develop the impression that, although frequently referred to, the gap does not even exist. It is covered, skipped, or bridged in various forms in the two professional profiles focused on pedagogy. However, if the gap would not exist (at least in principle), then that would mean that theories in the educational sciences would only marginally differ from practical pedagogical reflections. The differences that effectively exist between them could then be attributed to different work forms and conditions.

Such speculations are bold. Some of the differences between the two professions and their inherent reflexivity have already been emphasized above. The origin of these differences is, however, not the subject of argumentation here. Instead, it will be argued that the gap between pedagogical theory and practice does exist, but it is partially bridged by single actions or theories. That educators do apply theoretical knowledge to their practical experience shall not even be questioned. The professional reflectivity of teachers does transform the theories and results of the educational, 

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10 Here, with recourse to Alwin DIEMER (1964), the noematic science concept is delimited from the noetic one. The noetic concept is considered an adequate response to the specific challenges of a science and practice-oriented teacher education. While noematic science is oriented toward hypotheses and results, noetic science considers the perspective of knowledge, as well as its dependence on various forms of knowledge forms and sizes, variable object constitutions, and diverse methodological approaches and thematic orientations. Supposedly valid results can be subverted and undermined, for example, by external, discursive, or other developments such as material or cultural contingency. According to the philosopher Herbert SCHNÄDELBACH (1983), a so-called “research science” is characterized by the fact that it continually tests uncertainty concerning the validity of its own premises. BACHELARD (1971) speaks of the “self-confidence of the sciences.” Forms of knowledge and types of rationality or knowledge formats come into effect by being referred to — verbally, materially — in any form. Something thus provides increasingly clearer testimony of a certain knowledge format as the way in which this knowledge was generated is increasingly recognizable within it (a vehicle that is screwed together, a manuscript that is revised, a bird’s nest that is knitted). In its performativity-theoretical, phenomenological, and praxeological interpretation, such a genetic perspective of science is found to be particularly relevant for the elaboration of educational knowledge forms for teacher education.
cultural, and social sciences into the practice of professional action, and this is not disputed. The central question is how this can be conceived without simply masking the gap. Pedagogically practical actions can be justified with pedagogical theories. The allegation that theories in the educational and social sciences lack practical relevance cannot be proven empirically. Still, the theory-practice transfer definitely lacks sufficient research. This also applies to the complexity of instructional practices. Nor is there a script for the translation from theoretical to practical contexts (and vice versa). Such a script is, however, more or less prescribed for the teaching profession by academic studies and pressures to justify professional acting in the practical field. The major challenge of a theory-practice transfer is thus generally rather wildly handed over to vocationally active teachers who simply have to prove themselves in this exercise upon completion of their academic studies. Lesson plans—and more recently standardized testing and evaluation forms (see above)—are usually provided to them as an aid. However, pedagogy is much more than lesson plans and testing.

Given said gap, the results of empirical studies, e.g. of Heinz-Elmar TENORTH (2007) and Spencer KAGAN (1992) et al., according to which professional theoretical knowledge is only detectable in fragments in its practical field of application, are not at all surprising. It is assumed that arguments, provided as explanations of said gap, can obstruct the possibility of a pedagogically guided elaboration of action patterns and a repertoire for its bridging. The possibility that this may not necessarily be the case is investigated here. Precisely this possibility presents the central theme of university teacher training, and its respective didactics are at the focus of this book (cf. BAUER, KOPKA & BRINDT 1996). The theory-practice relation is generally described very differently in science or applied pedagogy. It is examined, for example, with or without empirical support, in theory and in practice, explicitly or implicitly. In this study, the great variety of interpretations of the theory-practice relation in pedagogy is not regarded as a disadvantage for a more precise definition of pedagogical professionalism. Instead, this pluralism offers the chance to obtain many different answers to the question of how pedagogical practices can bridge said gap between practice and theory. The pedagogically practical value of this insight is thus obvious, although it also definitively excludes the possibility of a universal pedagogical theory, as is sometimes reinforced by standard pedagogical knowledge and its measurement systems.

This paper is thus concerned with the examination of the critical-analytical relevance of a supposed gap between theoretical and practical pedagogy. For this, specifics of pedagogical action and judgement, as well as some of the concepts connected with the experience-based acquisition of complex technical, didactic, pedagogical, and theoretical perception and action schemes as part of
teacher education are initially taken into consideration. The interest lies not, as is otherwise common, in pedagogic or didactic models, but instead in the (inter-) active bodies in a teaching or learning situation and the question of how these are related to theories. On the basis of anthropological pedagogy, this book argues that always taking this gap into account is of fundamental importance.

Whereas cognitive or otherwise explicit knowledge does not foreground the very special character of professional practice of teachers, multimodal and sensory knowledge does. Pedagogical practice is based on different forms of knowledge. The multimodality of this knowledge will be described in a separate chapter. However, in the following, some of the general outlines of the modes preferred in this book will be presented.

The practical knowledge of teachers is predominantly defined by specific situations and cases, and it often assumes the form of analogies (COMBE & KOLBE 2004, p.846): case-specific interpretations are derived from recognized similarities. The practical knowledge of teachers thus exists, according to Arno COMBE & Fritz-Ulrich KOLBE (2004, p.846), in an orientation “[...] towards scenic images and examples in the abbreviated mode of analogical transmission.” It can thus be assumed, to follow Walter HERZOG & Regula VON FELTEN (2001), that decisions made in a concrete teaching situation or its subsequent analysis principally follow more a narrative than a logical way of thinking. Narrations that legitimize and guide pedagogical action are generated from a practical application perspective and/or are the result of enculturation processes. The practical knowledge of teachers, which is to be defined here, is principally held open to all interpretations of the theory-practice relationship in the professional field. In examining this, this book follows an approach to pedagogical issues that can be connected to an increasing focus on practice that is common in cultural and social sciences. (See DFG-Graduiertenkolleg 1608/1: Self-Making: Practices of Subjectivation in Historical and Interdisciplinary Perspective, since 2010; and DFG special research field 447 Performing Culture 1999 - 2010) The focus is thus on situated and practical knowledge closely tied to forms and themes of materiality and physicality (corporeality), as well as to those of visuality and imagery. Sense-world structures are seen in function of various forms of knowledge, specifically also by those which are referred to as aisthesis in cultural studies approaches.

11 A classification of different approaches to teacher education is provided by Georg H. NEUWEG (2010, for the first time in 2005).
12 In the following, the term “corporeality” is used in the context of acting and sentient bodies. Following Helmut PLESSNERS’s (1983 p.194) distinction between “corpse-having” and “corpse-being,” the concepts body and corpse are employed as different concepts in phenomenological theory, which is also represented by Bernhard WALDENFELS. The term body shall point to a material-functional condition, which also includes body standards, both of which are not covered in this book. Corporeality, however, is understood in perceptual terms.
13 The concept of reflexivity is understood here in the sense of Bernhard WALDENFELS (1990, p.192), as an expanded notion of rationality: “Therein I understand rationality in the broadest sense as the essence of meaningful and regular, understandable relationships that disperse into various rationality fields and rationality styles.”
Aisthesis describes an understanding that is perpetually incomplete. In the experience of the other and in experiences of art there remains some part of experience that keeps the process of understanding in perpetual unrest. Objects always appear as doubles: signs are also things, images are objects, the voice is part of the body, etc. There is a chiasm in every interpretation. Sense is combined with nonsense, understanding with non-understanding. As a concept, aisthesis covers the performativistic approaches to perception and comprehension that are followed up in this book. With it, theories of action and the various phenomena of the “performativistic” (see above) are explained, hereby placing the processual character of education in the foreground of theoretical and practical pedagogy. This makes it possible to reflect on those aspects of teaching and learning that elude direct planning, management, and control.

In this way, in particular the “tacit” aspects of pedagogy can increasingly be taken into account in teaching-learning contexts (KRAUS 2015, KRAUS et al. in prep., and the work and orientation of the international scientific network Tacit Dimensions of Pedagogy; further details at: tacitdimensions.wordpress.com). Although they influence our preferences, intuitions, and questions, our successful or unsuccessful learning processes, our precarious or successful subject constitutions, such aspects of action knowledge are not always accessible to us in articulated form: instead they become tangible theoretically as discourses and, practically, as modes of visibility, materiality, and physicality.

In the last two decades, the cultural sciences have seen both theoretical and empirical investigations into the concept of the “performativistic” (see WULF & ZIRFAS 2006) in pedagogy. For Art Didactics, see BUSSE 2004 and SCHÜTZ & BLOHM 2005 and many others. Visual arts education itself can be said to have experienced a “performativistic turn” in recent years. (Cf. LANGE 2013) In light of its application to pedagogical contexts and its fairly broad, though controversial, reception in the reference disciplines of teacher education, it is surprising that the performativistic concept does not yet play a central role in current political debates on education (see ADEN & PETERS 2011). By selecting a performativistic-theoretical approach for the elaboration of pedagogical forms of knowledge, one enters the realm of empirical research on practices. At first glance, such an orientation towards practices within the educational sciences and the corresponding shift away from pedagogical or scientific education models contradicts conventional thought systems of school pedagogy. When considered in greater detail, however, the orientation towards the practices within the educational sciences weaves together two fields as a paradox that cannot be denied. Thus, on the one hand it takes into account that the question of scientific disciplines and fields of study has always been geared toward the pedagogical work experience. On the other hand, the theory-practice relationship in pedagogy (more or less explicitly) determines pedagogical practice as well as pedagogical theory.
To the extent that research practices within the educational sciences have not yet been reconciled with “rational” thought systems, and in particular with standardization, at first glance it is not so easy to identify their added value. However, this value becomes particularly apparent in a concept of evidence that does not examine results or effects, but rather the processes, accomplishments, and procedures forming the origin of results or effects. A study of the forms of pedagogical knowledge in this context can be expected to contribute to an increase in the legitimacy of pedagogical-practical action. This template then allows for a theoretical preparation of pedagogical action within the framework of university teacher education, also in the sense of academic didactics.

This book sees itself as a complement to my book *Scholarly Principles in Teacher Education. What Kind of Science Serves a Practice-Oriented Teacher Education?*, which was published in 2015 and in which the phenomenological, praxeological, and performativity-theoretical approach is employed for a more precise definition of the scholarly principles of teacher education.

In the following, the practical knowledge of teachers is defined more precisely with respect to their professional practices in the classroom as set forth by pedagogical requirements. In this regard, this book can be understood only as an indication of and as an access to the complexity of its subject, but not as an explanation of various pedagogical forms of knowledge in detail. Subsequently, various university didactic concepts are presented that connect pedagogical and social-scientific theories with professional practice. Starting from a performativity-theoretical action theory for the analysis of school pedagogical action, the concept of “performative play” is then developed as the core principle of teacher education. In this regard, this book outlines basic considerations, without modeling any concrete undertakings such as courses or didactical settings in teacher education or proposals for assessment. The following chapter will examine a concept of pedagogical knowledge that is quite central for the historic-anthropological perspective in the educational sciences and in school pedagogy: pedagogical tact.

Växjö, February 2016
Pedagogical Knowledge
Pedagogical Tact as a Link between Pedagogical Theory and Practice

The category of pedagogical tact, which has been described in different theory contexts since the 19th century, describes a very important aspect of pedagogical action. The concept of pedagogical tact principally designates the empathy and judgement necessary for fitting educationally or didactically motivated practices and measures into pedagogical situations, as well as for the subsequent examination of the results obtained by doing so. On the one hand, it is treated as a self-reflexive regulative of pedagogic action, and on the other it is regarded as a mode of bridging the gap between the theories of the educational sciences and educational practice, between pedagogical knowledge and pedagogical capabilities. This notion thus serves to answer questions about how pedagogical action can be adapted in different situations, and to what extent.

Various uncertainties in the pedagogical field are implicitly and “tactfully” recognized and processed. The modes of interaction thereby observed are also developed “tactfully,” through intuitive assessments of the respective situation based on the actors involved and their basic attitudes and performances. The objective of pedagogical tact is to create the best possible fit between an action and the reaction to it, i.e., between impulse and response, between indecision and assertiveness, distance and proximity. William R. TORBERT (2001, p.259) describes “true dialogue” as “[...] transformational dances between the known and the unknown”; precisely this should be achieved on an interpersonal level in the classroom. This is made possible by teaching content and didactic planning, but especially through pedagogical tact.

Johann F. HERBART (1969a [1802]) considerably contributed to the establishment of pedagogical tact as a central ability of the teaching profession. Pedagogical tact arises in pedagogical practices. It is a course of action as well as a more internal movement, which initially depends on emotions and intuitions, less so on convictions. Pedagogical tact further implies that how a pedagogue is affected from the outside is more closely tied to her/his state of mind than to a result of her/his thinking. (MUTH 1967, p.68) After HERBART (1969a [1802]), Hermann NOHL (1957, p.137) elaborated a “pedagogical sensitivity” that provides educators with a peculiar distance to her/his cause as well as to her/his pupil, which finds its clearest expression in the form of pedagogical tact. The concept of pedagogical sensitivity is better known in English-speaking contexts than that of pedagogical tact.

HERBART’s texts are, however, ambiguous in regards to the interpretation of pedagogical tact as a purely mental ability. On the one hand (and in contrast to the preferred interpretation of the concept in this study), he defines pedagogical tact as a substitution for theory, which only allows for the implementation of the latter in practice. Tact thus allows the implementation of theory in practice
that has not governed it before. HERBART (1969a [1802], transl. by Norm Friesen 2015) argues that tact inevitably enters the spaces which theory has left empty, thus immediately becoming the “regent” of practice: “Let the question and counter-question balance, in order that we may return to our assertion that inevitably tact occupies the place that theory leaves vacant, and so becomes the immediate director of our practice. Supposing the theory true, happy he, no doubt, in whom this regent is a truly obedient servant of the theory.” On the other hand, HERBART occasionally uses “tact” almost synonymously with the KANTian “judgement.” Still further, he understands the concept as an indispensable link between theory and practice in pedagogy: “Now, however, for every theoretician, no matter how good, in the pursuit of his theory, [...] a certain intermediate element is introduced completely arbitrarily between theory and practice, i.e. a particular tact, namely, a rapid assessment and decision which, just like sloppiness, does not proceed forever uniformly, but also not like a perfectly executed theory [...] with stringent consistency and in complete discretion of the rule, while also meeting the true demand of the individual case” (HERBART 1964 [1802], p.126).

According to Jacob MUTH (1967, p.5), pedagogical tact is evident in the “binding nature of language,” the “naturalness of action,” the “avoidance of injury to the child,” and the “preservation of the necessary distance with respect to pedagogy.” In school pedagogy, pedagogical tact ensures “situational security,” it is a “dramaturgical ability,” an “improvisational gift,” and it consists of “the venture of free forms of educational action” (MUTH 1967, p.5). MUTH (1967) also ties tactful pedagogical action to rapid responsible judgements and decisions.

In this way, pedagogical tact thereby achieves what Jürgen OELKERS (2007, p.127) defines as the primary task for pedagogical action, when he writes, “with respect to education, coincidence, arbitrariness and randomness must be excluded [emphasis in original]. Children are objects of concern (Oelkers 1991), and s/he who rejects this attitude of concern acts irresponsibly.” In the best case, according to OELKERS (2007, p.127), an educator lifts “every concern” from children with the aim of creating a “[...] non-arbitrary and idyllic world,” which allows children a (playful) determination of their “own order” and makes learning possible (OELKERS 2007, p.128f).

OELKERS (2007) notion of a “good upbringing” and the “idyllic world of children” can hardly stand firm in the face of the many fates of children today. It can also not be used as a starting point for the modeling of (heterogeneous) child perspectives, which is the objective of childhood studies or also of student research. However, in relation to the objectives of pedagogically tactful action, his idea is instructive.

The term “idyllic world” may be an unfortunate choice, not least due to its socially and culturally exclusive character. A normative equation of pedagogy with the “good,” also present in the
dominant paradigm of today’s quality discourse involving “good teacher,” “good education,” “good schools,” should moreover be avoided altogether. Aside from obviously criminal actions, there is not one instance that could be used as a basis for a permissible assessment of what a caring or what an indifferent or indiscriminate pedagogical attitude or intention actually is. Pedagogical action and judgement rather move through a field of tension on which one must weigh between indifference and commitment, releasing and caring, leaving alone or insisting, distance and proximity. Conversely, a key educational objective of teacher training is to learn to make a choice of which phenomena should be met with commitment or caring, and which with indifference or distance.

If the excessive normative impetus is set aside, then OELKERS’S statement is still of great relevance in the pedagogical field to the extent it can be interpreted as the work of the educator in guiding kids through all kinds of trouble. The radical responsibility for the adolescent personality is emphasized. ZIRFAS (2001b, p.59) writes: “If the gift of education exists, then it is selfless and it frees from obligation [Derrida …]. Because if there is the gift of education, then only in the way that the educator is radically responsible for the pupil.” A teacher assumes her/his caring responsibility towards a child or a teenager by overcoming distress in their place (without major disaster), or by being able to cope with difficult challenges – as well as by being able to also hide this from the child or teenager. At the same time, the educator gives them a leap of faith and the best possible realistic recognition.

Coping with challenges presupposes self-efficacy, which Philip ZIMBARDO & Richard GERRIG (2003, p.543) define as a highly advanced life-experience: self-efficacy is the belief of an individual that s/he can provide adequate performance in a given situation. Self-efficacy beliefs include cognitive, motivational, affective, and selective processes and determine how a person feels, thinks, motivates him-/herself, and behaves (ZIMBARDO & GERRIG 2003, p.543). As the belief of self-efficacy should be realistic, it is highly demanding as a pedagogical objective. Usually, there is quite an asymmetry between educators and adolescents in relation to their beliefs in and experiences of self-efficacy. A lack of self-efficacy might be hidden by powerful attitudes. However, it can be reduced by successively transferring to a child or teenager a load of responsibility that s/he can carry and pedagogically supporting her/him in doing this.

In the concept of pedagogical tact, opposites arising within the pedagogical field, such as proximity and distance, comfort (“idyllic world”) and crisis, etc., are taken into account. Pedagogical tact can therefore neither be interpreted as a strategy, nor as a skill or competence. It is also not a principle, but an ability comprised of various forms of knowledge. Max van MANEN (1995, p.66) writes: “Tact is a format of knowledge that is essentially normative, personal, and intuitive. Tact therefore calls for a kind of phenomenological discourse that appeals to our interpretive conceptual understanding and that also improves our normative sensibility.”
An action of a teacher can provide testimony about his/her pedagogical tact. This tact is not independent of a situation and is also not easily implementable in action. Instead, an educator discovers, in himself/herself, to what extent s/he has possessed pedagogical tact while acting pedagogically. Such a (self-) realization is important for tactful action. The concept of pedagogical tact thus negates both a fundamental attitude of indifference and the idea of abstract pedagogical standards, just as it does purely formalistic attempts of controlling action (OELKERS 2007, p.127). According to HERBART, one learns pedagogical tact in practice (HERBART 1969b [1806]).

To capture pedagogical tact scientifically, as stressed by VAN MANEN, an epistemology and methodology is required that does not focus solely on cognitive and quantifiable processes. In her examination of the non-verbal interaction between a social educator and a group, Birgit ALTHANS (2007) proposes a way of applying the concept of “pedagogical tact” to empirical questions. In this scene from her participatory observations, breakdance training was being offered for male teenagers in the context of mobile youth work by a social educator and trainer. The scene was observed and recorded on video by the author. ALTHANS describes an interaction process that was consummated without language: with movements, gestures, and facial expressions. She focuses on the surprising and sudden action of the social educator. ALTHANS (2007) writes that the educator continues the virtuosic movement sequences proposed by the teenagers with a clumsy somersault, thus interrupting their actions and counteracting the exclusion of a little boy from the group of teenagers without disturbing the prevalent atmosphere, which the author characterizes as “loose.”

The author suggests a causal relationship between a seemingly amateurish movement by the otherwise professional dancer and educator, and the effective and pedagogically desired change of the social events, which she attributes to pedagogical tact. She sees the situational challenge for the social educator in the coordination of pedagogical, didactically-methodic, and kinesthetically-interactive moments in the face of resistance and exclusion.

ALTHANS (2007) names pedagogical tact as the indispensable sensitivity of the pedagogical professions for the contexts of their own actions, also in relation to the concept of the gesture. It is a “[...] performance of the medial nature of body movements” (AGAMBEN 2001, p.59). “A gesture,” AGAMBEN continues, “is a representation of a mediacy, of visualizing a medium as such.” By referring in gestures to juxtaposed spaces of experience, gestures convey knowledge with vivid physicality. This mode of gestures depicts a physically mediated social communication that constantly has to be mastered anew. The social field is not only location of such interactive processes, but also the medium through which messages are conveyed and problems are solved. For the description of the visible actions that arise from pedagogical tact, ALTHANS (2007) introduces the term “body marks,” which are further defined as a visible and social form of human physicality. According to this analysis, pedagogical tact does not arise from any semanticsthrough which the
social is designated as a repertoire of culturally defined and symbolic actions, but instead concerns a “transfer of the unavailable” (ALTHANS 2007, p.257).

A physically mediated transmission of the unavailable is described by the author, in her empirical example, as omissions, excess, and performative surplus. Prior to the educationally justified intervention, the little boy imitated ritualized breakdance gestures and movements in a partly exaggerated and not very skillful manner. By visibly citing the clumsily executed movements of the younger participant for the group of older youth, the social educator did not expose him, according to ALTHANS (2007), but rather reminded all participants through gestures of the motto of the afternoon, “[...] the creation of a laid-back atmosphere of collective exercise” (ALTHANS 2007, p.256). By thus placing the clumsily executed gestures within a certain social framework for the set of events, the (strict) breakdance movement code of the group was broken. In this way, the task of the social educator conveying this social framework to the teenagers becomes visible. The asymmetric teaching-learning situation is thus marked by the pedagogical intervention.

Instead of pedagogically influencing the teenagers, the educator simulates a role reversal, which temporarily suspends the initial social asymmetries. By affirmatively enacting the performative surplus of gestures of the little boy, he refers less to body control and instead, more fundamentally, to the fact of a lively physicality of all actors. With his behavior and actions, the social educator falls short of the social expectations of the teenagers, but by putting this at stake, he allows moments of a real corporeality that is intersubjectively based and aims at the equality of all actors.

By explaining pedagogical tact as a “transfer of the unavailable” in this analysis, it consequently becomes possible to interpret it as a way to vicariously deal with the problems (of the pupils) through the teacher, thus allowing spontaneous and not fully reflected acting to emerge as important for a successful teaching-learning situation. From a pedagogical-didactical perspective, the double abstinence of the breakdance teacher (neither directly addressing the pupils in an educational way, nor instructing them by being a sportive model) can be traced to an internal movement of detecting, sampling, testing, and researching, which becomes visible in action. Here, moments of real corporeality and the reference character of the corporeal come into play and are moved to the forefront of social events.

The social educator successfully initiated a social interaction that was only partially within his control. However, in the given example, he was certainly aware that with his gesture he had reinterpreted the social situation. Presumably, by tentatively comprehending the performance of his own actions and its reception by the others, he found a problem solution, acted accordingly, and thereby gave it a form in actu. He had implicitly scanned, one could also say researched, his own behavior and that of the others for the problem solution. With his pedagogical intervention, the
social educator therefore apparently replaced the different ages of the actors established by the teenagers in a mode of exclusion with the idea of equality with simultaneous diversity. One could speak here of “egalitarian difference” (Cf. PRENGEL, e.g. in 1993, p.30).

“Egalitarian difference” means the recognition of the diversity of individuals on the basis of equality. In this pedagogical standard, the freedom of everyone to make decisions for their own lives without constraints or limitations comes to the fore in the place of categorizations. It is thus safe to assert that in the example provided by ALTHANS (2008), and this is true for countless other pedagogical scenes and situations, theory is virtually brought to the stage. If the theorem of “egalitarian difference” had not previously existed, it could have been established from the analysis of the social development evident in the available empirical material. The practical pedagogical action is thus in a certain sense an implicit construction of theory. The knowledge thus determined is not a cognitive knowledge, as this would have required a verbalization of the experience and a classification of the same in scientific discourses. Nevertheless, the social educator himself, the teenagers, and the little boy, mediated by the pedagogical tact of the social educator and by their own particular sensitivity for an educational situation, probably acquired knowledge. Pedagogical tact thus allows an actor to check the plausibility of theoretical contexts in concrete application situations. It can be assumed that the social educator (probably most of all) is also capable of a verbalization of what he experienced. ALTHANS (2007) points out that pedagogical tact can also be defined as a mode of performative theory construction and as a so-called “theoretical sensitivity,” although, according to Barney G. GLASER (1978), it cannot be articulated, let alone measured. The transformation of scientific theory into pedagogical practice and vice versa can, as shown by ATHANS’ study, be determined by pedagogical tact as an implicit and physically-mediated capacity for empathy and judgement.

The study of ALTHANS also shows that implicit theory construction, processed as pedagogical tact, can be exposed by a scientific-empirical analysis of the actions of pedagogues and the effects of these actions. It is principally conceivable that this is also applicable for other technical, didactic, pedagogical, and situation-specific operational aspects of pedagogical professionalism. This hypothesis forms the foundation of the further considerations.

Theoretical knowledge can thus, within the meaning of an embodied and implicit knowledge, be brought to the stage by pedagogical tact. However, this is not to say that all consequences of this staging can be foreseen: unintended group dynamics may result, conflicts of interest may come into effect, or learning objectives may prove difficult to access. In short, the knowledge performed within pedagogical circumstances includes diverse uncertainties, which all actors will face and can deal with, for example through the use of pedagogical tact. Pedagogical tact is therefore not only
necessary for fitting educational or didactic intentions into specific situations, but also for subsequently verifying their performative effects.

These effects can be different for educators, students, school and teaching cultures, as well as for teaching research and teacher education. In order to examine the transformation of pedagogical theory into pedagogical practice from the viewpoint of pedagogical tact, the following questions arise (among others):

**With respect to the teacher:**

*What* does a teacher use for orientation in a situation where s/he must make certain methodological, pedagogical, and technical decisions?

*Which* considerations, emotions, and explicit or implicit control systems does s/he allow to guide him/her?

*What* does each conscious basis for decision consist of (self-conception, situation analysis, the anticipation of possible incidents), and *how* does it change situationally under the influence of pedagogical tact?

Does the teacher modify his/her decisions in consequence of these conscious reflections, and if so, *how*?

**With respect to the students:**

*How* do they constitute their being students?

*How* do they perceive a particular teaching or scientific research situation?

*How* do they deal with such situations?

*How* do they articulate themselves in the context of *which* motivational, socio-cultural, socio-economical, and other heterogeneous\(^\text{14}\) starting points for learning?

*Which* gender or age-related aspects or other non-teaching factors contribute to an instructional learning situation?

*Which* learning cultures can be identified?

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\(^{14}\) Heterogeneous starting points for learning become especially obvious under the normative stipulation that learning opportunities are motivating if they manage to connect to the different learning starting points of students, and contribute to the social integration of each individual. Scientifically seen, the consideration of the heterogeneity of the students is currently predominantly determined using well-defined values such as educational standards, psychometrically-oriented learning diagnoses, or also the normative pedagogical models e.g. for tolerance (see above, or inter-, multi-, transcultural pedagogy and gender-sensitive pedagogy). However, the latent pedagogical effects are thereby quickly removed from the perspective (KRAUS 2011).
Under what conditions do students extend their repertoire of practices, knowledge forms, and formats?

**With respect to school and teaching culture:**

*Which* working conditions (spatial situations, predetermined time frames, possibilities of social networking, rituals, and rules) and which substantive facilities (furniture, etc.) are available to the teacher and the student respectively?  
*Which* possibilities and limits are associated with these?  
*Which* practices are supported or dictated by a school or teaching culture? Which are not?  
With respect to teaching research:  
*Which* scientific methods are used to address and reflect unpredictable or disregarded aspects of research?  
Do analogies to the professional practice of the teacher play a role in the reflection of these gaps? If so, which ones?  
*Which* scientific results can be used to address and reflect what is situationally unpredictable?  

**With respect to teacher education:**

*How* can the general situational orientation of a teacher, when making a teaching methodological (technical) or pedagogical decision, be determined and trained?  
*How* can the feelings, considerations, and explicit or implicit control systems, which guide him/her in this, be trained and made professional?  
*How* can a necessary basis for professional pedagogical decisions (self-conception, situation analysis, the anticipation of possible events) and their situational changes be analyzed and their processing be evaluated?

These questions outline extensive issues that not only signify the theory-practice gap, but which can also be employed for a performativity-informed research on practices and on teacher education. In the following, these topics are examined with respect to a more precise definition of the challenges for teachers and teacher education. Whenever pedagogical practices are involved in this process, the hypothesis of inherent “theoretical sensitivity,” (GLASER 1978) in its sense of pedagogical tact, is always implied. Starting from a general outline of the idea of pedagogy in the classroom, in the following, the participation of the students in their own education is described as essential for its
success. Of interest here is the question of how teaching responds to the indispensable participation of students in their own education.

**Pedagogical Coordination and Convincing**

In answer to the author’s question of what determines pedagogical action in the classroom, the deputy head of a community school in Berlin responded: “*I am firmly convinced that the countenance and posture of the educator is the decisive factor. Am I on eye level with the students, do I act openly and directly with everyone? Am I able to resolve conflicts so that everyone (including myself) can leave the situation with dignity? Am I able to look at uneasy feelings, or even injuries that I have suffered, from a professional perspective, meaning: am I able to not take them personally and to face the student once again without reservation after a clarification? Am I willing to look at the people again and again from a new perspective and to revise my assessment of that person? Can I reflect myself, assess my behavior critically, and bring about change? Am I able to change the objectives and the approach of my teaching for the sake of an enhanced learning experience? Am I furthermore able to overthrow the planned schedule and improvise, if necessary? Am I able to inspire other people to inspire, invite, and encourage? Do I hand the responsibility for learning over to the children and teenagers? Am I willing to provide anyone who wants to learn with the necessary conditions, by reacting to and ending the disruptions of others, by entering into conflicts and setting limits? Am I self-confident, flexible, people-friendly, self-reflective, courageous, and honest?*

The teacher interviewed about her pedagogical actions in the classroom defines these primarily through “conviction” and “countenance and posture.” Aside from her desire to be “self-confident, flexible, people-friendly, self-reflective, courageous, and honest,” the teacher only poses questions to herself. The essential theme of this (self-) questioning is aimed at the willingness of a teacher to accept responsibility for an educational relationship, and at the development and maintenance of her/his “countenance and posture,” which should both be fundamentally determined by communication “at eye level.” The idea of an “eye level” contrasts with the fact that, in this quote, only the teacher is specifically committed to working out solutions in case of conflicts, which results in a (re-) establishment of the dignity of those involved in the conflict. In this context, it is expected of the teacher that s/he does not take insults personally, that s/he always makes an effort to revise his/her judgements about students, and that s/he is open to self-criticism. According to the teacher, orientation towards learning progress and an encouragement of the appropriate student engagement stand in the foreground of her pedagogical actions in class. The willingness and the desire to transfer decision-making power and “responsibility” to the students is connected with the
pre-condition that the teacher courageously tackles conflicts that arise from disruptions in class, and that she defines limits.

The pedagogical actions and judgements of the teacher primarily imply an orientation towards a broad spectrum of development tasks related to the students, which can be conflicting. The main interest of the teacher’s pedagogical actions in the classroom is to deal appropriately with (development-related) disruptions of a lesson by the students while not offending the participating parties. In the class, the teaching person is, however, also constantly faced with the challenge of making the subject content adaptable, in a multitude of ways, to the diverse learning situations in a student group. S/he coordinates overlapping activity patterns in a learning group with one another, organizing them towards a common goal, i.e. the desired learning effect. Such professional practices require a familiarity with and at the same time a perception of diverse interactive processes, as well as of learning, teaching, and disrupting actions. The knowledge of personal dispositions as well as of student patterns of interpretation and motivation are of central importance. Expressed in scientific literature, the claim of each individual student to support usually should be met in the classroom by individualized learning settings. This subject-oriented didactics, which, in Germany, is the central aim of classroom teaching, follows the principle of so-called “internal differentiation,” which must be constantly developed, updated, and tested in practice. With the help of didactic material based on learning diagnostics, an adaptive lesson planning as well as lesson setting are devised, in which specific learning steps and experiences can be made. However, classes are an effort that is not solely determined by the pedagogue. The pedagogical role of the teacher in the classroom can also be described with the concept of the “dignity of the practice.”15 Teaching that is not addressed to the students and coordinated with them is principally unthinkable. Two social groups, the people pursuing pedagogical intentions and those allowing themselves to be educated, are always actively involved in the educational process. Being educated is never purely passive, it must be permitted: this fundamentally conflictual nature of education was also raised by the interviewed teacher. It is a necessary condition for the existence of education that the teacher coordinates his/her acting with the readiness of the students to be educated. Education is thus not simply given because of a pedagogical situation. A practice and reality rather only obtains its pedagogical character through being accepted and appropriated; it does not possess this of itself. In school, this appropriation is performed by the student (by some earlier, by others later, and sometimes not at all) and in the best, rather rare, case permanently. Pedagogy and education is thus inextricably bound to the people involved. At the same time, it is linked to the “educational

15 According to Friedrich SCHLEIERMACHER, the actual solution of practical problems can only be provided in practice itself, and thus requires a self-dependent effort. “The dignity of practice is independent of the theory; the practice merely becomes a more conscious one through the theory” (SCHLEIERMACHER 1966, p.11).
significance” (HEID 1994) of human, social, ecological, and cultural phenomena. Educators have the task of highlighting such significance and making it transparent for the students. The contribution of those being educated to their own education must thus never be underestimated. Education must be understood by the students and plausibly adjusted to the educational conditions by the pedagogue.

