Linking Genocide and War
A Conceptual Study

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Abstract

Genocides and wars tend to covary yet the link between them is disputed. The definition and the extension of the concept genocide is also a subject of debate. Furthermore, it is disputed if historical cases of genocide are best explained as cases of genocide, or as cases of mass killings or as cases of civilian victimization in war. This paper explores how the definitional issues that surrounds the concept of genocide affect the research that investigates the link between genocide and war. The contribution of the paper is both descriptive and prescriptive. Previous definitions of war, genocide and the link between them is mapped through a systematic review of the most prominent theoretical works in the field. The results of the review is then analyzed with help of the ladder of generality and conceptual mapping. The analysis indicates that total genocide is a relevant concept, when we explore causal links between genocide and war. The conceptual mapping showed that prominent constitutive theories has portrayed war as slaughter and war as conflict. It is concluded that redefinitions of genocide, which highlights war as a form of policing or as an art or a form of self-expression, could contribute to our explanation of how wars enable genocide.

Keywords: Genocide, War, Conceptual Analysis
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1 Introduction

1.1 Introduction to the study

Genocides tend to occur during wars (see Section 4.3). Lemkin introduced the concept of genocide and initiated the discussion about the link between genocide and war\(^1\) (1944: 79f). The historical study of genocide gained prominence in the 1960:s (Midlarsky 2009: 281) and studies of genocide within the social sciences began in the 1970:s (Straus 2007: 476). Some early studies emphasized the link between genocide and war. However, it was in the early 2000:s that this link became an important theme within the theoretical literature on genocide (ibid: 493).

Several authors have pointed out that a lack of consensus regarding the definition of the concept of genocide has hindered a cumulative accumulation of knowledge about the phenomenon (Finkel & Straus 2012: 62f; Straus 2001: 349). Some authors have chosen to include cases of genocide into more wide-ranging concepts in order to provide better explanations for these cases (e.g. Valentino 2004: 9 – 15). Within the study of war the question of what constitutes a war is less contested than questions about the causes of wars and questions about within war-dynamics. Different theoretical perspectives\(^2\) on war provides different images of wars and its dynamic (Beach 2012: 169ff).

It is easy to get the impression that particular ways to conceptualize cases of genocide enables links between these cases and particular images of war. Authors that employs the concept of genocide tend to imply that wars are destabilizing and that this destabilization can contribute to genocides (e.g. Levene 2005: 66 - 77). However, when cases of genocide has been included into concepts with a wide extension such as civilian victimization and mass killings then it has been possible to connect these concepts, and thus also cases of genocide, with instrumental and utility maximizing reactions to the challenges of war (e.g. Valentino 2004: 69; Downes 2008: 37ff). If this impression is correct it would point towards an unsatisfactory situation. A risk is that different ways to conceptualize genocide can be used to point out different universes of

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1 The term "the link between genocide and war" is defined in this paper as a possible explanation for the correlation between genocide and war.

2 I define theoretical perspectives as highly abstract and axiomatic perspectives on social reality (e.g. rationalism, constructivism) (Esaiasson et al 2017: 39f).
cases and that particular universes of cases can be used to find support for a favorite theory about the connection between genocide and war. Another source of confusion in the debates regarding the link between genocide and war seem to be unclarities regarding the constitutive or causal nature of several theoretical claims (compare e.g. Finkel & Straus 2012: 58 and Shaw 2003: 44). This makes it difficult to acquire an overview of previous constitutive research about genocide and war, and to identify areas that requires further attention.

Different efforts has been made to untangle the relationship between the definition of genocide and the link between genocide and war. Shaw has developed definitions of genocide that links the concept closely to war (2003: 41ff; 2007: 154ff). Straus has explored how different definitions and selected cases has contributed to different links between genocide and war. He suggests the use of large yet disaggregated datasets of political violence against civilians, to explore common and different explanatory variables behind different forms of violence (2007: 495ff). Meiches claims that a wide definition of genocide, allows for multiple constitutive links between genocide and war and vice versa (2016: 13ff; 29)\(^3\).

This study reexamines how different definitions of genocide has enabled different links between genocide and war. It employees a more rigorous methodological approach than previous studies. Furthermore, it links the study of war closer to study of genocide, by examining of how different theoretical perspectives and conceptual frames on war has influenced the research that explores the link between genocide and war. Causal and constitutive links between genocide and war are identified. Prescriptive recommendations are given about the most relevant universes of cases. Aspects that has hampered comparability between previous studies are identified. In addition, it is examined if previous constitutive theories highlights all relevant aspects of wars and conceptual suggestions are made to enable more comprehensive constitutive theories.

1.2 Research aim and research questions

The aim of this paper is to explore how war, genocide and the link between them have been conceptualized and defined in previous research. In particular, I will explore these conceptualizations and definitions in the most prominent theoretical texts that imply a link

\(^3\) I was kindly allowed to cite from this draft by the author.
between genocide and war. A further aim of the study is to arrange previous conceptualizations and definitions so that causal and constitutional claims can be clearly separated, and different levels of generality can be identified. I will further seek to identify the most relevant level of generality for future studies. In addition, I aim to improve previous definitions so that future studies can be organized on a ladder of generality in order to improve the comparability between future studies. A final aim is to explore if reconceptualizations of genocide could highlight unexplored ways in which wars could enable genocide and thus explore if such reconceptualizations could make our constitutive theories more comprehensive.

My research question are thus:

- How has war, genocide and the link between them been conceptualized and defined in previous research?
- How could these definitions be improved in terms of relevance, comparability and comprehensiveness?

1.3 Limitations

I will only study how war, genocide and the link between them has been conceptualized and defined within the theoretical literature that implies a connection between war and genocide, or more wide-ranging concepts. Explaining genocides as part of a more wide-ranging phenomenon has important theoretical implications. Thus I have chosen to include theoretical texts that includes cases of genocide in more wide-ranging concepts.

I will only study how war has been assumed to influence genocide and not how genocide has been assumed to influence war. The reason for this is both conceptual and practical. If a genocidal outcome (see Section 4.1) is produced it seems unlikely that the targeted group will be able to launch sustained armed resistance against the perpetrators (Shaw 2003: 45). Yet, the naming of an event as a genocide has clearly been used to call for international attention and possibly even military intervention against genociders (ibid: 50ff). However, an exploration of the international repercussions of genocides would take this study to far in to the realm of international politics and away from its focus on the direct connection between genocide and war.
2 Theoretical considerations

The aim of this study indicates that we have to clarify the differences between causal and constitutive theories. We also have to introduce the ladder of generality. The role of concepts as illuminators of particular aspects of systems within constitutive theories, also has to be explained. To make these theoretical discussion understandable they will be framed by a discussion about the role of concepts within the social sciences.

2.1 Concepts in the social sciences

Social science theories stipulate a relationship between different social science concepts (Esaiasson et al 2017: 28) or, seek to explain social phenomena through the properties of specific concepts (Wendt 1998: 111). Concepts are thus the building blocks of theories and social science concepts should primarily be evaluated by their ability to function as building blocks in interesting and relevant theories. Concept creation is about capturing (or constituting, depending upon realistic or nomological assumption), parts of the ontology of social reality. (Esaiasson et al 2017: 27f; Goertz 2006: 3ff; Wendt 1998 112f).

Two important theories about concept definition is the necessary and sufficient attributes theory and the family resemblance theory. The necessary and sufficient attributes theory states that concepts should be defined by a specification of the necessary and sufficient attributes of the concept. If a phenomenon exhibits all the attributes stated as necessary and sufficient it is covered by the extension of the concept. The family resemblance theory states that a phenomenon that exhibits some or even a single attribute of a concept is covered by the extension of the concept (Goertz 2006: 27f). Thus the necessary and sufficient attributes theory uses an AND logic in concept formation while the family resemblance theory uses an OR logic (ibid: 44). The necessary and sufficient attributes theory points towards mutually exclusive concepts while concepts created with the family resemblance approach indicates grey zones and overlapping areas between different concepts (ibid: 29).

