Funding Nonviolent Resistance
Understanding Variation in Democratic Outcomes
After Nonviolent Campaigns

Johanna Hedman
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Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University
Supervisor: Håvard Hegre
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Abstract

Previous research has found that nonviolent campaigns are conducive for democratization, but variation in democratic outcomes still remains a puzzle. I address this research gap by analyzing whether democracy assistance that promotes political participation, civic political culture, and enabling environment for civil society before and during nonviolent campaigns can help explain why some countries democratize after regime changes initiated by nonviolent campaigns while other countries do not. I argue that sustained democracy assistance help maintain mass mobilization and build democratic institutions after the old regime has been removed. By using the method of structured focused comparison, I investigate based on data from USAID and OECD what kind of democracy assistance Tunisia and Egypt received before and during their nonviolent campaigns. I find that neither Tunisia nor Egypt to any great extent received the kind of sustained democracy assistance I hypothesized could impact democratization. I therefore conclude that it seems unlikely that democracy assistance had the kind of significant impact that could explain the different outcomes in Tunisia and Egypt. Lastly, I discuss how research on nonviolent campaigns could inform policymaking and contribute to designing more strategic democracy assistance in the future.

Key words: nonviolent campaigns, democracy assistance, democratization, regime change
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Introduction

Nonviolent conflicts have been an understudied subject in peace and conflict studies where focus traditionally has been on explaining causes of war. Whereas violence per definition is viewed as something active, there is a tendency to describe nonviolence as passive, and some scholars argue that nonviolent conflicts historically have been overlooked because violent conflicts are thought to be more pressing and easier to measure empirically. (Chenoweth, Cunningham, 2011: 272) Because ”peace is usually defined as the absence of war” (Levy, 1998: 143) the absence of large-scale violence is often interpreted as the absence of conflict; conflict is violence, and violence is conflict. But considering that several nonviolent conflicts have caused disruptive political change throughout the world — Berlin in 1989, Iran in 1979, South Africa in 1984 - 1994, the Color Revolutions in 2003 - 2005, Arab Spring in 2011, to name a few examples — and that many protracted armed conflicts began as nonviolent uprisings, it seems not just strange but also counterproductive to equate conflicts with violence. Understanding nonviolent conflicts can facilitate deeper understanding of the roots and onset of armed conflicts, but they are also worthy of study in their own right.

A nonviolent conflict is characterized by the presence of a nonviolent campaign, which Chenoweth and Stephan define as ”a series of observable, continual tactics in pursuit of a political objective.” (Chenoweth, Stephan, 2011: 14) The duration of a campaign varies between days and years, and the political objectives can be maximalist (focused on regime change) or reformist, but it always takes place outside of regular politics. The publication of ”Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict” (2008) by Chenoweth and Stephan marked a milestone in the study of nonviolent conflicts. This was the first time the argument that maximalist nonviolent campaigns are more successful than violent campaigns in achieving regime change gained substantial empirical support. Chenoweth and Stephan not only find that nonviolent campaigns are more successful and have a significant impact on the level of democracy following a regime change, they also show that successful nonviolent campaigns are considerably less likely to be followed
by civil wars compared to successful violent campaigns. (Chenoweth, Stephan, 2008) The relative effectiveness of nonviolent campaigns does not mean that nonviolence has always proved successful — many maximalist nonviolent campaigns fail to bring about regime change or succeed in overthrowing the regime, but fail to democratize, and sometimes spiral into civil wars. Chenoweth and Stephan find that there is no pattern in nonviolent campaigns’ success that can be explained by the level of democracy prior to uprisings, the power of the opponent or the regime’s degree of repressiveness; campaign success is independent of these structural conditions. Other scholars have also found that nonviolent campaigns are closely linked to democratization after regime change but variation in democratic outcomes has remained a puzzle and represents a research frontier within the field. Pinckney finds that variation between nonviolent campaigns that lead to democratization and nonviolent campaigns that do not lead to democratization after regime change is largely captured by different levels of civic mobilization and street radicalism. (Pinckney, 2018: 70) This means that when people remain mobilized during regime change, rather than going home "when the dictator is gone” (Ibid: 45) in combination with low street radicalism, measured through election acceptance, election boycotts, anti-system movements and sectarian political participation, democratization becomes more likely. (Ibid: 90) The question is why some nonviolent campaigns are able to achieve high civic mobilization and low street radicalism which are conducive for democratization.

It is at this point my thesis takes off. I will investigate whether democracy assistance can help explain some of the variation in democratic outcomes after nonviolent campaigns. I will seek to answer the following research question: Does sustained democracy assistance explain variation in democratic outcomes in recipient countries that experience regime change initiated by nonviolent campaigns?

External support is often assumed to negatively impact nonviolent campaigns, but there is very little empirical research on the relationship between international support and nonviolent campaigns. The research that does exist only focuses on external support to specific nonviolent campaigns. There is no previous research on how democracy assistance might influence outcomes after regime change initiated by nonviolent campaigns. This is a palpable research gap in light of the fact that since
the end of the Cold War, democracy assistance to government and civil society sectors has increased substantially and now makes up a significant portion of many states’ foreign aid budgets. Using democracy assistance as a foreign policy tool has received much criticism, but donors — states, multilateral organizations and private donors — have continued to invest resources to promote democratization in recipient countries.