To even be considered as education, educationally intended action must be convincing in at least some aspects. Such convincing is situational and, in a certain sense, has discursive character. In the asymmetric pedagogical relationship, the pedagogical objectives, methods, and intentions must repeatedly be determined according to the age of the children or teenagers and various other factors. There is no recipe for success in pedagogy. The diversity of child, adolescent, and adult-educational, e.g. pedagogical-professional, practices corresponds to various interpretations of and responses to pedagogical intentions. This means that a practice, which in one context is perceived as stimulating by a certain learning group or person, is possibly perceived very differently by others in a different context. Even if it is rather clearly defined itself, there is no ideal way to reach educational significance. Educational significance may moreover result from very different theoretical and practical angles of arrival. It is the teacher’s task to recognize the perspectives from which pedagogical sense originates, and to demonstrate and elaborate these for the student. Parallel to educational measures, pedagogues must stimulate the most convincing and also correct way of dealing with themselves, with others, and with the subject of reflection. This takes place in a multimodal manner, i.e. as verbal demands, as moderation, as support, as a reliable presence, as the production of learning situations. If a teacher is to ensure that educational pedagogical measures are observed and achieved, s/he must also be concerned with convincing those being educated of the fact that the right attitude in dealing with others, with oneself, and with the world is linked to education and learning and must be trained and learned. The goal of pedagogy is self-education and, at best, this is life-long learning. The central educational and learning objective of pedagogy thus consists of the fact that its addressees assume (self-) education as a “reality view” (HEID 1995, p.59, see above) and thereby must actively deal, in a never-ending process, with education, learning, and training in their broader sense as well as in the concrete environment. In educational terms, teachers therefore primarily have the task of presenting as convincingly as possible their pedagogical “view of reality” in a structured and didactically reduced manner to the students (and possibly to their parents or to colleagues). They must at the very least be ready to enter into a debate with them. Demonstrating one’s own perspective on education is a matter of experience and maturity, discussing it takes place gradually. Pedagogical convincing must address those being educated not only in a rational, but rather in a multimodal manner. Helmut HEID (2013, p.254) describes educational persuasion and coordination efforts as follows: “Adolescents do not have to
learn to respect norms or values, they can instead learn to respect concrete people and to critically and competently participate in discourses, in which the relevance and quality of intersubjectively testable arguments is disputed, which are indispensable for the competent assessment and responsible design of interpersonal social conditions.” A pedagogical relationship recognized by the people involved is thus of central importance for education. In a sense, education is a contract. In this mode of social bond, diverse forms and formats of knowledge stand in the foreground of all situations, in particular of situational challenges to the personality development of the students.

Even if it is assumed here that learning ultimately takes place spontaneously, the assertion of control in this context is an important task of pedagogy. The students cannot simply be left alone with the responsibility for their own learning. Education moreover consists of guiding learning for the purposes of initiating a pedagogically desired self-education—even if this does ultimately run its own course.

However, the academic study of pedagogy often overlooks the fundamental dependence of practical pedagogy on acceptance and adoption by its addressees. In the discourse on quality, educational convincing and coordinating activities have been reduced to an explicit consent or affirmation. The dependence on the social bond, which must always be established and tested anew in pedagogical efforts, is frequently ignored. One reason for this may be that concepts and models of teaching are still mostly based on the abstraction of the *students*; (Cf. HACKL 2008b) *students and learners* appear far too often as synonyms. It is commonly forgotten that “student” is a social role, whereas learning must always be mutually inscribed on the bodies of those doing it. Learning can be described as successfully managing challenges, and this is always put at stake.

Teaching in practice is, to a great extent, the result of a preliminary as well as process-accompanying didactic analysis of teaching content, and not an actual consideration of every individual within a learning group. However, the contradiction between the orientation to the needs of individuals, on the one hand, and the ideal of a “normal” student on the other is, however, ever-present in the classroom and is also continuously treated thematically. Last but not least the students themselves repeatedly return to this contradiction, demonstrating that they are not convinced that they personally or as a group are the subject of teaching. Pedagogical activities in the classroom thus always maintain a fundamentally precarious status. The pedagogical coordination and convincing cannot help but play for time (*you will understand eventually...*) and refrain from the immediate pursuit of its objectives. Educators thus offer a social bond fundamentally willing to wait for the fulfilment of its pre-conditions. Pedagogical convincing is principally incomplete as long as it must be expected that an actor does not or cannot fully assume responsibility for his/her own actions and learning, i.e. his/her self-education.
The contradiction between the idea of orientation towards individual learners on the one hand and the ideal of a “normal” student on the other hand are apparent in other opposing factors, such as standardization and subject-orientation. These are also merely normative approximate values that can hardly ever be attained. Certainly both norms are never fulfilled at once. An antinomian relation in pedagogy should in no case be resolved theoretically for one side or the other. This becomes evident in Winfried BÖHM’s critical comment (2010) on Maria MONTESSORI’s concept of normalization. He points out that MONTESSORI (paradoxically) places her so-called “preparatory environment,” which, in the sense of progressive education, is “oriented to the (individual) child,” in the service of repressive social systems or physical, psychological, social, and political hygiene. This is only possible, argues BÖHM (2010), because the two orientations, to the individual child and to normativity, are not recognized as field of tension in MONTESSORI’s approach.

The descriptive and informative value of opposing factors, in this case standardization and subject orientation, is rather low in terms of specific lessons. Instead they, in their ideal character, only form discourses and standards; and they mark central areas of conflict for pedagogy. Even if they continuously serve as central references for pedagogical theories, they cannot describe any educational reality alone. They are mere ideals, hardly suitable for establishing an educational reality or significance. The situation is similar for other definitions of pedagogy based on pedagogical objectives, such as learning, inclusion, education, or skills development. The next chapter deals with the traditional tendency to equate pedagogy with its objectives. It will be further described in terms of the concepts of Bildung and didactics. It is supported by some of the fundamental characteristics of learning.

**Equate Pedagogy with its Objectives, Educational Practices, and the Pedagogical Concept of Learning**

Pedagogy has become an academic discipline in the past hundred years. That is to say, it is seen as an enterprise to systematize efforts to build and organize knowledge in such a form that its explanations and predictions can be proven. However, equating pedagogy with its objectives, and thus to its pronounced normativity, has nevertheless been fundamentally contested and revised. Still, there is a strong tendency in scientific as well as in practical pedagogy not to refer to the things one can prove, but to ideals only. The purely theoretical template of pedagogical acceptability then stands in the foreground and everything that pedagogy should provide is derived from that. However, the equation of pedagogy with its objectives is not at all a necessity, although it can be justified historically.
This justification will be examined in detail in the following. Here, two central concepts for a more detailed definition of school pedagogy are considered. The first examines the concept of didactics, raised by Wolfgang RATKE and John Amos COMENIUS in the 17th century. The second is the concept of Bildung (“education”), which is primarily associated with Wilhelm von HUMBOLDT in the 18th century. Both concepts are influenced by Christian thought and its dualism of body and mind, and thus also of philosophical and political-practical orientation. Through this dualism, which is widely interpreted as a mastery or control of the body through the mind, thought, and ideas, it is not only possible to understand the pronounced normativity of the two concepts, but also the existing risk of their (e.g. political) exploitation, ideologization, and extrapolation. The deprivation of thoughts from bodies can explain the strong normative signature of theoretical pedagogy.

However, neither Bildung nor “didactics” present the center of practiced pedagogy, since pedagogy consists of practices that (more or less) convince in terms of the need to self-educate. Hannah ARENDT 1959, p.163) describes human action in general as “[…] falling into an already existing web” that one did not make oneself. Although action is initiated by the individual, it refers to others and to a social structure where it finds its justification and continuation, and also determines its mode of operation. Action is therefore always adjusted intersubjectively and thus tied to a socially mediated attitude. Every action has its place in a social as well as a material context. Georg BREIDENSTEIN (2008, p.206, [emphasis by author]) writes about the research on educational practices in a similar sense: “With the accentuation of practices, the view is detached from the actors. It is thus not about the question of who performs which practice, but conversely a question of who or what is involved in a specific practice. Human bodies as well as artifacts are construed as ‘participants’ of practices. […] A practice consists of certain ‘routinized movements and activities of bodies.’”

By elaborating an action-theoretical foundation on the basis of a performativity-theoretical approach, it is expected that research on educational practices can provide further insight into the specific implementations of diverse and multimodal pedagogical coordination and convincing processes. This is the program of this book. In this program it is presupposed that practices in pedagogical fields are the central theme of the educational sciences.

However, by far not all practices present in the pedagogical fields are also pedagogically desirable. Even the opposite is the case. By themselves, many practices in the classroom are open to interpretation and not necessarily educationally connoted. Nevertheless, there is a tendency to interpret all possible practices in pedagogical contexts from the perspective of pedagogy. Thus, for instance, every action of the teacher in front of a class, e.g. the opening of a window, can be interpreted as potentially normative. It can thus be valued as educational, but also as unpedagogical, irritating, or annoying. The actions of the students are also assessed from this perspective. Whether
a practice ultimately unfolds pedagogically desirable potentials or not, cannot be determined abstractly. It is moreover always centrally dependent on its interpretation by the actors involved. The opposite of the objectives of pedagogy (upbringing, education, etc.) can thus always be found in the complex and contradictory nature of pedagogical actions and judgements. This fact should not be overshadowed by prejudices about a pedagogy that has been reduced to its objectives.

For the learner, one can say the following: in order to want to know and to learn something, one must realize that one does not know it (yet). However, what one intends in anticipated learning processes is often met by reluctance in practice. The learning process is at times faced with internal resistances. According to Klaus HOLZKAMP (1995), such resistance demonstrates a self-reference specific and even characteristic of learning. Bernd HACKL (2009, p.79 [emphasis by author]) further determines this self-reference as follows: “Every instance of learning, as long as it is not established as a smooth and thus unnoticed secondary effect of continuous action, starts with the emergence of resistances that cannot be overcome by merely continuing to act as usual, and thus bring the option of an active self-transformation into play. Experiencing a discrepancy between the currently available and potentially attainable skills constitutes a subjective learning problem and forms the first and indispensable condition of every intentionally completed learning process. It does not rely on purely factual information on given skill deficits and possible ways for change, but adjusts, because of and through the fact that the concrete consternation of the actor becomes apparent in it.” A learner, according to Jean LAVE (1998) and Martin WEINGARDT (2004), principally cannot know what s/he will eventually know when s/he has attained a certain learning objective. This is an indisputable fact. Ignorance as the indispensable basis for learning can become explicit, and may manifest in disappointment, in perceived unwillingness, in errors, in a poor performance, in the experience of rejection by others. In a certain respect, the learner then existentially reflects upon him-/herself. Learning also sometimes does not take place. This is connected to diverse experiences of lack, such as a lack of resonance or even deprivation, personal deficiencies, frustration, failure, or negative attributions.

Dietrich BENNER & Andrea ENGLISH (2005) refer to a “negativity of Bildung” and link Bildung in general to diverse experiences of negativity. (Cf. BENNER 2005) In their opinion, a realization and processing of such negativity is performed marginally through awareness and cognition. The central mode of dealing with negative experiences of learning is forgetting them (BENNER 2005, p.13). Negativity in learning and education is discussed in more detail below.

To sum up, practices in pedagogical contexts are not per se related to upbringing, educating, and learning. Practices in this field moreover only emerge as pedagogically relevant or effective. Diverse practices may be recognized as pedagogical and convince in terms of their (pedagogical)
objectives. However, in acting with pedagogical intentions it is presupposed (although this cannot be easily obtained) that the addressees want to overcome their own lack of knowledge and learn. It is thus not right if one interprets pedagogical convincing as mere motivation. It cannot be stated that pedagogically desirable education, learning, or educational processes take place in situations purely externally described to be pedagogical ones. Practices in the pedagogical fields can only be grasped and understood in this sense if pedagogical intentions are recognized and prioritized by the stakeholders and addressees involved in them, and if they are complied with. As already pointed out, a pedagogical situation is produced by all its participants together. Its dependence on active participation is a unique feature of the pedagogical profession.

In the face of this complexity, it becomes evident that the diverse realities of pedagogy can hardly be represented by the linearity and coherence of theoretical knowledge. As stated above, a uniform and valid theory of what is pedagogically effective cannot exist. Only the conditions of pedagogical action and its particular dynamics and empiricism can be theoretically sketched. In this regard, the dualism between theory and practice plays a central role. It marks the constitutive deficiency of pedagogy. From the perspective of research on practices, it constitutes the area of conflict between the semantic-symbolic and the challenges of the practical field.

As has already become clear at various points, pedagogy still consists of many areas of conflict, reflected in more or less ideologically composed concepts, that are (or must be) resolved or bypassed in practice. In the following, central characteristics of pedagogical acting and pedagogical knowledge will be unfolded.

**Fields of Tension within Pedagogy**

It already been pointed out above that the areas of conflict formed by homogenization, normalization, and subject-orientation can neither be resolved theoretically nor overcome practically. The same applies to other pedagogical areas of conflict.

For example, the focus of a child or teenager on the here and now contrasts with a view towards their future, just as the orientation towards their already developed individual skills, interests, idiosyncrasies, and dispositions can conflict with their development potential. At the same time, diverse forms of heteronomy must also be weighed against the options of self or co-determination in pedagogical situations. The practical utility of school content and individual learning or personal development form a contradiction that is again and again bridged in diverse forms; the same applies to freedom and commitment in a pedagogical relationship. Contradictions that are visible in practices and that inevitably characterize a pedagogical relationship also include the evaluation of a demanded work and/or the allowance of errors. Different attitudes can be required: one of releasing
and/or of worrying, one of criticism and/or of indulgence, one of laissez-faire and/or protecting. A particularly significant source of conflict lies in the fact that a learning group usually differs from the educator in terms of age. (HELSPER 1996 and HELSPER 2001b). Some pedagogical areas of conflict can also be traced back to interpersonal differences: students may differ from each other in terms of their genders or their social identities, or in terms of their socio-economic and ethnic backgrounds. In addition, there may be differences in their skill profiles and their respective (moral, ethical, physical, mental) levels of development. They also differ in terms of their motivation and interests, and in terms of their possibilities as well as their willingness to engage in social undertakings, especially in school affairs. In school pedagogy, the interpersonal and/or intercultural differences show their effects in the initial conditions of teaching and learning, but also in ways of learning and in educational and learning objectives.

Pedagogical consideration of difference is usually not determined by explicit decisions. Often, ways of overcoming the pedagogical challenges connected to difference are instead implicitly dealt with: culturally and socially, inter and even intra-subjectively, formally and informally, and at times even in a contradictory manner. In other cases they are negotiated. Differences in dealing with questions of gender, native language, age, etc. can be decisive in pedagogical processes, yet there are also often gray areas beyond explicit differences that escape the interpretation of difference events. An example of this could be a conflict that seems, at first, to be defined by ethnic imprints, but is then traced back to socially shared feelings. Both explanations can only be explored in situ. If they are recognized or made visible by the actors, they can be analyzed by a study of educational practices.

The theoretical basis of professional knowledge about its own practice is thus partially defined by the knowledge of and personal conduct in the face of interpersonal difference events. This includes, for example, knowledge about ways of handling conflicts of values and differences of opinion, as well as a knowledge of habitus, access to learning, and different contexts for interpretation.

Interpersonal differences and difference events are also explored in scientific disciplines such as cultural studies, anthropology, sociology, medicine, etc. These disciplines are thus essential reference disciplines of the educational sciences; in particular of school pedagogy (classroom education, curriculum studies) and research on professionalization. However, an act of translation into these research contexts must occur, as the significance and effects of difference in pedagogical contexts cannot be ascertained from a distance, as in the other sciences. Not only the balancing, coordination, and negotiation of pedagogical conflicts by the teacher plays a crucial role for the

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16 In the French film The Class (original title: Entre les murs, eng. “between the walls”) by Laurent Cantet (2008), such negotiation processes are illustrated.
accomplishment of pedagogical objectives, but also the (mostly invisible) interpretation of such efforts by the students. It may even occur that the contradictions characterizing pedagogy are perceived so strongly by the students, or in rare cases by the teachers, that teaching is rendered impossible (KRAUS 2010).

This is also made more difficult by the fact that no single theory can conclusively deal with the contradictions of pedagogy, as these contradictions are not resolvable for purely logical reasons. WINKEL (1988, p.17) writes about the pedagogical area of conflict regarding external and self-determination: “The fact that one must experience limits, boundaries, and barriers just as much as self-determination, freedom, and autonomy can only be accepted by those teachers and educators who sustain these contradictions—for the impatient, breathless, and the purists, this antinomy is an abomination.”

If school practice can thus most adequately be reflected through the educational sciences that capture social realities in the sense of conflicts and various inconsistencies, then Krassimir STOJANOV (2004, p.80) is right in demanding that one must semantically distinguish between the terms antinomy,17 paradox, and dilemma even more accurately than has been the case thus far in specialized pedagogical texts. He writes: “This conceptual deficit relates to [...] the lack of a normative differentiation between different types of paradoxes or contradictions: i.e. between those which would be regarded as blockades for pedagogical action and education processes as a whole and which would therefore have to be rescinded, and such that may contain dialectical development potentials and which should therefore [...] be endured [emphasis by author].” Certain contradictions, antinomies, and areas of conflict are inevitable in pedagogy, others are unnecessary, irrelevant, or far from pedagogical practices. There is an urgent need to further differentiate these concepts, so that pedagogical practices and forms of knowledge can be determined with greater detail.

_The Plurivalent Normativity of Pedagogy_

On the one hand, pedagogical action is bound to a situation and to its actors. On the other hand, an orientation towards overarching norms constitutes an indispensable background for pedagogical action.

In principle, the normative framings (which are partially inexplicit for the teacher) of school pedagogical action can be expanded as follows:

17 “Antinomy”, Greek ἀντίνομος: against, νόμος: law; literally “incompatibility of laws.”
1. A teacher’s interpretation of a situation is (without further reflection) influenced by his/her individual disposition, experiences, ideas, and the ethical and moral principles which s/he advocates, as well as his/her spontaneous orientation values.

2. Just like their development perspectives, the dispositions of the students, their practices, beliefs, and attitudes represent normative stipulations for school lessons. Responding to these, or not doing so, stands at the center of the professional activity of teachers.

3. Colleagues, parents, school administration or supervision, etc. are authorized to assess the lessons of a teacher in different ways. Their education, upbringing, learning, and socialization concepts may, under certain circumstances, result in strong conflicts between one another. Such conflicts can usually be settled in social situations. They can also be suppressed, or appear as subliminal or even internal conflicts, such as moral dilemmas or conflicts of loyalty.

4. What is considered “school knowledge” is determined by curricular textbooks, testing apparatus, and academic disciplines in terms of specialized subjects. Curricular and other regulatory documents also determine how (individual) learning can access class topics. The reflection of such regulations must, in consultation with diverse knowledge formats, to be made possible in the classroom.

5. Formal working conditions represent normative framings. Work contracts, decrees, regulations and salaries, the organization and culture of a school, measures for assessment, and local stipulations come to mind.

6. Various social, discursively produced, or digitally mediated models of orientation contribute to the professional action of teachers. For example, certain interpretation patterns for behavior are socially or culturally conditioned. Such specifications, which become especially relevant in an immigration society that considers itself to be inclusive, often contradict each other: they must be constructively handled in the classroom.

7. Scientific results and approaches provide orientation in the classroom. For example, the analysis of the subject matter to be taught and the resulting learning steps, as well as didactic considerations and learning assessments, must uphold under the light of scientific correctness.

8. Everyday school life is increasingly determined by evaluations outside of the lessons, which, under certain circumstances, may determine the reputation and possibly even the existence of a school. (Cf. the “No Child Left Behind Act”, see above). A concept for the evaluation of school teaching that is oriented towards pedagogical and didactic considerations and is bound to a concept of quality based on pedagogical argumentation is still a goal of the educational sciences.\footnote{Juliane Lamprecht (2012) delivered remarkable achievements in this regard.}
9. The action knowledge of teachers is forever being challenged to orient itself towards the current democratic legal system and our fundamental rights, which require interpretation in a society that encompasses a plurality of values, standards, and cultures. In this respect, an independent and practical interpretation effort is constantly demanded from the qualified teacher.

In a society with a plurality of values, standards and cultures, the conscious and unconscious decisions of an individual also stem from his or her social context. Ultimately, teachers fend for themselves in the face of expectations strongly based on external standards. Strictly speaking, a teacher or a student who simply subordinates his/her own views to the various norms can avoid confrontation with the many-voiced normativity to which s/he is constantly exposed. Coping with the many-voiced nature of pedagogical norms is part of pedagogical professionalism. Just like students cannot be left alone with their own learning, students and parents cannot be expected to assess the complexity of norms ruling pedagogical decisions of all kinds. They likely cannot adequately respond to its multivalent nature, since they may not encounter it in their daily lives. It is the task of the teacher to bring such standards and interpretations into discussion. Information about them will hardly ever be comprehensive. Students and parents therefore cannot be “customers” or “purchasers” of education (as a product), nor can education be considered a service as it usually is according to the current concept of quality defined by the ideology of New Public Management. However, to a large extent, pedagogical efforts rely on the fact that teachers enable their students to perceive contexts characterized by plurivalent normativity, and to criticize it. Educated subjects are characterized by the fact that they can assess their own and others’ interests, objectives, and practices based on fundamental ethical principles, knowledge, and insights, as well as the social and cultural norms and provisions of the situation. The pedagogically guided acquisition of education and educational knowledge provides the frame for such decisions and judgements. However, the norms of action for teaching situations often remain implicit and are negotiated subliminally. The special dignity of pedagogical practice is to be found in the situationally adequate handling of a normativity that is (co-)determined by various actors and instances, multi-faceted, mutable, and marked by uncertainties. The educational convincing and coordination effort is ultimately linked to that. The traditional concept of pedagogical tact has been introduced to grasp the processes of an evaluation of behavior and principles of action in pedagogical contexts as pedagogically adequate. As pointed out on several occasions, pedagogical tact provides the link between pedagogical theory and practice. “Pedagogical sensitivity” is mainly concerned with so-called “tacit,” i.e. subliminal, latent, and hidden dimensions of pedagogical areas of conflict, as well as with their heteromorphic normativity.

**Tacit Dimensions of Pedagogy**
The tacit dimensions of pedagogy are understood as various non-discursive practices and forms of social understanding, as well as resulting pedagogical judgements and actions. Not only pedagogical areas of conflict, but also interpersonal differences are often not recognized and controlled explicitly or according to plan, but rather settled habitually, intuitively, in a “searching” (WALDENFELS 2004b) way. The diversity of learning processes and activities—such as adaptation, model learning, forms of attention, the integration of (previous) experiences, forms of embodiment—are not always regulated, conscious, and explicit. Orientations towards norms, moreover, often remain unconscious and do not become explicit. Furthermore, incorporated, experience-based knowledge, which is interwoven with the body and the senses, can also be expected in learning arrangements, in social interactions and their structures, in intermediate spaces (events during breaks, etc.), and in terms of the social relations and constellations as well as within the manifold processes of normalization that take place in pedagogical contexts. Tacit knowledge is constitutive for rituals, games, gestures, and social and cultural activities in education, training, and socialization. Not least, modes of authority and personal integrity often have a latent effect, especially in the classroom. The same applies to unconscious didactic techniques and subjective theories. Physical dispositions, habitus, and hidden methodologies as well as implied interpretations can be effective in a tacit way. Besides, there are many other tacit dimensions of pedagogy, such as diverse forms of othering or gendering, intercultural perspectives, and hybrid cultural forms and practices. Processes of social inclusion/exclusion, forms of repression, dispositives of power, forms of governmentality, technologies of the self,19 or contrary discourses may all function implicitly. Aesthetic or cultural knowledge may also be tacit. In covert ways, institutional/organizational conditions, symbolic spaces, the architecture, spatial organizations, as well as various kinds of materials and technologies have more or less hidden effects on teaching. Furthermore, socio-economic conditions and factors, as well as informal or formally learned phenomena of social inequality and phenomena on the borders of the virtual, the imaginary, and the real worlds are latent contexts that shape classroom activities. Various concepts of time, such as the influences of the past/history on the present or the anticipation of the future, act on education and schooling in a

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19 By merging the terms governing and mentality into the neologism governmentality, FOUCAULT stresses the interdependence between the exercise of government (practices) and mentalities that underpin these practices. Governmentality describes the control, normalization, and shaping of people’s conduct in order to create governable subjects through various techniques and regulations. Governmentality is composed of the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of a rather specific, yet complex form of power, which is directed primarily at the population, using political economy as the main form of knowledge and security dispositives as essential technical tools. FOUCAULT (2007, p.364f.) writes: “We pass from an art of governing whose principles were derived from the traditional virtues (wisdom, justice, liberality, respect for divine laws and human customs) or from common skills (prudence, reflected decisions, care in surrounding oneself with the best advisors) to an art of governing that finds the principles of its rationality and the specific domain of its applications in the state.” In the Western world, governmentality has led to the primacy of a type of power that can be described as “government,” above all other sovereignties and disciplines. According to the concept of governmentality, all social and individual life forms are an object of regulation and the network of power and knowledge is refracted in diverse power relations and forms of subjectivation. Here, authoritarian techniques are linked to “techniques of the self,” i.e. self-constitution, self-control, self-guidance, and self-management (see Fimyar 2008).
latent and unrecognized manner. The same applies to social dramas and rituals, as well as to scenes and (life-)styles. Furthermore, various latent events, physical activities (such as the modulation of the voice), visual and sensory-motoric integration events, the constitution and perception of images, meta-action-related and reflexive behavior, modes of a linguistic (re-)structuring of representations, discursive practices, action-related potentials of metaphors, and various other factors play a hidden role in planned events. Besides planned lessons oriented according to established disciplines and the majority culture, silent understandings following other epistemologies and “different”\textsuperscript{20} models of interpretation are at work in the classroom.

In concepts such as the “hidden curriculum” (JACKSON 1968), in which the interaction and relation of intended as well as unintended actions in the classroom is taken into account, or in the concept of the so-called “backstage of teaching” (ZINNECKER 1978), the importance of implicit factors for the success of teaching has been recognized and theoretically examined. In his formulation of “athematic factors of teaching,” HACKL (2008b) refers to those aspects which are not directly linked to the interaction of individuals, such as spatial, temporal, or structural conditions of teaching. Important for these factors are the above-mentioned “different” models of interpretation.

Tacit knowledge is conveyed in social and cultural practices. It allows the staging of effective actions. The term specifically signifies that the knowledge described does not become explicit. Nevertheless, it has effects. Tacit dimensions are very effective in many different ways, and they should be closely examined for their variety and the different ways they can be empirically observed.\textsuperscript{(KRAUS et al. in prep.)}

Teaching and education methods and the objectives of formal education are determined to a large extent by institutions, regulations, and professionals, but they are also dependent on prevailing conditions in specific school contexts. The pedagogical decisions that can be made and the practical knowledge required for these contexts can hardly be explored in a merely cognitive manner.

As already pointed out in connection with the concept of pedagogical tact, the focus here is on a sampling of behavior in terms of its situational adequateness from within. LUHMANN & SCHORR ([1982] 2000) describe this as context-sensitive ability, as sensibility for coincidences and opportunities that starts from problems and situational typing. Classroom education lacks effective technologies and it should develop technology replacement technologies, i.e. a fit of social and intentional rationality that are linked to an operation “on the reacting object”.

\textsuperscript{20} This refers to individual interpretations and/or ethnic, socio-cultural, and pop cultural events such as minority, alternative, or protest cultures.
In the next step, the term “pedagogical context sensitivity” is introduced. This concept points to the notion that pedagogical relations cannot only be determined from the standpoint of pedagogical tact as proximity and distance, care and release, and thus solely from the perspective of pedagogues, but that they must also respect body phenomenologies and the perceptions of the learners. Given the basic willingness to confront pedagogical contradictions, professional practical knowledge in the fields of pedagogy is not applied in a free-floating manner, but rather in dependence on specific temporal, spatial, and personal constellations. It will become evident that an important aspect in this regard is the pressure to act under time constraints.

**Pedagogical Context Sensitivity and Acting under Time Pressure**

Teachers normally operate under action and time pressure (see WAHL 1991 or NEUWEG 2005, 2010). However, these pressures may not be as obvious as they are in other professions.. These pressures often make it impossible for teachers to be aware of all the norms being introduced into the classroom, let alone to satisfy all of them. Time pressure thus hinders them in their professionalism; at the same time, dealing with a certain amount of action and time pressure is part of their job.

Action and time pressure in the classroom is often created by the students. In order to handle difficulties and challenges as they arise, a teacher may have to prioritize differently than s/he is used to. His/her strategies for acting may be questioned and then adjusted. Time-consuming challenges in the classroom are handled very differently by different teachers. The necessity of taking action in the classroom may lead to a situation in which judgement of this action is delayed. In teaching and educational practices that evolve under time pressure, diverse lines of actions and decisions often overlap in a complex, rapid, and not fully reflected or reflectable way. Under such circumstances, teaching activities may only be justified in greatly shortened incarnations. Time pressure often leads to the acceptance of—temporary or permanent—asymmetries in power. Significant phenomena may be overlooked. In the interpretation of development tasks, an ambivalent or otherwise self-contradictory logic of evaluation may also come into play (LAMPRECHT 2012, p.120). At times, exclusions and reductions will be perpetrated. Teachers set priorities, develop “action strategies” or “survival tactics” in ways that may be habitual or quite deliberate (see WULF & ZIRFAS 2007). Their educational success ultimately depends on both the specific teaching events as well as their context. However, all participants of a pedagogical situation must constantly be able to make compromises and/or set their priorities differently than before. This is certainly true for teachers, and it is expected from pupils as well.

A specific mode of temporality plays a role here: a situation may be more or less favorable for pedagogical and instructional measures. Favorable constellations can be considered *kairos*. A *kairos*
(ancient Greek: καιρός) is a correct or optimal moment. In contrast to chronological or sequential time, it signifies the quality of a time lapse, a moment of indeterminate time. As an (unexpected) event, kairos triggers amazement, dismay, or consternation. Something occurs that affects, touches, and occupies those involved (MERSCH 2002 p.13-30). At the same time, the kairos provides options for action. The term is mainly used in rhetoric. Here kairos is understood as “[…] a passing instant when an opening appears which must be driven through with force if success is to be achieved” (WHITE 1987, p.13). Kairoi also include learning opportunities. The knowledge of the dynamics that promote or inhibit learning is just as crucial for successful teaching as pedagogical intentions and multimodal practical knowledge. A kairos requires special perception and context sensitivity, which is more general than pedagogical tact because it also incorporates knowledge of environmental, systemic, and institutional aspects that transcend the immediate teaching field. The ability to perceive and to grasp kairos is not only of value to the professional experience of a teacher, but also an aspect of experiential learning for pupils. In this regard, a teacher has a role model function.

According to the body-phenomenological concept, context sensitivity is deeply rooted in perception. It cannot be consciously produced by the actors, but is perceived, admitted or suppressed, and employed by them in an educationally meaningful manner. Context sensitivity thus concerns experiences that were made passively or “suffered,” as well as actively acquired in a pre-reflective manner. MEYER-DRAWE (2000a, p.14) writes: “In the act itself, to which thought is subsequent, a sense is evoked in response to certain experienced contexts.” This can be further supplemented by Hannah ARENDT (1959, p.163): “The realm of human affairs, strictly speaking, consists of the web of human relationships which exists wherever men live together. The disclosure of the ‘who’ through speech, and the setting of a new beginning through action, always fall into an already existing web where their immediate consequences can be felt. Together they start a new process which eventually emerges as the unique life story of the newcomer, affecting uniquely the life stories of all those with whom he comes into contact. It is because of this already existing web of human relationships, with its innumerable, conflicting wills and intentions, that action almost never achieves its purpose; but it is also because of this medium, in which action alone is real, that it ‘produces’ stories with or without intention as naturally as fabrication produces tangible things. These stories may then be recorded in documents and monuments, they may be visible in use

21 In German: “Im Handeln selbst, dem jedes Erkennen nachgängig ist, wird Sinn hervorgerufen als Antwort auf bestimmte erfahrene Kontexte.” A quotation from Hannah Arendt (1959, p.150) helps to understand the term Erkennen, “thought”: “Thought and cognition are not the same. Thought, the source of art works, is manifest without transformation or transfiguration in all great philosophy, whereas the chief manifestation of the cognitive processes, by which we acquire and store up knowledge, is the sciences. Cognition always pursues a definite aim, which can be set by practical considerations as well as by ‘idle curiosity’; but once this aim is reached, the cognitive process has come to an end. Thought, on the contrary, has neither an end nor an aim outside itself, and it does not even produce results.”
objects or art works, they may be told and retold and worked into all kinds of material.”