Concept designed by the stating of attributes has three different components: a term that names the concept, an intension that is the sum of attributes of the concept and thus the meaning or substance of the concept, and finally an extension that is sum of the phenomena that is covered by the concept (Gschwend & Schimmelfennig 2014: 42) Indicators are often used to point out
and delimit the universe of cases that is covered by the extension of a concept (Goertz 2006: 62ff).

2.2 Causal and constitutive explanations

There are several types of social science theories and the relation between the different types is contested (compare Wendt 1998 and Ylikoski 2013). An often-used distinction is the one between causal and constitutive theories. Causal theories seek to explain why events take place while constitutive theories seek to explain how it is possible that certain phenomena possess certain properties. Causal theories seeks to explain events through a causal chain of action that preceded and caused an event. Constitutive theories to seek to explain how it is possible that certain phenomena possess certain properties through an analysis of the components and the organization of “systems (or wholes)” (Ylikoski 2013: 281; Wendt 1998: 104ff).

I consider constitutive and causal explanations as complementary and not fully comparable modes of explanation (Ylikoski 2013: 295). Concepts plays different roles in causal and constitutive theories. If we can organize the concepts that we use in different causal theories on a ladder of generality then there are great gains to be made. Concepts used in constitutive theories are used to illuminate different components and organizational aspects of system and they have to be considered in relation to these systems.

2.3 The ladder of generality

Satori suggests that we should organize concepts used in the social sciences on a ladder of generality (1970: 1040). The ladder of generality is only useable for concepts designed according to the AND-logic of the necessary and sufficient attributes theory (Goertz 2006 72). Consider for example the concept of war. We might define wars as violent AND large-scale conflicts. Let us say that we want to define the concept of intrastate wars. We can create a definition of intrastate wars by adding attributes to our definition of the concept of war. For example we could state that intrastate wars are violent AND large-scale conflict AND that they are fought between states or state-like entities that has their bases within the borders of the same

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4 Satori used the term the ladder of abstraction for his organizational framework. Collier suggested that the ladder of abstraction should be renamed the ladder of generality and that is the name I will use for the organizational framework (Goertz 2006: 69).
state. By adding attributes to the concept of war we have thus created a subtype of war called intrastate war. This example illustrates that when we add attributes to a concept designed according to an AND-logic the intention of the concept grows. Yet as the intention of the concept grows its extension diminishes; thus the concept will cover fewer cases. Concepts with small intensions and large extensions are more general and thus placed higher up on the ladder of generality and vice versa (Satori 1970: 1041). If we arrange types and subtypes on the ladder of generality we can construct comparable theories on different levels of generality.

2.4 Concepts and constitutive theories

Constitutive theories explores how properties are made possible through components and organizational aspects of systems or wholes (Ylikoski 2013: 281). When we explore how components and organizational aspects makes particular properties possible we only explore a particular set of components and organizational aspects. A great challenge for any constitutive explanation is to locate the most relevant set of components and organizational aspects (ibid: 285). Let us say that we want to explore how it is possible that a particular government has the capacity to announce elections. In this case it seems reasonable to explore the constitutional system of the particular state and how the organization and the components of this constitutional system grants the government the causal power to announce elections. However if we are to explore how it is possible for the same government to announce elections AND to collect taxes AND to punish it´s citizens then the constitutional system no longer seems to be the most relevant system to explore. That is because all of these power together creates the image of a powerful organization with highly intrusive powers. If we explore these powers together it seems more relevant to explore systems of ideas spread throughout the society in question about the right of the democratic state to rule etc. If we lump together phenomena or add new attributes to a concept then the most relevant components and organizational aspects of different systems can change. Given this concepts used in constitutive theories has be considered in relation to the systems we explore. In particular we have to consider if our definitions of a concept really illuminates the most important set of components and organizational aspects that we seek (compare with Jaccard and Jacoby 2010: 79f).
3 Methodological considerations

The aim of this study points towards three methodological challenges: how to map definitions in previous research, how to find the most relevant level of generality and how to explore potential gaps in previous explanations of how wars can enable genocides. The mapping challenge will be solved through a systematic conceptual literature review (Jesson et al: 15; 103ff). The level of generality challenge will be solved through an organizing of the results of previous studies on a ladder of generality. The gap finding challenge will be solved through the use of cognitive mapping (Trepagnier 2002: 108).

3.1 The conceptual literature review

Any conceptual study (Esaiasson et al 2017: 36f) has to consider the tradeoffs between a broad and a deep study. In a broad study a large number of definitions can be gathered and explored, while a deep study will focus on a smaller number of definitions. A strength with a deep study is that the smaller number of concepts considered will allow for a more detailed contextualization of the explored definitions. In this paper I will favor depth over breath. Since I study how two concepts have been defined and linked together a certain level of contextual information will be necessary to make sense of the presented links.

A deep study requires a strategic selection (ibid: 154 - 171) of theoretical texts. I decided to focus on the most prominent and renown theoretical texts that includes statements about the connection between genocide and war. There is a risk that I will miss some interesting links between genocide and war that has been suggested in less renown works. However, I decided to focus on the most renown works in order to clarify how genocide and war has been linked together in these work. When this clarification is done it will become easier to assess the value of less renown theories.

3.1.1 Data collection strategy

Review articles was used to identify the most prominent and renown theoretical texts within the studied area. Two review articles that explicitly considered the connection between genocide and war were identified (Straus 2007; Finkel & Straus 2012). Being mentioned as an important theorist within any one of these review articles was treated as an indicator of scientific
renown. Any of the mentioned theorists that had not produced a major theoretical text (i.e. a book), that included a theoretical argument about the connection between genocide and war was excluded. This produced eight works to explore (Levene 2005; Mann 2005; Markusen & Kopf 1995; Melson 1992; Midlarsky 2005; Shaw 2003; Semelin 2007; Valentino 2004). 5

Two non-systematic additions was made to the selected text. Downes (2008) was included since Finkel & Straus mentions his works as an important link between the litterateur that studies civilian victimization in war and the study of genocide (2012: 64ff). Other articles also mentioned Downes 2008 as important theorist (Nichols 2018: 90f; Kestnbaum 2009: 245f). Furthermore, I added Lemkin (1944) to the list given the huge influence that his work has had.

The located reviews only covered the period up to 2012. To fill the gap between the year 2012 and the year 2019 I examined two bibliographies (Tinnes 2015; Tinnes 2019). Yet this examination did not lead to the inclusion of any more texts.

3.1.2 Textual analysis

To systematically review the gathered texts a number of questions will be asked to each text (see Section 3.4 for the exact questions). A challenge in the execution of the textual analysis was a lack of clear definitions. I always strived to use the authors exact definitions of genocide, war and the link between them. When a definition of a concept was missing I investigated how the concept was described in the text. I then tried to detect or abstract the most vital qualities of the concept that these descriptions highlighted. Furthermore, I investigated if these qualities could be linked to prominent definitions of the concept in previous research (see e.g. Blaikie & Priest 2017: 117 on abstractions from different units of analysis).

3.1.3 Framing the conceptual literature review

To frame the presentation of the results of the litterateur review I will first present the concept of genocide, the concept of war and studies that points towards a correlation between genocide and war. In line with the rest of the study I will focus on the most renown ways to define the two concepts. The definition of genocide in article II in the United Nations Convention on the

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5 Weitz (2003) was excluded since it is a work of comparative history rather than social science theory.
Prevention and Punishment of Genocide tend to be the starting point for definitional debates about genocide (e.g. Levene 2005: 35ff; Gallagher 2013: 14ff), and this definition has great normative and political influence. Clausewitz definition of war is of seminal importance (Ångström & Widén 2016: 17f). Different theoretical perspectives on war will also be presented. Furthermore, I will present Ångström & Widén’s list of conceptual frames that has been used to explain the meaning of war (ibid: 15ff) since these frames will be used in the analysis of the constitutive theories (see Section 3.3).