The considerable increase in democracy assistance has not garnered much attention in research on nonviolent conflicts, but policymakers have sometimes been called upon to recognize the significance of nonviolent campaigns’ effects on democratization. Despite a converging interest in democratization and active citizenship, there is little overlap between research on democracy assistance and research on nonviolent campaigns. The policy advices that can be distilled from respective field tend to address one main audience — donors or activists. There exists a research gap when it comes to understanding variation in democratic outcomes after nonviolent campaigns, but there also exists a gap between research fields that study two different phenomenons separately — outcomes of nonviolent campaigns and democracy assistance — but which might be interlinked. Simultaneously addressing these two knowledge gaps can generate important policy implications because democracy assistance might explain some of the variation in democratic outcomes, and research on nonviolent campaigns can inform how democracy assistance is conceptualized and allocated.
Previous Research

Research on Nonviolent Campaigns

The study of nonviolent conflicts can be described as organized around the same conflict phases that often structure research on armed conflicts: the onset, the conflict dynamic and the outcome. Some central questions include: Under what conditions do nonviolent campaigns break out? How do states react and respond to nonviolent campaigns? What propels people to choose nonviolence?

The research field is often connected to a philosophical trajectory, following works by writers, politicians and activists such as Etienne de la Boétie, Abraham Lincoln, Mohandas Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr, and many scholars highlight their significance to the theory development of nonviolence. Gene Sharp's *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (1973) is a seminal work in the study of nonviolent conflicts. I will return to Sharp in the theory section, but it is worth noting here that Sharp's emphasis on agency, as opposed to structural conditions, reflects an on-going discussion in the research field, which permeates analysis of all conflict phases. Chenoweth and Cunningham argue that until recently "scholarship on nonviolent struggle has been primarily applied, descriptive or normative" (Chenoweth, Cunningham, 2013: 272) and empirical analysis of civil resistance emerged as a more prominent feature in the field only in the past decade. The publication of *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict* (2011) by Chenoweth and Stephan contributed to filling a research gap by presenting the results from one of the most comprehensive n-studies of nonviolent conflicts. Chenoweth and Stephen also launched NAVCO, a unique dataset containing information on major violent and nonviolent campaigns 1900 - 2006, which enabled more scholars to empirically analyze nonviolent campaigns.
In this essay, the focus is on analyzing the long-term outcomes of nonviolent conflicts and, more specifically, why some maximalist nonviolent campaigns result in democratization while others do not. Explaining campaign success is a central theme in research on nonviolent conflicts, and several scholars have traced the differences between successful and unsuccessful campaigns to the importance of military defections, the role of radical flanks and the dynamic of political jiu-jitsu. When it comes to long-term outcomes, previous research has established a positive relationship between democratization and nonviolent campaigns. Focus has been on testing the relationship, and subjecting the results to close scrutiny to uncover potential endogeneity and/or the influence of confounding variables. Bayer, Bethke and Lambach show that, ”democratic transitions that were induced by NVR [nonviolent resistance] campaigns are beneficial for the survival of democracy” and conclude that there seems to be ”a systematic pattern in the survival of democratic regimes” which can be explained by the presence or absence of nonviolent campaigns. (Bayer et. al., 2016: 768) Celestino and Gleditsch write that their results indicate that ”democratization has been substantially more likely to occur in the aftermath of nonviolent campaigns.” (Celestino, Gleditsch, 2013: 397) In a Freedom House study, the authors showed that one of the most important factors contributing to making countries free and democratic after regime change was the presence of nonviolent campaigns. (Ackerman, Karatnycky, 2005: 7) Chenoweth and Stephan control for potentially confounding variables such as the duration of the conflict and the level of democracy towards the end of the conflict compared to five years after the conflict has ended, and find that that the positive relationship remains robust. (Chenoweth, Stephan, 2011: 212)

There is now substantial empirical research underpinning the positive relationship between nonviolent campaigns and democratization, but exactly why and how this relationship works is the subject of theoretical debate. While the positive relationship appears to be robust, the variation in long-term outcomes is a relatively unexplored puzzle; it is not clear why some nonviolent campaigns lead to democratization while others do not. Pinckney addresses this knowledge gap by identifying mobilization and low street radicalism as key to understanding the variation. Pinckney finds that democratization becomes more likely ”when activists can keep their social bases
mobilized for positive political change while directing that mobilization toward building new political institutions.” (Pinckney, 2018: 5)

Whereas the relationship between democratization and nonviolent campaigns has received quite a lot of attention, research on external support is scarce. Dudouet identifies different forms of third-party interventions in the context of nonviolent campaigns and discusses how external actors can learn to provide helpful support to activists. (Dudouet, 2015) Johansen also discerns different categories of external support and discusses how donors’ agendas affect recipient campaigns. (Johansen, 2010) NAVCO includes information on external support to specific nonviolent campaigns, and Jaime Jackson uses this data in "The Role of External Support in Violent and Nonviolent Conflict Outcomes" (2015) to investigate whether external support influences campaign success in nonviolent and violent conflicts, but finds that it seems to have little effect. Next to research by Chenoweth and Stephan, this is one of very few empirical analysis of external support in the context of nonviolent conflicts. The subject is occasionally brought up, but it is rarely at the centre of analysis. External support is generally thought to make it easier for the regime to frame protesters as foreign, and thereby undermining the campaign's legitimacy and its ability to mobilize people. (Stephan, Chenoweth, 2008: 23)

External support is rarely discussed in broader terms — beyond support to specific campaigns. But there are scholars who point in the direction of democracy assistance as a relevant factor to include in analysis of nonviolent conflicts. Ackerman and Rodal propose a shift from responsibility to protect to ”a recognition of right to help” (Ackerman, Rodal, 2008: 122) and emphasize the need to ”develop a set of modern norms for how citizens and civil societies may freely work together across national boundaries” to promote democracy. (Ibid: 124) Dudouet points out that activists who make claims to the right to help are supported by ”international norms that legitimize democracy promotion, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders.” (Dudouet, 2015: 173) Ackerman and Karatnycky state that in light of the significance of civic factors in democratization processes ”it is surprising how small a proportion of international donor assistance is targeted to this sector.” (Ackerman, Karatnycky, 2005: 9) Furthermore, Bayer, Bethke and
Lambach review existing literature on nonviolent conflicts and conclude that it has "largely ignored the long-term repercussions of resistance campaigns" and argue that "research on democratic consolidation provides material to systematically address this issue." (Bayer et. al., 2016: 760) They draw the conclusion that the positive relationship between nonviolent campaigns and democratization has important policy implications for democracy assistance. They argue that if democracy assistance is to be sustainable, "it requires support from a broad base of civil society actors" who can contribute to creating "democratic institutions and rights in a peaceful way." (Ibid: 769)