People are not thrown into the world without anything, but are borne by humans into an already existing human world. The reference fabric of human affairs thus precedes all individual actions, so that the unveiling of the newcomer in speech or action are like threads beaten into a pre-woven pattern to consequently modify the fabric. In the same way, each newcomer affects the threads of life with which they come into contact within the fabric. Once the threads have been spun to a preliminary end, they represent an identifiable pattern, or can be recounted as a life story. ARENDT (ibid., p.162) further points out that personal uniqueness also comes into play in action. She writes: “Action and speech occur between people, as they are directed toward them, and they retain their agent-revealing capacity even if their content is exclusively ‘objective.’”

Jürgen FUNKE-WIENEKE (2004, p.197) maintains that a pedagogically relevant mode of communication can be interpreted as the instrumental, social, sensitive, and symbolic functions of the body’s own movement. This includes forms of mimic-gestural communication, attentiveness, responsiveness, the intuitive reconciliation of one’s own initiatives with those of others, empathy for the work tempos or scruples of others, and consideration of their sense of shame. A shared sense of humor can also be at stake. In short, this communication involves awareness of oneself and others in the sense of manifold possible relations to oneself, to others, and to the world. The modes in which this takes place in the classroom can include different narrative forms; the savvy use of teaching and learning materials; the adept use of space and time; the comprehensible demonstration of working steps; specific figures of argumentation; non-verbal problem-solving behavior; or the assumption of fictitious roles. All of these qualities enable interpersonal understanding and in particular the understanding of learning content and situations in the first place. An anticipation of the possible outcomes of social conflicts is, according to FUNKE-WIENEKE (2004), only possible through the so-called “social functions of physicality.”

As an interaction between influences on and the susceptibility to others and other things, resonance forms the basis for education and learning processes (SCHMID-MILLARD 2005), while

22 In German: “Der Bereich, in dem die menschlichen Angelegenheiten vor sich gehen, besteht in einem Bezugssystem, das sich überall bildet, wo Menschen zusammenleben. Da Menschen nicht von ungefähr in die Welt geworfen werden, sondern von Menschen in eine schon bestehende Menschenvelt geboren werden, geht das Bezugsgewebe menschlicher Angelegenheiten allem einzelnen Handeln und Sprechen voraus, so dass sowohl die Enthüllung des Neuankömmlings durch das Sprechen wie der Neuanfang, den das Handeln setzt, wie Fäden sind, die in ein bereits vorgewebtes Muster geschlagen werden und das Gewebe so verändern, wie sie ihrerseits alle Lebensfäden, mit denen sie innerhalb des Gewebes in Berührung kommen, auf einmalige Weise affizieren. Sind die Fäden erst zu Ende gesponnen, so ergeben sie wieder klar erkennbare Muster bzw. sind als Lebensgeschichte [Hervorh. i.O.] erzählbar. Weil dieses Bezugsgewebe mit den zahllosen, einander widerstreitenden Absichten und Zwecken, die in ihm zur Geltung kommen, immer schon da war, bevor das Handeln überhaupt zum Zuge kommt, kann der Handelnde so gut wie niemals die Ziele, die ihm ursprünglich vorschwebten, in Reinheit verwirklichen.”

23 This metaphor is used only in the German version of ARENDT’s book.

24 In German: „Handeln und Sprechen bewegen sich in einem Bereich, der zwischen Menschen qua Menschen liegt, sie richten sich unmittelbar an die Mitwelt, in der sie die jeweils HandelnDen und Sprechenden auch dann zum Vorschein und ins Spiel bringen, wenn ihr eigentlicher Inhalt ganz und gar ‘objektiv’ ist.”
inconsistent and incomplete resonance events unfortunately interfere with them. One event will thus interact with the various resonance backgrounds of individuals, from which their actions and judgements will be determined and assessed in greater detail and in diverse ways.

Such grounds for resonance can also be considered as spectrums of experience. These spectrums structure our perceptions in the sense of a back, middle, and foreground of perception and meaning. Resonance events encounter these spectrums and work their way into them by influencing the intellectual, emotional, volitional, and social dispositions humans possess due to their experiences. The experience spectrum of a person is modified by dealing with objects in time and space, as well as by conscious reflection on previous experiences, behaviors, references, and insights. WALDENFELS writes: “The circumstances change [for us] when interests, needs, and emotions come into play and when things are not only of varying importance, but also of increasing and decreasing significance, when they have greater or less weight, when they appeal more or less to us and concern us more or less and are consequently positioned closer to or further away from us. In our experience, the significance of something appears in a relief-like manner, while other things recede. This appearing and receding “[...] belongs to the forms of realization of experience and not to the mere affective states which accompany our cognitions and actions” (WALDENFELS 1998, p.221). Viktor von WEIZSÄCKER (1940, p.230) speaks of the so-called “body-self,” which “[...] as a self-experience leads to the conception of abstract movements.” Spectrums of experience and the body-self do not always appear in the same form, nor are they acquired once and for all. It is, however, not possible to control how they are shaped. Individual experience spectrums can also be more or less receptive to what influences them.

Theories, practices, and phenomena are thus not rationally ordered in our (mostly implicit) self-perception, but they are rather contoured and covered in predispositions, previous experiences, interests, needs, and emotions. Perception is primarily formed informally and implicitly (see DOHMEN 2001, who estimates that implicit learning accounts for 70% of all learning) through practices, theories, and the effects of materiality that a person becomes familiar with and then has at his/her disposal (HERZOG & VON FELTEN 2001, p.18).

According to Karl MANNHEIM (1980), a socially shared spectrum of experience can also be described as a “conjunctive experience space.” Such a space conveys itself to us in a habitual manner, and involves a past and present shared by multiple persons. It can be determined by parameters such as generation, gender, age, or social and cultural origin (BOHNSACK 2003, p.122). New shared experiences can also modify an existing “conjunctive experience space.” A “conjunctive experience space” is thus a corpus of everyday-relevant perceptions, interpretation, and action patterns that are within the meaning of a “common sense” shared with others, and which form the basis for intuitive as well as deliberate decisions. The knowledge that is created in
conjunctive experience spaces remains mostly implicit and is predominantly a-theoretical. It expresses itself in the “what” of social actions and statements. One can also speak of a habitus here (BOHNSACK 2003). Through habitus an individual is integrated into specific experience spaces that are shared with others. Habitus can, metaphorically speaking, harden into familiarity traps. This can be the case when a “conjunctive experience space” or even a socially shared experience spectrum is solidified into rules and rules through institutionalization and/or trauma.

**The Obstinacy of Habitus and Traps of Familiarity**

Pierre BOURDIEU & Loïc WACQUANT (1996, p.154) describe habitus as the capability of producing actions. This is a capability acquired in (social) practices and constantly oriented toward practical functions. Habitus concerns acting bodies. It is acquired implicitly, non-intentionally, and through acting in different contexts, i.e. it is embedded in holistic environmental experiences (DOHMEN 2001, note 52). Habitually learned things are mostly limited to a narrow and concrete sphere of influence, e.g. to direct action in complex environmental requirements. In his early work, BOURDIEU (1990) interprets habitus moreover as the semantic form of symbolic social relations. This means that habitus shares a similar nature with semantics, in that it allows social relations to be established without becoming conscious. Habitus provides the basis for (conservatively) ordered social conditions, and in this respect contributes significantly to social coherence.

The regulation of a performativity that constitutes a habitus is oriented towards “generative formula,” or “modi operandi.” A certain modus operandi is acquired in a mimetic manner (see GEBAUER & WULF 1998) and is oriented to standard execution of specific action. A simple example of a modus operandi is the knotting of a (sailor’s) knot. This process, which follows certain rules, represents a challenge to the dexterity of the amateur and is learned with reference to the model. At the same time, skillful knotting is a specific sequence of movements within a larger context of conduct and action which constitute a habitus. Within such a context, the modus operandi or the individual act or skill obtains a socially and culturally shared, i.e. contingent, sense. The mimetic learning of a modus operandi, unlike learning to tie a knot, usually occurs spontaneously and unconsciously. It can include individual, e.g. interpretative, modifications. In this manner, a habitus also emanates from the structures that it has created itself (BOURDIEU 1990).

Habitus constitutes a person’s integral moments of experience, and thus implicitly determines his/her dealing with him-/herself, with others and with the world, e.g. his/her basic attitudes, needs, physicality, and design of social relations. As culturally determined perception, interpretation and action patterns, habitus remains determined by the circumstances of its first appropriation, even if it
can change over time (BOURDIEU 1990). This means that it remains bound to a certain social field and its culture.

Habitus imposes structures on a social living environment. Such structures are implicitly understood within the context of their environment (HACKL 2008a). An example for such a structure is habitual, and thus predictable, ceremonies. A living environment as such is never entirely transparent for us; it can be made recognizable, reliable, and manageable only in terms of the habitual control structures that (partially) determine it. Benjamin JÖRISSEN (2007) even traces reflexivity back to habitus. In this way, e.g. stereotypes are integral parts of habitus; at the same time they result from habitually shaped reflexive acts (see also ADORNO 1973). From the fact that action is, in any case, only regular, recognizable, and predictable through typification, one could conclude that the regularity and inner consequence of actions and judgements can be attributed to the fact that foreign claims and demands, also of impersonal nature, are incorporated into them. On the other hand, it is also clear that no action, not even scientific thought and work, is free of socially-culturally coded, yet individually determined habitus.

In many ways, habitus is of great relevance for the fulfilment of educational objectives and teaching activities. Teaching and learning objectives are founded in habitual structures. At the same time, the formation of a certain habitus is pedagogically necessary and didactically meaningful for students. This could apply to the modus operandi of learning or to the training of certain reflexive patterns in the ability to judge complex questions. Habitus also contributes to practical and contextual knowledge in the teaching profession. In general, all decisions that claim legitimacy (e.g. ethical questions) presuppose diverse coping skills, which include habitus.

However, habitus can also become stiff and difficult to modify. It can act as a so-called “familiarity trap” in pedagogical contexts, in which context sensitivity is more or less suspended. In relation to the teaching profession, HERZOG & VON FELTEN (2001, p.20) write: “In post-traditional societies there are few professions that children and teenagers can get to know in such depth through mere observation as that of the teacher. During their career as pupils, prospective teachers have acquired perception, interpretation and action patterns that are hard to reveal and not easily influenced.” COMBE & KOLBE (2004, p.846) show that pedagogical and didactical concepts are often generated from the perspective of practice use, without further questioning. Validity is claimed on this basis. Furthermore, the action and time pressure of the teaching profession also plays a certain role: new options are sometimes not perceived when in contrast to well-known (and habitual) “best practice.” A teacher consequently falls into a “familiarity trap.”

25 See also Dan LORTHIE (1975): “Teachers teach as they have been taught. They don’t teach as they have been taught to teach!”
Therefore, teacher education should also be concerned with an “[...] ‘un-learning’ [...] of powerful knowledge, in order to be able to take on the apparatus of value coding in the middle of the structure of knowledge production” (STERNFELD 2014, p.9). Such un-learning can, as Nora STERNFELD (ibid., p.15) points out by referring to FOUCAULT, be described as an “[...] insurrection of subordinate knowledge types.” This also concerns an un-learning of privileges. In addition to intentional and explicit knowledge, the tacit knowledge developed in un-learning something should be highlighted here. Un-learning plays a central role in pedagogical contexts, both in terms of successful pedagogical convincing activities and regarding the associated phenomena of difference and knowledge forms. Un-learning is not least important with respect to the gradual and pedagogically framed transfer of responsibility to students, e.g., in the consideration of ethical issues.

The question of how an implicitly acquired habitus can be changed, and how new knowledge forms can be developed or acquired, is especially of interest in this paper with respect to the professionalization of the teaching profession, and thus with respect to the typifying nature of teachers’ body of knowledge. Habitus and the modes of changing it are generally a central concern of learning theory. Habitus is thus an important topic of teacher education, as well as an important goal of pedagogy.

Social circumstances can be transformed into new ones by bringing (new) interests, needs, and emotions into play, by a modification of meanings and by re-assigning higher or lower significance to certain experiences. In his early work, BOURDIEU does not, however, attribute a formative function to practices, including practices of the self. Kathrin AUDEHM (2008, p.135) points to an ambiguity in the habitus concept of BOURDIEU. While human behavior is bound to the structures of social fields in his early work, habitus is treated as a knowledge instrument of the human body in his later work. The dual idea is proposed that unsuccessful and failed practices challenge inertia, but a change of a habitus can also be triggered by it.26 A longer quotation illustrates AUDEHM’s reasoning: “According to Bourdieu, the performative logic of symbolic acts—verbal and physical—is founded in social magic, i.e. in the collective belief of social actors in the power and authority of the speaker, which is based on embodiment. However, this also makes the idea conceivable that acting can produce different practical meanings if actions gradually work on habitual dispositions over a long time. Furthermore, acting needs to be generalizable and so relevant to the collective that it acts on the rules of the games in the existing fields of practice as well as on social structures, so that the possibilities of positioning eventually change. Fields of practice in which physical

26 AUDEHM (2008, p.136) draws on the thesis that the adaptedness of the habit, which anticipates objective conditions, is a special case and habitus is neither necessarily appropriate nor coherent (BOURDIEU 2000).
challenges are directly related to questions of belief—such as beauty and virtuosity, education or performance—are present in the world of sports, theatre and dance, visual arts and photography [...]. These fields should be completed by the more or less subversive decoding practices of social creativity in everyday life or popular culture, up to such discursive articulations that partially suspend or manipulate symbolic differences by intervening in mystifying attributions and imaginary identifications” (AUDEHM 2008, p.137). Besides phenomena of “social magic,” as AUDEHM (2008) calls it, which she further specifies as the collective “belief” of social actors in the spokesperson, she classifies certain topics, namely beauty, virtuosity, education, and performance, as “questions of belief.” In areas such as sports, theatre, art, and everyday culture, physical challenges are associated with such “questions of belief.” This includes social and cultural practices. By evaluating a certain practice, primarily in an implicit manner, for its situational appropriateness, and by associating it with (believed) standards for beauty, virtuosity, education, and performance, it is possible, according to the author, to alter socially preformed habitus. Hardened habitus then becomes fluid. The many implications of this idea for a pedagogical approach to quality development cannot be unfolded here.

Education in school is in fact largely determined by its orientation in regards to virtuosity, creativity, even (pedagogically both more and less desirable) social orientation and the “questions of belief” that are inherent to these orientations. Virtuosity, creativity, and performance play an important role for adolescents. If one follows AUDEHM (2008), then a central task for educators is pointing out “questions of belief” or paradigms associated with virtuosity, creativity, and performance, and putting them at stake, discussing them, skillfully and multimodally, so that habitus can change. Dealing with adolescents’ “questions of belief” often decides whether and to what extent they ever engage in learning processes. According to AUDEHM (2008), the reflection of “questions of belief” affect habitual dispositions and produce a different practical sense than what has been habitually formed, in particular if these dispositions are interpreted in physical practices. Experiencing the virtuosity of a performance, observing a creative process in execution, or executing it oneself, are ways of getting to know action contexts that differ from the usual, therefore they represent a basis for the emergence of new habitus. Only then can mindset changes and pedagogically desirable self-education processes be initiated.

With respect to the modelling of teacher education, it is possible to draw the following consequences by merging strands of the argument that have been unfolded thus far:

1. New foundations for experience can be created when previously absent interests, needs, and emotions come into play, when the meaning of things changes, and when experiences are accorded higher or lower significance. It is the job of pedagogy to initiate such processes in relation to pedagogically desired learning.
2. The possibility of changing a habitus (e.g. the willingness to learn) is linked to the intuitive re-interpretation of “questions of belief,” which is mostly mediated through body practices (see above), and thus not primarily explicitly or rationally. The resulting implicit knowledge cannot be held, secured, or controlled. It does, however, become apparent in action.

3. A situationally correct (teaching) behavior cannot principally be compared with a “wrong” one. For, according to BOURDIEU, perceptions of right and wrong behavior or acting are habitual. Habitus is incorporated into our physicality, and our body cannot be wrong, so to speak. Our bodies are influenced socio-culturally in terms of habitus, and the bodily dimension principally cannot be generalized in the sense of right and wrong. However, habitus are advantageous, or disadvantageous, considerate, or ignorant; they have bad or good effects in different regards. In sports and in art practices (as well as in other fields of action), such features become an issue. If here certain measures do not prove adequate, then something else is intuitively and resourcefully looked for, something new that could be beneficial for the problem-solving process. The result can be un-learning, reversal, or crisis.

This not only makes it clear that changes of habitus are desirable. It also shows that a revision of habitual structures is only possible in the context of practical action, and it will also be accompanied by negative experiences. Insofar as virtuosity, beauty, education, and performance are conceived and discussed as “questions of belief” (see above), and thus not as already pre-determined, then the practical action addressed here obtains, at least from the scientific perspective, distinct affinities with the playful.

Questioning existing knowledge that is shared with others and even embodied, however, may also lead to defensive reactions and pronounced resistance. The habitus concept allows an analysis of teaching and learning objectives with respect to such risks. Furthermore, the habitus concept can help to provide analytical insight into phenomena of difference that play a role in defensive maneuvers on the part of the students. For lack of space, these two effects cannot be discussed in greater detail here, even though this means that a very central part of pedagogical practical knowledge and thus an important field of research is disregarded. Instead, the following focuses on the importance of habitus for teachers, which lies at the basis of problematic resistance. The objective of tracing the development of teacher habitus is to draw consequences for teacher education.

As already pointed out above, prospective teachers usually experience far less discontinuity in terms of common-sense knowledge of their occupational field than members of other occupational
groups. For a teacher it is seems natural to consider experiences from their own school career – even if merely based on the comparatively high degree of habitualization – as “reliable knowledge.” This knowledge is, however, determined by the perspectives of the students they once were. This perspective, however, usually focuses on those aspects of school that are not related to the production of resonance events oriented toward learning. For example, from the perspective of students, the production of common learning spaces oriented towards school learning is usually not a primary concern. For the pupils, school is usually not determined by the skillful handling of diverse areas of conflict, or by a systematic questioning and reflection of common practices and everyday theories with respect to pedagogical concepts and other sciences. Instead, a student’s own significance or that of their favorite classmate(s) within the classroom and school events stands in the focus of attention. This is not at all surprising, since pedagogy would have otherwise already achieved its objective of transferring manifold responsibility. The “selfism” of pupils, proven by Jean PIAGET (1962), is thus in a certain sense constitutive for pedagogical efforts as well. However, the professional reflexivity of teachers must significantly differ from those grounded in student experience, and the changeover from the perspective of a student to that a teacher must therefore stand in the foreground of teacher education.

The changeover from the role of the student to that of the teacher is especially linked to the willingness of the teacher to bear responsibility for the creation of good learning circumstances and education incentives for students – i.e. that they are convinced of self-education as the central objective of pedagogy – and that the students are also mentally capable of it. As pointed out above, context sensitivity and continuous, multimodal-knowledge-based, and highly context-related convincing activities are especially crucial for pedagogical action. Since it is always under scrutiny, pedagogy is an adventure. The fact that the pedagogue is able to set aside his/her own need for adult forms of recognition, or is at least convinced of the necessity to do so, is also part of this huge challenge.

Learning opportunities (kairos, see above) are determined in a context-sensitive manner. One’s own range of experience and habitus can be adjusted according to different contexts. This takes place, e.g., when habitus becomes modified through practices oriented to “questions of belief” (see above). A broad and sometimes unarticulated repertory of actions and decisions oriented towards phenomena of difference is required in order to deal with fields of pedagogical tension.

In the multidimensional knowledge profile that constitutes expert pedagogical knowledge, implicit and explicit forms of knowledge both play a role, as do cultural perceptions, interpretations, and action patterns. Such patterns, which can be used to construct a model of this multiform
professional knowledge, have been examined in socio-cultural and anthropological approaches. From a sociological perspective, cultural-habitual and contingent knowledge has already been discussed, and the term multimodal knowledge has also been employed above. In the following, forms of knowledge are described from a social-scientific perspective.

**Practical Knowledge for the Teaching Profession**

Traditionally, primarily the explicit, categorical, constant, structured, and potentially reproducible knowledge of facts and concepts (“knowing that”) has played a central role in formal schooling. (BLOOM et al. 1956) It is possible to resort to such knowledge to justify why something behaves as it apparently does, or how a certain conception has come into “common knowledge.” This type of knowledge also includes declarative didactics or pedagogical justifications (BONB 2003, p.22). In so-called structural knowledge, explicit, declarative, or even factual knowledge is associated with non-explicit orientation and practical knowledge (see BURGER 2005, p.45 f.).

Other forms of knowledge can, however, only be made explicit in individual aspects, and can hardly be determined or described in their entirety. This applies to practical knowledge (ibid.), which comprises the knowledge and anticipation of rule-governed action sequences, complex interactions, cycles, and feedbacks, as well as the ability to combine the perspectives of certain practical problems with each other. The ability to act within a certain situation is ensured by intuitively combining the facts, methods, techniques, and skills deemed relevant to it. Procedural knowledge as a method knowledge is often observed together with conditional knowledge, which refers to the respective conditions for action. (See BLOOM et al. 1956) Another instance of non-explicit orientation and practical knowledge is the knowledge about phenomena of a particular living environment in terms of its typical process structures, and the knowledge of the modes of ways of actively dealing with it.

From a purely practical perspective, predominantly implicit orientation knowledge is gaining importance due to the decreasing social relevance of conventional experience knowledge, and in view of the increased complexity of living environments. Source knowledge (“knowing where”) is a

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27 “Pedagogical anthropology proceeds in a pluralistic manner. It thereby avoids the premature hardening of its knowledge, and can remain open for the non-identical. This pluralism, which is clearly distinct from arbitrariness, results in a principal openness for interdisciplinary or transdisciplinary work, which does not aim at reduction, but rather at an increase of complexity of anthropological knowledge. Historical pedagogical knowledge is constituted under specific linguistic-cultural conditions, but at the same time also in an increasingly important international context.” (WULF & ZIRFAS 1994, p.16, italics in original)

28 See the Collaborative Research Centre 573 “Pluralisation and Authority in the Early Modern Period” (Period: 2001 - 2011), Subdomain “Orders of Knowledge” at the University of Munich: http://www.sfb-frueheneuzeit.uni-muenchen.de/projekte/b/b.html. The Humboldt University in Berlin even offers a degree program on this topic: https://www.hu-berlin.de/de/einrichtungen-organisation/verwaltung/bolognalab/projekte-des-bologna.labs/vielfalt-der-wissensformen. Besides, the psychological definition of knowledge forms by Ton DE JONG & Monica FERGUSON-HESSLER (1996) is well-founded and extensive.
special case of orientation knowledge, through which systematically available knowledge, usually in text form, can be acquired. (BONß 2003, p.24.) Value knowledge becomes apparent in the recognition, mediation, and participation of norms and values in a situation. Environmental knowledge is understood as the knowledge of the interactions of certain social groups, and knowledge of the manner in which certain intentions are expressed, which expectations are (or can be) directed at whom, which initiatives will be successful under which conditions, which forms of social control are effective, and how these can be dealt with. Identity knowledge includes the pre-reflective representations of a person to him-/herself. It is substantiated by the capacity for self-perception, self-assuredness, and self-control, and by the ability to regenerate after physical or psychological stress. Interaction knowledge comprises skills such as understanding, reflecting, and analyzing social relations (and conflicts). Organizational knowledge defines an organization, its functions, the standards of conduct applicable within it, what one can expect from its members or as a member of it, and the obligations that one has with respect to it. Guidance knowledge concerns the decision-making structures in an organization, from the coordination of labor processes to organization-specific standards of authority and discipline, to the knowledge of ways to motivate others. Tacit forms of knowing bridge the gap of pedagogical theory and practice in manifold practical ways. In principle, the structure of these various forms of knowledge already appear in the curriculum for teacher training, or at least could easily be combined into one. In terms of their acquisition, however, the modes of interaction between implicit and explicit forms of knowledge have not been sufficiently clarified in a scientific manner (DOHMEN 2001).

The radical pluralism of perspectives and “rationality types” (WALDENFELS 1990), already established above as the main focus of pedagogical anthropology, can be debated in our context as the different forms of knowledge that must be made available to teacher education. In their situational dependence and strongly implicit character, these forms of knowledge defy systematization. The importance of the various explicit as well as implicit forms of knowledge for orientation, judgement, and action is primarily investigated within interdisciplinary anthropological theory formation (see KRAUS et al., in prep.). Situated forms of pedagogical knowledge are empirically elaborated within the framework of practice research. Here, social milieus, ethnicities, gender, age, and hybrid cultural phenomena come to play a prominent role.

In this book, one channel for the study of pedagogical forms of knowledge is placed within educational-scientific practice research, especially focusing on its relevance for teacher education. Professionalization in this occupational field is here interpreted as the shaping of experiences and their relative significance through the explicit and implicit learning, design, and adaptation processes dominated by educational coordination and persuasion activities.
Every individual acquires knowledge in a different way based on their experiences as well as on external conditions. These conditions can also change in dependence on the individuals involved, on their respective circumstances, as well as over the course of their lives.

The acquisition of knowledge, i.e. also of pedagogical knowledge, is principally neither directly observable nor can it be equated with a specific teaching canon. The significance of pedagogical action is determined and challenged in different ways by different fields of tension. In parts it can be explicitly addressed, and in others it can be implicitly treated in pedagogical practices. While these challenges are often omitted in the scientific and theoretical perspective, pedagogical expert knowledge and pedagogical action are constantly confronted with them. Endlessly variable challenges that must be addressed by pedagogical forms of knowledge arise in different pedagogical situations and circumstances.

The mostly implicit context sensitivity fundamental to all pedagogy is based on all these knowledge forms. At the same time, context sensitivity is part of classroom education, because lies at the foundation of convincing pupils of the value of education. Context sensitivity is aware of every pupil participating and his/her positioning in a concrete pedagogical situation (see the example of the social educator and the little boy). For professionals in the teaching field, expert context sensitivity and context-sensitive education must be a central concern. As pointed out above, by referring to practical and orientation knowledge relevant for teaching practice, guidelines of scenic images and examples are generated. This happens as an implicit linking of perceptions, interpretations, and action patterns with particular theories, and is then applied to the concrete situation by means of analyzed transfers. From this perspective, explanations, perceptions, action patterns, examples, and scenic images are guiding actions in the teaching profession. Accordingly, as part of teacher education – e.g. through practice research – practical scenic images should be generated that can be used to regulate practical action in the field.

In the following, the proposal will be made to devise succeeding classroom lessons as “choreography.” Teaching as choreography places decisive weight on the fact that it relies on the constructive participation of all involved (in the lesson). In the optimal case of lesson choreography, an implicitly effective “experience space” is formed on the basis of context sensitivity and pedagogical tact: its dynamics represent a viable foundation for school education. The security and guarantees pedagogy provides for pupils consist of the reliable and tactful handling of pedagogically relevant resonance events. As not only pedagogy, but also didactics and logistics play a role in the pedagogical actions of a teacher, successful teaching may be based on planning, calculations, and control, but this cannot be everything.
The following section begins by describing in greater detail what is meant by pedagogy or pedagogical knowledge forms in the classroom. Then, well-known concepts for teacher education are outlined. By discussing these concepts in relation to the outlined concept of pedagogy and pedagogical knowledge forms, it is possible to determine the tasks of teacher education more specifically.
Pedagogy in the Classroom
Teaching as Orchestration and Choreography

In interpretations of teaching as “orchestration” or “enactment” (in German: Inszenierung), as initially proposed by Gottfried HAUSMANN (1959) and as “presentation,” as Hans RAUSCHENBERGER (1985) called it, the situational dimensions of teaching are conceptually defined. The teacher plans “scenes” and stages action sequences, through which the students can literally rehearse obligatory learning material.

Based on such concepts, teaching can also be understood as “choreography.” This interpretation takes into account the conditions of success and failure for individual actions in the classroom, as well as the tacit dimensions of classroom education, such as the coordination and convincing activities required of teaching. These tacit dimensions are largely excluded in the interpretations of teaching as an “orchestration” and “presentation,” as in these interpretations plans and conscious staging play the central role. However, in the classroom, the teacher must act not only as a director, but also as a moderator, companion, consultant, helper, coach, advocate, supporter, role model, and sounding board. In all these regards, a broad practical knowledge that reaches far beyond didactic and logistic skills is required in order to build on the experience and interests of the pupils, with the aim of initiating the acquisition of knowledge by them.

Successful teaching can be described as choreography as follows: if the teacher and students communicate skillfully, bindingly, respectfully, and in the interest of the subject with one another in a particular teaching situation, then the instruction is choreographic. This is the case if various places in the (class-)room are used according to predetermined or situation-specific rules, and if teaching media supports these events. A (successful) choreography is dependent on the more or less active participation of teachers and students involved in classroom activities geared toward learning and education (see also the approach of WINKEL 2007). In class, the students and teachers perform acts on which they usually comment. Choreography in the classroom can therefore only be successful if the actors are committed to certain thought and behavior patterns, which, under the condition that they convince the actors, are collectively taken up, answered, and developed further by the individuals as well as collectively. Options for individual action often appear spontaneously. However, it lies in the contradictory nature of pedagogical situations that such a common ground often still needs to be produced in parts (or as a whole) while it is being performed.

In contrast to dance choreography, which is usually not disturbed by happenings outside the performance venue, classroom activities are rather strongly exposed to events that are not teaching-

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29 See also the BMBF-funded project “Promoting Cultural Education in the Media Age” (see: http://www.bildungsserver.de/Kulturelle-Bildung-im-Medienzeitalter-KuBIM–5751.html), and the pilot project “School as a Space Stage” (see: http://www.pedocs.de/frontdoor.php?source_opus=1630).

30 See also the philosophy-education concept of “theatrical philosophizing,” developed by Christian GEFERT (2002).
related, such as disruptions and disabilities that can potentially suspend the choreography of classroom education. Furthermore, teaching is also not necessarily considered a meaningful and desirable action by the acting persons and recipients, although they are encouraged to think so, as the aim of pedagogy is to convince them of the importance of lifelong self-education. It is not difficult to see that being exposed to all the uncertainties of learning cannot be immediately attractive to everyone. For the pupils, what happens in the classroom are moreover obligatory events primarily oriented toward social necessities (compulsory education). In a sense, students are obliged to accept the learning aids handed to them in the interest of an (actual or simulated) self-education. The mostly unspoken pedagogical contract behind it is always highly prone to failure. There is no other way. As stated above, it must be re-established, justified, and constructed on a continuous basis. If a learning situation can still be addressed with communicative, i.e. teaching and educational means, then the instructional choreography is maintained. If this is, however, not the case, it has been partially or completely suspended. An uncomfortably uncertain, unreliable situation that may handicap pedagogically desired learning then gains ground.

The choreography of lessons is thus always up for grabs. It is only given if the pupils and the teachers interpret emerging difference events in the context of meaningful teaching and participate in its design. The teachers introduce such coordination processes into their process-accompanying planning and will modify them if necessary. In the following, structural aspects of teaching are unfolded in terms of notations.