3.2 The ladder of generality as an analytic tool

As a general rule scientists wants to explain as much as possible about the world in the simplest possible way. This idea of maximizing leverage implies that more general explanations are preferable to more specific explanations (King et al 1994: 29).

Consider the ideal of maximizing leverage in relationship to the ladder of generality. Let us say that we are interested in consumer behavior and that we place this concept at the top of the ladder of generality. Lower down on the ladder of generality we can find subtypes of consumer behavior such as consumer behavior on the housing market. If a general theory of consumer of behavior is able to explain consumer behavior in the housing market then there is no reason to develop a specific theory about consumer behavior on that particular market. However, let us consider consumer behavior on the markets for illegal drugs. On these markets we might find or anticipate that consumer behavior is influenced by very specific factors such as compulsory addictions and short-term gratification. Thus a general theory of consumer behavior might be very misleading when we try to explain consumer behavior on the markets for illegal drugs. In that case we should a develop a specific theory, or at least modify our general theory about consumer behavior, if we are to explain consumer behavior on these markets. Thus the most relevant level of generality is the highest level of generality upon which we develop a theory that provides an adequate explanation for the phenomenon of interest.

An aim of this paper is to point out the most relevant level of generality when we study the link between genocide and war. We know that there are previous studies that considers this link. If we were able to arrange previous studies on one or several ladders of generality we should be able to explore if the character of the link changes when we compare studies on different levels of generality. If we climb down one level of generality and find that the nature of the suggested
link has changed significantly at the lower level of generality, then this would indicate that the lower level generality is the most relevant level for our explanation of phenomenon and vice versa. However if there are problems to arrange previous studies on a ladder of generality then it seems important to provide suggestions about how previous definitions of our concepts might be modified so that we can arrange future studies on a ladder of generality. It seems reasonable to use the best identified practices in previous research in such suggestions, since this will allow for better a comparability between future and previous studies then to use new and untested ideas.

3.3 Using cognitive mapping to finds gaps in previous research

When we explore how one concept (e.g. war) can make the extension of another concept (e.g. genocide) possible our ultimate goal is to highlight all vital or important ways in which one concept enables the extension of another concept. Gap-finding will thus be vital. Cognitive mapping (Trepagnier 2002: 181) can be used to systematically map previous connections between different concepts. If we are to explore gaps in previous research we first have to explore what attributes of the concept that is threatened as whole (e.g. war), that has been highlighted in previous research. We can then consider if there are any vital attributes of the concept that is threatened as whole (e.g. war) that has been ignored in previous research, and if these attributes seems to be connected to any vital components or organizational aspects of the concept. We can then go back to the concept whose extension we explore (e.g. genocide), and consider if it can be redefined in any way to highlight unilluminated attributes of the concept that we treat as a whole (e.g. war). In practice it is difficult to list all vital attributes of war stated in previous research. However, we could list different conceptual frames that each points towards a bundle of attributes of war and explore if these frames has been highlighted in previous constitutive research (see Section 3.1.3 regarding the list of conceptual frames that will be employed).

An alternative way to explore unilluminated ways in which wars could enable genocides could be to explore cases of genocide during wars that do not seem to fit with previous constitutive research. One way to integrate at least some empirical data into a conceptual study is to consider different empirical examples.

3.4 Operational indicators
During the work with the three tasks presented in the method section (the review, the organizing on the ladder of generality and the cognitive mapping), three sets of operational indicators will be used. For the literature review the following questions will be used to guide the exploration of the texts:

- How is genocide conceptualized and defined or described in the text?

- How is war conceptualized and defined or described in the text?

- How is the link between war and genocide conceptualized and defined in the text, and what mechanisms is suggested as a link between genocide and war?

When all of these questions have been answered the following analytical questions will be considered:

- Is the link between genocide and war best understood as causal or constitutive?

- With which theoretical perspective on war does the link between genocide and war fit best?

For the causal theories, the following question was added:

- How has the concept of genocide been operationalized, and / or which cases are explored in the study?

To solve the task of organizing previous studies on a ladder of generality, the following questions was asked:

- On what level of generality has previous causal studies been conducted?

- Can these studies be placed on a ladder or several ladders of generality?

When all of these questions has been answered the following analytical question will be
considered:

- Which concepts, qualities and mechanism changes as when we move up and down the ladders of generality?

- Can previous definitions be modified so that future studies can be placed on a or several ladders of generality?

To solve the task of cognitive mapping the following questions were asked:

- Which conceptual frames of war have been highlighted by previous constitutive theories?

- Are there any conceptual frames that has been neglected in pervious constitutive theories and could these frames be linked to important components and organizational aspects of war that could enable genocide?

- Could the concepts of genocide be redefined to highlight neglected conceptual frames of war that are linked to neglected components and organizational aspects of war?
4.0 Reviewing the link between genocide and war

4.1 Genocide

The term genocide points towards the annihilation of groups (Gallagher 2013: 1; Midlarsky 2005: 24). A distinction can be drawn between genocide as an outcome and genocide as a process (Gallagher 2013: 27; Levene 2005: 203f). The UN definition of genocide in article II in the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide from 1948 states that genocide is a criminal act: “committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group” (Gallagher 2013: 14). A number of means that can be used to achieve the destructions are listed and this list includes killing or causing harm or creating unbearable living conditions or preventing births or a transfer of children to other groups (ibid: 14f).

The UN definition is contested along several dimensions (Straus 2001: 361; Gallagher 2013: 13). I will here focus on three dimensions that are related to issues that has the hampered comparability between previous studies that stipulates a link between genocide and war (see Section 5.1.3).

The issue of scale is one contested dimension. It seems ethically unreasonable to exclude cases of annihilation of smaller groups from a definition of genocide (Gallagher 2013: 31f). However, large-scale annihilation requires an advanced organization of destruction and persistence while the destruction of smaller groups do not require the same degree of organization and persistence. Furthermore, Valentino suggests that the killing of large number of individuals indicates an intent of mass destruction (Valentino 2004: 12). The concept of genocidal massacres suggested by Kurper could be used to point out cases of annihilation of smaller groups (Markusen & Kopf 1995: 62ff).

Another contested dimension is if the extension of genocide should cover both the destruction of groups in whole and a partial destruction of groups (Gallagher 2013: 28ff). Analytically one can at least draw a distinction between the partial and the total extermination of groups. No historical case of genocide seems to have led to the destruction of every individual from a group. The worst historical cases of genocide has led to the destruction of 66 – 70 % of the victim
group (Midlarsky 2005: 7f). Thus a possibility is to use 66% destruction or more of the victim group as an indicator of total genocide.

A third contested dimension refers to the victim group. The UN definition point towards the destruction of specific groups such as racial groups. But how do we classify cases of destruction of other groups or categories such as social classes? A great risk of pointing out specific social groups is reification (Malešević 2017: 217f; Gallagher 2013: 33). Another problem is that social groups tend to be hard to delimit. During a genocide it is always the preparators that defines and delimits the victim group (Levene 2005: 86ff; Malešević 2017: 217f). Thus there are strong arguments against limiting the use of the term genocide to the destruction of certain fixed social groups (see Shaw 2007: 63 – 77, for a more elaborated discussion).

Straus has suggested a typology of genocides that is of importance when we study the link between genocide and war.Straus suggested that we should separate colonial and revolutionary genocides. Colonial genocides are committed against indigenous people during conquests and revolutionary genocides are done to accomplish radical internal changes (Straus 2001: 369f). Colonial genocides are thus linked to the conquest of foreign territory while revolutionary genocide are linked to domestic changes. However, a problem with this typology when we study the connection between genocide and war is that control over territory tend to change during wars.