**Research on Democracy Assistance**

The central question in research on democracy assistance is, unsurprisingly, if it actually works. Does democracy assistance from external actors lead to democratization in recipient countries? It is a widely debated topic in a field that spans across international political economy, political science and development studies. Democracy assistance encompasses a wide range of initiatives, which can be focused on supporting human rights, rule of law, political parties and free media but also on fighting corruption and gender inequality. Carothers and Ottaway describe three different phases of democracy assistance: the first phase was marked by a focus on supporting elections, and during the second phase donors began to allocate resources to the development of state institutions, whereas the third phase is defined by increased efforts to strengthen civil society. (Carothers, Ottaway, 2000: 6) The different phases reflect a gradual shift towards a bottom-up approach to democratization that has resulted in that civil society now occupies a central place in many strategies. Over the course of these three phases, Carothers argues that two different approaches have emerged among donors: a narrower political approach, focused on elections and political rights, and a broader development approach, focused on socioeconomic conditions as well as political ones. (Carothers, 2009: 5)

Donors naturally claim that their support has an impact, but scholars have produced mixed answers to the question if democracy assistance is effective or not. The varying results can at least partly be explained by the use of different kinds of data
(aggregated or disaggregated) and different ways of measuring the dependent variable (democratization, democracy, governance, etc.). Knack finds a weak relationship between aid and democratization and concludes that there is no evidence that aid promotes democracy. (Knack, 2004: 262) Other scholars have found that aid appears to have been more effective in promoting governance and democracy during the Cold War than after. (Askarov, Doucouliagos, 2013: 623) However, Finkel, Pérez-Liñan and Seligson measured the effects of American foreign aid on democracy building 1990 - 2003 and found ”there are clear and consistent impacts of USAID democracy assistance on democratization in recipient countries.” (Finkel et. al., 2007: 436) Targeted aid to elections, civil society and free media were found to be most impactful. The main difference between this study and previous research is the use of disaggregated data that distinguishes democracy assistance from other kinds of aid. In 2011, Scott and Steele analyzed US democracy assistance during a slightly different time-frame, 1988 - 2001, and found that ”even after controlling for other factors […] democracy aid exerts a statistically significant, positive, and substantively meaningful impact on democratization.” (Scott, Steele, 2011: 62)

Unlike research on nonviolent conflicts, the focus is almost exclusively on the structural conditions shaping democratization, and often circles around the chicken or egg problem; does development lead to democracy or does democracy lead to development? This emphasis on macrostructures might be the reason why democracy assistance is rarely connected to the study of nonviolent campaigns, which is more interested in agency. However, research on democracy assistance is not absent in peace and conflict studies. There are scholars who trace the human security paradigm to new ways of working with conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and Leininger describes how democracy assistance has become a more common instrument employed by UN peacekeeping missions. Leininger states that democracy assistance ”is increasingly regarded as one possible means to create and maintain peace in post-conflict situations.” (Leininger, 2006: 473) Jawad examines the effects of OSCE’s democracy assistance and emphasizes that it is ”necessary for promoters of democracy to provide a long-term commitment.” (Jawad, 2008: 623) Lappin analyzes democracy assistance ”as a distinct foreign policy tool in post-conflict peacebuilding” (Lappin, 2010: 194) and discusses how conceptual confusion hampers evaluations of democracy assistance’s effects.
Research on Democratization

Democratization has given rise to a vast research field, and I will focus on a few aspects that are especially relevant to this essay. The overview is intended to highlight broad patterns thought to be conducive to democratization and to outline obstacles. In the theory section, I will proceed to theorizing how democracy assistance, within the context of nonviolent campaigns, can help circumvent these obstacles.

Four theoretical approaches dominate the field: structural, strategic, social forces, and economic. These approaches are not incompatible with each other, but differ on where to place the main emphasis. Scholars emphasizing structural conditions conducive to democratization often base their arguments on modernization theory, which was put forward by Seymour Lipset who hypothesized that citizens in more economically developed countries will not tolerate repressive regimes. (Lipset, 1959) The causal relationship between economic development, often measured through GDP per capita, and democratization is contested. Przeworski et al. argue that high GDP per capita prevents democracies from backsliding into authoritarianism but does not trigger democratization per se (Przeworski et. al., 2000) whereas Epstein et. al. find that "higher incomes per capita significantly increased the likelihood of democratic regimes." (Epstein et. al., 2006: 566) Boix and Stokes argue that their research shows that "economic development both causes democracy and sustains it." (Boix, Stokes, 2003: 545) This approach now also encompasses a range of structural factors thought to be linked to democratization: income inequality, natural resource abundance, religious composition, societal fractionalization, colonial heritage, etc.