Notations of Teaching

As long as choreography predominantly arises during classroom activities, it is fluid. At the same time, the term “choreography” refers to the underlying “notations” of this fluid run of events. “Notations” are understood as the organizational, curricular, content-related, didactic, and pedagogical structures of (teaching) events. This not only includes the antecedent planning of the teaching, but also actual (i.e. possibly also spontaneous) presentation forms: blackboard content, work materials, the spatio-temporal organization of learning processes, as well as the people, objects and environments, class register records, etc. involved. According to an expanded concept of notation (see ARNS et al. 2004), notations are not only visible or tangible things (e.g. writing), but also mental designs that shape visible events. Thus symbols, i.e. intentionally or unintentionally evoked references (Cf. PEIRCE 1993, p.64 f.), can also be notations. Symbols have the objective and/or effect of producing meanings. Human physicality can also be incorporated into this expanded concept of notation. Thus, communicative statements and communicative understanding can be oriented to or expressed through the human body. The term “body language” includes
miremik (gaze and gaze behavior), facial expressions, gestures, posture, movement, haptics (touch and contact behavior), proxemics (proximity and proximity behavior), olfactory dimensions (smell and smelling behavior), as well as the many ways of being silent. Body movements can be interpreted as (documentable) movements in space that affect others; thus they also are notations. Furthermore, bodily sensations, such as well-being or pain, movement and joy of motion; physical expressions like laughing, crying, silence, and screaming; and sensual events like perceiving, speaking, and listening present possibilities of lexical and codified understanding. Academic subjects, material working conditions, temporal and spatial factors, teaching results (e.g., texts written by students), classroom observations, filmic documents, photos, and ad-hoc plans are all also notations. Notations are visible and perceived, or at least they are potentially perceptible. Notation in the classroom includes everything that triggers learning, or anything that is effective or principally suitable for such an objective. It includes language, traces, materials, and physicality. The actors are not necessarily aware of notations. Notations are only partially planned in advance and used specifically to deal with concrete challenges. They also occur in spontaneous, associative, emergent, and intuitive forms. Notations introduced or selectively induced by the lesson choreography, or those that appear spontaneously, are more or less generative. Teaching is directed through the use of teaching material, through verbal impulse, through the utterance of a pupil, or through other notations and events that are unrelated to the teaching act. A successful teaching choreography is highly dependent on the fact that the teacher places the perceived notations in relation to one another, in such a manner that the basic signature of the overall events is pedagogical. It has been pointed out that, with respect to the objective of choreography, the teacher must make an effort to transform theory into practice and vice versa. In this, barely influenceable or controllable moments can play an important role: the mere obligation to deal with a learning interest is thus insufficient for the creation of a learning environment accepted by the actors. Only a context of meaning borne jointly by the actors can serve as a foundation. The context for the meaning of education can indeed be initiated and structured by a (teaching) person, however, its maintenance requires the joint effort of all those involved. Such a framing of teaching can be provided in a systematically and rationally determined lesson plan that draws on the theoretical didactics of teaching-learning relationships (MAIER 2012). In this case, the lesson plan creates a context of meaning for teaching, and both the educational as well

31 ALTHANS (2007, p.257) describes the aspects of human physicality that are visible and can thus become the object of research as “body traces.” In this book, the concept of notation is regarded as more comprehensive.
32 Here one could also refer to “body semiosis.” The meaning of the symbols and the symbolism of body communication for understanding and articulation, which has been increasingly recognized in recent decades, thus demands of semiotics an investigation into the structures, functions, and classification of body language and their culture specificities (see: http://www.semiotik.eu).
as the didactic signature of a lesson are constructed. This involves a certain kind of notation, namely a linear text based on anticipations events and the various ways of handling them. In a lesson plan, learning, education, or competence objectives are formulated on the basis of professional analysis and justified by existing educational curricula and standards. These objectives are linked to didactic and pedagogical considerations anticipating the behavior of individuals in a study group. They also help to shape levels of learning and its conception, the classroom atmosphere and its rituals. The lesson plan draws on models of knowledge and skill acquisition, and on systematically determined learning preconditions (observations, tests, etc.). Through such an analysis, the lesson topic is structured in the form of learning sequences. This means that, with respect to general, specific, and subject-oriented didactical and pedagogical considerations, the lesson objectives are broken down methodically into activities that are probably feasible for the students. This presupposes viable learning and working steps as well as methods, impulses, and media that support these; subject-oriented learning environments must be designed. The lesson topic is then systematically developed in its various aspects, which each in themselves also include prior knowledge or newly experienced aspects of reformulation and re-contextualization of the lesson subject. In the ideal case, all these aspects are recognized and understood by the students. What has been didactically prepared and made subject in teaching then delivers the criteria for assessing the achievement of the learning and competence objectives. The end of a lesson includes the planned reflection on what has been learned, and an outlook on what will follow. In educational settings, the fulfillment of learning and competence objectives provides the core of the lesson plan. Didactics are seen to be rational and therefore convincing. However, it should be pointed out that machines do not learn.

Recently, a paradigm shift has occurred in Germany, from a definition of school learning as knowledge acquisition to competence development. This shift not only addresses the acquisition of specialist knowledge, but also its application in concrete situations. This means that lessons are no longer planned and structured primarily based on subject classification, but rather on competence objectives and on the steps for attaining them. The detailed planning of a lesson thus takes a back seat in favor of a conception of long and medium-term individual learning development paths using formal learning diagnostics such as competence development models.

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33 While learning objectives usually describe the intended learning effect with respect to a specific content, competence objectives are directed toward the formation of capabilities, skills, orientation, and application knowledge. Educational objectives should support self-confidence and autonomy, problem-solving capabilities, and the social responsibility of a person, or even make such things possible in the first place.

34 In other countries, other approaches are used to increase the performance of pupils. In Sweden, for example, the acquisition of knowledge is still the sole focus of curricula. Swedish teaching or school curricula (läroplaner) are aimed at knowledge and specific facts, familiarity, understanding, and skills (in Swedish: fakta, förtrogenhet, förståelse, färdighet). Synonyms for “förtrogenhet” are: a self-adjusting familiarity, close acquaintance, habit, insight, or understanding. It includes tacit knowledge.
A lesson plan can indeed, as mentioned above, be considered as an inherently meaningful and stringent script. However, education is constituted by the interaction, communication, and learning events that take place within the classroom. In the best-case scenario, these events correspond with the lesson planning and its implementation. However, while the activities of those involved in education are fundamentally related with one another in teaching planning, one must always anticipate, in a teaching situation, that someone will step out of line, that breaks, planning dysfunctions, errors, and unforeseen events occur. The choreography is therefore always precarious. It cannot be entirely certain, and thus can also only to a limited extent be reviewed in retrospect according to how it fulfilled the objectives it set. The inspection of the success of multimodal forms of knowledge transmission and pedagogical convincing effort is the most difficult of all.

A teacher not only applies planning strategies in advance of the lesson, but also constantly during it. In so doing, s/he resorts to such notations that make choreography, i.e. successful teaching, most likely. His/her handling of the choreography in situ requires a whole range of knowledge forms, including an implicit knowledge of various behavioral dispositions; her/his own thought and motivation structures and that of the students; as well as an awareness of applicable norms. Teachers must put all of these aspects into relation with the educational content. An elaborated but open-ended and broad knowledge for the choreography of teaching with relevant notations requires, on the one hand, a special sensorium based on capabilities and reaction modes mediated by one’s own physicality. On the other hand, the teacher choreographically places normative demands and the (different) situational interpretations of the actors into relation with one another.

In scientific, school-didactic, and university-didactic contexts, not only written lesson plans and actual question-and-answer events should receive attention. Instead, meta-communications, body language interactions, motivation structures, behavioral dispositions, and unforeseen events in the classroom, together with many other notations, are relevant for a successful instructional choreography. The repertory of notations and its potential for classroom education cannot be differentiated enough.\(^{35}\)

The functional orientation of the pedagogical and curricular actions of a teacher is thus observable and can be retained in notations, if s/he places the statements of the pupils in a particular context (see HACKL 2006 and 2009).\(^{36}\) An analysis of effective notations of pedagogical interactions, based on empirical research, is possible on the basis of the following central questions: How is teaching accorded higher or lower significance through choreography?

\(^{35}\) In view of the expectation that the logic of (social) events can be documented and empirically researched based on notations, however, the question arises whether the existing repertory of scientific forms for recording these events is sufficient, and how it can be extended further. See http://tacitdimensions.wordpress.com.

\(^{36}\) Described by HACKL 2006 and 2009. Cf. also the concept of a symbolical pre-reflective knowledge.
How are the unforeseen and the results of specific situations treated?
Which normative demands are considered?
In what way are these demands taken into account?
To which specific contexts are they related?
How do controversial perspectives come into play?

The empirical elaboration of these questions on professional reflexivity must still occur. Professional reflexivity must be understood in changing contexts of action determined by many factors. In this book, it is only possible to take the first steps in this direction by introducing a practically oriented description of school pedagogy within the framework of pedagogical areas of conflict, fields of tension, difference events, plurivalent normativity, tacit knowledge, context sensitivity, pedagogical convincing activities, and kairos, as well as by encouraging their reflection in approaches to teacher education.

Some common concepts for professional competence development are set forth in the following. Hereby, a paradigm shift with respect to forms of knowledge as subjects of learning in school is presented. Subsequently, the concept of a “reflective practitioner” will be discussed in detail, which has been especially common in English-language literature and has been relevant for the pragmatic perspective on teacher education from the 1980s until today. This is followed by a presentation of empirical examples of explorative learning at higher education institutes and approaches of action research considered relevant to the development of university teacher education. These concepts serve as a foundation for the development of a new concept aimed at the consideration of the described particularities of pedagogical forms of knowledge in teacher education.
University Teacher Education
Competences and Competence Development for Teachers

Today, the mission of many educational institutions, not least of universities, is no longer the dissemination of educational knowledge but instead action and application-oriented competence development. Formerly, the central subject of education as well as of school-teaching and theoretical didactics was unchanging and reproducible fact and concept knowledge (“knowing that”). (See BLOOM et al. 1956) With the paradigm shift, orientation, assessment, and applied knowledge, i.e. “competences,” have come to the foreground of education and learning processes. This is true for education in schools and the educational and regulatory curricula governing them, as well as of relevance for reflections on professional decisions and actions.

However, the old knowledge paradigm has not been definitively dismissed in the new paradigm of formal learning. “Competences,” although they cannot not be determined without considering contexts of action, are moreover currently being discussed in a similarly categorical manner as was formerly the case for reproducible knowledge.

This does not only apply to professional competences. All kinds of personal competences are currently being standardized on a large scale, and measured on the basis of cognitivist approaches (see DFG 2006).\(^{37}\) Franz E. WEINERT (2001, p.7) has, under commission of the OECD,\(^{38}\) presented the following definition for “competence,” which was used in the PISA studies. Competences are the “[...] cognitive skills and abilities that an individual possesses or learns in order to solve particular problems, as well as the associated motivational, volitional and social readiness and skills, for the successful and responsible application of the problem solutions in variable situations” (ibid.). This reasoning assumes that guidelines for competent judgement and action are available and can also be established and trained. This concept of competence therefore simultaneously describes a starting point, a path (“learning”), and an objective (“skill”) (see LIEBAU 2003).

The extent to which competence development is a disposition or a process, and whether it concerns educational events, learning, and/or socialization, thus remains open. The competence concept moreover serves as an implicit argumentation structure in which “successful action” and “problem-

\(^{37}\) For more on the science concept that underlies this essay (implicitly), see KRAUS 2015.

\(^{38}\) The OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) is an international organization with the character of a permanent conference. It is committed to democracy and market economy. It was founded in 1961 as a successor organization to the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation, which was concerned with the implementation of the Marshall Plan. Today, the OECD sees itself as a forum in which the governments can share their experiences, identify best practices, and develop standards and policies as solutions to common problems. Among its objectives are optimal economic development, a high employment, and a rising standard of living in its member states, as well as economic growth and expansion of world trade on a multilateral basis. The mandate of the OECD is very broad and covers almost all policy areas, with the exception of defense policy. The analyses and recommendations of the OECD are based on a liberal, market-economical, and efficient economic order. The organization calls for the removal of barriers and increased competition. In recent years, education and social policies have gained importance. For example, the OECD is known for the PISA studies. The organization is conceived in a strict interstate manner. Its decisions are binding under international law, but not always directly applicable in the member states.
solving” are defined in the sense of practical life and social requirements. According to this definition, a competent subject performs actions that have been judged in advance as constructive, adequate, and definite. If, and how the requirements have been fulfilled can be displayed on a scale. Both the social and emotional readiness to apply a certain skill as well as the skill itself are simply understood as given, they are both considered an integral element of skill. Pedagogical convincing efforts, the willingness and ability to assume responsibility, community values, and educational knowledge are all on equal footing in this concept of competence.

The area of conflict between the norm and individual interpretations, which is central to pedagogy and also highly precarious, thus remains unelaborated in the competence concept. Above all, the question arises if the motivations and abilities to act competently, in a specified, prescribed and in any case “adult” sense, can simply be considered as given. It is not at all self-evident that the actions and judgements of a child or teenager can be designated as “competent” in an age-independent or even adult sense. Personal, communicative, and social competences differ for different age groups, not only in terms of measurable details, but also in terms of maturity and development.

The exclusions and blank spaces that are related to the competence concept are highly problematic, especially because the coordination and convincing work of educators does not receive adequate attention. From the perspective of competence development, the role of teachers has been undermined in three different ways:

- Since it is unclear whether competences are dispositions, or how their development is related to education, learning, and/or socialization events, the pedagogical contribution to competence development is undetermined;

- The value of action (see KUHLEN 1991, p.338), the criteria superordinate to all competences, is generated socially and dependent on the concept of an individual self. By prescribing value systems in the common competence concept, no importance is analytically bestowed on the traps of familiarity, experience frames, and habitus so central to the teaching profession.

- By considering competences as applied knowledge (only), the manifold types of teaching knowledge are questioned.

In the development of teacher education, which is the objective here, such a questioning of pedagogic professionalism cannot be considered purposeful in any way. In view of the paradigm shift of general educational objectives, the question of the pedagogical dynamics and logics of evaluation and those of individual learning approaches arises. Little is still known, in particular, about the significance that learners place on their own actions and on those of others (see VOGT 2007). There is no longer a clear canon of knowledge, or a requirement profile for professional
conduct. Even the processes of democratization and the growing cultural diversity in schools contribute to an erosion of the job profile within the context given by the competence concept. Relevant pedagogical forms of knowledge cannot be mapped on a scale. This may be why, instead of recognizing the dignity of pedagogical practice, one finds standards based on assessment and evaluation instruments created elsewhere, e.g. in psychometrics.

The cognitive psychological interpretation of the competence concept is avoided in this publication. Despite all criticism, however, it is not discarded, but rather integrated into a wide range of knowledge forms that have already been detailed above. Such knowledge forms find application e.g. in Swedish education research and policy (see GUSTAVSSON 2002). WEINERT’s competence definition implies that every knowledge profile will only become apparent as competent or incompetent in its application, and this will also be adopted here. However, not only competent skills, but also dispositions, experience profiles, intentions, acquired knowledge, and trained forms of knowledge are confronted with situational challenges in the field. In this sense, the possibilities of participation, argumentation, and modelling, in the form of learning, knowledge, and action, are actually precursory to competence. These possibilities are discovered, conceded, and supported within the framework of pedagogical coordination and convincing. In this regard, teaching is conceived as an ethically defined situation and is applicable not least to the polyphonic examination of ethical issues. This examination is not ended by measurement and standardization efforts, and it thus does not render the examination of pedagogical coordination and convincing events unnecessary. The diverse challenges encountered in the pedagogical field can be mastered skillfully, but they cannot be determined once and for all. In pedagogical contexts, competences must ultimately be defined individually. The definition of competences is thus an ongoing process that undergoes enormous changes.

Undoubtedly, the knowledge necessary for coping with situational challenges is diverse and not purely cognitive. With respect to the educational objective of competence development, this particularly elucidates the need for a theoretical awareness of pre-reflective and pre-predicative forms of knowledge and learning (see also DOHMEN 2001; FRANK et al. 2003). When this is considered, however, what has been eroded within the cognitivist concept of competence can be amended theoretically by recognizing diverse forms of knowledge and learning. By interpreting competences as cognitive skills and abilities as well as a motivational and social willingness, one still follows this reasoning: as orientation, evaluation, and applied knowledge are forms of knowledge, the acquisition of stable, explicit, and canonized knowledge is in fact still the focus of formal learning. However, its acquisition is dependent on a whole variety of tacit factors, such as differences in maturity, personality, situation, reflexivity etc. In contrast to a knowledge concept
formerly largely reduced to scholastic factual knowledge, it now concerns a significantly expanded concept: “competences” include a broad spectrum of explicit and implicit knowledge forms.

With the paradigm shift from general education and the acquisition of specialized knowledge towards competence development, the focus of (German) school pedagogy is thus about to shift from only focusing on explicit and verbalized knowledge towards practical, not always articulable, but normatively oriented knowledge. In pedagogical practice and in teacher education, the paradigm shift is often depicted as follows: teachers design learning situations as situations where competences can be applied (MANDL et al. 2002). The role of the teacher is then no longer defined primarily by the transfer of knowledge, but as tutoring or learning support, accompanied by the monitoring and analysis of learning skills and processes. However, a paradox appears in this context: while tutoring, understood as the promotion of the autonomy of individual learners, is practiced in heterogeneous learning groups, “monitoring” and learning diagnoses are based on the standardization of specialized knowledge and competences, or at least employ corresponding measuring instruments. Standardization ultimately targets the ideal of a “standard” pupil, and therefore also of a “standard” teacher. From a purely logical perspective, the two concepts of situated and individual learning support and learning diagnostics are incompatible; once again practical pedagogy thus moves through an unresolvable area of conflict, to be skillfully bridged using pedagogical practices. The question that arises here, however, is whether this area of conflict is an unnecessary dilemma (cp. STOJANOV 2004) that can be resolved by tying learning diagnostics back to didactics. This idea about didactics in school cannot be followed up here.

The interpretation of teaching and learning processes as individual and active construction processes not only applies to constructivist-oriented approaches (e.g. MANDL&GERSTENMAIER 2000), but also to models of “professional learning” (e.g. GRUBER et al. 2005). For example, in narrative pedagogy, professionals are encouraged to formulate their own interests and to pay attention to related discovery and application contexts. It has always been the task of both teachers and students to reconcile tacit guidelines of judgement and action. This is e.g. true for routines and rules that are tacit and thus largely elude direct access with standardized performance profiles. For teachers, the challenge is to be role models and show forms of mastering, for learners the challenge is to reconcile these guidelines as as learners. In focussing on individual practice knowledge and the practices of teachers and pupils in the context of school settings, this book resorts to an expanded notion of the term “competence” borrowed from Dieter-Jürgen LÖWISCH (2000, p.129). In this competence concept, the value of competent acting is emphasized by the fact that competences are further defined as a “[...] factually correct becoming active and being active, which should be shaped as valuable and which is tied to personal attitudes.” In the school context, a competent pedagogical perception is correspondingly a trained one; a
competent judgement is formed by knowledge; competent action is ethically sensible and part of the responsibility of the acting person. In a pedagogical situation, the ethical and moral stipulations for acting, according to LÖWISCH (2000), are linked to the interpersonal interaction of the various direct and indirect participants, such as teachers, students, parents, and to their common perception of social responsibility. First of all, competence is linked to the goal, “[...] to explain and elaborate the action ethos of the pedagogical actor [... and to work towards it in a way] that learners become aware of acting and its freedom, its complexity, its riskiness, its temporality, and its multiple responsibilities. They should become aware of the responsibilities connected to acting and the formative character of acting in general” (LÖWISCH 1995, p.9). It should be made clear to learners that someone is competent if capable of repeatedly making judgements and acting responsibly under diverse conditions and with consequences that are not always predictable. What is thus presented to learners as “competence” is simultaneously also posed as a challenge they can emulate. In this way, knowledge-based and action-oriented learning is demonstrated and at the same time practiced by understanding, judging, and acting. The pedagogical ethos that has been designed to result in understanding on various levels is, in the best cases, accepted and adopted by the subjects of education as they acquire (self-) responsibility. The primary objective of education has already been described as a pedagogization of thought and action, as “lifelong learning.” The pedagogical ethos is primarily comprised of the willingness and the context-sensitive capability of explaining the value and relevance of education to learners.

School pedagogy is thus not directly concerned with the development of competences, but rather with the establishment of preconditions for competent action and judgements. It involves the acquisition of knowledge with the objective of initiating self-education. This is made possible through pedagogical practices, i.e. those based on diverse forms of knowledge for which the teacher takes responsibility. The central subjects of education are thus – presupposed as given in WEINERT’s (2001) definition of competence – the structural conditions and motivations for competent judgement and actions. Thus not only are competences to be developed through reflection and practice. Moreover, the ethical and moral considerations that accompany competent acting, expressed e.g. in philosophical approaches, literature, cultural knowledge, or the arts, must also be considered. Skills that foster competence development can certainly be checked and evaluated, but they are subject to a variety of learning circumstances and didactics in its broadest sense must be directed to philosophical and cultural topics.

In short, the diverse preconditions for competence-oriented knowledge acquisition are of primary concern for teacher education and professionalization research. In everyday life, such preconditions are the processes of sense-finding and sense-making, as well as the observation of conditions for decisions based on social and cultural stipulations. The training and development of participative,
dialectic, and responsible forms of learning, knowledge, and action also presupposes sensitivity for the contingency of action, as well as perception of social and environmental interdependencies.

The precondition for the development of competent action and judgement is an educated context sensitivity related to experience and physicality. For example, Diethelm WAHL (1991) employs the “physical” to denote the interactive, symbolically gestural, and material aspects of professional teaching practice knowledge. In particular, the “near perspective,” i.e. the pedagogical relationship with an individual pupil, and the “distant perspective,” embedding the learning situation in a larger context, must be reconciled with each other. While ways of dealing sensitively with maturity and other interpersonal differences play a decisive role for the practice of the near perspective, the classification of learning and interaction events in larger contexts are primarily intended to (competently) meet the plurivalent normativity of action. Both should be the central subject of competence development.

Pedagogical action thus endeavors to be reconciled with its context, to be convincing, and to be (permanently) followed and imitated as a desirable ethical attitude. Thus the application of knowledge takes place in the context of pedagogical action, generally neither fully consciously nor solely using (competent) guidelines for action and operational schemes that have been foreseen and trained. The essence of practical teaching knowledge, as has been pointed out above, is based on creating analogies between specific situations, and is oriented towards a use perspective. Above, this has been interpreted as an orientation towards narratives.

Both nationally and internationally, the concept of a “reflective practitioner,” developed by Donald SCHÖN (1983, 1987) presents an important university didactic concept that can be used in terms of developing the forms of knowledge important for practical teaching.

“Reflective Practitioner”

Although no consensus has been reached on the interpretation of the concept of a “reflective practitioner” (see TROWLER & BAMBER 2005, p.84), it is generally understood as a criticism of the notion that theoretical content can simply be implemented in pedagogical professional practice. The concept rests on the concept of a reflective mode, which is considered to supplement this professional practice. According to SCHÖN (1983), the professionalism of teachers is characterized by the appropriate perception of unpredictable situations in professional practice, and by acting in an accordingly sensible manner. With respect to Michael POLANYI’s (1966) concept of tacit knowledge and referring to Gilbert A. RYLE, SCHÖN ties the ability to constructively deal with the unforeseen with “knowing how” and other knowledge forms central for practical activities. As “knowing-in-action,” such knowledge lies in the act itself. SCHÖN (1983) writes: “Reflection-in-
action has a critical function, the structure of knowing-in-action [...] we may, in the process, restructure strategies of action, understandings of phenomena, or ways of framing problems [...]. Reflection gives rise to on-the-spot experiments. We think out and try out new actions intended to explore the newly observed phenomena, test our tentative understandings of them, or affirm the moves we have invented to change things for the better.” The fact that reflective practitioners consider problems as well as their solutions not as simply given, but as challenges, is thus decisive for SCHÖN’s concept. Such practitioners derive their actions from their observations of irritating, unsettling, and uncertain factors, which they handle in a determined, constructed, and tentative manner (see also the education concept of Rainer KOKEMOHR (2007, p.14), which interprets the educational process as triggered by introduced orientations that can be questioned.

SCHÖN’s approach to teacher education is realized with “on-the-spot experiments” (SCHÖN 1983, p.141ff). “On-the-spot experiments” resemble the didactical model of “reflection-in-action”, according to which action strategies, assumptions, explanation approaches, or problem formulations are subjected to critical analysis. According to this approach, an episode is singled out, restructured, and translated into an “on-the-spot experiment.” The results of “reflection-in-action,” which are otherwise implicit in the repertory of situational responses, thereby become apparent and thus negotiable, criticizable, processable, and verifiable. This approach of SCHÖN corresponds to the didactic model of “reflective teaching” as a training form, in which pupils reflect previously performed lessons under the guidance of experts. According to the model of “reflective teaching,” individual instructional situations are shaped by teachers and, in the words of Clemens SEYFRIED, Andrea SEEL & Astrid HUBER (2006, p.286), “[...] when viewed under the magnifying glass [emphasis by author], are denoted linguistically, accurately described, so that problems can be analyzed in a better manner, or in the first place identified. A diffuse impression of unsuccessful teaching and a sense of dissatisfaction can be examined – and the problem can be found.”39 The following procedure is proposed:

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39 The authors quote a client.
In their evaluation of this method proposal from the perspective of the trainers and students who practice it, SEYFRIED, SEEL & HUBER (2006) find a pronounced acceptance of the method in both groups. For example, 97% of trainers and 70% of students indicate that they observed the desired competence development for the students or for themselves after completion of their work with this model. However, SEYFRIED, SEEL & HUBER (2006) critically note that the process led trainers to focus on negative situations during the debriefing. The trainers further observed one-
sided, too personal definitions of “relevance” in pedagogical situations for the teachers-in-training they considered “less committed and talented.” They thus identified rationalizations that generalize in an inadmissible manner. The authors of the study interpret this as an indication of an overly sophisticated cognitive demand of the model.

With respect to this criticism, one can refer to Max van MANEN (1995), who convincingly explains that the interactive and spontaneous nature of a classroom situation usually does not allow a distance to one’s own actions. Thus reflections can succeed only to a limited extent in the context of pedagogical practice. The explicit, linear-logical reflection mode, based on a clear definition of social situations and normatively oriented, does not do justice to the practical knowledge of the teaching profession (this corresponds to the conception of SCHÖN 1983). According to Fritz OSER (1997), “reflective teaching” is also not suitable for producing “sufficient reference” to the empirical results of research. Furthermore, the model of the “reflective practitioner” is criticized, because the provisional behavior of a teacher cannot be solely explained by the correct implicit knowledge or the “knowing how” needed for successfully handling unexpected teaching situations. Such knowledge is not explicit, but always also generated, modified, linked to, or confronted with other forms of knowledge. The question of how a reflexivity that corresponds to the dynamic experimental approach required in the professional field should be developed is still unanswered.

However, practice research could be used to elaborate such reflexivity. Practice research can be conducted based on the concept of “learning through research” (see below). For the concept of “learning through research” there are, however, significantly fewer research results when compared with international practice research (FICHTEN & MEYER 2014, p.11).

**Approaches of Action Research**

Action research was introduced by Kurt LEWIN in the middle of the 20th century within the context of the democratization movements of that time. Even if there is no unified concept, the different threads of this tradition are still characterized by fundamental similarities (ALTRICHTER & FEINDT 2011, p.215f.). Action research is fundamentally defined by a “[...] social-democratic cognition and action interest;” its participants are thus considered experts and “[...] equal partners in a decision-making and testing process” (KLAFKI 1982, p.75f.).

The basic idea of action research in schools is that quality development of schools and teaching should ideally be formulated from the perspective of practice; at the very least, the research should be coordinated with the actors to which it relates. The processing of development tasks and their documentation should take place, as far as possible, in the school, and thus in cooperation with the participants at school or even performed autonomously by them.
Action research primarily seeks to serve practice in the field. The methodically controlled production of knowledge, which is applied as an alternation of action and reflection, aims at a reflective knowledge in which the concerns of the subjects being researched are mediated with cross-social (i.e. also scientific) action options and cause-effect relationships (RADTKE 1979, p.84). In doing so, action research is bound to strict ethical codes and is performed in professional learning communities. For the scientific community, action research is particularly relevant when it gives access to empirical materials otherwise inaccessible for conventional scientific practice (RADTKE 1979, p.97f.). At the same time, action research draws on the full spectrum of scientific methods and approaches.

The definition of Wolfgang FICHTEN & Hilbert MEYER (2014, p.13) is often applicable to projects of action research in the context of teacher education: “Action research is a research approach that allows practitioners to examine important issues of their everyday working life independently, in a methodically controlled manner, and within the framework of a professional community, with the aim of [1] elaborating knowledge that is local, (but still) meets scientific quality criteria; [2] critically discussing individual professional practice through a reflective distance to everyday working life, and to professionalize roles; and [3] using the examination results for school and teaching development.” Teachers in schools, teachers-in-training, and academic teachers are thus mainly responsible for action research. The two first groups are also its main subject. According to the quotation, there are no clear boundaries between internal school evaluation [3] and a training of methodically-based professional reflexivity [1 and 2] in the implementation of action research in the context of school, academic school pedagogy, or professionalization research. In Germany there are many examples of institutionalized action research for teacher education and/or advanced teacher training.40

Action research in schools, however, is crisis-prone, as it is usually dependent on the motivation of its participants, on its highly situation-dependent compatibility with the school and teaching practices, and on financial and temporal resources. It thus very centrally depends on individual, social, and communal acceptance. It has also been found that the differences between the cooperation partners from schools and from universities with respect to their situations, qualifications, and disciplines can lead to various problems; empirical studies show that action

40 For example, the Laboratory School and the College of Bielefeld has this expectation (see HOLLENBACH & TILLMANN 2011). Other examples are the initiative of Wolfgang Klafki at the University of Marburg in the 1970s; the Hamburg Research Workshop School Development at the Department of Education of the University of Hamburg, the Osnabrück Research Workshop School Development, the Research Workshop at the University of Bremen and the research module at the University of Paderborn (cf. FICHTEN & MEYER 2014 pp.14 et seq., where further examples are also listed). For evaluation results of the so-called. “Oldenburg Team Research” with respect to its professionalization effects, see FICHTEN & MEYER 2014. See also the work of the Nordverbund Schulbegleitforschung (literally: school concomitant research of the northern network) http://www.nordverbund-schulbegleitforschung.de/index.php?show=50 and the globally active Collaborative Action Research Network, CARN (http://www.esri.mmu.ac.uk/carnnew/).
research induces the tendency to presuppose the same competences for all partners, which they do not have in most cases (FICHTEN & MEYER 2014, p.77). One solution for this is seen in a “[...] productive connection of moments of work-sharing cooperation with pragmatic and dynamic task differentiation” (ibid.). Furthermore, the pragmatic orientation of action research projects can also be accompanied by shortcuts that are not permissible in science. The work-sharing cooperation at times may go too far, so that counterproductive hierarchies emerge (ALTRICHTER & GSTETTNER 1993). In order to avoid a shortening of the scholarly referential framework as well as role-confusions, emotional barriers, prejudices, and ideological rigidity, the authors propose a systematic introduction of scientific theories and methods to the participating teachers or teacher students, as well as an external supervision of the cooperation.

Within action research, there is, however, generally no training in terms of a development of epistemological and methodological reflexivity. This can also be problematic for the organization of scientific studies. The methodically guided processing of teaching and school development can also be complicated by time and action pressure, and other non-linear characteristics of pedagogical acting, such as by the mutually conflicting interests, ideas, or skills of those involved. This may result in teachers expecting too much from scientists or vice versa, as well as in problems with loyalty or hierarchies in the field. There are no reliable success criteria for action research, although frequently abstract norms, rules, requirements, and standards are used as a guide. However, they often fail to consider the conditions at the school and in the classroom, as well as the actual practices (RADTKE 1979, p.31)

Following FICHTEN & MEYER (2014, p.14), who interpret action research as research-based learning, it is possible to posit productive teamwork, a thorough reflection of ethical aspects, motivation, and sufficient resources as the most important conditions (not criteria) for the success of action research projects (FICHTEN & MEYER 2014, p.35 et seq.).

Before discussing the concept of research-based learning in more detail, the concept of working with cases is the subject in the following.

**Working with Cases at the University**

In working with cases in the context of teacher education, the “case form” of pedagogical action and pedagogical knowledge forms that has already been outlined above is adopted. Work with cases is described by a diverse array of terms corresponding to different procedures (casuistry, case-based work, case analysis, case study, case vignette). As part of teacher education, the work with cases generally aims at the development of critical thinking through the development of reflexivity in terms of practices and experiential learning.
The cases that are studied in universities are generated from practice and directly connect to the practical experience of teachers. At the same time, there are several possibilities to theoretically (re-)contextualize the cases. In freeing a case from its action context, complexity is reduced and also depicted. This fundamentally opens a potentially multi-perspective handling of the selected detail of (school) reality, which is often captured on film or through participatory observation.

According to Sabine REH & Kerstin RABENSTEIN (2005), cases are used as follows in teacher education:

- as examples to illustrate general findings;
- in applying educational scientific theories, methods, categories, and terms relevant for a course;
- to introduce the forms of analysis of a particular scientific or practically pedagogic subject area;
- for a method-driven elaboration of possible solutions to pedagogical problems.

The aim of case-based learning is formulated by Annika GOEZE & Stefanie HARTZ (2010, p.111) as follows: “Theories on everyday life and motives for action are given a linguistic form through the case and are ‘transferred from the state of the intuitive to a reflexive stage’ (Nittel 1997 p.145).” The room for interpretation created here does, however, become a problem, if there is no response to a lack of exact procedures and stable concepts. The quality of case-work is also crucially dependent on the prior knowledge of those interpreting the case, knowledge that must not least be formed in teacher students.

REH & RABENSTEIN (2005) formulate the educational aspect of case-work in their plea for its combination with the systematic development of expertise. Systematic work with cases should serve to avoid speculations about the intentions of others, circular reasonings on the basis of what is already known, or inadmissible generalizations. Cases are selected to raise questions. In this mode, they should contribute to the deconstruction of internalized interpretation patterns or subjective theories about schools and education, and to the elaboration of structural insights (Cf. COMBE 2001; HELSPER 2001a). Considering the knowledge-defining significance of provocation in combination with its devotion to the singular, both REH & RABENSTEIN (2005) and Edmund STEINER (2004, p.49-116) consider case-work a particular meaningful exercise in abductive reasoning: that is to say, a logical operation that, according to PEIRCE ([1903] 1934), combines an instinctive, pre-theoretical moment of insight with a procedural, methodical-rational forwarding of hypotheses.
Case-work is especially suitable for the dissection of methodically-controlled speculation, circular arguments, and generalizations. In particular, the structures of casuistic texts usually exhibit a paradigmatic thought mode that is contradictory to the methodical-scientific approach. This discrepancy can be a subject of meta-analysis of case understanding from the first, the second, and the third-observer perspective, and can thus help to illuminate the theory-practice relationship in pedagogy from different angles.