4.2 War

War has been defined as a violent protracted conflict between two or more parties that tend to be organized (Abimbola & Dominic 2013: 34). A commonly used indicator of a war is 1000 battle deaths per year (ibid; Ångström & Widen 2015: 22). Ångström & Widen has presented a list of conceptual frames that has been used to explain the meaning of war. Framing war as a tool points towards war as an instrument that can be used to achieve political or other goals. A bargaining frame points out war as a way to show commitment and preferences. War conceived of as violence or slaughter is self-explanatory. A forth frame is war as antagonism or conflict. This frame also highlights war as a way to handle or settle conflicts. A fifth frame is war as a form of policing. This frame highlights war as a way to uphold a political order. The sixth frame is war as art. This frame highlights warfare a creative endeavor. The final frame presented is war as self-realization. This frame highlights links between warfare and identity (2015: 15ff).
Clausewitz claim that war is embedded in politics, it is “the continuation of policy by other means” (1976: 87). The metaphor of the duel is used by Clausewitz to characterize war (ibid: 75). This metaphor illustrates that war is a high stakes deadly game that creates immense danger for the participants, and that sets them under massive pressure (ibid: 113f). Clausewitz states that the only active means in war is combat (ibid: 95ff). Engagements and potential engagements (ibid: 181f) are thus at the core of the process of war. There is no theoretical limit to the violence that the belligerent can cast at each other during wars (ibid: 77) and wars were all societally resources are directed towards the war effort has been called total wars by other authors (Markusen & Kopf 1995: 35ff). Clausewitz further claims that war has a tendency to escalate (1976: 75ff) although the danger, the cost and the embedding of war in political structures can keep the escalatory tendency of war at bay (ibid: 78ff). The belligerents in wars will try to realize their war plans and sabotage the plans of their opponents (ibid: 84ff). This creates a complex strategic interaction between the belligerents in an environment marked by fear (ibid: 113ff), uncertainty and frictions (ibid: 117ff). This will often lead to unexpected and unplanned outcomes and situations.

The rationalist theoretical perspective on war fits well with the idea of war as a tool and as a form of bargaining (Fearon 1995, Beach 2012: 169). A challenge for the rationalist perspective is to explain why belligerents would choose to engage in costly and dangerous wars or, escalations of war (Fearon 1995: 383). Constructivists perceives wars as a way to fight for our identity. They claim that identities are more vital for us than the maximization of our utility. Fighting for an identity is thus used to explain why belligerents are willing to bear the high costs of war (see e.g. Ringmar 1996: 187ff). A cognitive-psychological perspective on war that is common within foreign policy analysis emphasis cognitive misrepresentations and psychological weakness (Beach 2012: 170). This perspective fits well with the image of war as a high stakes and deadly game since the pressures from such a game will test our cognitive and physiological abilities. The social-physiological perspective on war emphasis how war creates a vilification of the enemy and a sense of victimization of the self that can escalate conflicts (ibid: 170f). Finally there is historical-sociological perspective that portraits war as an historical phenomenon that changes as social structures and ideas evolve (Malešević 2010: 70-84).

4.3 The correlation between genocide and war

Several correlation studies provide strong support for the claim that wars and genocides tend to
correlate. Based on an analysis of a dataset covering genocides since 1945 Fein concludes that there is a strong correlation between genocide and war (Fein 1993: 95). Nichols claims that 80% of all genocides that has occurred during the year 1955 and the year 2000 occurred during civil wars (Nichols 2018: 89). Matthew Krains study from 1997 indicates that war correlates with the occurrence of genocide and that wars also seems to affect the severity of genocides (Midlarsky 2009: 282).

There are limitations to the correlation argument. Genocides are rare in comparison to wars; thus most wars do not correlate with genocides (Nichols 2018: 89, Shaw 2003: 44). Furthermore, there are cases that has been classified as genocides that did not occur during wars. Thus the occurrence of a war does not seem to be a necessary nor a sufficient condition for genocides. However the fear of war has been considered as a potential explanatory variable for cases of genocide that was not committed during a war (see e.g. Levene 2005: 86). I will now explore potential explanations for the correlation between war and genocide, suggested in ten influential theoretical works.

4.4 Genocide as an instrument in war

4.4.1 Alexander B Downes

Downes (2008) seeks to explain civilian victimization during wars. Civilian victimization during wars is defined as a military strategy with two necessary attributes: a government approved strategy AND the intentional OR predicable killing of many non-combatants (Downes 2008: 14). Civilian victimization is produced by a “widespread, repeated, and systematic use” (ibid: 17) of actions that will lead to a foreseeable deaths of non-combatants (ibid).

Downes text indicates that he conceptualizes war as a tool that can be used by states to achieve policy goals. The text also highlights the frictions of warfare and the fact that warfare do not always go as planned (ibid: 29ff).

The mechanisms suggested by Downes as a link between war and civilian victimization is a desperation to win and a hunger for territory. Desperation can be caused by wars of attrition or by the use of guerilla warfare by an opposing belligerent. Desperation makes it more likely that
a belligerent will resort to civilian victimization. If a belligerent hungers for and conquers territory it becomes more likely that it will resort to the strategy of civilian victimization, if it conceives the population in the conquered territories as hostile (ibid: 3ff). A conquering belligerent will sometimes focus their killings of civilians within a conquered territory on a specific group, due to ideology (ibid: 35).

Rational strategic calculations functions as the link between war and civilian victimization in the text (ibid: 37). Downes theory is clearly causal. The theory fits well with the rational theoretical perspective on war although ideology is acknowledged as an intervening variable when killings are directed towards a particular civilian group. Furthermore, it is noted that the strategy of civilian victimization only has a mixed record of success (ibid).

Downes uses a dataset covering interstate wars between years 1816 and 2003 (ibid: 42). Several cases that has been classified as genocides are discussed as cases of civilian victimization in war. This includes Nazi Germanys extermination of the Jews in the occupied parts of the USSR (ibid: 17) (other aspects of the Holocaust are not discussed by Downes), and the mass killings of Armenians during World War I (ibid: 79).

4.4.2 Benjamin Valentino

Valentino (2004) seeks to explain the phenomenon of mass killing. Mass killings is defined as the “the intentional killing of a massive number of noncombatants” (Valentino 2004: 10). Two necessary attributes of mass killing is that the killings are intentional AND that they are directed against non-combatants (ibid).

Valentino states that “war… can be a powerful political and military tool” (ibid: 3). An instrumental way of looking at war is thus highlighted by the author. Warfare is also described as an intentional mass killing of combatants (ibid) and thus as slaughter.

Valentino suggests that political leaders tend to resort to mass killings in desperation after they have tried other political tools (ibid: 4; 68) He further suggests that mass killings are more likely to occur during wars if “leaders perceives conventional military tactics to be hopeless or unacceptably costly” (ibid: 69). The use of guerilla warfare by an opponent (ibid: 82) or wars of attrition are important factors that can cause such perceptions (ibid: 84). Counter-guerilla
motives has also affected many cases of mass killings (ibid: 75 -92 ) and a perceived threat of guerillas can be spurred or enhanced by conflicts interpreted through an ideological lens. A will to settle inhabited territories is another cause of mass killings linked to war (ibid: 77ff).

The perceived instrumental strategic gains of mass killings during wars functions as the main link between war and mass killings in the text (ibid: 3f). The link is best conceived of as causal since certain situations within wars will make mass killings more likely. The author perspective on war fits best with a rationalist perceptive on war, yet a boundedly rational positions is strongly emphasized and ideology is thus an influential variable (ibid: 67f). The explored cases indicates that the strategy of mass killings tend to fail in the long run (ibid: 67f).

Valentino operationalizes mass killings by using the quantitative indicator of 50 000 intentional deaths within a five-year period (ibid: 11f). Cases during the twentieth century is studied (ibid: 75 – 90). Cases of genocide such as the Holocaust and the Armenian genocide is included among the explored cases (ibid: 77f).