The strategic approach focuses on how elite divisions directly or indirectly influence democratization — without these internal conflicts, democratization processes are unlikely to begin. (O'Donnell, Schmitter, 1986) The social forces approach shares several assumptions with research on nonviolent campaigns: it is also actor-centric, less concerned with how structural conditions shape democratization, and focuses on mobilization from below and what roles different social classes play. This strand of research has given rise to the famous line no bourgeoisie, no democracy, which Moore formulated to summarize his claim that the middle class has been essential to
democratization. (Moore, 1966) Finally, the economic approach is described by Teorell as integrating the other approaches by highlighting how structural economic conditions affect the strategic choices of the elite, and how and why mass mobilization from below occur as a response to economic realities. (Teorell, 2010: 25)

In *Determinants of Democratization*, Teorell argues that while these four approaches have their merits, neither presents an all-comprising theory of democratization. By combining a large-*n* statistical analysis with nine different case studies, Teorell finds that triggers to democratization include economic crises, neighbor diffusion, peaceful demonstrations, multiparty autocracy and democratic regional organizations, whereas impediments to democratization are found to be geographically large countries, dependence on oil and foreign trade, and a large Muslim population.¹ (Teorell, 2010: 145) Teorell concludes that these results confirm the importance of all previous approaches, but their explanatory power differs depending on whether the purpose is to understand democratization from short-term or long-term perspectives. One of his main findings is that structural conditions do not determine democratization in the short-run. While Teorell uses a different terminology than scholars within the field of nonviolent conflicts, it is noteworthy that he finds a robust causal connection between peaceful demonstrations and democratization. Teorell also states that more research is needed to disentangle the complex interplay between international and domestic forces driving and obstructing democratization. (Ibid: 155) According to Teorell, the relatively weak explanatory power of structural conditions bestows actors with significant room for maneuver. Donors of democracy assistance could therefore make a difference by targeting support to ”the capacity of societal actors to mobilize non-violent protests against the incumbent regime.” (Ibid: 157) Moreover, Teorell finds that modernization has played a role in democratization, but mainly through media proliferation — not economic development. (Ibid: 13) Against the backdrop of the trend among donors to take a development approach to democracy assistance, it is interesting that Teorell argues that democracy assistance geared mainly towards economic development in dictatorships actually can reduce the likelihood of democratization. (Ibid: 157)

¹ Teorell writes, ”the 'Muslim gap' […] mostly appears to be an 'Arab gap’”, and not per se linked to Islam. (Teorell, 2010)
**Definitions of Key Concepts**

**Nonviolent campaign** is defined in NAVCO as a unit of analysis, which comprises a sequence of continuous strategies employed over any period of time — from days to years — to achieve a political objective. (Chenoweth, Lewis, 2013: 416) In line with the focus of previous research on nonviolent conflicts, I concentrate on nonviolent campaigns pursuing the maximalist objective of regime change. Chenoweth and Stephan conceptualize civil resistance as a "form of unconventional warfare" (Chenoweth, Stephan, 2011: 18), and they emphasize that nonviolent campaigns are not necessarily completely without periods of violence, but they can nevertheless be distinguished from violent campaigns based on whether the actors are civilians or armed groups, and if the methods used primarily are nonviolent or violent. (Ibid: 16) To qualify as a nonviolent campaign, the principal tactics are not designed to physically threaten or injure the opponent. (Lewis, Chenoweth, 2013: 3) Moreover, to be categorized as a nonviolent campaign, the actions cannot take place within the "normal bounds of regular politics (e.g. elections, lawsuits, lobbying)" (Pinckney, 2018: 13) which by extension means that what is categorized as a nonviolent campaign will vary depending on the country it is taking place within; activities that are considered to be regular politics in a democracy are usually not regular politics in a dictatorship. The definition of nonviolent campaigns is therefore to a certain extent context-bound to accommodate the varying nature of regular politics.

**Regime change** refers to the replacement of one regime by another regime. The Polity IV project defines a regime as "the recognized central authority for a social unit that is delimited spatially through the identification of formal, territorial borders." (Marshall et. al., 2014: 1) Geddes et. al. use a regime definition that emphasizes "the rules that identify the group from which leaders can come and determine who influences leadership choice and policy." (Geddes et. al., 2014: 314) Embedding the role of rules in the regime definition is intended to facilitate distinctions between different kinds of regimes and their decision-making procedures. (Ibid) This definition enables analysis which recognizes that "a single, continuous period of authoritarianism […] can conceal multiple, consecutive autocratic regimes", (Ibid: 315) meaning that a regime change does not inherently
imply a change from an autocratic regime to a democratic regime (or vice versa). To pin-point regime change, Geddes et. al define the beginning of an autocratic regime if any of the following things occurred: the executive came to power through undemocratic means (which means anything besides being elected in free and reasonably fair elections), the executive came to power democratically (through an election) but then changed the rules, or competitive elections were held but the military prevented popular parties from participating. (Ibid: 317) An autocratic regime ends when any of the following occurs: the new executive is someone other than the incumbents and is elected in a competitive election, the government is ousted through a coup, mass protests, civil war, invasion or other coercive means and then replaced by a regime that follows a different set of rules (not necessarily democratic), or the ruling group significantly changes the rules for electing leaders and politics. (Ibid: 318) To summarize, regime change means that one regime is replaced by a new regime, which follows a different set of rules than the old one, and the end of a regime change is characterized by stabilization and "establishment of any consistent pattern of politics." (Pinckney, 2018: 15)

**Democratization** refers to the process towards arriving at a political system where decisions are made by people who "acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote." (Pinckney, 2018: 14) Exactly when during this process the threshold of becoming a democracy is crossed varies depending on how democracy is measured, and there exists no consensus on the meaning of democracy or whether it should be treated as a continuous variable or an either/or phenomenon. Teorell defines the basic criteria of a democracy as the holding of free and fair elections of the executive and/or legislative offices of the state, in combination with the existence of political rights, such as freedom of association and opinion. (Teorell, 2010: 30) These aspects are also factored into V-Dem’s Electoral Democracy Index, which "seeks to embody the core value of making rulers responsive to citizens." (Coppedge et. al., 2018: 38) In the section on research design, I explain how I use this index to investigate changes in electoral democracy levels before, during and after nonviolent campaigns, in order to measure democratization.