REH & RABENSTEIN (2005) see a very fundamental problem of case-work in teacher education in the fact that well-founded and tested concepts are still missing: “An independent field of research has not (yet) been established for the evaluation of cases in seminars, or for the question which teaching competences a teacher trainer needs to possess for this” (REH & RABENSTEIN 2005, p.3).

This, however, has changed in recent years (see de BOER & REH 2012). One example is the approach of research-based learning, which is currently in great demand in the wake of teacher-training reforms. In this context, it must be highlighted that research-based learning at the university can be distinguished from both generic university didactics that aim to retrace earlier research processes and results, as well as from critical learning as the reflection of fundamental scientific questions (FICHTEN 2010, p.133).

Research-based Learning at the University

In accordance with the “Recommendations for a Core Curriculum of Educational Science” published by the Structural Commission of the German Educational Research Association (DGfE) in 2004, “research-based learning” is an integral part of both teacher education and the research field of school and teaching development, which has seen a significant rise in importance over the past years. This becomes obvious, for example, in the commission’s recommendations on the structuring of new courses and degrees, such as the implementation of the BA/MA system (see DGfE 1999). These recommendations stipulate the combination of school and teaching development with research-based learning in the module “Profession-Specific Teacher Training.”

Similarly, the “Structural Model for Teacher Training in the Bachelor-Master System in Study Unit 3” and the “Activity Field School” of the BA, published by the German Educational Research Association in 2004, includes “Instructions for Theoretically Guided Methodical Observation and Analysis of School Reality.” The MA incorporates advanced professionally oriented training.

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41 The recommendations of the Structural Commission therefore also explicitly stipulate the combination of the thematic area of school and teaching development with research-based learning in the modules “Profession Specific Teacher Training.” and “School development: school program work and evaluation, exploration of the working field school (research-based learning, pedagogical case understanding).”
Research-based learning at the university is legitimized by the idea of the unity of teaching and research, which is constitutive for the humanistic education concept. Academic training is not limited to the reception of theories and research results, but is also seen as an active participation in the creation of scientific knowledge (GARLICH 1996). According to the guiding idea of the university, a scientific study can allow the active participation of students in science, instead of limiting their contribution to the reception of results. In terms of university studies, “scientific,” as already defined by the German Federal Assistant Conference (“Bundesassistentenkonferenz”) in 1970, means the “[...] training by scientists, in a science and for a profession that depends on science and requires systematic, independent, and critical work in particular area” (BAK 1970, p.9, emphasis by author). Here, science is seen as a communicatively structured cognitive process taking place as an institutionally framed participation. There is no “[...] unified theory and no related didactic of research-based learning” (KOCH-PRIEWE & THIELE 2009, p.271). Within university didactics, research-based learning can be discussed as the introduction to empirical-scientific work, action research, case-work, as a reflection of individual practical work, as biographical approaches to the teaching profession, or as an interdisciplinary integration of professional teacher knowledge and abilities in a research-led, research-based, research-oriented, research-transmitting, and/or research-concomitant manner (KARBER & WUSTMANN 2015). In didactic approaches it is understood as teaching-learning arrangements aimed at strengthening the self-efficacy of professional actors, at the formation of a scientific attitude, and at the abilities of problem-solving and self-regulated learning, i.e. at sustainable and versatile competence development (cp. MESSNER 2009, ROTERS et al. 2009).

The term “research-driven attitude” is, however, unclear (KULLMANN 2011). A “research-driven attitude” can be seen in “[...] withstanding the uncertainty of action, repeatedly reflecting the implications for action in uncertainty, and also taking responsibility for the action” (RABEKLEBERG 1996, p.295). Structure-theoretical, competence-oriented, professional-theoretical, and professional-biographical approaches all emphasize the formation of a professional reflexivity (FICHTEN & MEYER 2014, p.24).

In their synopsis of currently circulating models of research-based learning, FICHTEN & MEYER (2014, p.33) formulate its tasks in terms of problem-solving, self-regulated learning, self-efficacy, and reflection competences in the context of action research. These tasks include:

- the creation of an action-oriented knowledge base and extension of practical profession knowledge. For example, the implicit knowledge of professional practitioners should be made explicit and thus available to them (FICHTEN & MEYER 2014, p.12);
- the increase of problem-solving capabilities;
the optimization of pedagogical decisions and improvement of operational rationality;
-the modification of situation perception and interpretation by multi-perspectivity and reframing;
-the intensification of communication with pupils and colleagues;
-the modification of long-term convictions;
-the strengthening of the personality and a modification of the “professional self”

As a university didactic concept, research-based learning provides an integration of research into teaching. This is beneficial for science, and simultaneously ensures that teaching is not “[...] a mere handing down of cognitions that has solidified in the form of school knowledge, thanks to its liaison with epistemological approaches” (HUBER 1983, p.497). Not only the important characteristics (methods, classification) and procedures of scientific research should be imparted during studies. In view of the heterogeneity of existing theoretical approaches and methods, as well as of the researching parties, active participation in science should also be encouraged in a variety of ways (Cf. BOELHAUVE et al. 2004). Research-based learning in higher education, in particular, should be implemented as a theory-led discussion of experienced reality (FICHTEN 2010). The demands of this approach are thus high.

In operational terms, research-based learning recognizes the development tasks in everyday life and professional practice, and treats them as research subjects. In this way, learning should be established as a lifestyle—as “life-long learning.” The characteristics of the method of research-based learning include (COLLINS & BROWN 1984, cited by MESSNER 2009):

-the independent choice of a topic by the researchers or learners, whose practical relevance is either given from direct observation or stated in school practice documents such as teaching protocols;
-the accompanying survey of the current state of research, and the precise definition of a problem/question or a hypothesis formation;
-the selection of possible methods, experimental set-ups, etc. to examine this question;
-the risk of errors and misdirections is taken into account, while the opportunity for unexpected findings is considered. Both are documented and presented to the working group;
-the classification, evaluation, and reflection of thoughts, ingrained patterns, images of schools and teaching of pupils emanating from one’s own school-biographical experiences are discussed, communicated, reflected, and their implications are considered for one’s own future actions;
Research-based learning must be learned. Appropriate learning settings initially provide the possibility of imitation. For example, teachers can illustrate their own research actions (modelling). After an exercise in scientific procedures, research actions occur following instructions and with relatively close supervision. The teacher supports the learners in independently working on a problem (coaching), s/he provides structuring advice (scaffolding), and accompanies independent work. An advanced knowledge of research approaches and methods increasingly allows independent research activities (exploration). The learners then explain and justify their procedures as they implement them with independent problem-solving competence (articulation). In the same manner, the reflection of the research activity and the creation of documentation and presentations (texts, Powerpoints, subtitled film sequences) are directed and learned. This can take place as part of a discussion or in comparison with different procedures. Since such learning has a pronounced exploratory nature, it permanently poses new challenges to the learners as well as the learning tutor. The prerequisite for the professional structuring and accompaniment of research-based learning is certainly being qualified for scientific work. At the same time, science tends to evade the type of ad-hoc knowledge transfer that can take place under time pressure in teaching training. FICHTEN (2010, p.166) therefore clearly distinguishes research-based learning from scientific research: “As a learning concept, research-based learning adheres to axioms of learning theory and a learning logic. Research as an instrument of scientific knowledge follows epistemological, methodological and methodical criteria, i.e. scientific and research logic.” In short, the approach of research-based learning is not scientific, but rather science-related or science-based. The practical relevance of research-based learning is also not proven; according to FICHTEN & MEYER (2014, p.14), “stringent data is rare.” FICHTEN (2010, p.159 et seq.) also discusses some results that he uses to clearly identify research-based learning as a learning rather than a research concept. However, at the university, the fulfilment of the demand for “more practical relevance” and “smaller classes,” which is usually associated with research-based learning, is now more unrealistic than ever (HUBER 1998). Instead, the unity of research and teaching is currently in danger of being crushed by the tension between cutting-edge research, which is exposed to international competition, and the school-like university for the masses (“degree factory”) (see also HUBER 2003). The latter universities are increasingly designed for professional qualifications, thus it is necessary to pre-structure research-based learning so that it can take place independently, and to document it so that it can be transferred into other contexts. Research-based learning must be conceived in terms of a training performance evaluation oriented towards competence development,
even for large numbers of students. For the creation of such learning environments, it is possible to employ digital media, which produce professional proximity in a multimodal manner and thereby contribute to the development of professional thinking and acting.

An exemplary use of research-based learning is given by the approach of design-based research in the sense of participatory environmental governance (see the research project “DGE-Evaluating the Delivery of participatory environmental Governance using an Evidence-based research design” by Jens NEWIG, Nicolas W. Jäger, Ed Challies at the University of Lüneburg. http://fox.leuphana.de/portal/de/projects/projects%2875dd5943-bcc1-4e93-939c-6060321a02b6%29.html). The design-based research approach will be discussed in the following. Thereafter, a new concept for participatory and science-based quality development in the education sector will be introduced.

PART 4

Example of Research-Based Learning at the University: Design-Based Research (DBR)

Sasha BARAB & Kurt SQUIRE (2004, p.2) define design-based research (DBR) as “[...] a series of approaches with the intent of producing new theories, artifacts, and practices that account for and potentially impact learning and teaching in naturalistic settings.” Design-based research is based on philosophical pragmatism, according to which the value of a theory lies in its potential to change the world; BARAB & SQUIRE 2004, p.6 (cf. also COBB et al. 2003, p.10) write: “The theory must do real work.” Insights are generated in practical situations and any changes within them are conceived as innovation.

In DBR, it is assumed that research and innovation are based on planning and design. Here, a particular notion of the activity of planning is employed: a research design has distinct characteristics, it includes specific procedures, and it is founded both theoretically and empirically (VAN DEN AKKER 1999). A design is always directed towards an objective, which is understood as a “product” in the DBR approach (The Design-Based Research Collective 2002, p.7). In the context of pedagogy, this product is usually a pedagogical intervention: a lesson plan, a teaching model, a hypothesis, a theory, specific teaching material, one or several design principles. Design principles, which are the central concept of the DBR approach, are understood through the relationship of processes, results, and context. A “design is an innovative plan or model to be tested in practice. HERRINGTON et al. (2007, p.4096) define “design principles” as follows for the DBR approach: “Design principles contain substantive and procedural knowledge with comprehensive and accurate portrayal of the procedures, results, and context, such that readers may determine which insights may be relevant to their own specific settings. In the traditional sense, generalization
of design-based research findings is rather limited; instead, use of design principles calls for a form of analytical generalization.”

The aim is a precise and a reflexive procedure: Jan HERRINGTON et al. (2007, p.4091; referring to BROWN 1992 and COLLINS 1992) write: “They described it [DBR] as a methodology that requires: addressing complex problems in real contexts in collaboration with practitioners; integrating known and hypothetical design principles with technological affordances to render plausible solutions to these complex problems; and conducting rigorous and reflective inquiry to test and refine innovative learning environments as well as to define new design principles.”

HERRINGTON et al. (2007, p.4092) detail a procedure of “[...] phases of design-based research mapped against typical elements of a research proposal”: a topic or an option is identified in terms of its history and its background, so that the value of the study both for practice and for theory becomes evident. According to Jan VAN DEN AKKER (1999, p.7) “[...] a more intensive and systematic preliminary investigation of curriculum tasks, problems and context is made, including searching for more accurate and explicit connections of that analysis with state-of-the-art knowledge [...]”. This involves the elaboration of approaches that appear to be suitable for solving the signified problem (HERRINGTON et al. 2007, p.4095). Such research design is also understood as an innovative learning environment (ibid.). Repetitive cycles, in which a particular research design (test design) is developed, tested in practice, evaluated, and further developed on the basis of the evaluation results (i.e. restructured, reconstructed, conceived anew, extended, and/or re-designed), is characteristic for the DBR approach. A research-based examination of a design makes use of the entire spectrum of qualitative and quantitative socio-scientific methods. The overall objective is a contribution to the improvement of professional practice as well as to the corresponding theory formation.

In the context of university DBR settings, students are involved in the research process early on, signifying scientific problems, developing research designs, and working on these together with their teachers at university and/or with the teachers at school. In educational research and teacher education, the DBR approach is used to elicit the theory content of teaching practice, to identify its problems, to design approaches to problem-solving, and to test these solutions in teaching. Theoretical dignity is attributed to teaching practice. For example, Susanne PREDIGER & Michael LINK (2012, p.42) write: “[...] the development of learning arrangements [should] already be imagined as a potential field of research for the generation of new knowledge. Every learning arrangement is implicitly backed by a local theory of subject-specific learning, which must be made concrete and empirically documented and verified.” Design-based research not only aims at interweaving research and practical lesson development, it is also accorded the potential of revolutionizing teaching and learning (HERRINGTON et al. 2007, p.4098).
The DBR approach was initially developed in a scientific community that was almost completely unaware of didactics as a discipline (cp. HUDSON & MEYER 2011). It is thus surprising that the approach is seen as relevant in scientific contexts with a strong didactic tradition. The DBR approach resembles the didactic operationalization of learning or competence objectives in lesson design (see above) and the reflection of a planned teaching practice, applying its procedures to pedagogical, logistical, and school-organizational issues as well as to its research-related agenda.

However, the pragmatist signature of the approach is partially problematic. According to pragmatism, truth is initially conceived as the conformity of a thought, an idea, or a statement with reality; according to William JAMES (1906), this is linked to the process of verification. Conformity with reality consequently refers less to a fixed relation, but rather to the process of examining hypothetical problem solutions, which can be associated with observable theoretical or practically relevant consequences. There is a risk of equating truth with usefulness (cash-value).  

In this case, the gap that exists between (scientifically) theoretical and practical pedagogy, i.e. between pedagogical knowledge and skills, is overshadowed.

If the improvement of educational technologies is discussed in the DBR approach, it must also deal with their prominent criticism (such as LUHMANN & SCHORR 1982). Within the DBR approach, this criticism is countered by, for example, maintaining that it only applies to so-called predictive research approaches, which are distinguished from the DBR approach (see HERRINGTON et al. 2007). While the hypothesis-tested and experimental methods of predictive research approaches are accused of being detached from teaching practice, with DBR practitioners formulate problems and a potential problem solution from within their own field of practice, and in consideration of observed or hypothetical (even technological) planning principles (HERRINGTON et al. 2007, p.4089). However, in this dense cooperation with the practitioners, scant attention is paid to familiarity traps or to implicit forms of pedagogical knowledge.

The model of “Research-Based School—Quality in Development,” which draws on some of the aforementioned models and responds to some of their needs, is presented in the following. This model for cooperation between universities and schools was developed by the author in collaboration with Uta SCHORLEMMER. It attempts to unite the various approaches for teacher education in a practical manner.

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42 This may hinge on the interpretation of the term “principle”: according to Aristotle, “principle” (Lat. principium, beginning, origin, or basis) is a concept of logic. Principles provide the substantive and methodological foundation for a philosophical construct, for a scientific approach, or for an everyday opinion. The term is attributed to a branch of philosophy, epistemology, that calls for or examines the preconditions for cognition as a (subjective) insight and for objectivity in knowledge, what constitutes certainty and justification, and what type of doubt may exist for what kinds of convictions. In the tradition of empiricism and pragmatism in the English-speaking context, epistemology is conceived as theory of knowledge and is thus related to the generation, justification, and dissemination of knowledge. The philosophical, unconditional “insight” is not always separated from the non-philosophical “view” or even an ideology (on the problem of insight, see: HABERLIN 1952).
Example of an Approach to Research-Based Learning at Schools and Universities: Research-Based School – Quality in Development

In the model “Research-based School – Quality in Development,” projects of school and teaching development are combined with tasks of teacher education, with research-based learning at the university and, in a broader sense, with professionalization research. Given the described situation at the universities, it was deemed necessary to find a way to pre-structure research-based learning in such a way that it could largely take place independently. Furthermore, the qualification function of career-oriented study programs requires that research-based learning is documented, so that it can be certified and transferred to other contexts.

The objectives of the project are thus focused on the development of a concept of action research that can be implemented within the pre-existing structures for cooperation between schools and universities. These cooperations usually revolve around the constructive processing of teaching and school development tasks. Teachers at the research-based school are supported by a scientific coordinating team that helps to set up research projects beneficial for classroom teaching and school development. In some cases projects are also conducted under academic leadership. Development tasks, which result from school and teaching activities, are examined in university seminars. At the same time, the approach of school development through participation is also viewed as a tool for quality development in university teaching. The scientific coordinating team thus works at and deals with the gap and/or interface between practice and theory.

In order for the research cooperation to be beneficial for both the school and the university programs, the primary objective of the project lies in establishing a concept of quality that is based on a close collaboration (not identity) of research and teaching development. The aim is to construct and support a professional learning community. This quality concept includes the conviction that the quality of work at the school and at the university is high, and that efforts to improve work or facilitate work processes are a natural part of the occupational identity of the employees of the cooperating schools and universities. Individual projects of school and teaching development should be conducted on the basis of a continuous reflection of quality and its potential for school development. It is expected that the determination, formulation, and scientific processing of

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43 This model is based on the understanding of “quality” of the Ludwigsburg University of Education as of the summer term of 2012. The concept is also inspired by the “Hamburg Research Workshop School Development” at the Department of Education of the University of Hamburg, where manageable issues of teaching and school development, which are processed professionally and studied in university seminars, are formulated in cooperation with schools. The “case archive” that has been established at the University of Kassel is exemplary for the digital service agency (http://www.fallarchiv.uni-kassel.de/).
developmental tasks should make work easier and improve quality at the university. Such tasks are thought to be best recognized and used by the individuals who participate in the work processes that involve these tasks,\textsuperscript{44} which may also include external provisos (e.g. new regulations on the level of educational policy). Quality development is therefore an integral part of the school concept.\textsuperscript{45}

Development projects that respond to practical challenges with a manageable problem potential, from which a significant added value for the school is anticipated, are preferred. Priority is usually granted to improvement projects that are of concern for a directly affected group of people. Quality initiatives are thus generally developed from the “bottom up.” At the same time, the aim is not only to achieve the greatest possible transparency of measures for quality development; the largest possible participation of those affected is also desirable.

Dialogic processes especially focus on the commitment of teachers and pupils as a primary resource for concrete development work. This serves to accentuate their personal responsibility for teaching-learning processes. In an interactive space, those participating in teaching and school development articulate their needs, interests, and expectations. Based on sequentially identified layers of need, the project thus follows the objective of supporting pupils (and teachers) in increasing their self-efficacy and acquiring democratic and methodological skills. They study, learn to understand, and apply the methods, strategies, and procedures most suitable for the analysis of teaching-learning processes and of quality development. Development tasks are formulated by reflecting on the challenges related to them and put into use in concrete measures. Using various differences (gender, mother tongue, age, previous experience with different school learning and performance profiles, etc.), diverse context and subject-oriented challenges for pedagogy are addressed and included in heterogeneous initial conditions and cultures of learning. The concept of the research-based school serves to conceptually link teacher education with its occupational field by actively involving teachers in the administration, interpretation, structuring, empirical grounding, and multiplication of data, analysis, and expertise.

This should bring about innovative didactic and scientific impetuses for the university. At the university and within the framework of method workshops related to qualification theses and scientific publications, scientific studies are created on subjects and challenges that emerge in

\textsuperscript{44} Participants are people who are involved in the work process in question because their task or responsibility field. These could be people from completely different organizational units. In the sense intended here, “participating” also applies to people who experience the results of the work process immediately, i.e. the addressees of the process.

\textsuperscript{45} The school and the university are contractually obliged to provide appropriate resources, (regulated decision structures and processes in committees, regulated possibilities of participation and intervention or similar), assistance, support, and legwork, as well as appropriate certificates for scientific achievements rendered as part of the project. The interest of teachers and their willingness to perform their own scientific work, as well as their openness to the scientific interest of others in their work and to the tasks of teaching and school development is also governed by contract and rewarded with a reduction of the teaching load. Smaller scientific grant applications are used to obtain additional financial, time, and staff resources for scientifically oriented teaching and school development.
schools. Quantitative and qualitative methods are combined. This allows for an improvement of scholastics and academic appraisal of students, even with high student numbers.

The major challenges that confront such a project can be countered by organizing the connection between research-based schools and research-based learning at the university at two central points of contact. This first is a coordinating team or coordinator, a scientific employee position at the school location who is responsible for the scientific quality development program of the research-based school. The coordinator sees him-/herself as an interface for information, school-related professional and scientific knowledge, and for the protection of the personal rights of those involved, and also as a mediator of the interests of the school and university. The second point of contact is an e-platform as a “digital service office,” created and maintained according to the standards of scientific ethics. The organization of projects at the school and university is functionally controlled via the e-platform (Moodle). The various digital function fields of the e-platform are gradually implemented at universities and schools, under careful consideration of various property rights (e.g. privacy rights), and are constantly subject to quality assurance. This is also the responsibility of the coordinator. The digital service office provides information about scientific procedures and instruments of qualitative, dialogical evaluation. It connects these with the documentation of meetings, seminars, research, and other services (e.g. with the case archive). This documentation contributes to the theoretical and empirical work performed at the university. Digital media make it possible to place film, image, audio, and text media side by side, to combine these with one another, and to process these further. Besides the coordinator and the teachers, password-protected access to the e-platform or its subdivisions is also granted to cooperating scientists. On the e-platform one can find and retrieve data material, methods, and results of scientific studies. Mediated by the scientific coordinator, scientists also provide their own analyses, texts, etc. on this platform and thus contribute to the work on quality at the research-based school and at the university. The access of scientists, teachers, and students to the e-platform and the processing of data by these groups gives rise to synergies (publications, concepts for teacher-training, scientific cooperation) that bring about many advantages both for the research-based school and teaching at the university. The clear and careful documentation of the development projects (documentation of resolutions, proposals, reports, data, studies, teaching materials, didactic methods, etc.) within the digital service office serves to make the quality development process comprehensible for contributors to the project, as well as those not directly involved. This work is facilitated using digital technologies.

The procedure for quality development can be described as a continuous, spiral-formed reflection process concerning ways of improving the school and teaching quality according to the following model:
I Determining quality requirements/needs and defining objectives
At the school, the participants determine in which part of their respective field of work a quality development is necessary, and which changes are desired.

II Project description and documentation
The participants describe the current state of the work context in question, including their current perception of its strengths and weaknesses. A developmental task is formulated, a procedure is defined, and a schedule is established.

III Data collection and documentation
Scientific results are determined for the development task and a research setting is developed. At this point it is also possible to submit a funding application, if necessary. This is followed by methodologically based data collection and analysis. Particular emphasis is placed on possibilities for (further) processing of school-wide tools of quality assurance (regulations, statutes, checklists, forms ...).

IV Communication of results and documentation:
The participants have password-protected access to processes, tools, responsibilities, procedures, results, etc. The obtained results and the developed process descriptions or quality tools are, if this has not been done already, made available to the coordinating body, in order to ensure the coordination of the various quality initiatives in a cohesive quality management system.

The strategic decision-making committees of the school work, mediated by the coordinating team, together with the groups or individuals engaged in active research. Scientific strategizing and operational quality development are not understood hierarchically, but as two aspects of the same project.

An external opinion can be secured with input from a critical friend at a so-called negotiating table – a meeting only convened in serious cases of conflict. Together with the coordinator, those directly involved in the conflict, a supporter for each party, and the critical friend attempt to solve problems. The negotiating table can also recommend that the quality concept as such is modified (e.g. by listing new key categories of quality development).

Table 1: Cooperation model
On an operational level, the cooperation between the different groups is organized as follows:

The scientific and school project management formulate strategic development objectives that motivate and guide individual projects, whereby the interpretation of these objectives can be broadly interpreted. Quality development is monitored and moderated by the project managements in a fundamentally dialogic manner; the operational groups usually work independently.

The working groups for quality development, in which potentially all those involved in school development participate, link development projects to the cross-project strategic objectives and legitimize these within the framework of the school concept. The working groups devise development projects they can delegate or conduct themselves. They must pay attention to comply with the notion of quality set forth in the school concept, and cooperate with the university.

The multimodal learning setting of the e-platform allows for the pre-structuring and enabling of multimodally applied university didactics in teacher education. This model of teacher education, which can be implemented by means of the e-platform, make it possible in university seminars to selectively address the challenges currently at stake in teaching and school situations, and to reflect these scientifically within a university didactic framework. This occurs through the access to development tasks, which have been formulated in school or in teaching practice, as well as to the flexibly and professionally collected film, audio, text (transcription), and other digital data material. Data material from the school (film, documents, policy documents etc.) and processable development tasks arising in the school (pedagogical intentions, competence objectives etc.), are thus presented to university students in their seminars. They receive the material from the school via the e-platform: the actors in the school have been supported by the coordinator in the collection of data, which s/he processes for scientific analysis (transcriptions, film editing, formatting, and anonymization) and uploads to the e-platform. The digital pool allows students (and other project participants) to create an empirical study on a development task provided by the school, and to arrive at their own questions. Furthermore, the students develop alternatives to the documented practices or situations in schools and teaching, in a multimodal, i.e. analytically-lyrical, cinematic, figurative, and auditive manner, as well as solutions, contrasting scenes, possible parallel events, or “backstages” (ZINNECKER 1978), which they record and document during internships, or by making use of artistic means (short films, etc.). It is expected that various learning opportunities result from the material which they generate. Individual works from the digital portfolios created by the students are discussed in the seminar group and possibly also evaluated in the form of examinations. Results that have been selected for this purpose (analyses, films of alternative paths) are forwarded to the cooperating schools, and they continue to process these results with the help of the coordinating team. If necessary, the team may comment on or explain the student’s results. A re-circulation of processed documents back to the university is also possible.
Basic structure of the e-platform:

![Diagram](image)

With this digital setting for information, communication, and learning, the multimodal advantages of digital media become apparent and can be discussed in a transdisciplinary manner. The e-platform can be used for presentations, discussions, or trainings. As a multimodal learning setting, it is also suitable for the support of large lectures or smaller seminars at the university. The work with the e-platform can be understood as DCBL (Design Challenge Based Learning) as understood by Eli BLEVIS (2010): it is intended to give rise to an explorative and creative discussion of various learning subjects; individual and collaborative activities; and the public presentation and critique of the results. The multimodal presentation and examination of processes and practical knowledge can also be adapted for the interpretation of professional reflexivity based on implicit, rather than explicit, forms of knowledge relevant for school and teaching development. On the basis of the “open architecture learning model” of Terry WRIGLEY (2007), the e-platform can also be understood as an open setting for research-based learning, which can also be extended by new components. The development of applications on the e-platform that allow the interactive connection of school events with events held at the university is also conceivable. Diverse forms of knowledge linked with the theoretical perspective of pedagogical anthropology are brought to attention and made the subject of competence development in the context of the teacher education.

Having now discussed the conceptual and organizational framework and operative learning settings for teacher education, in the following the principle of performativity will be developed, the principle best suited to the pedagogical forms of knowledge unfolded above and their elaboration. This formulation of a general principle, on which the acquisition of pedagogical knowledge forms can be based, seems necessary in order to introduce the application of theory in the pedagogical profession. This principle has already been defined as the relevant mode of dealing with the unforeseen, supported by professional, methodical, pedagogical, and didactical knowledge.\(^\text{46}\) Performativity is at the center of competent pedagogical action and, at the same time, the precondition for such.

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\(^{46}\) One example of learning content being examined in terms of its unforeseen aspects could include the explanation of various forms of energy production, on the basis of different forms of risk management in science or technology education. Another example is the interpretation of a work of art in art class, based not on what is depicted, but to what it responds (see DIDI-HUBERMAN 1992). In both examples, a factual situation is explained in the light of the unforeseen or unknown.
In the following, a performative education concept is placed in relation to a performative game concept, and developed in view of the mediality of pedagogical action events. This aims at determining the performative character of educational practices, to make these illustratable or representable, and to thus make them accessible for teacher education. Performativity is a controversially discussed concept. In the following it is first described by relating it to rationality. Subsequently, the competence concept is examined in relation to a performativity concept different from the action-theoretical argumentation unfolded in this book. The performativity concept is then re-considered on the previously developed premises. This is done primarily with the objective of fulfilling the specifics of pedagogical knowledge. Hereby, the approach of pedagogical anthropology should be made fruitful for teacher education, by examining science not only in terms of scientific methods, but also in terms of its generic and critical potentials.\textsuperscript{47}

\textsuperscript{47} Above, research-based learning was distinguished from generic learning, i.e. the retracing of earlier research processes and results, and from critical learning as a reflection of fundamental scientific questions.
Performative Pedagogy
Performativity and Rationality

Every theory construction and every learning process also has a performative character. That is to say, their meaning or significance is not only achieved through a purposeful, rationally controlled, and strategic procedure, but also approaches the actors in an eventful or emergent manner (KERTSCHER & MERSCH 2003). According to the concept of emergence, phenomena and their effects cannot be easily differentiated. Take the example “a tree grows”: the formation of the trunk, branches, twigs, and leaves, the tree’s height and its width results in the tree itself, seen from the perspective of performativity, the process of growth and the tree itself cannot be distinguished.

Another example of performativity is “the gradual construction of thoughts during speech,” to which Heinrich VON KLEIST ([1805] 2004) refers when he admonishes his readers to speak to others with “the sensible intention of instructing oneself,” (ibid, p.405) instead of talking about what they already know.48 Because of their emergent character, performative actions and their consequences cannot be fully anticipated by the actor, which is why it is not possible to rationally control them in every respect. Performative action, judgement, and understanding cannot be solely attributed to a concept of understanding based on text and speech, but rather originate within a complexity of perceptions and processes. Performative action is based on gestural reenactments, on deictic actions and structures, on the recognition of developments and processes as they occur, and on formations that arise. Performative understanding is always related to singularities and an alterity that cannot be fully grasped. Within this anticipation of the performative, the conceptual design of knowledge remains provisional and precarious. A theory of the performative to a great deal eludes measurement or standardization.49

The study of performative phenomena in the sense of practical research is by no means contrary to an academic approach or to pedagogical theory formation. Ralf BOHNSACK (2007, p.201 [emphasis by author]) writes: “[...] the cultural and social scientific observer should question: how is what is believed to be true and correct, or marginalized as untrue and false, produced in everyday

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48 VON KLEIST ([1805] 2004) continues: “Often I sit at my desk, poring over documents and trying to discover the point of view from which some complicated controversy might be judged. Then, when my inmost being is involved in the endeavour to arrive at the truth, I usually stare into the light, the brightest point in the room. Or when an algebraic problem arises, I look for the first preliminary statement, the equation, which expresses the given circumstances and from which later the solution can be easily deduced by calculation. But, lo and behold, if I mention it to my sister, who is sitting behind me and working, I discover facts which whole hours of brooding, perhaps, would not have revealed. Not that she literally tells them to me; for neither does she know the book of rules, nor has she studied Euler or Kästner. Nor is it that her skillful questioning leads me on to the point which matters, though this may frequently be the case. But since I always have some obscure preconception, distantly connected in some way with whatever I am looking for, I have only to begin boldly and the mind, obliged to find an end for this beginning, transforms my confused concept as I speak into thoughts that are perfectly clear, so that, to my surprise, the end of the sentence coincides with the desired knowledge. I interpose inarticulate sounds, draw out the connecting words, possibly even use an apposition when required and employ other tricks which will prolong my speech in order to gain sufficient time for the fabrication of my idea in the workshop of reason.” (Available: http://www.ias-research.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Kleist-and-Hamburger_-_1951_-_On-the-Gradual-Construction-of-Thoughts-During-Speech.pdf)

49 For a detailed exposition of the determination of the scientific orientation of teacher education on the basis of a performativity theoretical approach, see KRAUS 2015.
practice, in its socialization history, in its sociogenesis?” A social event can thus be determined by a performativity-theoretically informed analysis directed at the “how” of an event. The object of “[...] a valid sociological observation is consequently [...] not the motives and subjective intentions themselves, but merely the processes of their construction, i.e. their interpretative and definitional performativity” (BOHNSACK 2007, p.202). However, an adequate descriptive language for the inner regularity and momentum of performative social phenomena and their interpretation has to date only been elaborated to a very limited extent, and this is particularly true in the context of knowledge forms in pedagogy.\(^5\) A development of such a language would, however, be especially important for university didactics in the context of teacher education.

“A performative perspective rejects a general and absolute method and interpretation of reality in favor of a relativistic interpretation that is adapted to contexts, and which yields a plurality of idiomatic gestures and contextualising phenomenologies” (WULF & ZIRFAS 2007, p.9).