4.5 War as the cradle of a genocidal mindset

4.5.1 Michael Mann

Mann (2005) seeks to explain murderous ethnic cleansing. The concept is created to cover the worst forms of intragroup cleansing of a group from a territory. The methods used for cleansing included in the concept is the total or partial, intentional or unintentional extermination of the group members. It also includes the use of violence to induce mass flight or to control reproduction (Mann 2005: 10ff). Genocide is included in the concept and it is defined as an intentional act aimed at annihilating an entire group physically AND culturally (ibid: 17).

War or the fear of war is presented by Mann as a destabilizing factor that produces tensions and fractions within the state (ibid: 7). This description of war seems to fit well with the image of war as duel; a deadly AND high stakes game (see Section 4.2).

A vital effect that war, or the fear of war, has in Manns text is that it radicalizes social identities. This spurs radicalized fractions within the wider political sphere that calls for a harsher treatment of “domestic enemies”. (ibid: 7; 23ff). Ideological war can produce a further
The radicalization of identities. During wars it becomes easier to target civilian groups since they become vulnerable during the war. COIN operations and siege warfare can also create incentives for large scale attacks on civilians (ibid: 32).

The stated mechanisms imply two links between war and murderous ethnic cleansing. War radicalizes social identities and this affects the political sphere. Within-war-dynamics can also create incentives for or makes attacks against civilian groups possible. Mann explicitly states that political tensions are more important than the military incentives, thus the main link implied in the text is that war is the cradle of genocidal mindset through its radicalizing affects within the political sphere (ibid: 30ff).

The connection between war and murderous ethnic cleansing in Manns text is best understood as causal since the pressures of war are assumed to trigger processes of radicalization. Manns theory fits best with a social-physiological image of war since the pressures discussed above influences social identities.

Mann surveys a wide range of cases of murderous ethnic cleansing throughout human history (Mann 2005).

4.5.2 Manus I. Midlarsky

Midlarsky (2005) seeks to point out the conditions that makes genocide a probable outcome (Midlarsky 2005: 6f). Genocide is defined as “state-sponsored systematic mass murder of innocent and helpless men, women, and children denoted by a particular ethnoreligious identity, having the purpose of eradicating this group from a particular territory” (ibid: 10).

The concept of war in Midlarsky’s text is intimately connected with the concept of loss (ibid: 68). Loss points towards the idea of war as a disaster. An image of war in previous research that loss could be connected with is Clausewitz’s image of war as a dual. The deadly AND high stakes character of war that this image illuminates strongly implies the possibility of a disastrous outcome.

Being in the dominion of loss during a war is a central condition that makes genocides more probable (ibid: 86ff). The dominion of loss is defined as a dominion were all expected outcomes...
yield less or the same utility as the reference point (ibid: 104). Given prospect theory (the main claim of prospect theory is that losses are conceived of as more hurtful than equal sized gains) (ibid: 103ff), Midlarsky stipulates that agents will not act in a rational utility maximizing way when they are in domain of loss (ibid: 67). Rather he expects that agents in the domain of loss will become extremely vigilant against threats to acquired gains, and that they will try to compensate for losses. Belligerents who has lost previous wars are more likely to believe that they are losing an ongoing war since they will use previous experiences as references in an uncertain environment. When a belligerent is in the domain of loss they will likely become extremely vigilant and harsh against suspected “internal enemies” in order to protect acquired gains. It is also likely that they will try to compensate for losses, something that can be done by attacking civilian “internal enemies” (ibid: 106).

The link between genocide and war in the text is psychological. Particular situations in war can create a non-rational genocidal response and thus make war the cradle of a genocidal mindset. Midlarskys theory is best understood as causal and it fits well with a cognitive-psychological perspective on war.

Midlarsky focuses on the most extreme cases of genocide and a destruction of at least 66 % of the targeted population is used as indicator. Focusing on the twentieth century Midlarsky ends up with three selected cases: the Armenian genocide, the Holocaust and the Rwandan genocide (ibid: 22ff).

4.5.3 Robert Melson

Melson (1992) seeks to explain the phenomenon of total domestic genocides. Total domestic genocide are defined as “a public policy whose intent either…the extermination of a collectivity or category usually communal group or class, or…the killing of a large fraction of a collectivity or a category…and the destruction of its social and cultural identity in most or all its aspects” (Melson 1992: 26). Domestic genocides are made against a domestic segments of society rather than a group on foreign soil (ibid: 2).

Melson portrays war as a challenge that creates fear among the political elite (Melson 1992: 19f). This point towards war as a high stakes AND deadly game, something that Clausewitz
illustrates with the image of war as a duel (see Section 4.2).

Melson stated that a revolution followed by war, or at least the threat of a war, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a total domestic genocides (ibid: 278f). If a post-revolutionary state ends up in a war, or fears war, fear will grow among the political elite for “domestic enemies”. The constrains that a war places on a state will also limit the range of perceived solutions to the perceived threat from “domestic enemies”. At the same time wars will makes state less constrained by state-society relations, making it easier for the political elite to use violence large-scale violence (ibid: 19f).

The link between genocide and war described by Melson is a psychological link since war is implied to effects leader psychology, and thus war is the cradle of a genocidal mindset. But there is also a political link since war is implied to affect state – society relations (ibid: 19f). There are tensions in the text regarding the importance of these two links (compare e.g. ibid: 19f and ibid: 248). A possible way to reconcile these tensions is to argue that war creates fear thus making extremist even more extreme, and that the fear created by war furthermore makes it easier for extreme fractions to promote their policy suggestions. Given that the fear created by war is such a central push factor in the theory I would argue that the Melsons theory is best conceived of as causal. Given this fear Melsons theory fits well with a cognitive-physiological perspective on war.

Melsons total universe of cases are the Holocaust, the genocide of the Romani, the Armenian Genocide, Stalins genocide of Kulak and the Cambodian genocide (ibid: 279). The focus in Melson (1992) is on a comparison between the Holocaust and the Armenian Genocide.

4.6 War and genocide as radical attacks on the international order

The definitions of war and genocide in Lenvene (2005) is best discussed together. Genocide is defined as “state organized partial or total extermination of perceived or actual communal groups” (2005: 203). War is discussed as a phenomenon that puts massive pressures on states (ibid: 86). Different types of wars is also discussed, and a distinction is drawn between wars against perceived legitimate or illegitimate enemies (ibid: 56). Wars against illegitimate enemies are essentially wars of destruction. Such wars can escalate and become genocidal, still they lack a necessary attribute of genocides (ibid: 64f). The necessary missing piece is a phobic
projection on the victim group producing the image of a vast, powerful and illegitimate threat to the state (ibid: 135 - 143).

The underlying conditions for genocides presented in the text is a nation-state (ibid: 144ff) with a severe identity crises. The identity crises steams from a perceived inherent greatness of the state and the perception that the state is being held back by other states (ibid: 186). When such a state ends up in a situation where its perceived development is acutely threatened by external forces then we are in the risk zone for genocide (ibid: 196 - 206). War or the fear of war are often an important cause of such crises (ibid: 86). War and genocide are also likely responses to such crises, since states with this specific type of identity crises are likely to engage in ”massive violence” (ibid: 197) to overthrow a “contemporary reality” (ibid) that acutely threatens its identity (ibid).

The link between genocide and war pointed out by Levene is both functional and causal. Pressures of war or the fear of war can aggravate underlying identity crises and thus trigger a destructive causal process. The link is also functional since both genocides and wars functions as answers to the identity crises that these states experience. However, engaging in new wars can reasonably further deepen the crises that these states experience thus trigger new causal processes. Levenes text fits best with a constructivist perspective on war given the link it proposes between war and identity.

Levene focuses on five archetypical cases of genocide: the Holocaust, the Armenian genocide, the Rwandan genocide, the genocide of the Kulaks and the Cambodian genocide (ibid: 67ff; 83ff).