**Democracy assistance** is an "an externally driven, agent-based influence on democratization." (Finkel et. al., 2007: 411) External actors range from states,
multilateral organizations and private donors. Bush defines democracy assistance as “aid given with the explicit goal of advancing democracy overseas.” (Bush, 2015: 4) Democracy assistance is not interchangeable with democracy promotion, which encompasses a wider set of strategies that external actors use to promote democratization in other countries. Democracy assistance is an example of one form of democracy promotion, but democracy promotion also encompasses measures ranging from ”diplomatic pressure to conditionality on development aid to economic sanctions, and even to military intervention” (Azpuru et. al., 2008: 151) — activities that do not fall within the definition of democracy assistance. While democracy assistance can be allocated to a wide range of categories — human rights, anti-corruption, gender equality, democratic participation, etc. — it is narrower than democracy promotion in the sense that it only captures economic support to governments, institutions or various kinds of civil society actors that work to strengthen democracy and/or to foster ”conditions that could lead to democracy’s rise.” (Ibid) Put simply, democracy assistance is economic support from external actors, which is intended to promote democratization in the recipient country.

**Civil society** is a contested concept employed differently depending on ideological position. At its most basic, civil society usually refers to an ”intermediate associational realm between state and family populated by organizations which are separate from the state.” (White, 1994: 379) The World Bank’s definition of civil society encompasses ”the wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations.” (World Bank, 2010) Civil society is not synonymous with promoting democratic values, human rights or rule of law; there is no inherent contradiction in apolitical and/or unprogressive civil society organizations. The key common denominator among civil society organizations is that they operate autonomously from the state, but civil society organizations range from NGOs, religious groups, labour unions, non-profit organizations, sports clubs, charities, professional associations, etc. (Ibid) To use the term ’civil society’ as a unitary actor is

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2 For example, Marxist and liberal usage of the term differ, but I will not delve into these ideological discussions.
therefore misleading because it obscures the fact that civil society denotes a collection of voluntary organizations of individuals outside the realm of the state.

**Enabling environment for civil society** refers to the social, legal and economic conditions in which civil society organizations operate. It was coined to highlight obstacles to freedom of association, and to stop assessing the “health of civil society” by counting the number of NGOs in a country. (Fioramenti, Kononykhina, 2014: 468) The capacity of people ”to participate and engage in the civil society arena” (Ibid: 475) is shaped by a set of conditions ranging from laws restricting or explicitly forbidding free association to low education levels to gender inequality that limits women’s access to civil society. Three main dimensions are used to measure the enabling environment for civil society: socioeconomic, sociocultural and governance. (Ibid: 477) In the context of democracy assistance, supporting the enabling environment coincides with what Carothers calls the development approach to democracy, meaning that some donors target projects designed to improve education, justice sectors, gender equality, and governance. In the long run, this kind of democracy assistance is expected to bring about ”incremental, long-term change” (Carothers, 2009: 5) which by extension improves the capacity of citizens to become politically active.

**Political participation** is often described as an important requisite for democracies, and can be ”loosely defined as citizens’ activities affecting politics.” (van Deth, 2016) Political participation take many forms, and Teorell et al. suggest a typology that encompasses five dimensions: electoral participation (voting in elections), consumer participation (donations to charity, boycotting, consumption, signing petitions), party activity (to be active within a political party), protest activity (taking part in protests, strikes and other protest activities) and contact activity (contacting/lobbying to organisations, politicians and/or civil servants). (Teorell et. al, 2007) Ekman and Amnà argue that this typology benefits from also including less manifest forms of political participation, and state that, ”’political participation’ is quite simply all actions directed towards influencing governmental decisions and political outcomes.” (Ekman, Amnà, 2012: 289)
Civic political culture is a concept used to capture the claims put forward by previous research that one reason why nonviolent campaigns promote democratization is because they depend on cooperation among diverse groups of people, and thereby “establish certain constraints and incentives that prevent actors from straying from the democratic path.” (Bayer et. al., 2016: 762) Civic political culture is characterized by tolerance towards opposing political views, cooperation and trust among citizens, acceptance of state authorities, and it has been described as conducive for the durability of democracy. (Almond, Verna, 1963; Inglehart, 1988) Research on nonviolent campaigns argue that since successful nonviolent campaigns hinge on mass mobilization, they need to embrace opposing views among protestors and cooperate across different social groups, and therefore develop a civic political culture, which “spills over” from the nonviolent campaign to the subsequent democratic regime. (Bayer et. al., 2016: 762)
Theoretical Framework

I will develop my theoretical argument by first outlining the causal mechanisms connecting nonviolent campaigns and democratization and, second, by theorizing how democracy assistance can explain variation between democratic and non-democratic outcomes after nonviolent campaigns. I will then present my hypothesis and causal story.

Why Nonviolent Campaigns Promote Democratization

Previous research shows that there is a positive relationship between nonviolent campaigns and democratization, but the question is how to make sense of it from a theoretical perspective. Celestino and Gleditsch emphasize that there is no automatic causal pathway between nonviolent action and democratization. (Celestino, Gleditsch, 2013: 397) Similarly, Pinckney states that ”the impact of nonviolent resistance on democratization is indirect.” (Pinckney, 2018: 44) Nevertheless, while the causal mechanisms are difficult to pin down, the positive relationship between nonviolent campaigns and democratization strongly suggests that there is something about nonviolent campaigns that can help explain the forces that drive democratization.

It is useful to anchor explanations to the causal link between nonviolent campaigns and democratization in Sharp’s theory of power, which often underpins analysis of nonviolent conflicts. In the 16th-century, Boétie identified consent as one of the most important sources of power, and Sharp elaborated on this conceptualization of power and argued that, ”political power can most efficiently be controlled at its sources.” (Sharp, 1973: 10) Sharp criticized the monolith theory of power for treating government power as a ”self-reinforcing, and self-perpetuating force.” (Ibid: 9)

Following the realist tradition in international relations, which has ”dominated the study of war since Thucydides” (Levy, 1998: 145), states have been viewed as the primary ’containers’ of power but where their power come from has historically not garnered much attention in the field of international relations. By contrast, research
on nonviolent campaigns incorporates the citizens of these states into its theoretical framework, which "turns much of the traditional understanding of power on its head." (Ackerman, Rodal, 2008: 119) Sharp's theory of power has received criticism for downplaying structural factors, but the central theoretical assumption is still often applied; power is not intrinsic to the rulers, it depends "upon the obedience and cooperation of the subjects." (Sharp, 1973: 12) Consequently, if people withdraw consent, the sources of power corrode and "a regime's capacity to rule begins to lessen." (Schock, 2013: 279) Celestino and Gleditsch argue that "nonviolent direct action is more likely to disperse power among actors in ways that will favor democratization" (Celestino, Gleditsch, 2013: 391) because power-sharing arrangements and broad-based coalitions become necessary to advance political objectives, and the risk that few individuals are able to take hold of power decreases.