Considered from the viewpoint of performativity and phenomenology,\(^5\) performative actions exactly and only signify what they accomplish. The actor experiences this significance as an event (FISCHER-LICHTE 2001, p.20). The act of witnessing significance includes a mimetic moment (GEBAUER & WULF 1998) and the chance for a (re-)interpretation of action patterns. At the same time, performative action has its place only in the specific context it influences, and by which it is influenced. Performative action can partially do justice to a cause or intention, e.g. it can be reconciled with intersubjective needs or connected to the attitude of the acting person. It is based on individual context sensitivity, i.e. it can be more or less pronounced in a variety of ways.

The modalities, functions, effects, and contexts of a thing or an event, which are of particular interest from a performativity-theoretical perspective, also constitute the focus of phenomenology, especially of body-phenomenology. On this, Kate MEYER-DRAWE (2003, p.2) writes: “The ego does not approach its world by straddling it with constructions. It ‘receives’ it and expresses it in a kind of reprise. The bodily orientation in the world comprises linguistic organization. Language expresses the tension between situatedness and objectification because it is able to refer to present

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\(^5\) Research that has addressed such a descriptive language, principally in the field of cultural studies as well as educational science, was undertaken within the frame of the Collaborative Research Centre 447 of the DFG: Performing Cultures - Performative Turns in the Middle Ages, in the Early Modern Period and in Modern Times (see: Http://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/5482988) (BOHNSACK 2007, p.208).

\(^5\) The term “phenomenon” is used both as a terminus ad quo and a terminus ad quem (BLANKENBURG 1991). In the first case, a phenomenon is in itself apparent and thus unequivocally observable (terminus ad quorum). In this sense, phenomenology is a descriptive science of phenomena, that which has been observed is researched by describing how it becomes apparent: this takes place with the aim of understanding this thing from within. The question of how a thing becomes what we perceive it to be addresses its appearance. In the literature of educational science, phenomenology is generally thought of as a descriptive theory of objects (Gegenstandsdilekhe). In the second case, “phenomenon” as a terminus ad quem describes something that is yet to be uncovered, not because it is hidden, but rather because it must be determined within its respective context. In eidetic, constitution-phenomenological, transcendental, and body-phenomenological approaches, “phenomenon” does not merely designate a thing of the actual world, but the thing that becomes apparent in following certain regulatory functions. The term “phenomenology” is concerned with “phenomenon” as a terminus ad quem.
as well as to absent things. Language organizes the situation, while the perception merges into it.” This can be complemented with WALDENFELS (1994, p.132): “Action always has something of a negotiation; because, here, objectives are not found in their final state or set arbitrarily, they are rather formed and determined over the course of the realization. The objectives are indicated more or less in the given, they are presaged” by what has already been realized. This statement can be interpreted to the effect that any action, even the objective-oriented, has an intrinsic performative moment. “Actions are always indirect, broken, mediated by intermediate fields, intermediate entities and intermediate forms such as schematics, style, ritual, symbol, technology, rules, and norms.” (ibid., p.134). We are used to describing such intermediate field entities and forms in a rational manner. Here, however, it becomes clear that they all have one side facing away from us, one that can also (perhaps imperceptibly) be changed by performative events. Performative activities and judgements are influenced by their context, which never completely reveals itself to an actor; they set specifications that in turn produce new contexts.

Contexts arise and are processed in a performative manner. In the classroom, a (successful) choreography may be the result; this will be discussed in more detail at a later point. Because actors can only partially anticipate their own actions and contexts, i.e. as the performative constitution of meaning is unpredictable for them, the private and personal becomes interwoven with the foreign. (see also FISCHER-LICHTE 2001, p.20). On the performativity of human physicality, Sybille KRÄMER (2004, p.20) writes: “In the materiality, the corporality, the presence and eventfulness of signs, something becomes effective that undermines or exceeds the order of the signs, and can thus not be understood or described appropriately as representation or expression events.” The experience of performances often coincides with thoughts about them; at the same time, a surplus of significance and meanings goes beyond mere cognition.

A performative constitution of reality can rely on the effects of language, e.g. on discursive effects. It can also be triggered through actions, through images, and through things. From the perspective of performativity, diverse ways of constituting reality exist, such as recognition, understanding, awareness, reconstruction, and perception. These forms of comprehending performative events are also forms of knowledge and rationality (see above). Explicit declarative knowledge, which is at the forefront of the rationality-theoretical paradigm, is placed alongside many other forms of knowledge.

According to the performative paradigm, and in contrast to the rational one, it cannot be assumed that a (research) subject is simply given. As already pointed out, the focus is rather on the genesis of phenomena and on the interactions between different subjects, facts, as well as on constitutional processes. Through the performative paradigm it becomes possible to elaborate how much current actions and events are embedded in an antecedent structure, a mimetic structure that is appropriated
by the actions and events in its alterity and, simultaneously, as their origin. The genesis of phenomena is thus dependent on its conditions, such as the involved actors. Conversely, new circumstances and pre-conditions are created through the development, change, emergence, self-identification, or effects of performed actions. The objective of performative research is mainly to determine the ways in which performative moments, actions, and practices shape a social field. Subsequently, it can be studied how antinomies, such as what is considered universally valid versus what is context-specific, are performatively interrelated in a social situation. From the performative viewpoint, the practical consummation and design of actions are of interest, along with their expressive qualities, the action aspect of language, incorporated styles, rituals, habitus, threshold and borderline situations, and mimetic circulations (WULF & ZIRFAS 2007, p.8 et seq.).

Performative factors and phenomena cannot be reduced to intentional, conscious, or purposeful action; intentional action weaves into them.

An example of an emergent performative process is the handshake, which, as a form of welcoming, receives a certain significance (e.g. self-confidence, sovereignty or nervousness, insecurity) via its intensity, where and when it takes place, and even its temperature. Such significance is not necessarily intended by the actor. Perhaps he or she will not even be aware of it. It may impose itself nonetheless, and present participants – for a short time – with a unique, i.e. separated from explicit context, non-verbal statement. For example, the welcoming perceived through a handshake in a certain way can create a certain relationship quality, which may have little to do with the explicit action, but nevertheless strongly influences the relationship of those interacting. A moist and strong handshake from a business partner may be construed as a sign of latent excitement and arouse suspicion. It is consequently possible that signs of fraud, guile, or cunning will be sought in the conversation that follows, even if it is marked by courtesy and kindness. Apparently friendly statements may be intended to convict the counterpart. Other feelings, attitudes, and unconscious intentions can also accompany the mistrust. The counterpart may have a corresponding perception. Below the surface of the explicit, implicit events take place and set the communicative course, which may be relevant for the discussion and its outcome. The implicit tenor of a conversation may also diametrically oppose the explicit. The multimodal ability to follow both the explicit as well as the implicit communication that is simultaneously occurring, and to position oneself with respect to both, is generally decisive for the success of conversation.

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52 Other performative phenomena are the effects of an anticipation of possible development regarding real actions, the social dimensioning of an event, the dependence of respective realities on decision-making and/or shaping power. Also the violent nature of certain phenomena is performative. Furthermore, situationally emerging, individual, eventful, spatially-medial, social, material, dramatic, symbolic, and personal scenarios, as well as external influences such as conditions, margins, and practices, all characterize the performative side of a situation (WULF & ZIRFAS 2007).
This example clearly shows that performativity describes action in terms of what causes, requires, and accompanies it. This constitutes a performative action event; both the effects of actions as well as the forms of action can have a more or less pronounced performative character. “Theoretical sensitivity” (GLASER 1978) (see above) has a performative character.

The performative character of social events can be determined using the following questions:

What is represented as “one’s own”?

In what respect are foreign aspects excluded from “one’s own”?

What quarrels occur and how are they resolved?

Social inclusions and exclusions are considered to be the detailed perceptions of self and others generated in social negotiation processes.

In research or exploration oriented to the performative paradigm, it is possible to identify discrepancies and contradictions of a phenomenon in itself as well as in comparison with others. These inconsistencies may arise in action and in speech events, in their simultaneity, or in the light of manifold interdependencies. Through analysis, factors that contribute to the success or failure of a performative action can be described.

In performative practices and processes, certain objects and facts come to the foreground and others recede to the background. As performative effects generate diverse possibilities for acting and perceiving (WALDENFELS 2004a, p.198), the analysis of such effects can support the study of experiences that are formed performatively. The performativity-theoretical perspective focuses on facts that are produced by practices, and the knowledge acquired through them. However, only part of what forms experience can be detected. The intensity, depth, and range of experience remain only rudimentarily recognizable.

It is controversial to what extent a stable reference, e.g. an action subject, can be identified in the described performative dynamics. Performative processes moreover take place according to certain modes. These include action (1); speech effect and recognition (2); discourse (3); aesthesis (4); images (5); and repetition (6). These modes are where the translation of pedagogical theory into pedagogical practice takes place. Above we described this translation process as “pedagogical tact,” and as a way a dealing with the fields of tension within pedagogy, with its plurivalent normativity and with its tacit dimensions.

(1) action: With the first mode, our actions explicitly or implicitly aim to serve a cause – or avoid this. Therefore action is (socially) negotiable (MAROTZKI 2007, p.178). Furthermore, action suits its own symbolism and a certain constitutive capability. For example, if a child does not behave according to expectations in a situation that has been pre-interpreted by adults, then the adult interpretation of the situation can be undermined, at
least briefly, in the face of the different, e.g. functionally unbound, interpretation of the child. Then, a very special kind of rationality comes into effect, and its symbolism may change the social situation. The adults may accept the new situation, perhaps by interrupting their adult conversation and responding to the impulses coming from the child, e.g. by starting to play with him or her, or otherwise acting in a childlike manner. According to WALDENFELS (1994, p.82 and p.447), the mimetic moments in this example can be traced back to responsiveness. “Responsiveness” means that, with all our perceptions (even in our scientific observations), we respond to something that concerns, stimulates, addresses, or calls upon us. Our assertions, opinions, or beliefs, in the sense of being “response,” begin elsewhere and are not limited to the execution of personal designs or intentions (WALDENFELS 1998, p.44 and p.81). This is not least associated with a modification of existing structures of thought (ibid.). WALDENFELS (1994, p.133 [emphasis by author]) writes: “Actions can be [...] assessed based on whether they meet the needs of a person or thing, whether they make something out of what is given.” WALDENFELS (ibid, p.467) develops the notion that, in its responsiveness, the human body can also replace all symbolic media and become the sole medium.\footnote{WALDENFELS 1994, p.467. He establishes this as follows: intralinguistically, the body makes marks with voice and hand, which contribute as phonemes and graphemes to the linguistic generation of meaning. Semilinguistically, symbolic speech turns into a linguistic pointing gesture, with which the humans feel their body and use it in an indicative manner. Paralinguistically, phenomena such as intonation, speech rate, rhythm, and hand signs are part of the generation of meaning in speaking, writing, or writing style. In extra-linguistic phenomena such as facial expression, eye contact, gestures, gait, or posture, the body itself speaks.} Therein, he refers to Edmund HUSSERL’s thought that we do not actually put our actions into use, but they are staged, or that something else is staged by action (HUSSERL 1950, p.98 and p.259). Action is not merely either intentional or spontaneous, it also testifies to its contexts through co-determining and evaluating them. KRÄMER (2004) develops her performativity concept by referring to such processes. More specifically, she considers theatrical action and artistic presentation forms that stipulate participation of the audience in a performance. She shows that in performative action a “creative metamorphosis” of the perceived world takes place. Krämer (2004, p.20) writes: “Mediated by the materiality, corporeality, presence, and eventfulness of signs, something becomes effective which undermines or transgresses the order of the sign. This signification process can neither be reduced to representation, nor to expression.” In a social context, the significance of physical events can neither be fully governed nor anticipated. In her concept of a “corporealizing performativity,” the (over-)emphasis on the cognitive shifts from actions and judgements towards design, uniqueness, creativity, and emergence shall be overcome. The concept of the performative thus detaches itself from cognitions and connects with other modes of constitution.
In regards to (2), speech effect and recognition, it has just been reflected that action can be knowledge-conducive. Conversely, our recognition can influence our actions; it changes according to new cognitions: “Cognition styles characterize the action style of subjects in a social context” (KRÄMER 2004). Actions and behavior are modified through consciously made decisions and insights. Cognitive approaches are based on this (hypothetical) evidence and explain it. According to the performativity-theoretical approach, language lends itself to discovery, invention, and presentation, because it creates a “textual canvas.” The textual canvas can dictate specific subject and object positions, options, knowledge, and action forms. We thus move through speech effects and in linguistically composed cognitions, but we do not control or govern them completely.

(3) Discourse: The meaning of “discourse” varies in different languages. In German, the term is primarily understood in terms of a structured ensemble of speech actions in which linguistic action patterns are implemented in communicative units. Michel FOUCAULT (1991) defines as discourse everything that we (for specific reasons) deem reasonable, given, or true. A discourse is the result of a (not strictly personally initiated or structured) opinion-forming process. Language and purpose are closely interrelated here as power effects. Discourse analysis based on FOUCAULT examines linguistic actions in terms of their rules and regularities, and how reality is constructed by them. Here, discourse analysis focuses the social anchoring of what is deemed to be true, and historical changes. Since such contexts can be reconstructed or explored especially well in institutions, institutionally framed communication generally presents the main research field of discourse analysis. Individual thinking and acting are integrated in discursive interdependencies, which can be traced back to impersonal mechanisms of power such as the formation of public opinion, the “Zeitgeist,” or common social interpretation and action patterns (BÜHRMANN et al. 2007).

(4) Aesthesis: KRÄMER (2004) defines “aesthesis” as a proceeding in which an event and acts of perception, processes of action, and their contemplation or reception come into relation with one another and are assessed before any symbolization. She describes aesthesis as “[...] the bipolar consummation of an event and its perception, which is specifically not reduced to a symbolic expression event” (ibid., p.14). This refers to an intuitive morality or ethics established before any rational judgement (see also SEEL 1993). As the materiality of (speech) characters, as the sensuality of perception, aesthesis is counterpart to logos. However, circumstances are also dimensioned in an ethical manner. In the example given

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54 The following descriptions of the term can be found in dictionaries: English discourse: “written or spoken communication or debate,” French discours: “un développement oral fait devant une audience, le plus souvent à l’occasion d’un événement particulier.”
above, the conversation between business partners changes due to a perceived sensual tension between actor and observer. Here, the prototype of the business conversation is implicitly undermined by aesthetical difference experiences. Due to the symbolism and seminal influence of such experiences, a new course is set for the conversation and for the perspectives of those involved.  

(5) Images: the spontaneous production of external and internal images as a metaphorical basis for rational forms of cognition takes place in a performative manner (see WULF & ZIRFAS 2005). The reason for this, as Gottfried BÖHM (1978, p.447) puts it, is that “[...] image and speech participate in a common plane of imagery.” In the above example of the symbolicity of a social situation modified by the child, it is conceivable that the image of the social situation with high suggestive power, the adult conversation, is changed by the participation of the child. Memories of one’s own childhood, etc. may come up and start ruling the situation. In art, e.g. in film, adequate imagery is sought and found for such developments of change, or respectively for subliminally occurring changes of prevalent orientations. By working out their performative structure, such processes can be made plastic and visible. BÖHM (1978) shows how images and artistic works bring about the modified sensation of a thing, and even their complete (implicit or explicit) reinterpretation.  

(6) Repetition: Gilles DELEUZE (1994) established “difference” and “repetition” as an opposition structure of language according to which each sign obtains its value based on its distinctness from other signs. Repetition is not interpreted as a unity and equality in itself, i.e. not as the production of one and the same thing. Rather, it brings about a fundamental difference. Such a difference cannot be reduced to contradiction. By deferral or repetition without the initially deferred thing and its original size, a thing rather assumes a valence (designated as difference here) that stands on its own. Through processes of recursion, political, socio-cultural, tangible, and natural environments exert influence on living environments and orientations in a performative manner. Through repetitions, social structures (such as habitus, conventions, rituals, and institutions) arise and their existence is also secured. At the same, a sign that is used in another context is given (a new) meaning through new relationships. In this way, an existing structure can also be undermined and modified through repetition.  

The performative game is a concise form of modification by repetition, a mode of changing prevalent orientations through images. It is also an example of intuitive morality as well as of aesthetic or discursive knowledge styles that become apparent in action. In the following, it will be shown that the defining differences applicable in a social situation – and those that are suppressed or negated in such situations – become optional in the performative game.
At various points it has already been indicated that, according to the performative paradigm, human possibilities of action, although not fully controllable, can be modified through diverse influences. However, the performative paradigm is also criticized precisely in this regard. This criticism can become useful in terms of its analytical potentials. The former argumentation will in the following thus be confronted with a (self-) critical view on it.

1. The performative paradigm is accused of being supported by an “[...] idea of permanent identity revolution, which is an identity mimicry” (WULF & ZIRFAS 2007, p.30). Change thus principally knows no boundaries in the performative paradigm. Everything seems permanently changeable and configurable. In this regard, research based on the performative paradigm also faces the allegation that it overestimates the malleability of given social conditions.

2. Meaningful depth, as well as ethical-philosophical implications or substantiality, are not considered in performative processes, because they can neither be identified as performative processes, nor as effects, emergences, or interdependencies. Significances, meanings, and relevance can thus only be determined in their visible manifestation. Ethical-moral, existential, social, or religious dimensions of an event or action can be abridged in situated phenomena in order to keep the performative processes in motion. Pure pragmatism in the sense of “the show must go on” can then stand equivalent to a careful action with different levels of meaning.

In short, performative processes can also be signified as arbitrary. That is to say, a valid moral-ethical preference for one specific attitude over another cannot be made based on its performative effects alone. Such a preference can, moreover, only be achieved with arguments, not based on evidence.

Used critically and analytically, the performativity paradigm can be applied to diverse social phenomena relevant for our context: today, many social fields and phenomena are oriented purely towards efficiency. As a kind of false friend, the term “performance” is then used to refer to sales, effectiveness, viewer levels, and a pursuit of profit based on indices of fulfilment. The special dynamics of processes is replaced by strict output orientation. Assessments based purely on quantitative output are called here “performative.” Human values that are not as evident, measurable, and thus not as detectable or marketable, can then claim decreasing public visibility compared to purely quantitative criteria. This applies to central human values such as dignity, personality, generosity, selflessness, gentleness, solidarity, public spirit, compassion, inner greatness, to a fundamentally analytical attitude, to respect towards life itself. However, these values are very central to pedagogy; they even justify it in the first place as the aims of pedagogical
coordination and convincing efforts. Even the readiness for pedagogy and, as a consequence, for self-education, is not measurable. Compared to more striking orientations that are also more easily represented in numbers, human values face the risk of social underestimation.

Even if terms such as significance, objectivity, and evidence conceal it, empirical research also always relates to “performance” in our sense. This corresponds with the (supposed) value-neutrality of science as a special analytical quality. However, the results of evidence-based empirical research, as it is mainly understood today, only apply to the visible or visualized surface: it lacks cultural, philosophical, and ethical depth. We have already stated this problem in the context of the concept of performativity. Furthermore, there is also an absence of a sustainable ethical, philosophical, and culturally sensitive frame of reflection for the prevalent orientation towards competence development.

The performativity-theoretical paradigm can therefore hardly be used to demand work on inner attitudes. Research based on the performative paradigm is not even suitable for justifying (self-) education, or for developing alternative models of society in the sense of a revaluation of social values. Profound historical impulses, such as those that emerged from the Enlightenment and from other socio-critical movements, cannot be expected from the paradigm of performativity. Since, in contrast to the rational paradigm, the performative paradigm is simply not suitable for philosophical, legal, literary, or other culturally significant principle designs, it cannot provide any ideals or lodestars that oppose the inhumanity nowadays inscribed in social phenomena. The implications that this entails for pedagogy conceived of in a performativity-theoretical sense can only be indicated here.

Rational designs still provide the necessary and indispensable framework of a science geared towards the performative paradigm. As already indicated above, the rationalist and the measurable interpretation of concepts such as education, competences, planning, and control have by no means been shelved. There are rational standards for the evaluation of learning outcomes, the assessment of the severity of boundary violations (fraud, violence, etc.), and for their prosecution. Material and temporal resources are rationally tangible. In many fields, statistical, measurable, and rational agents are thus important in quality assurance.

We, however, have entered into a fringe area of pedagogical knowledge and action forms that are themselves not measurable. The performative paradigm has, compared with the rational paradigm, the advantage that it can be analyzed using practical examples. In this paradigm, theoretical explanations, values, and significances are understood on the basis of practices in which they become visible. For example, by using the performative paradigm it is possible to identify phenomena with a socially subordinate status, as is the case for such events that refer to the human
values listed above. The performative paradigm also offers the possibility of capturing the less conspicuous social and cultural values visible in practice, in their contextual and local intrinsic value. Similarly, it is possible to analyse ideologies, undesirable side effects of actions or processes, action-guiding success formulas, habitus, etc., under performativity-theoretical conditions. Phenomena can be studied with respect to their genesis, how they are fulfilled, and with regard to their effects in the field. It is further possible to determine what is or can be considered feasible in a concrete situation, and what is or will be excluded in it.

Performative events are so-called multimodal events. Multimodal events are, on the one hand, referred to as techniques that are far from theory (see JEWITT 2009). On the other hand, a strong epistemological meaning is created when, for example, digital possibilities of expression are related to verbal linguistic and physical possibilities of expression and to the significance of objects in the real world (BALDRY & THIBAULT 2006). Kay O’HALLORAN (2005, p.11) points out the possibility of “[…] utilizing and combining the unique meaning potentials of language, symbolism, and visual display in such a way that the semantic expansion is greater than the sum of meanings derived from each of the resources.” Research fields are currently opening up for multi-modal interdependencies in various scientific disciplines: the languages of art (O’TOOLE 1994); the grammar of design (KRESS & van LEUWEN 2006); mathematical discourse (O’HALLORAN 2005); the semiotics of human interaction (MARTINEC 2005); the relationship between gesture and phonetics (ZAPPAVIGNA et al. 2010); approaches for the study of the iconology of the performative (WULF & ZIRFAS 2005); sound studies (SCHULZE 2008), etc. All of these research contexts present theoretical-analytical as well as methodical and methodological impetus for performativity-theoretical research from which educational science can benefit.

Concerning teacher education, the necessary tacit knowledge or “knowing-how” of the teaching profession can be developed with recourse to MEYER-DRAWE’s (2008, p.2) phenomenological approach of an “oblique observation”: an “oblique observation” attempts to understand and achieve the pre-rational, pre-predicative, and pre-reflective through reflection (ibid., p.118). Such a perception is not directed to one thing, but rather applies to the pretence of perceptions embedded in a particular situation. It is thus not directed to a what, but rather captures an object in how it shows itself, or in the “[...] way something respectively comes to sight, to execution or into discussion” (WALDENFELS 1998, p.22). This is the “unthematie” in an awareness, according to Iso KERN (1975, p.76 et seq. [emphasis by author]), and an “oblique” repetition of consciousness: while consciousness is straightforward repeated in the direct reflection, “[...] a more complex basic form of mindfulness mirrors the reflection in more pregnant sense. The repeated consciousness is no longer centered accordingly, no longer in the same direction of interest, but rather in a reversal or reorientation. This is done by no longer directing one’s interest to consciousness, but by bending
back its intention to any unthematic moment of the same. It captures some moment in realized consciousness, which indeed belongs in this consciousness, but is not objective within it. The oblique point of view must be practiced in the context of teacher education.

In order to formulate didactics that are founded in performativity theory, the relationship between performance and competence or competence development will be determined in more detail below. The result is then put in relation to the choreography of teaching, to the theatricality of teaching action, and to personality development.

**Performativity and Competence**

Noam Chomsky (1965) distinguishes a universal cognitive deep structure, i.e. competence, which is empirically perceptible and subject to change. He sees this structure and the performance of human action in a relationship of interdependency. Thus, according to CHOMSKY, the deep structure of competence can be reconstructed through a structural analysis of performance. According to CHOMSKY, performance thus can be used to conclude cognitive competences.

This theory is compatible with the current debate on competence, which is marked by cognitivist learning theory, insofar as it maintains that certain identifiable skills can be hypothetically concluded from visible actions, or vice versa. If one follows this argumentation, then “performances” such as output, revenue, effectiveness, audience, performance indices, and ratings can be linked to competence (see previous discussion on quality). According to this model, even competences related to human values such as dignity, personality, altruism, solidarity, public spirit, compassion, inner greatness, a critical attitude, respect, and friendship, as well as motivations and attitudes that may change over the course of a lifetime, become apparent based on their performance. CHOMSKY’s approach, however, has little to do with the previously examined concept of performativity.

Instead, the concept of “competence” and “performance” is given relevance for our theoretical context in the work of Sibylle KRÄMER (2004). In connection to the central concept of performativity in the speech-act theory of John L. AUSTIN ([1955] 1962), KRÄMER (2004) understands the performative as a paradigm of knowledge representation. In contrast to a way of thinking in which educational knowledge is composed cognitively, she describes a corporeal mode

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55 In German: Es handelt es sich dabei um das in einem Bewusstsein Unthematische, nach Iso KERN (1975, S.76f. [Hervorh. i.O.]), um eine „oblique“ Wiederholung von Bewusstsein: Während in der direkten Reflexion das vergegenwärtigte Bewusstsein sozusagen geradewegs wiederholt wird (z.B. in der Erinnerung sehe ich nochmals die Gema auf einer Bergkuppe), [...] spiegelt eine komplexere Grundform der Vergegenwärtigung, die Reflexion im prägnanteren Sinn, das wiederholte Bewusstsein nicht mehr gleichsinnig, nicht mehr in gleicher Interessenrichtung, sondern in einer Umwendung oder Umorientierung, indem sie ihr Interesse nicht mehr auf das richtet, worauf das vergegenwärtigte Bewusstsein bzw. dessen bloße Reproduktion, thematisch achtet, sondern ihre Intention auf irgendein im vergegenwärtigten Bewußtsein unthematisches Moment desselben zurückbiegt. Sie erfasst irgendein Moment im vergegenwärtigten Bewußtsein, das zwar in dieses Bewußtsein gehört, aber in ihm selbst nicht gegenständlich ist.”
of knowledge representation. Our mediated access to the world she refers to as a “corporalizing performativity.” The lynchpin of this understanding of knowledge is, as already indicated above, its link to “self-manifestation.” In this, physical actions performed in front of an audience are of particular interest (KRÄMER 2004, p.17). Through the observation of a person’s actions by others, in watching these others become witnesses, that is to say from the second observer perspective. The actor him-/herself also perceives the course of action observed by the others, and adapts his/her own actions through being observed, drawing inspiration from it. Perceived actions and the reactions to them constitute a singular (e.g. social) reality. However, only the actions can bring to light how the situation (and its perception) changes. The development of a “corporalizing performativity” (KRÄMER 2004) in the sensual tension between the actor and the (external or self) perception of his/her actions is not normalized in advance, nor a sign for a sense that lies beyond the visible. It is thus also not representative (as for CHOMSKY 1965), but rather constitutes a situation and its meaning.

The observation and participatin in multimodal performative events are thus “competent” if they are performed in an adequately “worthy” manner (see LÖWISCH 2000), whereby “worthy” action in the framework of teacher education is considered choreography. Competent action should therefore not be understood as a kind of automatism based on the successful use of an existing scheme of action, as assumed by CHOMSKY. Allegedly skillful actions are rather inscribed with a kind of transformative power, because they are successfully answering to others and, by this, to alterity. To return to a previous example: if the expected business conversation is modified by underlying parallel events determined by the handshake, then one can designate those business partners as competent who can detect, in addition to explicit processes, the implicit ones by means of their physically mediated empathy and judgment. Such partners answer in an adequate way to the other. The explicit events are then mediated together with the implicit ones, in such a way that the business conversation can be described as “business-like.” As explicit and implicit processes often differ and may even contradict each other (a friendly face and an aggressive handshake), the partners must respond to both levels in a meaningful manner. In an analogy to pedagogical tact, the

56 According to KRÄMER & STAHLHUT (2001, p.17), performativity was initially emphasized in speech-act theory as a dimension of action in speaking, where oral contract conclusions, layoffs, etc., are simultaneously intended courses of actions (see AUSTIN [1955] 1962). According to this thesis, we do not only use language to describe the “world.” In our speech action, we can also induce certain situations. However, this only applies to social facts, i.e. to such facts that are maintained by recognition from a community. Our social action is rooted in these facts. Performative expressions thus accordingly follow rules of action that ensure success in the intersubjective field (KRÄMER & STAHLHUT 2001 S.95 et seq.). Since these rules are supposedly universal, KRÄMER criticizes the performativity described by austIN as a “universalizing performativity” (KRÄMER 2004 p.14). She criticizes that austIN ignores the spatio-temporal instantiation of speaking, and also fails to consider the asymmetries of power and fundamental differences of speech acts in face-to-face interactions, on television, or similar. As “iterabilisiereperformativitie”, KRÄMER (2004) presents the context-fixedness of significances (DERRIDA) and the socio-formative power of speech acts (BUTLER 1993). Jacques DERRIDA ([1967] 1978) elaborates that performative speech acts function by citing a convention, i.e. by repetition. Judith BUTLER (1993) shows that genders are historically established by the repetition of practices and that the power of conventions, institutions, and customs can be undermined by concept imprints. The freedom of action of a subject and his/her ability for subversion are founded in repetition, because in repetition it is possible to repeat with slight changes, and to thereby bring about shifts. KRÄMER (2004) critically notes that DERRIDA’s approach, as well as that of BUTLER, assumes the equation of culture and text.
worthiness of such action could be described as “business tact.” As stated above, in the performative paradigm phenomena are generally considered together with their genesis. Competence is therefore dependent on its context. If the handshake of a person is aggressive, a neutral facial expression can be more adequate or competent than a friendly approach. Competent acting distinguishes itself in its performance, and does not exist as an a priori applicable catalogue of traits or abilities.

A concept of competence that captures skillful action in the mode of the performative can also be related to the definition of competence according to Andreas FREY (2006). For him, competences are defined based on the requirements of a situation. These requirements, however, have a slightly different connotation than in the common understanding of competence. FREY (2006, p.31 [emphasis by author]) writes: “If the requirements of the situation coincide with a person’s individual conglomeration of skills, then the person has the competence to deal with a task or problem.” This indicates the simultaneity of ability and requirement, output and process, object and genesis, disposition and development. In regard to competent action, according to this interpretation a person does not simply dispose of the abilities that they need in order to respond appropriately to given requirements. The approach of FREY (2006) can rather be interpreted to mean that both an instantiation of reality and reality itself takes place in competent action. An ever-emergent reality and the ability profiles corresponding to it can only be anticipated and controlled to a certain extent; they cannot be measured.

The performative constitution of reality distinguishes itself in emergence, repetition, through its recourse to a complex antecedent structure, through difference and synthesis events, and through aesthetic. Successful action or competence can be more closely determined as a situation-adequate realization of such aspects in terms of resonance and responsiveness. The impact and success of competence are not fully controllable by the acting person. They are neither evident only in their intentions, nor in their subsequent rationalizations. S/he moreover experiences them.

Pedagogical action competence is generally interpreted as a decision-making capability and assertiveness, as well as a coordination, cooperation, problem-solving or transfer ability (LÖWISCH 2000). In contrast, performative pedagogy can be described as an implicit knowledge of meanings and (self-)dynamics of body practices, as well as the ability to apply this knowledge in a context-sensitive manner. Particular consideration is given here to the fact that our experiences are primarily mediated in a sensual-corporeal, and thus in a medial, social, and historical manner.57

According to the performative paradigm, action, cognition, discourse, aesthetic, image, and material

57 HORKHEIMER & ADORNO (1944) present a counter-concept when they point out that the objectified, tangible reference to one’s own and to foreign nature has become a self-evident, everyday condition of modern life: “The body cannot be reverted back into the lived body (German: Leib)” (HORKHEIMER & ADORNO in: RÜSEN 1999, p.254 et seq.).
events become meaningful in emergence, in actions of synthesis, difference, significance, and repetition. The topos of an “ideal world,” marked by pedagogical coordination and convincing efforts; by promoting experience profiles; and by the successful choreography of teaching become objective categories for pedagogical tact. An instructional choreography is therefore founded on these forms of practice and action, and these are thus the central subjects of teacher education.

Before performative university didactics can be discussed in more detail, a concept of pedagogical learning and education must be elaborated from a performativity-theoretical standpoint. It should have become clear that conventional notions of reality are understood as changeable and even dispensable in learning events using the performativity paradigm, and that they can be brought into movement in favor of potential living environments. By focusing on the performance of learning, “[...] the principles are created to think of spaces as open, dynamic, and produced by actions in the first place” (HUBIN 2010, p.2). According to this paradigm, the unforeseeable must always be reckoned with. Performative learning and education events are not entirely predictable, controllable, or measurable.

**Learning and Performativity**

MEYER-DRAWE (2005) shows that there is an unreflected aspect inherent to the concept of learning: learning means *desired* learning.

Not only the negativity of learning processes, that is to say their invisibility, optional nature, and laborious character (see above), but also their complexity becomes clear from the viewpoint of the performative. Learning processes can be construed as a mode of constituting reality. Such a constitution is based on the idea that a learner is *addressed by* and *responds to* the learning objects as well as to learning objectives. At the same time, a learning process is a modification of reality. The learner actively influences a particular practice or a concrete learning situation through his/her way of understanding something (GÖHLICH 2007, p.137). Learning events thus include performative processes of passive affectivity, as well as those of active influence. In both instances, through learning reality is created.