4.7 Total wars as enablers of genocide

4.7.1 Eric Markusen & David Kopf

Markusen and Kopf defines genocide as “when a government slaughters its own citizens or subjects” (1995: 4). For the slaughter to be genocidal it has to be carried out AND sanctioned by an organized power AND the victimization has to be based upon group membership AND the killing has be directed against civilians OR be indiscriminate (ibid: 71; 252ff).
Total war is defined as “when two or more governments slaughter each other’s civilian citizens, as well as military personnel” (ibid: 4; compare with Section 4.2). Here it is clear that slaughter is the central attribute of war highlighted.

Markusen and Kopf illuminate several factors that make it easier for politicians to engage in massacres and genocides during wars in general and total wars in particular. Inter-group tensions tend to flare up during wars making it easier for politicians to “scapegoat” victim groups. Governments becomes more secretive and powerful during total wars and moral constrain becomes weaker in society in general. It becomes easier for the government to plan and conduct genocides as military operations given the military capabilities that has been mobilized, and given the fact that victim groups tend to become isolated of world and weakened by war (ibid 64f).

Markusen and Kopfs link between genocide and war is thus that total war enables genocide. The proposed links are constitutive. Given the focus on an historical form of war (i.e. total wars), the theory fits best with a historical-sociological perspective on war.

4.7.2 Jacques Semelin

Semelin defines genocide as a “particular process of civilian destruction that is directed at the total eradication of a group” (Semelin 2007: 340). Semelin conceptualizes genocides as a form of massacre that became possible in the twentieth century given state capabilities that made it possible for states to control the composition of the demos in powerful ways (ibid).

Semelin want to highlight the darkest and grimmest aspects of war and that is the aspects of “battlefield violence and…massacre” (ibid: 132). This is clearly war as slaughter. The history of war or rather war as an historical phenomenon is also emphasized by Semelin (ibid).

Semelin states that massacres and wars has always covaried (ibid: 132). War makes massacres possible since they produce a new universe of experiences. It is a universe marked by insecurity, hyper-vigilance and acute security dilemmas. In such a universe of experiences almost anything will seem justified in the name of security. In addition, warfare tend to hide massacres through the closing of battle zones and through a rhetoric were the killings of non-combatants in disguised as combat (ibid: 145f). After battle victories defeated foes or civilians living in
occupied areas becomes easy targets (ibid: 133). However war is also an historical phenomenon. A widespread use of massacres in a region will make massacres a standard tool in regional wars. The coming of total mobilization, during the French revolution, is pointed out as particularly important since all parts of the enemy nation could now be pointed out as hostile and dangerous. Total mobilization also made it possible to vilify “domestic enemies” (ibid: 134ff). When total mobilization coincided with powerful states in the twentieth century, with a strong interest in keeping the demos free from any “harmful elements” (ibid: 340), genocides become possible.

Semelins links between genocide and war is that wars enable massacres and that total wars made more extensive massacres and even genocides possible. Semelins links are constitutive and they fit best with a historical-sociological perspective on war.

4.8 Genocide as an extension of modern wars

War and genocide is closely related in Shaw (2003) thus they are best discussed together. Genocide is defined as “the destruction by an organized armed force of a largely unarmed civilian group (or groups) principally by killing members of the group(s)” (ibid: 5). Shaws defines war “as an act of force by an organized social power to compel an enemy to submit to its will” (2003: 18). This definition of war point towards war as a tool however, the most vital attribute highlighted by Shaw of both war and genocide is slaughter on a large scale (ibid: 18f). A difference between genocide and war is that war is generally conceived of as legitimate while genocide is generally conceived of as illegitimate (ibid: 4f, 46f). Still wars tend to escalate, and the violence of war tend to surpass strict military necessity leading to a degeneration of war (ibid: 5, 23f).

Shaw claims that the scale of possible military destruction was immensely large during the twentieth century and that it has become more common to point out whole societies as enemies. War and war plans thus degenerated on an unprecedented scale during this century (ibid: 24ff). New forms of degeneration has been reborn after the Cold war through so-called new wars and wars that places huge risks on civilians (ibid: 50ff). The logic of modern degenerated wars makes it possible for political leaders to point out whole social groups as enemies, and to use

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6 See Shaw (2003: 5) for a similar formulation
the military capacities mobilized during wars to destroy these social groups (ibid: 40ff).

Shaw denies a direct causal relationship between war and genocide (ibid: 44). Since he argues that the logic of modern wars facilitates genocidal plans (ibid) his theory is best conceived of as constitutive. The theory fits best with a historical-sociological perspective on war.

4.9 Conflicts between nations makes genocide a rational strategy in war

Lemkin (1944) defines genocide as “the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group” (1944: 79). He describes genocide as a process that involves the destruction of “national patterns” (ibid) that are replaced by the oppressors patterns (ibid). A wide range of techniques can be used to destroy these patterns (ibid: 82ff).

Lemkin contrasts modern limited wars and historical “wars of extermination” (ibid: 80). As society evolved Lemkin claims that war has been “tamed” in to a contest between states and their armies. However the German conduct during the WWII is a fall back to, and an evolution of, wars of extermination (ibid: 79f). This can be linked back to Clausewitzs idea that war is escalatory by nature but can be kept under control by social institutions. The idea of war as an expression of underlying conflicts is furthermore illuminated by the mechanisms stated below.

Lemkin claims that the genocides conducted by the Nazis was made possible by total war and Nazi ideology. He focuses on the ideological explanation. He further claims that nations and not states are the fundamental units in national-socialist ideology. Thus nation-socialists conceives of war as a conflict between nations rather than as conflict between states. A particular war may even be seen as a part of a long conflict between nations. Given this genocides becomes a rational strategy within war and within the long-term conflicts between nations (ibid: 80ff).

The link between genocide and war pointed out in the text is that conflicts between nations, rather than between states, makes genocide a rational strategy in warfare. The link between genocide and war suggested by Lemkin is best understood as constitutive and it fits best with a historical-sociological perspective on war.
4.10 A summary of the review

A summary of the review is provided in the two tables below
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<th>Theoretical perspective on and highlighted attributes of war</th>
<th>Operationalization and / or explored cases</th>
<th>Suggested mechanisms linking war and genocide (or wider concept)</th>
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Table 2 – Constitutive theories explored in the review

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<th>Theorist</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaw</td>
<td>Genocide as an extension of modern wars</td>
<td>The destruction by an organized armed force of a largely unarmed civilian group (or groups) principally by killing members of the group (s).</td>
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Analysis of the links between genocide and war

5.1 The ladder of generality

In Section 5.1 I will analyze previous studies that points out a causal relationship between genocide and war in relationship to the ladder of generality. I will first arrange previous studies on a ladder of generality. I will then analyze what happens when we move up and down this ladder of generality and thus explore the most relevant level of generality. After that I will point out conceptual aspects that hampers the creation of a consistent ladder of generality and finally provide suggestions about how to improve comparability. Section5.1 will thus seek to improve previous definitions in terms of relevance and comparability.

5.1.1 Arranging previous studies

The causal theories explored in the review illustrates three main ways to conceptualize genocide. In decreasing order of generality genocides can be included in a concept that covers a wider range phenomena or a direct causal link can be drawn between genocide and war, or war can be linked to a subtype of genocide. Downes, Valentino and Mann includes genocides in to more wide-ranging concepts. Levene and Midlarsky explicitly studies genocides while Melson studies a subtype of genocide called total domestic genocides.

Downes’ concept of civilian victimization includes cases of genocide that happened during wars. Part of Valentions study covers mass killings during wars. It is easy to isolate the assumed effects of war upon mass killings in Valentions work and mass killings during wars fits well as subtype of civilian victimization. Midlarsky defines the attempt to eradicate a group as a necessary attribute of genocide and he focuses on the worst cases of genocide during the twentieth century. His selection of studied cases is similar to Melsons that explicitly focuses on total genocides. All the main cases studied by Melsons and Midlarskys occurred during wars. Thus I would argue that Midlarskys and Melsons works can be seen as studies of the total extermination of groups during wars. A total extermination of significant groups during wars fits well as a subtype of mass killings during wars. The arrangement of these four studies on a ladder of generality is illustrate in the figure below.
Levene's definition of genocide includes both a total and a partial destruction of groups. However, when he explores the attributes of genocide he focuses on five archetypical cases. These five selected cases are very similar to the total universe of cases covered by Melson's concept of total domestic genocide. Furthermore, he studied cases that occurred during wars and during times when the perceived risk of war was high.