Chenoweth and Stephan argue that the source of nonviolent campaigns' relative effectiveness is found in their ability to attract more people to participate in acts of resistance in comparison to violent campaigns. Mass mobilization makes it difficult for the regime to delegitimize or crack down on the campaign without risking backfiring effects (political jiu-jitsu) and the nonviolent tactics also render people active in nonviolent campaigns into more trustworthy negotiation partners. (Chenoweth, Stephan, 2011: 11) When nonviolent campaigns fail, it is because they are "unable to overcome the challenge of participation." (Ibid) This explanation to nonviolent campaigns' short-term success is also used to understand the prevalence of more democratic outcomes in comparison to violent campaigns. The dynamic is summarized by Ackerman's and Rodal's statement "how one chooses to fight determines what one wins." (Ackerman, Rodal, 2008: 119) Violent campaigns, even when successful in realizing political objectives, are often followed by new outbreaks of violence, partly because the incentives for using violence as a means to resolve conflicts are difficult to remove. (Chenoweth, Stephan, 2011: 210)

People who participate in nonviolent campaigns have fought for political change through conflict mechanisms that encourage "nonviolent bargaining and conflict resolution after the conflict has ended" (Ibid: 219) and the transition into resolving conflicts through political institutions is consequently less dramatic. In line with Chenoweth's and Stephan's argument, Bayer, Bethke and Lambach assert that the
long-term success of nonviolent campaigns hinges on their ability to maintain legitimacy and mobilize people from different groups in society, which lead to the development of a civic political culture characterized by compromises and cooperation. (Bayer et. al., 2016: 762) After the regime has been ousted, this civic political culture significantly affects the development of institutional politics and, in extension, the consolidation of democratic change. Pinckney also highlights how nonviolent campaigns create "norms of peaceful expression" which encourage "socio-political conduct conducive to long-term sustainable democracy." (Pinckney, 2018: 18) Pinckney reasons that nonviolent campaigns are more likely to attract activists and appoint leaders with pro-democratic values, and participating in nonviolent campaigns give "ordinary people a set of tools and a feeling of political efficacy" (Ibid: 45) which help advance democratic objectives. Schock references research on social movements which shows that participating in collective action have benefits "such as increased feelings of empowerment and political efficacy." (Shock, 2013: 286)

The theoretical arguments explaining the causal link do not vary significantly between scholars who have studied how nonviolent campaigns promote democratization. The arguments consistently take stock of the complexity of the relationship and depict causal pathways that work through mass civilian mobilization and civic political culture that foster compromises rather than hard-line politics. Most scholars identify the main mechanism through which nonviolent campaigns promote democratization as their ability to "attract a greater number of participants than any form of violent resistance." (Bayer et. al., 2016: 760)

Theorizing Democracy Assistance

The causal mechanisms outlined above contribute to understanding why democratization is more likely after nonviolent campaigns than after violent campaigns, but they do not explain variation in outcomes — if all successful nonviolent campaigns have mass mobilization in common, why do some result in democratization after regime change while others do not? Pinckney refers to this as the "unresolved question" and proposes that the answer lies in "the 'black box' of
Building on the theoretical argument centered upon mass mobilization, Pinckney argues that democratization depends on low street radicalism and high civic mobilization. While Sharp’s theory of power facilitates analysis of how regimes can be ousted through nonviolent campaigns and explains why this is far from impossible, it is nonetheless very difficult to remove a regime, and to thereafter re-direct efforts and keep people "politically engaged in the process of building a new political regime” (Pinckney, 2018: 24) present a whole new range of challenges. Johansen even argues that in most cases the establishment of a new democratic regime is "more difficult than the actual removal of the old power-holders.” (Johansen, 2010: 109) Pinckney pinpoints how democratization depends on continued mobilization and on preventing street radicalism which "disrupts the process of institutionalizing a new political system.” (Pinckney, 2018: 25) This explanation disentangles parts of the puzzle, but at least one loose end is still left hanging — why are some nonviolent campaigns able to sustain mobilization and shift focus from ousting a regime to building a new democratic regime?

Applying democracy assistance in this context means introducing a theoretical framework that is centered upon how democratization can be promoted through the interplay between international and domestic factors. From this follows a basic assumption that external actors can impact a country’s democratization process. It does not mean that they can successfully initiate nonviolent campaigns, in fact, there are no examples of that they have ever done so (Chenoweth, Stephan, 2011), but external actors might be able to influence the conditions in which nonviolent campaigns unfold.

Finkel et. al. state that international factors traditionally have been neglected in studies of democratization and argue that the links between "international forces and domestic causes of democratization […] have not been carefully theorized.” (Finkel et al., 2007: 409) Their argument is that external actors can encourage democratization indirectly by promoting modernization, and thereby reshaping the structural conditions that "serve as prerequisites for regime transitions or
survival” (Ibid: 410) and directly through the empowerment of individuals, organizations and political institutions that work for democratic change. Similarly, Scott and Steele identify agent empowerment as an important causal link between targeted aid and democratization in recipient countries. (Scott, Steele, 2011: 53)

Providing democracy assistance to shape structural conditions to become more conducive for democratization reflects a recognition of that democracy assistance "may be unable to overcome adverse social conditions in the face of overwhelming odds against democratization.” (Finkel et. al., 2007: 412) Donors therefore target the enabling environment for civil society. On a theoretical level, this kind of support corresponds to an assumption in previous research that democracy encompasses more than periodic voting and "requires continuous, active participation in public affairs by citizens organized in a great variety of interest groups.” (Carothers, Ottaway, 2000: 4) The logic goes that if it easier to become politically engaged, democratization is more likely.