In their concept of mimesis, which connects well to the performativity paradigm, Gunter GEBAUER & Christoph WULF (1992) interlace the passive, “resonant,” and the active, “responsive” side of learning with one another. Mimesis describes an adoption of the given or performed in the mode of action, which functions like a *citation*. A person seizes what is presented to him/her and cites it, as it were. Such a citation always includes deviations from what is being cited. Mimetic action, in this special case mimetic *learning*, is a situated, unique, and social event. Mimetic citation can bring about agreement or conflict. GEBAUER & WULF (2003, p.77) write:
“Mimetic processes initiate movements with broken intentions, provide space for the non-identical, create opportunities for a non-instrumental approach to the world in which the particular is protected against the universal and things and people are granted a break.” In short, mimetic learning is an appropriation that remains open to interpretation.

In performativity theory, the relation of a learner to her-/himself, to others, and to the things to be learned, i.e. the relational character of learning, comes to the foreground of attention. The relational character can include a pedagogical relationship. The self-to-world references which determine learning processes are devised in a mimetic way. However, the depth of meaning inscribed in a self-to-world relation is relevant to learning in many ways. If one also considers the performative interpretation of human physicality as a “corporealizing performativity,” (KRÄMER 2004) and the phenomenological interpretation of the body as an organ of thought that can also become the “sole medium,” then the physical dimension in learning is accentuated. It is thus conceivable that the success of learning efforts on the one hand, or just as deeply impressive failure on the other hand, can result in physical effects (like excitement or discomfort). Such effects are, under certain circumstances, separate from consciousness. Effects of the successful or unsuccessful learning efforts will then continue to be reproduced (repeated, see above) at least partially independent of rational appeals. In the case of the success of learning efforts, a flow of enthusiasm detached from consciousness may result; in case of failure the learning barrier might be felt physically. The reasons for (successful) learning or its failure are predominantly implicit and therefore largely far from conscious. It has already been pointed out that we are permanently faced with our own lack of knowledge, missing skills, and unintentionally missed perceptions (see above). Formal learning largely ignores these integral moments of failure, which are not accessible to targeted influencing. However, if these failures are lost from sight, then a formally framed pedagogical situation can obtain an inhumane signature.

Teaching-learning research is thus confronted with the very important, but rarely discussed, issue of how a learner can receive support on an action level that is hardly controllable by the consciousness (see KRAUS 2002). In view of the great practical importance of non-rational, implicit experience qualities in pedagogy, it is inadmissible that they have remained so underexposed in teaching-learning research. They certainly play a role in subject-oriented learning theory (HOLZKAMP 1995) and in communicative didactics (WINKEL 2007), but they are not systematized there. From a performativity-theoretical standpoint, especially the precarious nature of success in learning can be identified by certain notations. Learning disappointment, (temporarily) inadequate learning outcomes, mistakes and the like are, however, also considered an integral moment of the commencement of learning, both in terms of its genesis and as an accompanying aspect; MEYER-DRAWE (2008, p.90) writes, “the how of learning redraws to the darkness.”
In performativity theory, learning is defined as the overcoming of a state of ignorance as well as un-learning (see above), and it will also be analyzed in this respect. An experience of failing can be remembered. It is pivotal for the success of the learning process that things to be learned are perceived even before any anticipated learning success or failure within the sense of resonance or response. According to the specialist literature, such experiences should be reached in a pedagogically didactic manner, primarily through learning settings based on experience and oriented toward the students. A performativity-theoretical study of such settings in terms of the notations observable within them must still be performed. The possibilities of perceiving the resonance and response that centrally characterize a learning process are socially framed. While this moment is implicit in learning, it must become explicit in educational processes.

**Educational Processes**\(^58\) **and Performativity**

According to Wilhelm von HUMBOLDT (1767-1835), what lies in the general interest will be achieved if the human being is “free.” The individual is a final aim, not subordinated to any purposes which lie outside of him/her. The individual is thus the first location of personality development; a pre-condition which, as a result of educational processes, also comes into the foreground of socially and culturally shaped relationships.

Pedagogy is thus not based on an asymmetrical relationship, in which the burden of responsibility lies with one side only. It also includes practicing being on eye level and an increasing assumption of responsibility by the other side (think of keywords such as: emancipation, lifelong learning). It includes moments of paternalism or heteronomy, just as much as those of self-responsibility or co-determination. Seen from a descriptive phenomenological perspective, pedagogy includes both “educated” and “uneducated” processes; learning and non-learning takes place. Education and non-education also occur equally (HEID 1994, p.59): pedagogical action is both inclusive and exclusive, aspects of democracy as well as their opposites can be found here. Since the objective of pedagogical intentions is to develop and change, but the ambiguities cannot be extinguished, pedagogical intentions can basically only be met partially; Jörg ZIRFAS (2001a, p.58) writes: “[...] the pedagogical intentionality must necessarily miss the identity of the other as the objective of education.”

In the context of school and university, the humanistic education concept can, however, not be negotiated without compromise. Educational processes are always framed asymmetrically, since they are subject to social purposes. Pupils have always been forced to learn in terms of memorizing

\(^{58}\) See also WULF & ZIRFAS 2007 and other works of these authors, KOCH 1999, KRAUS 2008-2012
externally induced content. At the same time, an educational institution does not call for a total identification with society, institution, or state (FEND 2008, p.95). Individuality and personality must be met with respect in educational institutions, and independent thinking and acting as well as the development of public spirit and democratic capability should be promoted.

It can never be established with certainty whether an individual actually accepts externally introduced content for him-/herself. Education can thus in no way be equated with school or university attendance. Attendance only makes education probable, because it can be assumed that individual educational processes in these institutions designed for it actually does take place, and are also supported in these. The question of how education is acquired in a formal framework is the subject of this book.

From the performative perspective, the concept of education can be supported by the principle of recursion. Actors handle a new situation by relating it to previously made experiences and insights, introducing these into a learning situation and adapting them to it. For this they revert to the various forms of knowledge available, explicitly or implicitly, to them. For example, when calculating and measuring, a referral is made to calculating and measuring in all the dimensions, a person can fathom. This has great didactical relevance. One who speaks refers to communication in all its facets. The business partner in the handshake example will certainly implicitly review and reflect on various other situations and modes of social, professional, or private interaction. More intuitively than consciously, s/he will use these recursions for orientation in the course of a discussion, and gear his/her actions accordingly. In the example of a child interrupting adult conversation, the adults recourse to their own prior experiences. Previously acquired experiences are thus prerequisite for situationally adequate actions. As forms of knowledge they are usually not available explicitly, and they are also not directly accessible for a causal access. Recourse to the available options for dealing with given challenges occurs in a pre-predicative manner. In the recursion, even ideas that appear absurd at a first glance can be associated and constructively employed for the solution of a problem.

Educational processes are therefore characterized by the fact that they refer to a multimodal, broadly applied, and versatile spectrum of experiences, which determines the intellectual, motivational, volitional, and social dispositions of a learner. Such a range of experience is never complete in the performativity-theoretical perspective, and it also changes depending on experiences, references, and new insights or behaviors. However, it is still affected by the circumstances of its first appropriation (see above).

Recourse to personal experience assumes the expectation of self-efficacy (see above); at the same time self-efficacy is generated in recursions. Self-efficacy can materialize through successful
adaptation to prevailing norms, or to the measurable fulfillment of certain performance targets. It is also based on the fact that an individual can appropriate an objective, attitude, or belief; that s/he can understand meaning independently; and that s/he can expand his/her possibilities of recursion. With a growing body of knowledge and with an ever-more-flexible access to various options of recursion, the probability increases that self-efficacy will materialize. One thesis, which would still have to be researched in terms of performativity theory, is that this would create a motivational basis for action, as established e.g. by Matthias JERUSALEM & Diether HOPF (2002). By recursions the individual thus gives every object, attitude, or conception his/her own imprint, which at the same time is adapted to given structures. Their experience spectrum acts as a base, medium, and working surface.

Education can be concluded from such a performance as follows: if individuals can perceive their own successful recursion to their spectrum of experience, if they can introduce their self-efficacy in a community and constructively influence it, then the objective described by HUMBOLDT can be (temporarily) achieved. In this case, one strives for education as part of a social contract concluded amongst free people. Free individuals move within a social field and practice successful coping with challenges that arise.

In contrast, Jan MASSCHELEIN & Norbert RICKEN (2003) use the humanist objective of (self-)education, and thus also its performativity-theoretical adaptation, to point out that this is nowadays mainly geared toward a one-sided, selfish, and competition-oriented preparation for the labor market. In their opinion, such striving includes a self-immunization against those experiences that constitute an affront or threat to certain existing power structures and positions. The underexposed collective dimension of education can moreover, according to the authors, only be obtained through a rehabilitation of shared experiences. They place the communicative framing of education in the foreground, and include not only explicit but also implicit body language interactions, milieus, practices, their spaces and times, material factors, habitual structures, and ritual practices (see also WULF & ZIRFAS 2006). An empirical study of this thesis has not been performed to date.

Educational processes triggered by teaching are influenced, diverted, and infiltrated by diverse factors in performative ways. That is to say, a pedagogical intention or practice is always accompanied by its opposite, stronger at times, weaker at other times. Controlled and directed procedures reinforce subversive effects, especially if the control of social relationships is not easy to handle or activates resistance. This raises the question of a mode for action which would make it possible to encourage pupils to perform the desired recursions than only through control and direction.
HACKL (2008a, p.233) shows that subjective concerns are already present in how patterns of interpretation are claimed to be valid. He writes that the “[...] desire and striving for a reasonable shaping of the world itself always refers to a specific possible, necessary, and latently intended rational clarification and practical processing of the contradictions through educational processes.”

The quality of a need or a desire to clarify a thing (for oneself) already proposes a structure of clarification. For example, a small child wants to know about the taste of a candy and acquires this knowledge by eating it, whereas a food chemist immediately associates a certain substance analysis with the sweets. According to HACKL (2008a), (educational) aspirations materialize even before any rational access to reality. This can serve as a common reference for the definition of education. In the case of educational intentions, the ability to actively cope with various inconsistencies and inadequacies is pre-reflectively combined with the ability and willingness to assume as well as transfer responsibility. Along the lines of the previously developed reasoning, both of these abilities are based on manifold recursions, they are thus pre-structured by the possibility to develop an attitude to things and to oneself in a pre-objective manner. GEBAUER & WULF (2003, p.82) indicate what constitutes educational aspirations from a positive perspective: “Spaces are incorporated with the help of senses and movements. Such movements are a medium of social relations and individual experiences and they connect individuals and things and contribute to the socialization of children and adolescents. Social spaces and social processes constitute each other mutually, really and imaginary.” The basic willingness and ability to establish relationships with the environment are again assumed here and detailed further by WULF & ZIRFAS (2007, p.29 [emphasis by author]). With respect to the acquisition of social and self responsibility; they write: “Education is the performative and reflexive linking of culture and individuality, which enables humans to contribute themselves to their educational conditions, and consequently also to their self and world situation—i.e. to be able to shape themselves. Educational processes are therefore social learning, action and change processes, which occur for those are being educated but as a process to which they actively contribute at the same time.” Learning processes can be established in educational processes.

However, both of the cited approaches of HACKL (2008a) and GEBAUER & WULF (2003), as well as many other pedagogical theories, are based on the assumption that the environment necessary for learning (willingness and ability of the learner for taking responsibility, motivation) can simply be presupposed (e.g. in the sense of every child wants to learn or can be motivated for this purpose). This assumption is not only untested, it also cannot be proven. It is moreover a normative setting that says nothing about ways it can be achieved. It skips pedagogy. As has already been established above, the contextualization necessary for the experience of self-efficacy, as well as the broad range of experience and knowledge required for it, is created by pedagogic
coordination and convincing efforts, by practices aimed at education and learning, and by emergence. The prerequisites for all of these factors are recognizable and socially viable structures. The teacher endures what is still unavailable for the young person, or they at least know how to deal with the challenges of learning. However, this alone is no guarantee for the success of their convincing efforts.

Educationally disadvantaged attitudes (and thus impediments to learning) can be triggered by learning barriers or even by an exaggerated enthusiasm. They may also be caused by an insufficiently differentiated body of experience and knowledge, or an impediment to the adoption of social responsibility. An already completely explained world, as implied in the encyclopedic concept of knowledge, can also stand in the way of educational aspirations.

An educationally conducive situation is thus characterized by a differentiated experience of successful recursions to one’s own experience spectrum, and by the experience of self-efficacy in a social community, or in society. It is further characterized by the decisiveness of pedagogical convincing efforts with a simultaneous openness for emergence and the adoption of responsibility of those being educated. Recursion to previous experience can be examined through the diverse modes of action and knowledge performatively involved in them.

The moment of active (responsive) acquisition of knowledge also coincides with a passive (resonant) arousal of motivation and inspiration. An affirmation of the (supposedly) given is not what is achieved in performative education processes: instead, a learning object is answered in such a way that something is made of what is given (WALDENFELS 1994, p.133 et seq.). Educational relations are not only pragmatically functional, but are also determined by cultural circumstances and challenges associated with inclusion. A context can be brought to the stage by reflecting on it through action, by playing it through in all its possible variations, and by incorporating changes into what has been “cited,” i.e. invoked by recursion. The design of a context is thus achieved from within itself, as WULF & ZIRFAS (2007, p.29) note: “The educational profile of performative processes lies in their creative and reality producing moments, which can produce the dispositions and availabilities of the parties.” In reference to HACKL (2009, p.76 [emphasis by author]), the emotional balancing of a situation also plays an important role in this respect. “The factual inability to cope with an action problem through mere action, can thus only be identified by localizing and clarifying it through emotional experiencing.”

One mode of performatively and reflexively linking interpretation and emotion may be “corporalizing performativity” (KRÄMER 2004), which revises the assumption of a purely cognitive basis of competence, instead advocating a “creative metamorphosis” of the perceived world, which takes place in action. WALDENFELS interprets such metamorphoses as series of
responsiveness events. The concepts of a “corporalizing performativity” and a “creative metamorphosis” of the perceived world can be applied to the relationship between the professional knowledge of teachers and their pedagogical work as follows: a behavior that provides a reliable pedagogical coordination and convincing effort will draw on diverse forms of knowledge and create scenes and pathways, allocate places, and pre-shape possible responses, while also serving to express interactive patterns, norms, and styles. At the same time, it will also initiate movements and practice rhythms, and seems almost predestined to trigger educational achievement and learning. The performativity-theoretical paradigm allows for an analysis of such processes. Here the specific characteristics of pedagogy, such as its fields of conflict, polymorphic normativity, the relevance of habitus, and pedagogical tact stand in the foreground of pedagogical forms of knowledge and of teacher education.

The performativity theory outlined above can likewise be used to establish certain dynamics in a group, classroom activity, teaching process, or school development. It also supports aspects of the culture of a school and the historically developed “corporeal identity” of an educational institution, or a modification in an educational environment. Since performativity is regarded as a generic principle, it can be used as a model in teacher education, despite the complex pedagogical challenges it must prepare for. In terms of a performative education and learning concept, various enculturation processes and the multimodal testing of various self and world conditions (e.g. their emotional tone, socio-spatial coordinates, forms of knowledge, as well as real, imaginary, and virtual figurations) have been discussed. Performative education processes are emergent, they take place as pedagogically motivated recursions, and they are grounded emotionally. The concept of performative education finds its teaching-theoretical counterpart in the interpretation of teaching as staging and choreography.59

**Performativity, Staging, and Choreography**

In the performance of a practice or in the judgement of such a practice, certain things come to the foreground of perception and action, while others retreat to the background. Various scenes can be generated in this manner; WALDENFELS (2004a, p.198) writes: “In staging, movements are initiated, rhythms are practiced, forces are mobilized, paths are paved and places are allocated in staging, instead of a mere application of means toward an end.” The imagery in this quotation corresponds to the visual language WALDENFELS also draws on in describing the emergence of experience spectrums.

59 Similar concepts also include “learning by teaching” (KRÜGER 1975 or MARTIN) or teacher research (DANN 2000).
A staging structured by specific scenes can be attached to attention events, which form the basis of learning, even if learning itself remains hidden. More precisely, a specific staging suggests directions for the attention.

We live in a mediated world, that is to say, education and learning also takes place in digital spaces. In the performative paradigm, learning conceived for classroom situations in conventional lesson plans can be supplemented or even replaced by “hyper-learning” in networks, learning environments, and learning communities (DOHMEN 2001 note 47). The choreography of teaching is thus concerned with real, topological spaces of immediate perception; with imaginary associations and parallel spaces; and (in a more or less pronounced manner) also with digital spaces. Thus pedagogy must also frame learning in virtual spaces, or at least determine the pedagogical forms of knowledge available in digital teaching and learning cultures.

WALDENFELS (2004a) locates mediality in human attention. He speaks of a “functional logos” (ibid., p.120) and refers to the idea of Edmund HUSSERL (1950, p.98, p.259) by suggesting that we do not put our actions to use, but that rather something, which only partially emanates from the actor, presents itself in our actions. In this respect, as has been pointed out above, a teaching choreography can be deduced from notations: planning, materials, normative requirements, interactions, the various modes of interpreting a situation, capacity profiles, situational components and incidents, aspects of logistics, spatial and temporal aspects of learning, activated experience spectra, and conjunctive experiences spaces.

If it is assumed, that an acting person experiences notations before giving them, then this means that what teachers stage with their actions is to a great deal separate from their own intentions. This raises the question of how a teacher can assume and fulfill radical pedagogical responsibility for her/his pupils. The criticism of the performativity paradigm was directed at its superficiality and risk of (identity) mimicry. Both applies to weak rationality. The performative events that become independent in the (quasi-)theatrical situation of school instruction thus call for further explanations. This will occur below in two steps. First, the relationship between the practical knowledge of teachers and the performative spectacle will be explored. Thereafter, personality development is illuminated from the perspective of performativity.

**The Mediality and Performativity of Professional Teacher Action**

Today, the discussion of learning in “function fields” and function-like learning environments is increasingly common. This is accompanied by the challenge of a continuously growing flood of information and data (see DICHANZ 2001). The moment of the unknown is now linked to a daily confrontation with unpredictable external as well as internal image sequences, briefly touched upon
topics (e.g. in the case of “zapping”), and imponderable capitalisms (WIRTH 2001, p.34). Media pedagogy in particular examines the question of which forms and contents play a role in dealing with knowledge in this deluge.

In the context of rapid technological development, the differences between distinct practices not only become blurred in dependence of the respective medium (digital, analogue, and physical), they are also redefined in view of an oversupply of archetypes, templates, action models, and norms. We surf the net and can acquire virtual landscapes with a mouse-click, we can act virtually as avatars etc., but the applied mode of action (the mouse-click) is always the same. In the real world, however, the various effects of one and the same action mode require different practices. At the same time, the same type of effect (e.g. a “kill,”) is assessed in a fundamentally different manner in the virtual and in the real world. This assessment is also based on the entirely different cultural factors in the virtual world (e.g. different “gamer” groups) as compared to the real world.

Practices, as often pointed out in cultural study analyses, can thus not be determined per se in an “augmented reality” or “mixed reality,” but their definition is rather dependent on the particular medium and its respective cultural significance. This (re-)determination follows a less definitional understanding. Digitally encoded reality can be seen as a virtual, sensitive area, as an experience repository for secondary experiences. Digital existence considers natural existence and living environment as artificial. To this extent, the digitally coded reality is a kind of second skin. The associated coding of human activity by technology approaches the individual from the outside. Technology is thus impressed onto our actions.

Winfried MAROTZKI (2007) argues that these and other ontological changes taking place under the influence of new technologies barely affect social and cultural realities. In his view, the experiences that an actor has with virtual scenarios are not at all “new” in a historical perspective. MEYER-DRAWE (1996, p.89) calls the human body “transfigurative,” i.e. for her, the difference between life and artifice is not clearly identified. According to MAROTZKI (2007) and MEYER-DRAWE (1996), human existences are not questioned by virtual scenarios, but redefined, staged, and varied; at most, performative strategies and action forms are affected by the virtual modes of motivating, irritating, pointing to, or supporting forms of commenting, modifying, presenting, interpreting, arranging, or ritualizing.

In contrast to this, in the following it is assumed that an activity initiated by mouse-click definitely has a different character than a real one. If the words for certain actions are not affected by the change associated with virtualization, then it is indeed not a real actor who moves through the

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60 “Augmented reality” or “mixed reality” refers to a reality enriched with virtual elements, wherein virtuality can be considered a knowledge-style (MAROTZKI 2007 p.182 et seq.).
virtual world and jumps, meets, and shoots other people: it is an avatar controlled by mouse-clicks. Furthermore, crucial differences also exist between real and virtual actions and knowledge forms, and this becomes evident in how they are performed. Action events, their effects, the more or less pronounced performative character of action forms, and performative “theoretical sensitivity” (GLASER 1978) are radically different in the virtual space than in the real. These differences are of great interest pedagogically, not only because they concern knowledge, but also because ethical issues come to be regarded differently here. In this text, the focus is on the fact that the use of new information and communication technologies allows for an analysis of how practices can be applied in a more or less appropriate manner in various activity sectors, and how they affect real-world practices and relationships. If different forms of knowledge and action are presented or brought to the stage performatively in an instructional staging, they also become negotiable. In this case they can also then dispose of their potential social and cultural superficiality. Such practices need to be researched.

In the context of the phenomenological perspective on the performativity paradigm, as was pointed out above, the human body can also replace all symbolic media and become the sole medium, thereby becoming quasi-independent and thus, in a sense, artificial. With respect to such a performativity, which has its place in the real world, the mimicry of identity and the overestimation of the malleability of given social conditions were critically noted. Based on the teaching activities of a teacher, it is also possible to refer to theatricality here, which WULF & ZIRFAS (2007, p.24) determine in the following elements:

1. theatricality is the representation of a real or imagined consummation of an action (performance) in front of an audience;
2. the semiotic nature of a theatrical representation is characterized by moments of increasing suspense (staging);
3. in the context of theatrical representations, corporeality serves as a category of material and representation aesthetics;
4. in the context of theatrical representations there is an aesthetic reception linked to an interpretation of the (necessarily social) situation.

Theatricality thus contains representational qualities, increasing suspense, physicality, and interpretation events. However, long before the media boom, teachers have succeeded in the performance/presentation of their knowledge. By stating school learning content, they establish links to a particular extracurricular living environment. With this, they not only create the conditions for access to learning. In their scenic actions, they can also mark appropriate (or socially adequate) “modi operandi” and “habitus” as structures and structuring dispositions that are
constituted in practice and remain oriented towards practical functions. They present certain working techniques and action sequences, they lay out arguments, make interpretations, etc., and thereby exemplify perception, decision, and action forms in front of the pupils, which are based on professional or everyday habitus. The professional theatricality of teachers has always partially overlapped with the knowledge of professional actors, even though the former is intuitively and auto-didactically appropriated.

Besides the similarities, the following differences exist between a theatre spectacle and (school) education: an artistic or aesthetic theatrical staging, the methodically elaborated and systematic production of effects such as catharsis, performance, and entertainment, are aimed at the artful manipulation of the audience by means of fictitious identities (roles), narrations, and abstentions, to which theatregoers expose themselves of their own accord. Fake identifications, exclusions, and legitimations are staged. In contrast, pedagogical productions focus on teaching and learning processes and processes of upbringing, as well as those of (self-) education (WULF & ZIRFAS 2007, p.24). These processes are delegated to the addressee in a pedagogically responsible and tactful manner, and they should delineate themselves from seduction, delusion, and influence in order to convince in a serious and reliable way.

Teacher who make their explicit and implicit pedagogical knowledge (in an unskilled or “wild” manner) explicit by representational or performative means, can still be judged in a similar fashion to media stars, whose public appearances are carefully designed and professionally styled. It may happen that a (young) audience in the classroom almost exclusively pays attention to whether a teacher is successful in putting up a show according to standards predetermined by the mass media. Teachers exposed in such ways can get caught in traps of representation (MASET 1999, p.104). MASET attributes this to a disavowal of show, spectacle, and staging that is deep-rooted in our culture and which is also reflected in phrases that condemn eccentric behavior, such as: Don’t put up such a fuss! Don’t play the hero! Don’t make a show about it! Theatrical behavior has always been admissible in school in the context of festivities and stage presentations. Everyday schooling is, however, primarily characterized by guided teaching and educational processes. Describing teaching situations as theater and the classroom as a stage may cause some anxiety for pedagogical stakeholders, if it is associated with the risk of a loss of control for teachers and the institution (WENZEL 2004). A more-or-less accidental theatrical competition between teachers and media stars is thus very well disputable in the light of the media criticism of Norbert BOLZ (1997). According to BOLZ (1997, p.666), the media network as a system excludes the “world as an environment.” Although new information and communication technologies present a virtual parallel world that may be emotionally charged, it is not a vital living environment for humans. The media also transports sense, nonsense, and antisense indiscriminately (ibid, p.669). Such associations may
be invoked in the minds of those being educated if the behavior of teachers and media stars are thought together. Showing, representation, exemplary behavior, and an emphasis on theatricality in the classroom can thus indeed induce problems already described above by the criticism of the performative paradigm. For example, Anna HERBERT (2014) describes a performance by students that goes unnoticed by teachers (in her case at the university), which consists of playing a good student in oral exams without possessing the required knowledge, or applying it. Teachers, as noted by the author, conclude from the mere form of the performance that the required achievements have been provided. She ascribes this phenomenon to the testing regime of universities, which disavows the educational ideals of the institution and its members. Herein, manipulative strategies, fictitious identities, and fake attributions and legitimations, etc., replace university knowledge and education.

The risk of a superficial show, however, does not preclude the recognition of theatrical moments in education and teaching practice, or the possibility of reflecting them in the context of teacher education and professionalization research in general. In view of their ambivalent character (“show” vs. mediation events), the analytical potential of the performativity paradigm must stand at the forefront of these reflections. How can this be made possible?

1. HERZOG & VON FELTEN (2001, p.22) show that by questioning an “emphatic” concept of reality, a differentiated analysis of the educational reality of today can be made. They write: “An emphatic concept of reality is used as a justification for the rejection of mediated experiences. That this could be an outdated kind of didactic thinking is only hesitantly revealed by the new information technologies.”

2. A staging can take into account the many co-existing realities in which we operate today. In regard to the experimental potentials of different media, MASET (1999, p.104) points out that the potential for subjectivity in each should be expressed in a non-representative sense. Realities thus become negotiable, one world is beside another. It can be assumed that especially gifted actors, skillful and appropriate stage designers, and astute directors among the teachers can oppose the virtual as well as the arbitrary (stage and show) world with the potentials of their subjectivity.

3. In face of the representative and even manipulative aspects of their professional practice, teachers have the primary task of leading by example a humane, factually-based, and personally valuable examination of teaching subjects and learning objects. Their exemplarity develops mainly in implicit interaction events that can be visualized in a theatrical manner and thus become negotiable. One objective of teacher education must thus be to practice professional action on the implicit level of interaction.
4. As pointed out above, the basis for a teacher’s trained use of the potential of his/her subjectivity, enabled in the theatrical mode, is a context sensitivity mediated by intrinsically physical movements. This includes pedagogical tact. From the standpoint of context sensitivity – which is central for pedagogical action – it is clear that instructional choreography and staging go far beyond mere mannerisms (see PRANGE 2005). This surplus can be elaborated in performativity-theoretical terms.

Kristin WESTPHAL (1997) shows how a physical display in a theatrical mode may cause diverse effects that can be made didactic or instrumentalized in another way. MEYER-DRAWE (2002, p.15) writes in this sense: “Knowledge of the world is not raised in thought, but is kept going by our bodily experiences.” According to WESTPHAL (1997), theatrical forms of expression in the classroom can motivate or irritate, and this can be used to allude to habits and routines. This may possibly serve to support and/or comment statements or actions e.g. in the sense of a reverberation, a demonstration, or a reflection (MEYER-DRAWE 2001, p.13). The didactic functions of instructional staging can principally be related to any pedagogical situation, in which a specific content is examined and thereby modified, presented, interpreted, staged, arranged, or placed in diverse ritualized contexts for learning purposes. The theatrical is put in the service of learning and education.

The previous considerations on the relationship between the professional knowledge of teachers and the (self-) education of pupils as an intersection of “corporalizing performativity,” together with WALDENFELS’s interpretation of acting as staging, leads to the conclusion that an action that generates scenes is also suitable for the provision of knowledge forms and formats and for the shaping of diverse attention events. In order for a teacher to sense the experience and perspective interests of the pupils, they must possess a broad orientation, action, and world knowledge, and they must be able to mediate it to the students with pedagogical tact.

The theoretical background developed here derives the following fundamental tasks for teacher education:

1. Competence development must raise awareness for various ways of thinking and forms of action, as well as for explicit and implicit knowledge forms and formats;

2. The transformations of scientific theory into pedagogical practice and vice versa, which must be performed by teachers, are always performed, reflected, and tested differently. The pedagogical challenge of bridging the gap between theory and practice in the field (keywords: pedagogical tact, pedagogical fields of conflict, polymorphic normativity, habitus and their modification) are of paramount importance.
Thus, the attention of teacher education must be focused on the training of physical practices and their reflection. Research oriented towards the performativity paradigm focuses on how theory, norms, delusions, prejudices, or rationality are incorporated in these practices, as well as the various possibilities for mutual influence between theory and practice.

The theory that all pedagogical processes can be described as performative ones will be further detailed below with respect to identity and personality development. The above-mentioned challenge of the effects of the virtual or the imaginary is thus re-examined. This is used to present a performative learning and educational concept, and to explore its practical relevance for teacher education. A didactic principle, “performative play” is subsequently developed on this basis. Then, teaching and research settings will be presented that make it possible to examine the genesis of action and orientation knowledge in the teaching profession.

**Performativity and Personality Development**

In the example of a business conversation introduced by a handshake, the integrity, professionalism, social relations, and therefore also the social identity of the business partners are not only defined by their intentional, but also by their non-intentional action. This applies as well to the identities of social groups and to their “conjunctive experience spaces.” The performativity paradigm can be used to elaborate how social identities are pre-theoretically and implicitly formed in social contexts. However, in school pedagogy and professional research, the non-intentional aspects of personality development still tend to be undervalued. While the idea that early childhood development is predominantly non-intentional and bodily appears widely accepted (see DORNES 1992), this is usually not assumed for the development of older children.

However, non-intentional and socially framed relationships and occurrences apply to all age groups. One can say that development and learning are even primarily mediated through the body and by its specific forms of expression, experience, representation, action, and knowledge, as they occur almost completely independent of control. The reference to physicality in a designed or natural environment over the course of a lifetime, in performative terms, can be seen as a partially active, partially passive, and habitually determined *doing age*. Identities are thus endowed with age-related attitudes, gestures, and practices that form or engage even before conscious reflexivity. Explicit knowledge joins the picture and can trigger the modification of a behavior or a spectrum of experience. Seen from the perspective of performativity, the reference to one’s own physicality and to that of others is dominated by characteristics of social milieus currently relevant for an actor as well as by his/her abilities. These form tacit dimensions of education and self-education. Ursula STENGER (2007, p.67) describes non-intentional personality development as follows: “The ego
only constitutes as a specific one in action.” With respect to the relationships set forth above, it should be added that action as well as recognition, discourse, aesthesis, images, and material events are modes of the performatory constitution of reality. They are aspects of personality development as well as forms of cognition. The development of a personality is consequently determined by the way a person handles various forms of action and cognition, discourses, images, and their performative effects in a multimodal and age-dependent manner. According to the performativity paradigm, the pedagogic supervision of personality development is not only concerned with explicit knowledge; teachers also refer to their sense of such moments that promote external and internal change, dynamics, and agility; above all, they are able to use different forms of knowledge.

The performatory thought model has been accused of arbitrariness and a tendency towards ethical and moral relativism, and this criticism also applies to the performatory interpretation of personality development. For WULF & ZIRFAS (2007, p.15 [emphasis by authors], quoting BUTLER 1997), the strength of the performative paradigm primarily lies in the fact that it “[...] creates a practical perception of what the body is and beyond this, how it assumes its place in the prevailing cultural coordinates.” Presentation and staging practices, which can also be described as corporeal styles, (BUTLER 1999) are discussed in terms of the performative. Anja TERVOOREN (2007, p.98 [emphasis by author]) writes: “Corporeal style refers to the activities of the body into which it is incorporated as a whole, the attitudes of the body; its size, strength and endurance, the clothes and hairstyles [...]. This style is further constituted by the movement of the body and individual body parts: the voice, the gait, the body tension, the mastery of body techniques, the form of visual contact with persons of the same and opposite sex, and the way of sharing similar movements, as well as the relationship between body and space.” Corporeal styles can be used to explain the establishment of cultural identity, gender constructs, the performative creation of a peer group, or the feeling of solidarity that unites the members of a peer group, a family or a school class (see also GÖHLICH, WULF & ZIRFAS 2001; WULF & ZIRFAS 2007). In this sense, the self and world-structuring elements of “habitus,” as outlined by AUDEHM (2008) on the basis of Pierre BOURDIEU (1990), are connected to vocabulary, postures, judgments of taste, expressions, worldviews, conjunctive experience spaces, and social integration processes.