Mann's concept of murderous ethnic cleansing focuses on violence directed against particular group and it is thus less general than mass killings. However, murderous ethnic cleansing includes non-intentional killings and other less severe forms of violence, making it wider than mass killings. Furthermore, Mann studies cases that occurred during wars and peace.

Neither Mann's nor Levene's work can thus be placed neatly on the suggested of ladder of generality. If we would place them on an approximate ladder of generality it seems most reasonable to compare Levene's study with the other studies that focuses on the total destruction of groups. Mann's study is best conceived of as a study; of the total and partial destruction of civilian groups.

The arrangement of all the reviewed causal studies on an approximate ladder of generality is
illustrated in the figure below

Figure 2 Previous studies arranged on an approximate ladder of generality

5.1.2 Analyzing the arrangement of previous studies

We can notice that the rational perspective on war is limited to the two highest levels of generality illustrated in Figure 2 (see Section 5.1.1). Yet there are differences between these two levels of generality. Downes claims that ideology functions as an intervening variable when a specific civilian group is targeted for destruction, yet he emphasizes the importance of the strategic context of the war as the primary driver behind civilian victimization. When we move down the ladder of generality to the level of mass killing we can notice that Valentino emphasizes the bounded rational logic behind mass killings, although he still claims that the strategic context during wars can be very important. A possible explanation for these differences is that Downes finds that civilian victimization in war has a mixed record of success while Valentino finds that mass killings tend to be failed strategy in the long run (compare Section 4.4.1 and Section 4.4.2). If we move down one step further on the ladder of generality we notice that Mann claims that the strategic situation during wars has an effect on murderous ethnic
cleansing. However, Manns focus shifts decisively from the strategic context within wars towards a destabilizing effect of war upon social identities. When we move down one step further on the ladder of generality we notice that none of the three studies that focuses on total genocides, implies any rational connection between within-war dynamics and total genocide. Rather these studies emphasizes that wars creates politically destabilizing (or radicalizing) emotions, or pathological or compensatory reactions.

In sum, the analysis indicates that if we study cases of genocide as part of a large universe of cases, such as civilian victimization or mass killings in war, it seems to be possible to connect genocide with boundedly rational reactions to within-war-dynamics. However if we move down the ladder of generality and only study a partial or total extermination of civilian groups then war has primarily been perceived of as a destabilizing factor. This is particularly emphasized in studies of total genocide. This indicates that the links between total genocides and wars exhibits important idiosyncrasies. Furthermore, it indicates that vital idiosyncratic links between total genocide and war only becomes visible when we examine total genocides as a particular category of cases. It is hard to draw any certain conclusions about the partial destruction of groups since this category is not isolated in any of the examined studies.

5.1.3 Compatibility problems between previous studies

While a rudimentary comparison can be done between different levels of generality in previous studies there are several problems that hampers comparability between these studies. Three problems require some further discussion: unclear distinction between ongoing wars and the fear of a potential war, the issue of territoriality and the issue of what targeted groups that should be included in the concept of genocide.

Previous studies points out two main ways in which war can have a causal effect on genocide. One is that within-war-dynamics can produce situations that pressures belligerents to commit mass atrocities. For example it has been claimed that the use of guerilla warfare by an opponent can pressure belligerents and give them incentives to victimize civilians. The other main causal link pointed out between war and genocide is that an actual war, or the fear of a war, can produce a fear of state destruction (compare e.g. Section 4.4.1 and Section 4.5.3). It is vital to separate these two different ways in which wars could affect genocide since within-war-dynamics can only affect states during wars while the fear of state destruction could be sparked by an actual
Another issue relates to territory and war. In the review we can notice that different approaches to territory and war, has led to different ways to code different cases and aspects of different cases. For example Downes discuss Nazi Germanys mass murder of Jews in the concurred part of USSR as a case of civilian victimization. Other parts of the Holocaust such as the mass murder of German Jews is not explicitly stated to be a case of civilian victimization (see Section 4.4.1). Melson classifies the Holocaust as a total domestic genocide. This coding is confusing since large parts of the Holocaust occurred on newly conquered territory. An underlying distinction behind these different ways to code cases seems to be an analytic distinction between home territory and foreign territory. The idea seems to be that genocides are either committed for domestic reasons on home territory or for imperialist reasons on foreign territory. This way of thinking is problematic when we study war and genocide since control over territory tend to change during wars (see Section 4.1). For example, a civilian group that is believed to be hostile and to support enemy forces on foreign territory might also support enemy forces if these forces start to occupy our home territory. Analytically it seems more reasonable to conceive of genocides during wars as one process, and to separate between genocides that occurred during wars and genocides that did not occur during wars, then to distinguish between genocides or parts of genocides committed on home or foreign territory.

The third issue that hampers comparability is the identity of the victim group. For example Midlarsky only includes cases where ethnoreligious identity was used to point out the victim group, while Levene states that the victim group categorization is constructed (see Table 1 in Section 4.10). As I have argued for above I see no reason to limit the concept of genocide to the destruction of particular social groups (see Section 4.1).

5.1.4 Conceptual suggestions

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7 An expectation would be genocides during wars when one of the belligerants was so weak that it had no chance of penetrating the home territory of the other side.
Based upon previous considerations (see Section 4.1 and Section 5.1.3), the figure above illustrates a suggested ladder of generality for the study of potential causal effects of within-war-dynamics upon genocide. Civilian victimization would follow Downes definition (see Section 4.4.1). Mass killings would follow Valentions definition (see Section 4.4.2), however an ongoing war would be added as a necessary attribute to the concept. Total genocides during wars would be mass killing of civilian that was directed against a particular social group, leading to the annihilation of at least 66 % of the targeted group within a particular territory. Partial genocides during wars would have the same attributes yet the annihilation rate among the targeted population would be lower than 66 % (see Section 4.1). Genocidal massacres during wars would cover killings (although not mass killings), directed against a particular social group of civilians. Where the killings took place would not be vital for the definitions but rather if the killings happened during a war or not. A category of negative cases that could be used for comparative analysis would be genocides that did not occur during wars.
If we are interested in a possible causal effect of the fear of state destruction, caused by war or the fear of war upon genocide; then we should remove the occurrence of war as a necessary attribute from the ladder of generality illustrated in Figure 3. A removal of this attribute would produce the ladder of generality depicted in Figure 4. Killings by an organized political actor would cover the “widespread, repeated, and systematic” (Downes 2008: 17) use of killings of non-combatants, by an organized political actor. The other concepts would be defined as above, yet the occurrence of a war would be removed as a necessary attribute from these concepts. To detect negative and positive cases we would have to operationalize the variable fear of state destruction.

5.2 Components, organizational aspects and conceptual frames of war

In Section 5.2 I will analyze previous studies that implies a constitutive relationship between genocide and war in relationship to the presented conceptual frames of war (see Section 4.2). I will first discuss previous constitutive studies and the conceptual frames of war that they highlight and furthermore, the vital components and organizational aspects that are linked to these frames of war. I will then highlight unilluminated conceptual frames of war and discuss
if these can point towards unillumined components and organizational aspects of war, that could enable genocide. I will finally provide suggestions about how genocide could be redefined to highlight neglected conceptual frames of war. Section 5.2 will thus seek to improve previous definitions in terms of comprehensiveness.