In line with Pinckney’s argument on why street radicalism is harmful for democratization, Diamond asserts that political institutionalization is "the single most important and urgent factor in the consolidation of democracy.” (Diamond, 1994: 15) The paradox in the relationship between nonviolent campaigns and democratization is that the former is often defined as "non-routine and extra-institutional political acts” (Schock, 2015: 3) whereas the latter depends on the development of "formal political institutions.” (Pinckney, 2018: 60) I believe this paradox highlights why mass civilian participation is not enough to explain variation in outcomes. My argument is that democracy assistance can promote political participation among different civil society actors, and help put in place platforms and networks among civilians before and during nonviolent campaigns, which facilitate channeling extra-institutional political acts into political institutions. The same democratic agents and platforms may be irrelevant when it comes to understanding the onset of nonviolent campaigns, but during nonviolent campaigns, they can play an important role in institutionalizing activism and pushing for a new democratic regime. This argument is in line with Diamond’s statement that democratization has often been initiated and consolidated through pressure from "independent groups and grass-root movements.” (Diamond, 1994: 4)
Building on the idea that nonviolent campaigns "spread norms of political engagement" (Pinckney, 2018: 18) and produce a civic political culture that renders it more likely that participants "codify emerging norms of nonviolent contestation into domestic institutions" (Chenoweth, Stephan, 2011: 219), to provide sustained democracy assistance to the civil society sector can "foster greater civic and political participation" (Carothers, 2004: 102) which help keep people engaged after the old regime has been ousted. Voluntary associations can be conceptualized as "schools of democracy" where people have the opportunity to gain civic skills (Putnam, 2000), and learn how to "influence policy, and to scrutinize and check the exercise of state power." (Diamond, 1997) If people have participated in some form of organization — student movements, religious congregations, women's groups, professional associations, trade unions, civic associations, etc. — they are likely to have gained experience from cooperating with others and having to make compromises with strangers. These skills should be useful during nonviolent campaigns, and may also make it easier to achieve cohesion, which Pearlman argues enhances "the organizational capacity to mobilize mass participation and contain disruptive dissent." (Pearlman, 2012: 41)

Bermeo, who analyzes post-war democratization, reviews the democratic consolidation literature and states that it is "packed with calls for strong civil societies." (Bermeo, 2003: 163) Bermeo emphasizes that it is not the density of civil society that is most important but "the nature of associational life" and therefore focus should be on supporting "a civil society that is tolerant and nonviolent and thus supportive of democracy." (Ibid) The point with providing democracy assistance to civil society organizations is that they have the potential of developing a civic political culture characterized by "democratic attributes, such as tolerance, moderation, a willingness to compromise, and a respect for opposing viewpoints." (Diamond, 1994: 8) Put simply, gaining democratic experience on a small-scale in "schools of democracy" in authoritarian regimes should be helpful experience on a large-scale during nonviolent campaigns.

Ackerman and Rodal highlight how authoritarian rulers recognize "the potency of civilian-based nonviolent mobilization" and therefore sometimes characterize civil
society "as a strategic battleground." (Ackerman, Rodal, 2008: 120) Sustained democracy assistance can be viewed as a kind of Trojan horse in countries ruled by authoritarian regimes — we do not know when a nonviolent campaign might break out, but if it does erupt, democracy assistance before and during nonviolent campaigns might contribute to creating "structures that institutionalize democratic changes" (Scott, Steele, 2011: 54) and thereby decreasing the risk that a political vacuum emerges.

This theoretical framework, fused together by combining research on nonviolent campaigns, democratization and democracy assistance, adds another set of explanations to the causal chain connecting nonviolent campaigns to democratization after regime change. From this fusion, three causal mechanisms emerge which explain how democracy assistance could affect the variation in democratic outcomes: political participation, civic political culture, and an enabling environment for civil society.

**Hypothesis and Causal Story**

Hypothesis: Regime change initiated by nonviolent campaigns is more likely to result in democratization if the country received sustained democracy assistance during and before the nonviolent campaign.

**Figure 1. Causal Story**

Democracy assistance promoting political participation, civic political culture and enabling environment for civil society before and during nonviolent campaigns

Facilitates sustained mass mobilization and development of democratic institutions during nonviolent campaigns

Democratization after regime change initiated by nonviolent campaigns
The main assumption underpinning the causal story is that external actors have the ability to influence democratization after nonviolent campaigns through democracy assistance. My argument is that the interplay between international and domestic factors fits within the agency-focused framework in research on nonviolent campaigns because they fill different functions — external actors cannot replace or create credible domestic agents who work for democracy, but they can empower them if they have taken form by supporting political participation and civic political culture, and they can attempt to shape the structural conditions in which these actors operate; structures that are difficult to change from grass-root levels.