As we have already seen, the question of whether symbolic orders are visible in their performative implementation, and to which extent they are malleable, cannot be answered with theory, but rather only within specific contexts. From a phenomenological point of view, habitual structures are usually incorporated into an antecedent corporeality, which can also affect or even suspend them. Lived corporeality, however, moves at the limit of what can be said. It includes a non-constructible immediate, unspeakable authenticity, and invisibility (inner organs etc.). The referential character of the body thus contains many more options than just what is visible (this becomes evident at the
frontiers of physiological research, e.g. in brain research). This can be intuited by all of us in our capabilities to describe our experiences, which are often rudimentary at best. We cannot go “behind” our own physicality as the spontaneous basis of our perception, awareness, and comprehension, nor can we see behind the physicality of others. On the bodily level, we perceive ourselves, other people, things, and signs primarily as concrete existence. We only in a second step detect them in their meaningful or conceptual implications. Reality constitutes itself for us through consistencies, which are typical of each respective thing. Here, MERLEAU-PONTY (1986, p.183) speaks of the “meat of things” (fr.: chair) as the “generality of the sensible itself,” and as “the anonymous that is native to us.” As a body, we feel like other bodies and things and are connected to them. MEYER-DRAWE (2003, p.8) writes in reference to MERLEAU-PONTY: “Our sensual complicity with things draws us towards cognition, but does not guarantee it.” The things are never given to us as such, we rather experience them in terms of “elusions of comprehension.” (WEISCHEDEL 1962, p.244, see also MEYER-DRAWE 1999). Even intentions are not entirely transparent for us. A thing first appears in our perception and not in our minds and thoughts, therefore it is not under our control and eludes the clutches of the self; comprehension always comes later. This refers to the mode of how we perceive reality and ourselves in an objective way, and how we deal with external and internal realities. We impart sense to the “elusions of comprehension,” we think and talk about them, and we stage them; in our acting we provide, in a multimodal way, evidence of reality as it is valid for us, even if it is never fully accessible for us. We occupy, appropriate, assimilate reality as our own, and treat it as a subject. Edgar FORSTER (2004, quoted in BRAMBERGER 2007, p.104) writes accordingly: “The cultures of the performative function according to a logic which permanently also invokes the unavailable.” Lived corporeality binds our perception, language, thinking, and actions to what is unavailable for us: to the ignored, the absent, the desired, the undone. Our superficially self-contained existence is simultaneously based on what is available and unavailable in the sense of presence and absence, manifestation and latency. ZIRFAS (2001a, p.58 [emphasis by author]) expresses this by maintaining “[...] that one must assume an irreducible absence of intention in the performative act of educating, in the pedagogical act itself.” Pedagogical intentions are constantly confronted with the facts that they not only may miss their target, but that they are not fully self-transparent. The same is true for (self-)education and, as pointed out above, for learning and educational processes.

The medium in which personality and identity development takes place is physicality; it is thus not reducible to (self-) invention, eccentric enthusiasm, or masquerade, as is critically attested the performative paradigm.

If personal development is ultimately attributed to what is corporeal and thus in part to what is unavailable, then constructive and destructive moments are located both under and above the
consciousness. It thus becomes clear that injuries, deprivations, destitution, isolation, loss of the familiar, or forms of (social) discrimination represent profound risk factors to personality development not only from the mental, but also from the physical point of view. An important goal of pedagogy is therefore to prevent risk factors and threats to personal integrity, and to strengthen the “body-self,” which has been more precisely defined by VON WEIZSÄCKER (1940) above as a self-experience that leads to the design of abstract movements.

The creation of a so-called “ideal world” and a successful choreography of school instruction must be the focus in a pedagogical situation. An “ideal world,” generated using pedagogical tact, is attained by striving for a concise and socially binding order, i.e. easily recognizable and socially viable structures in which every child is given a certain place defined by real recognition and, at the same time, by potentiality.

If personality development is affected by the fact that it is possible to (successfully) deal with things that elude comprehension in a resonant and responsive manner, then the moment of repetition plays a central role in how something is experienced to elude comprehension (DELEUZE 1994). Phenomena that have been previously experienced in a certain way will likely be perceived again in the same way, and the reaction to effects will also be similar to previously experienced ones. If deviations and influences, different interaction processes or diverse stagings are performatively incorporated into such repeated events and associated forms of knowledge, then their signature may also change.

The major challenge for teachers, however, is to identify how a practice appears in performance and in dependence on its context. Professional action in this field is centrally characterized by the fact that practices attributed with pedagogical validity can also respond to pedagogical coordination and convincing efforts in a stringent, context-sensitive, subject-oriented, and performative manner.

In performative sense-making, aspects of emergence, of the new, of change, and of design are joined by sense-making mediated solely by rationality and rules. The subjects of an analysis of the performative aspects of personality and identity development mainly include the actors’ spontaneous handling of specific challenges, the constitutive character of situational interpretations, self-identifications and all kinds of emergences, aspects and effects of human physicality, linguistic events, the constitutive power of images, situated effects, as well as various explicitly or implicitly effective areas of conflict. All these aspects can be described as forms of knowledge fundamental for pedagogical action and, at the same time, as integral moments of pedagogical coordination and convincing efforts.
By discussing the motivations, justifications, and context-dependency of actions, the realistic limits for performative superficiality, “show,” and mimicry on the level of action can also be set without obstructing the possibility that habitus can be staged and processed as part of these. The principle of this didactic concept is the performative play.

**The Performative Play as a Didactic Principle**

While “performativity” denotes an action-theoretical approach, “play” refers to a specific spectrum of action forms. According to the performative paradigm, educational and teaching processes are the result of multidimensional situations, open-ended staging, and last but not least emergent and/or action-based forms of representation. Pedagogical and didactic principles and practical procedures, valid regulations and situation-appropriate applications performatively stand in diverse relationships (interdependencies, controversies, mutual reinforcement) with one another. Relations between a particular speech and a particular action; the performative constitution of the subjects and objects of an event; the construction of a phenomenon through assumptions made about it; claims and contradictions; theses and antitheses; decision-making structures; as well as disparities and antinomies update themselves performatively and are factors that centrally determine pedagogical situations. The performativity paradigm can be used to determine how a social field is affected by such occurrences. The objects of study for performative research include everyday phenomena and manifestations of professional practices and emergences, growth processes, technologies, scientific procedures (see KRAUS 2015), and their interdependencies.

Performativity was furthermore defined above as an activity that produces its meaning horizons from within itself, although it is also embedded in a particular social situation and its affiliated horizon. Substantive, physical, aesthetic, and representative performances interact with situations which are fragmentarily constituted by still other performative consummations.

The playful presents a key moment of the performative; in turn, the performative is always an aspect of the playful. The performative play describes a particular action that helps to elaborate the rules which it follows by following up its performativity. In the following, the performative play concept is explained using the concepts of “corporalizing performativity” (1); “simulation” (2); “intermediary space” (3); the “rules of the play” (4); “attention as responsiveness events” (5); and “cognition-constitutive action practice” (JÖRISSEN 2007, p.191) (6):

(1) Corporalizing performativity: in playing, symbols usually have a sensual presence (GEBAUER & WULF 1998). Physical practices can also serve as symbols in the sense of communicative statements and/or in the sense of a constitution of sociality (GOFFMAN 2005). The events which take place in the mode of a “corporalizing performativity” can be described as follows
with respect to Benjamin JÖRISSEN (2007, p.189 [emphasis by author]): It is “[...] a ludically imprinted understanding of the boundaries of social differences, since the mimetic actor strolls sometimes on one and sometimes on the other side of distinctions, without this boundary being valid for him, because it is not (yet) their distinction [...]. The border—as a form or unit of a difference—has yet to take shape.” In performative play, boundaries set through role, generation, or gender differences become available and are defined anew. They can be physically performed and thereby tested within the play by resorting to various symbols and symbolizations. A community is constituted both on a symbolic level and in real life. Various possibilities of the body-self are generated and tested in a playful manner.

(2) Simulations: In performative play, everyday life is fictionalized and everyday experiences obtain the character of a staging. According to Natasha ADAMOWSKY (2000), playing presents action directives for movement in simulations (Lat. simulare: pretending something, feigning). The processing of information does not necessarily take place here, but rather its transformation in accordance with the wishes, interests, action patterns, and negotiations of the players. In the context of a “simulation,” certain provisions are linked with different and potentially inexhaustible possibilities of staging. This must not necessarily lead to an explicit action. The search rather acts in the double meaning of a body movement, on the one hand, and as an intentional act on the other hand. According to ADAMOWSKY (2000), in playing the implicit objective orientation must simulate reality. The following, however, is true from an epistemological perspective: “In the performative, the ludic thwarts causal or final reflexive sense-making” (FORSTER 2007, p.226). At the same time, playful action can, in line with MAROTZKI (2007, p.178 [emphasis by author]), also “[...] be understood as performances of a specific cognition style, a demanded reality accent, which enables the collective play in the first place, insofar as it makes the scope of this situation recognizable and socially negotiable.”

(3) Intermediary space: According to Donald W. WINNICOTT ([1982] 2005), play has its place in the intermediate space of transitional phenomena and transitional objects, where the symbolic order between ego and non-ego unfolds, through which experiences of the world are made possible in the first place. WINNICOTT ([1982] 2005) localizes cultural experiencing in playing, wherein he understands “culture” as an extension of playing in the sense of connections of materials with subjective and social interests.61 Fundamentally, in playing intermediary objects are characterized by their potentiality, by uncertainty, as well as a notion of “not-yet” (BLOCH 1987). In the intermediary space, the play is detached from the everyday

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61 HAKL (2009, p.73 [emphasis by author]) provides an important indication of the argumentative basis of such standpoints: “Meaning is what is given in the form of a subjective evaluation. The emotions therefore do not cease to act where cognitions begin […] They merely form dimensions of an overall process that are distinguishable in analytical abstraction, and they act simultaneously and continuously. They do not exist in any other form than as a functional symbiosis.”
world and its directives. At the same time it also presents a protected space, because, as Mihaly CSIKSZENTMIHALYI (1975) points out, moments can arise in which differences such as today and tomorrow, seriousness and flippancy, convention and innovation, authenticity and deception, sense and nonsense, become suspended. In play they obtain a new validity that then structures the play (BATESON 1972). In playing, the functions of meaning are shifted, and ever-new “association and relationship systems” (SUTTON-SMITH 1997) are created.62 The simultaneity of possibility and reality can enable enhanced experiences. According to Roger CAILLOIS (1961), these include agon (competition), alea (chance), mimicry (role playing), and ilinx (vertigo). Sigmund FREUD (1969) may also have amended “daydreams.” Monika WAGNER-WILLI (2001) points out, with reference to Victor TURNER (1969), that the performative is inextricably linked with acting in a liminal space in the game, whereby liminal situations are not presented as existential borderline experiences, but as everyday passages. She says the following on experiences of liminality in playing (ibid., p.124): “Accentuated sensual-physical experience and expression modes take effect in it, elements of the expressive and the ludic, i.e. playing with symbols and aesthetic means of expression. As further dimensions of the performative, the reference character of social interactions (to the structure) and their performance character are pertinent for the liminal.” When waged in social situations, the liminal is the place where an individual can fit into a new social milieu or cultural formation. At the same time, threshold situations (e.g. the first time home alone, the beginning of school) are usually not structured (TURNER 1969). Procedures can be rehearsed in a playful manner, which allows the individual to actively adapt to a new situation. The attribution of sense and meaning to activities then occurs playfully. Social identities are created; procedures are generalized, standardized, and/or made habitual. Varying roles and life concepts (MOOR 1961) can be acted out.

(4) The rules of play: Action under the pre-conditions of performative play is principally not subject to any explicit (moral or ethical) restrictions. However, the use of the body and the environment propose rules for acting and lead to agreements. Using playfully appropriated action patterns and through a targeted rehearsal of representational modes of the living environment, agreements and rules can be actively established, or they may arise from the situation (see also KRÂMER 2004, p.17 and OELKERS 2007). According to Richard

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62 See also the play concept at the basis of Ludwig WITTGENSTEIN’s (1995 § 28) language theory. To describe how the number two is defined, he writes the following: “This is called two – when pointing to two nuts – is absolutely accurate – but how can one define two this way? People provided with the definition do not know what one wants to denominate with two; they will assume that the intention was to call this group of nuts two! He can accept this; but perhaps, vice versa, if I want to attach a name to this group of nuts, misunderstand it as a number name. And just as well, if I explain a person’s name in an indicative manner, they could regard it as a colour name, as the name of the race, or the name of a cardinal direction. This means, that the ostensive definition can, in any case, be interpreted one way or another.” It should be pointed out here that definitions are not given, we rather move within the boundaries of certain systems of communication within which and with respect to which we become active through speech. On the relationship between play and reality, see GEBAUER & WULF 1998.
SENNETT (1993), the established control structure can be understood as a safeguard of individual variation. A control structure determines what is considered possible, but can also conceal the impossible. In performative play, an inherent logic of mimetic acquisition on the one hand, and construction, on the other, unfolds at the intersection of abstract structure, situational or material context, as well as the scope of action of the involved individuals. Keywords such as: “perspective-taking” (FLAVELL 1966), “to act in-between identities” (SCHECHNER 1985), or projections of the ego on the non-ego and on the “strange” (WALDENFELS 1990) refer to possible intersubjective processes (BATESON 1972) which give performative play its structure.

(5) Attention as responsiveness events: Orientation and practical action can only succeed in the playing mode if various forms of constituting the world are available. In this respect one can also speak of attention techniques which, according to WALDENFELS (2004a), correspond to technologies external to humans. Techniques are embedded in the relationships between different people and between people and things. Acts of perception, (play) rules, mental calculations, strategies, decisions, and reflexive or routinized behavior are, just like idiosyncratic actions and rule infringements, integral moments of playful forms of action. However, they alone do not constitute the performative course of play. Orientation within the game also depends on response events, medial acts, and interdependencies.

To make performative play the starting point of (university) didactic considerations, didactical concepts must be translated into a metaphor of body staging. Learning thus becomes performative knowledge acquisition; the acquisition of knowledge takes place in the performance of knowledge; learning contents are then understood as, or translated into, scenery or stage sets. The planning of a lesson or seminar session acts like a choreography, for which the topology of the classroom or seminar room, as well as action variations, are defined for the performative development of the common subject.

The concept of performative play is not a teaching model, but rather a way of thinking about instruction and, in our case, university teaching. It therefore does not substitute teaching models or forms of instruction such as lesson development through questions, lectures, or other forms of performing instruction methods. Various didactic models are rather viewed as different possibilities for staging certain action and knowledge forms with the aim of a successful choreography.

When it comes to teacher education, pedagogical tact should be in the focus of the mediation of pedagogical knowledge forms. It is defined as context awareness required for both prepared as well as spontaneously integrated educational or didactical undertakings in a concrete situation, i.e. for the rational or intuitive verification of their effects. Both theoretical and practical aspects suit
pedagogical tact; it is a rationality style and a procedure to generate theory through visible actions. Such a process focuses on the body as an organ of thinking and of dealing with the unavailable. Adequate translations from theoretical into practical contexts are apparently provided by practicing teachers by themselves; the theoretical modelling of such translation has been identified as one aim of this book.

The theoretical and empirical investigation of such translation in performativity-theoretical terms, which will be explored further in the following, are described as a “rehearsing” of pedagogical forms of knowledge.
Performativity-Theoretically Informed Processing of Pedagogical Challenges within University Teacher Education
Performative Play as a University Didactic Principle

In a university seminar that offers the possibility of self-testing in a movement space, a broad range of themes, methods, methodologies, and practical applications of teacher education has to be taken into account. One may refer to existing classifications to demarcate subject areas (LENZEN 1994 or DIETRICH 1990), which can then be translated in the interest of performative processes. The field of pedagogical forms of knowledge, which is the topic here, is particularly suitable for this.

As we have seen, the specifics of the action and orientation knowledge of teachers play a special role in regard to the exercise pedagogical forms of knowledge. In order to define the orientation, action, and world knowledge of teachers in greater detail, scenic images and examples towards which their professional action is oriented must be identified (COMBE & KOLBE 2004, p.846). In terms of practicing pedagogical coordination and convincing efforts, such scenarios must always be modelled before anything else (see ALTHANS 2007).

On the basis of the performative paradigm, it is possible to describe how professional experience can be formed within teacher education using five elements. Teacher students must acquire flexible knowledge through methodically guided experiences (HERZOG & VON FELTEN 2001, p.24) in order to be able to:

1. develop as many notations of teaching as possible, and reflect on the creation of a teaching choreography;
2. make habitually solidified biases available through implicit knowledge;
3. respond pedagogically to the confrontation with unexpected events in practice;
4. tactfully grasp pedagogical challenges in practice, i.e. both actively and passively;
5. develop expertise in dealing with pedagogical areas of tension and, in particular, difference events and heteromorphic normativity.

These five modes of forming knowledge, thought, and activity can simultaneously be interpreted as ways and means, as well as objectives. They entail very different education (formation) profiles. It is assumed that performative knowledge and experience formation within teacher education can primarily be obtained by the performative rehearsal of staged contexts of pedagogical practice, and by scientific ways of thinking.

It has already been addressed that an analysis informed by performativity theory must address synthesis and difference events, emergences and the formation of profiles, as well as repetitions and their effects.
The empiricism of performative processes, like those of (self-)education, learning and education, and pedagogical tact are, as set forth above, characterized by self-reference, respectively by a pragmatics of recursion in which a thing is given its own valence. The communication to which one refers when talking or interacting with others is in fact not empirically detectable in all its facets. Speaking and acting allow deductions about what recursions are occurring. The respective modes of experience to which one refers can then be rudimentarily inferred. Besides, in didactic and pedagogical settings one can examine the performative ways of elaborating, extending, annotating, and rearranging experience profiles.

In the performative paradigm, especially the situated effects of various influences on a teaching choreography must be taken into account. To reiterate, the analysis must pay attention to action aspects of language as well as incorporated styles, practical action manifestations and designs, ritualized events, habitual behaviors, liminal situations, mimetic practices, and self-interpretations and communicative effects, as well as situationally arising individual, eventful, temporal, spatial, medial, social, physical, dramatic, symbolic, personal, autonomous, and heteronomous scenarios, props, and action possibilities. All of these have been examined in the context of another academic discipline, cultural studies. In the performative context, they are examined as part of teacher-training practice research for their dynamics and context specificity. It should be noted that the transformation processes accompanying an application of theory to the professional practice of teachers cannot be, as pointed out above, interpreted unidirectionally, because practice also influences the theories applied to it.

Situational factors can be modified by the professional acting of teachers, and the theories they represent are thereby transformed and modified. Pedagogical fields of conflict, difference events, aspects of heteromorphic normativity, situational challenges for pedagogical tact, and options for choreographic ingenuity (WALDENFELS 2004b) can then be processed in an exploratory and science-based manner. For example, it is possible to elicit, question, and restructure everyday pedagogical knowledge using scenes that are acted out in a theoretical and/or pedagogical sense. Such an analysis can support the development of a professional ethos and make the students capable of pedagogical expertise. The guided analysis of collected material (participant observations, film footage, and photos) trains knowledge acquisition modelled on the basis of scientific work.

In teacher education, the didactic principle of performative play is aimed primarily at a case-based rehearsal of perception and decision-making that is sensitive to individual variation.

Particularly those processes which “make sense” through their combination of somatic, material, and cultural motives can be determined using case studies. Oriented on the work of HACKL 2006 (p.242 et seq.), these include:
1. Visible or evident notations such as body movements and postures, words, images, characters, mimetic codes, formulae, melodies, or representational constellations are all carriers of (in)voluntary messages which are more or less open to interpretation. The reconstruction and use of notations are a central theme of teaching and education.

2. How much body language is spontaneous or intentional cannot be measured. Its manifestation is only detectable in a functional field. It becomes understandable in the context in which it yields effect.

3. Somatic conditions and situations (such as threat, fear, happiness, and joy) manifest from within, i.e. are manifested by the subject. The feelings, attitudes, or intentions of others can only be conjectured. Only their performative character and their visible effects can be determined.

4. The nonverbal framing of a statement, including notations and intonations, mimic and gestural data, body movements, and relations to others, does not only contribute to the social significance of events, it essentially constitutes it (BOHNSACK 2003).

5. Partial messages may unfold certain autonomy. It is thus possible that verbal and nonverbal messages contradict each other.

6. With reference to FOUCAULT, the impersonal structures and commandments that arise through inserting a particular action into a situation must also be considered. Discourses are effective in the formation of the individual in contrast to the general, for example in the organization of biographies into a particular sequence of development phases, although these may be perceived as more or less freely combinable elements (see also HACKL 2006, p.251).

HACKL (2006) points out that “factuality consists of diverse significance events, that is, it is composed of somatic, physical, and relational moments. Meaning can vary greatly in specific contexts. This meaning-making then creates new facts. Facts are the basis of situational and habitual forms of expression, as they co-constitute the style and presentation mode of individual actions and therefore the typicality of an individual personality, as well as determine the semantics of

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63 The understanding of the other for the emotions of the self is, as elaborated by Hans JOAS (1996), only possible if one assumes the “primary sociality of man” as a primordial syncretism, to which the individual subjectivity, as an ontogenetic differentiation product, is subordinated. Bernd HACKL (2006, p.246 [emphasis by author]) radicalized this view even further when he writes: “Emotions, consternation, and ambitions constitute themselves as divided states, which are only repressed to individuals at a later stage.” The extent to which feelings, consternation, and ambitions are shared intersubjectively, cannot not be answered conclusively in terms of performativity theory, but it is certainly rudimentarily evident in performances.
collectively shared cultures. Many significance events fluctuating widely based on context are a part of university teacher education.

Based on his idea of teaching as improvisational theatre, “[...] for which the script has [in principle] not yet been written, the stage has not yet constructed, and the players do play any predetermined roles,” Arno COMBE (1997, p.13) makes the proposal that prospective teachers should be provided with the possibility to observe learning situations. This should be recorded from the viewpoint that the action contexts are determined by pedagogical forms of knowledge, both on the side of those acting professionally as well on the side of those observing. Practices of perceiving, observing, and thinking are thus coupled with those action and knowledge forms that have a pedagogical sense (RHEIN 2010, p.54). The coping strategies of the practitioner in the field are the basis for pedagogical tact. The focus on the practice of theory development in view of the unforeseen therefore particularly involves the need for an awareness of implicit knowledge and learning forms. The analysis must be concerned with the reaction of the pupils to certain notations. In addition to the central focus of planning and control in the classroom which must reflect on topics, methods, phases, social forms, or evaluation criteria, a teaching situation is also decisively structured by aspects that are non-thematic within it, such as latent meanings, nuances, body language, spatial and temporal structures, or material circumstances. Identifying ways to handle such unforeseen aspects is the focus of performative university didactics.

In this book, the challenges and issues of teaching situations, which can be choreographed and explored in their practical relevance in a performatively playful manner, have already been formulated with regards to the concepts of pedagogical forms of knowledge.

In the following, four examples will demonstrate, in a very brief way, how these forms of knowledge can become concrete. These are thus suggestions for topics and structures of seminars or practical trainings that are oriented towards a performative university didactics. For this purpose, reference is made to the tasks that have already been deemed fundamental for teacher education: raising awareness for various ways of thinking and forms of action, including both explicit and implicit forms of knowledge, and rehearsing the transformation of scientific theory into pedagogical practice and vice versa. Five key fields of experience have already been identified: (1) the process of making habitually solidified biases available; (2) expertise in dealing with pedagogical areas of conflict, difference actions, and heteromorphic normativity; (3) the notations of teaching and teaching choreography; (4) pedagogically dealing with unexpected events; and (5) pedagogical
tactfulness in dealing with situational challenges. These objectives of performativity-oriented teacher education form the basis of the case-based choreographies elaborated below.⁶⁴

5. **Example: The “Pupil Job” as an Incentive for Reflection**

The main reference for the following example is the task of (1) making habitually solidified biases available again, which is part of the professional experience necessary for teacher education.

In the school classes that he examined in an empirically praxeological manner, Georg BREIDENSTEIN (2006) describes a boredom and lack of commitment to school matters that pupils display, almost as if they see their role in school as a “job”: he thus calls it the “pupil job mentality.” As in other jobs, pragmatism, routines, and common issues play the central role in this mentality (BEREIDENSTEIN 2006, p.263). As it turns out, this behavior of the pupils not only reliably bridges the tension between competition and solidarity they experience. Although it is pedagogically not actually desirable, it also makes the situation in the classroom more predictable for the teachers.

Viewed in performativity-theoretical terms, this research does not yet allow the conclusion that pupils are generally bored in school. It must rather be assumed that the “pupil job” mentality, which is apparently widespread in Germany, is linked to various causes, implications, and consequences (it would, for example, be necessary to examine why the human right to knowledge is not perceived as having priority over other attitudes to school).

The central subject of research oriented to the performative paradigm is, as stated above, how the genesis of practices becomes visible as they occur. The causes and implications of the detected phenomenon of a “pupil job,” as well as its consequences, are thus of interest. The phenomenon could be treated in a seminar that incorporates teaching practice and analyzes it in its various performative aspects.

6. **Example: Voice in the Classroom**

This sketch of a seminar again concerns how to (1) make habitually solidified biases available.

In the seminar, the focus is placed on those pedagogical forms of knowledge and communicative effects that are connected to the human voice or its intonation. Initially, the phenomenon of voice is

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⁶⁴ For examples of the performativity concept in the specific context of visual arts education studies, please refer to LANDKAMMER in ERNI et al. 2011.
elaborated (e.g. based on cultural-scientific studies) as an anthropological constant, possibly also in contrast to synthetic or distorted voices. Then the voice is dissected as an instrument of education, through recursion, i.e. in terms of the voice as a tool for naming, processing, ordering, and re-designing the world. The better someone knows and can handle this instrument, the easier it is for him/her to analyze the manipulation that can be connected to the voice. Furthermore, one’s (own) voice is an analytical tool. This can be experimentally explored in the seminar. The pitch, volume, and timbre of the voice provide information about the individuality and emotions of the person speaking (ROHMERT 1991, p.100). Empirical studies (DIETRICH 2010) show that the modulation of the voice can be perceived as insightful, expressive, or objective. In particular, if a certain intonation is considered spontaneous, a fairly large informational value is attributed to it, and evokes certain reactions.

Such insinuations and potential or actual responses to voice are initially theoretically negotiated in the seminar and then also elicited empirically, in a methodically controlled manner, based on film examples, stagings, or experiments.

7. Example: The First Lesson

Students are expected to develop (2) expertise in dealing with pedagogical areas of conflict, difference actions, and heteromorphic normativity.

This seminar introduces the issue of fear during a new teacher’s first lesson with an unfamiliar class by drawing on passages from “The Concept of Anxiety” by Sören KIERKEGAARD ([1844] 2014). Here, existential anxiety (in Christian-theological terms) is considered a characteristic of the human mind and free will. In a state of innocence (or ignorance), anxiety is only latent, but then something drives the person out of this rest. In order to be freed from (latent) anxiety, they then must overcome their perceived anxiety. In a sudden leap, which science cannot explain, something gets a new quality, and the individual changes through the newfound awareness of him-/herself.

On the basis of this idea formulated by KIERKEGAARD ([1844] 2014), ways in which a new teacher can step in front of the class; what will happen at the beginning of the lesson; and how the inexperienced teacher can respond to it are played through in a scenic-theatrical or even associative-fictional manner. In performative play, limits set by cultural and social differences become negotiable and are redefined, for example by staging them or resorting to various symbols and symbolizations and by playfully reacting to them. In this manner, behaviors that are habitually executed as well as consciously employed strategies and survival tactics can be explored and
developed in their community and personality-forming aspects. The analysis identifies different options of a professional approach to one’s own fear in front of an unknown class.

Based first on the reading, then on the subsequent conception and investigation of empirical studies on the subject of a first lesson, or a staging of said lesson, it is possible to complement, deepen, and develop the knowledge reflexively acquired from the text in the seminar.

8. Example: Practice Research by Videotaping from a Performativity-Theoretical Perspective

This example is concerned with the development of (3) as many notations of teaching as possible, as well as a teaching choreography.

As established above, projects of practice research employ different scientific methods. A scientific, research-based learning in teacher education is possible, e.g. by working with video recordings of classroom scenes. The thematic selection may include the lesson initiation, the work phase, a practice sequence, or teaching reflection.

For the investigation of a video clip with respect to performative phenomena, Iris NENTWIG-GESEMAN & Monika WAGNER-WILLI (2007) suggest the following methodological approach: first, a detailed overview in the sense of a pre-iconographic description is made, which focuses on the social situation as a physical-spatial-scenic organization and interaction. Gestures and interaction elements are described, with the interest of avoiding an insinuation of motives as much as possible. The “[...] coordination of gestures and verbal actions [are detailed] in interactive relation with one another and with regard to their integration into long-term interaction processes” (NENTWIG-GESEMMANN & WAGNER-WILLI 2007, p.216). The subsequent reflective interpretation that builds on this description is aimed at the so-called documentary meaning of the social situation, which is analyzed in its materiality, in terms of the interaction patterns that take place within it, and in view of the individual actions of individuals. In particular, the simultaneity of the situation; its interaction-contingent iconic-scenic design; the physicality pre-structured by the situation as well as present in interactions and individual actions; the territorial conditions; and social processes of negotiation come into view. Verbal and physical expressions such as gestures, facial expressions, posture, and movement through space occur simultaneously and are put in relation with one another. The authors write: “It is thus both of interest how the actors interact with each other, as well as how objects, stylistic means of expression, and territories are handled in the interactive process, which interpretation is assigned to them, and which conjunctive and communicative contexts are referenced” (NENTWIG-GESEMMANN & WAGNER-WILLI 2007,
p.216 [emphasis by author]). In regard to the meaning of the social situation, Françoise HATCHUEL (2007) writes “[...] that the complexity of reality was [is?] fractal, and that any observed moment contains the entire complexity of the phenomena in question” (HATCHUEL 2007, p.152 et seq.). Particularly those sequences where the exchange of linguistic interactions and physical practices take place very rapidly also unfold as stage performances with a spontaneous character. They can be described as focusing acts in which conjunctive experience spaces are revealed. Particularly scenes with high interactive density, increased concentration, and a synchronicity of courses of action, scenes in which an autonomous rhythm can also arise, may present experience centers for a social group that can unfold innovative force for them.

In all of the four examples, the focus is on a concept of quality that emphasizes the generation of those forms of pedagogical knowledge which bring about pedagogical practices. The “strong-mindedness of practice” and the opportunities for “bringing [oneself] in range of the concrete everyday experiences of the actors” (see above) should be particularly accentuated. With these objectives, awareness is raised for anthropological assumptions and the multimodal knowledge that guides pedagogical work. Here, quality refers not to “good quality” or a “quality label,” but to the orientation to pedagogical objectives and forms of knowledge, which, in the context of school education, can be described as “choreography.”

**Outlook: Avenues of Research**

The elaboration of a pedagogical concept of quality, applied in a performativity-theoretical manner, must still be performed. Such a concept has already been broadly pre-structured above, for example in the concept for the evaluation of pedagogical activities in school oriented towards pedagogical and didactic considerations. Neither the concept of quality nor the concept for evaluation in schools is, however, the explicit subject of this investigation. The development of these concepts must be linked to the closer determination of pedagogically-practical competences, especially with regard to the different fields of pedagogical challenge (conflict prevention and work, motivation, pedagogical diagnostics, interaction, etc.) and their didactic development for teacher education. However, this bundle of tasks cannot be tackled before other questions have been researched in more detail. The central role of pedagogical antinomies and areas of conflict for pedagogical knowledge has already been highlighted. They can be inevitable, unnecessary, or even irrelevant, but the investigation of under what circumstances they qualify as such must still be carried out. The concepts of learning and education in which tacit moments and influences are considered relevant for appropriate attention events should also be determined in more detail. Concepts of learning and education that take their negativity into account has already been the focus of extensive theoretical research, as has
been referenced above. The empirical application and further development of such approaches is still, however, missing. Pedagogically valuable areas of conflict, as well as the tacit dimensions of pedagogy, must still be thoroughly investigated. Their processing is complicated by the undefined relationship between theory and practice in the pedagogical fields, which is identified as an unbridgeable research gap and put at the basis of pedagogical forms of knowledge as well as pedagogical tact. It is not considered rationally solvable. Here, the technology deficit of pedagogy becomes apparent, even if it has a slightly different significance and different implications in performativity-theoretical terms than at the time of its discovery by LUHMANN & SCHORR (1982). This should also be pursued further.

The breadth and complexity of pedagogical forms of knowledge in teacher education has been examined in this study, and a proposition has been made for its systematic recognition in educational science. Theory and empirically-based practice research with an anthropological signature is generally considered suitable for the further examination of the questions that were asked here.
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