5.2.1 Previous conceptualizations and conceptual frames of war

The conceptual frame of war as slaughter dominates the presented image of war\(^8\) in three of the four constitutive works explored in the review. A key idea in previous research is thus that the slaughter of war makes the slaughter of genocide possible. Markussens & Kopfs, Shaws and Semelins definitions of genocide point towards slaughter as a key attribute of genocide. Markussens & Kopf even uses the word slaughter in their definition of both genocide and total war. The components of war that is highlighted in these three theoretical works are closely linked to slaughter. A main component is the mobilized armed force that is a tool that can be employed for the slaughter of combatants. However, it can also be employed against civilian groups. The mental components of war mentioned in these theories (insecurity, hyper-vigilance and security dilemmas), are closely linked to the fear of violence or slaughter. The social components mentioned (weakened moral constraint and scapegoating), and the organizational fact that a state becomes more powerful during war are closely linked to the stated mental components. An organizational factor highlighted by these theories is that the scale of slaughter is vital for wars ability to facilitate genocide. Total wars enables the vilification of entire enemy societies and total mobilizations enables a vilification of “domestic enemies” that might threaten this mobilization.

Lemkins theory highlights war as a form of conflict and as a way to handle underlying conflicts. If wars are perceived as a way to handle long-term conflicts between nations then it is assumed to facilitate genocide. While the definitions of genocide used by the other constitutive theorists clearly points towards the killing of human beings, Lemkins definition points towards the destruction of something more abstract: national patterns. Wars perceived as a way to handle conflicts is clearly a wider conceptual framework than war perceived of as slaughter. Lemkin can thus illuminate that the antagonism that underlies perceived wars between nations facilities

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\(^8\) Shaws definition of war point towards war as a tool. However it is primarily the image of war as slaughter that he uses to link together genocide and war (see Section 4.8).
a much wider variety of social practices then just killing and slaughter.⁹ A vital component of perceived underlying conflicts is that they tend to be prolonged. Prolonged, never ending conflicts, will reasonably make it easier to justify radical and brutal policy suggestions. Thus, while the other explored constitutive theories highlight how the scale of war can enable genocide Lemkin illuminates how the duration of perceived underlying conflicts can facilitate genocide.

5.2.2 Unilluminated conceptual frames of war

Five of the seven conceptual frames of war that was mentioned in Section 4.2 has a peripheral role in the examined constitutive theories. I found it hard to link war as a form of bargaining or war as a tool to vital components or organizational aspects of war, that could facilitate genocide. Warfare as a form of self-expression is linked to ideational components of war and it highlights ideals such as the warrior ideal and the ideal of service to a political community. Markusen & Kopf notes that the ideal of selfless service to a political community has facilitated both war and genocide (Markusen & Kopf 1995: 81). If warfare is perceived of as a form of self-expression then these ideal can see be as components of war itself, components that are likely to be present during wars and components that genociders can use to enable genocides. A component of war closely linked to the image of war as art is the creative use of force and coercion during wars. Warfare as a highly competitive endeavor, and this encourages creative ways to use force. Many cases of large-scale civilian victimization during war contained novel and innovative ways to use force. Britain found an innovative solution to the problem of civilian support for enemy forces during the Boer war. The British forces forced large number of Boer civilians in to camps were many of them perished (Parker 2008: 251). The gas chambers used during the Holocaust was a new invention (Semelin 2008: 234). If we frame war as an art we can highlight the creative use of force during wars and examine if this creative side of war could enable genocide. War as a form of policing highlights militarized police units as a component of war. The importance of militarized police units during massacres and genocides has been acknowledged (e.g. ibid: 182ff). Organizational aspects of policing during wars might need further attention and how the ideals of policing changes during wars could also profit from further inspection.

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⁹ See Meiches (2016: 20f), for a similar argument
5.2.3 Conceptual suggestion

Shaws definition of genocide that was mentioned in the review has several strengths when we seek to explore constitutive links between genocide and war. The definition: “the destruction by an organized armed force of a largely unarmed civilian group (or groups) principally by killing members of the group(s)”, does illustrate how the tool war (i.e. organized armed force) can also be used as a tool of genocide. It also links genocide to slaughter by adding killing to the definition of genocide. We could modify Shaws definition by adding more attributes to it in order to highlight different images of war. A possible redefinition could be: “the destruction by an organized armed force of a largely unarmed civilian group (or groups) principally by killing members of the group(s) in order to serve perceived needs of a political community”. This definition highlights ideational motives behind genocide. By linking these to a definition that links genocide to war we point towards ideational motives and self-expression, as a possible link between genocide and war. If we instead state that genocide is “the destruction by an organized armed force of a largely unarmed civilian group (or groups) principally by killing members of the group(s) in order to serve perceived needs of safety and security”, then we can link up genocide with war as a form of policing. To link genocide with war as a form of art we could define genocide as “the destruction by an organized armed force, of a largely unarmed civilian group (or groups) principally by killing members of the group(s) through military operations” (compare with Levene 2005: 64).
6.0 Conclusions

6.1 Summary of main conclusions

This paper has explored how different ways to conceptualize genocide has enabled different ways to link genocide and war. The study shows that boundedly rational instrumental reactions to within-war-dynamics has been portrayed as important contributing factors to genocides, when cases of genocide has been included in the extension of more wide-ranging concepts such as civilian victimization. However, studies that has focused on the total or partial destruction of civilian groups has emphasized the destabilizing effects of war upon emotions, identities and politics. Furthermore, they have claimed that this destabilization has contributed to genocides. These differences are particularly emphasized in studies of total genocide. This indicates that the connection between total genocide and war are marked by vital idiosyncrasies. This suggest that the level of total genocides is the most relevant level of generality when we study the total destruction of civilian groups. Since the partial destruction of civilian groups was not isolated in any of the examined studies, it was hard to draw any certain conclusion about this category.

Three factors that has hampered comparability between previous causal studies were identified. One factor was a lack of distinctions between the pressures on states created by within-war-dynamics and the fear of state destruction created by war; or the fear of war. Another factor was a problematic distinction between domestic and foreign genocides or aspects of genocides. A lack of consensus regarding the victims groups that should be included in the concept of genocide also hampered comparability between previous studies. Two ladders of generality was suggested for future studies in order to overcome these problems and thus improve comparability between studies of causal links between genocide and war.

The review of the constitutive theories indicates that war has been highlighted as slaughter and as an antagonist conflict in previous constitutive research. The analysis of the review identified several conceptual frames of war that could help us identify neglected aspects of war, that might have enabled genocides. These conceptual frames was war as art and as self-expression and as a form of policing. It was suggested that these conceptual frames of war could be highlighted through modifications of Martin Shaws previous definition of genocide, in order to provide a more comprehensive image of war within the examined field.
6.2 Suggestions for future research

This paper has contributed with a more rigorous analytic framework that can be used to examine how different definitions of genocide enables different links between genocide and war. However, the employment of this framework made a strategic selection of examined studies necessary. A great risk with a strategic selection of units of analysis is that incorrect inferences can be drawn or that an incomplete image of a subject can be presented (Esaiasson et al. 2017: 158ff). Comparability problems between previous studies also calls for caution regarding the conclusions drawn from the study. Further examinations of these conclusions could be done by an exploration of more studies using the presented analytic framework and furthermore, by empirical studies that compares the explanatory value of the examined links.

Another contribution of this study are the two presented ladders of generality. These ladders are not attempts to present a universal solution to the definitional issues within the study of genocide. They are based upon considerations and identified as best practices found within the literature that claims that there is a causal link between genocide and war. The ladders can be used to examine new causal hypothesis or to reexamine old hypothesis about how wars might cause or contribute to different forms of civilian victimization. They can also be used to form large disaggregated datasets as has been suggested by Straus (see Section 1.1).

Modern cases of genocide, such as ISIS attempts to destroy the Yazidi’s (Human Rights Council 2016: 1) and suspected cases of genocide such as Myanmar’s campaign of destruction against the Rohingya’s (Human Rights Council 2018: 358 - 364), seems to point towards intimate connections between war and contemporary cases of genocide. It seems important to explore if previous theories that links together genocide and war are relevant in our contemporary world. Such explorations could highlight spaces of further theorization. Tragically, the social relevance of the explored subject is high, and more research is thus necessary.
Sources


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