The purpose of this paper is not to explain the onset of nonviolent campaigns, but to explain the variation in democratic outcomes after regime change initiated by nonviolent campaigns. I argue that countries experiencing regime change are more likely to democratize if they have received sustained democracy assistance that promote political participation, civic political culture and enabling environment for civil society. This kind of democracy assistance is expected to facilitate sustaining mass mobilization and developing democratic institutions in the new regime. Unlike external support to specific nonviolent campaigns, which risks undermining campaigns' legitimacy, this kind of democracy assistance lays a groundwork that facilitates democratization, but it does not interfere or meddle with how nonviolent campaigns unfold.
Research Design

Method

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether democracy assistance can help explain why some countries democratize after regime change initiated by nonviolent campaigns while others do not. My theoretical argument is causal because I expect that sustained democracy assistance contributes to more democratic outcomes after nonviolent campaigns, and exploratory because I aim to "identify a possible cause of an outcome." (Gerring, Cojocaru, 2016: 397)

I will do a comparative case study by using the method of structured focused comparison. It is a suitable method for testing my hypothesis for several reasons. First, a comparative case study enables me to investigate the potential causal impact democracy assistance has on democratization after nonviolent campaigns by comparing variation across different cases. Second, neither random sampling nor a large n-study is possible with the small population of cases of regime change after nonviolent campaigns, and, third, the theoretical expectations in combination with the available data on democracy assistance necessitate an examination of the project descriptions. If I were only interested in the level of democracy assistance, this would not be necessary, but I am primarily interested in looking into what kind of democracy assistance countries have received to see if my theoretical framework holds up. In line with my argument, I am especially interested in investigating whether democracy assistance has been allocated to organizations and projects designed to promote political participation, civic political culture and an enabling environment for civil society in recipient countries.

Structured focused comparison was developed to "yield useful generic knowledge of important foreign policy problems." (George, Bennett, 2005: 67) Case studies "thrive on sensitivity to temporality, agency and process" (Teorell, 2010: 29) but they are at a disadvantage when it comes to producing claims of generality and controlling for confounding variables. While the method of structured focused comparison does
not amend this relative disadvantage, it lays the foundation for more systematic comparisons between cases. It improves the researcher's ability to draw more general conclusions by taking cue from statistical and survey research models and borrowing "the device of asking a set of standardized, general questions of each case" (George, Bennett, 2005: 69) This means that the researcher refrains from adapting too much to idiosyncrasies of individual cases that render generalization difficult. The word 'focused' refers to that the method requires the study to be focused in the sense that it is "undertaken with a specific research objective in mind." (Ibid: 70) In other words, the method of structured focused comparison is not intended to be used when explaining all aspects of a case; it requires a clearly delineated focus on instances of some phenomenon of interest; in this essay, the relationship between democracy assistance and democratization after nonviolent campaigns.

**Operationalization**

The independent variable democracy assistance is operationalized by investigating the level of democracy assistance and, more specifically, the gross disbursements of democracy assistance. OECD and USAID have data on commitments and gross disbursements, but commitments take a long time to fully disburse and only give indication of future flows whereas gross disbursements reflect actual payments made each year. Gross disbursements are therefore more accurate measurements of democracy assistance because it is unlikely that indications of future democracy assistance have any impact on democratization.

Developing indicators of democracy assistance is important to be able to evaluate the causal mechanisms, and there is a delicate balancing act between recognizing the multifaceted nature of democracy assistance and making the concept so wide that it becomes difficult to measure empirically. In line with previous research, I will not categorize assistance targeted to health, humanitarian or economic sectors as democracy assistance because its potential impact on democratization is expected to be too indirect to trace and theorize meaningfully. I operationalize the independent variable by using data included in the Government and Civil Society Sector in USAID:s database. I also use the Government and Civil Society Sector in OECD:s
database, and I include all fourteen sub-sectors except: public sector policy and administrative management, public finance management, domestic revenue mobilization, and facilitation of orderly, safe, regular, and responsible migration, because none of these categories coincide with how I conceptualize democracy assistance; I do not expect any of these sectors to impact democratization after nonviolent campaigns. Including these categories in the output could result in reporting misleadingly high levels of democracy assistance. To investigate what kind of democracy assistance the countries have received, I analyze the project descriptions attached to the investments in combination with how previous research has evaluated the countries’ democracy assistance.

When it comes to the level of democracy assistance, the sheer amount of money does not say much; it needs to be put in relation to something. To compare the cases, it is necessary to weigh in differences between the two countries. I therefore use two different approaches to measure the level of democracy assistance:

**Democracy assistance in relation to GDP:** Previous research often uses official development assistance (ODA) as a percentage of GDP to measure aid intensity. (Knack, 2004: 255) I will therefore measure the level of democracy assistance each year by calculating the total sum of democracy assistance as a percentage of GDP.

**Democracy assistance in relation to population size:** The impact of one million dollar is likely to be different in a country with a population of less than 15 million compared to a country with 80 million. This does not mean that small amounts of money cannot be impactful if strategically invested, but it is nevertheless useful to factor in population size.

The dependent variable is democratization after regime change initiated by nonviolent campaigns. I use V-Dem’s Electoral Democracy Index (EDI) to measure how the countries EDI score changes from before the nonviolent campaign to after the regime change has taken place. EDI weighs in electoral competition, full suffrage, free and fair elections, freedom of association, freedom of expression, and independent media, to calculate a country’s EDI score each year. (Coppedge et. al.,
2018: 38) The reported EDI score is taken two years after the replacement of an old regime with a new regime because the democracy levels are likely to fluctuate in close connection to regime change. By stabilization, I mean that the level of electoral democracy does not change significantly in the following years, and marks the end of the regime change that was initiated by the nonviolent campaign.

Case Selection

To test my hypothesis, it is necessary to compare cases with variation on the dependent variable. The hypothesis would gain some support if countries with democratic outcomes had received democracy assistance before and during the nonviolent campaign, but it is not enough to draw the conclusion that democracy assistance causally impacts democratization. The hypothesis should therefore be tested by investigating democracy assistance to countries with no democratization after regime change initiated by nonviolent campaigns; if these countries received similar kinds and levels of democracy assistance, it would weaken support for the hypothesis. I will therefore choose cases based on whether the outcome was democratic or non-democratic.

The case selection criteria is first, the regime change in a country must have been initiated by a nonviolent campaign with maximalist objectives and, second, the selected cases must have different outcomes — democratization or no democratization — to allow testing of the hypothesis. In Gerring’s and Cojocaru’s typology, this case selection strategy is labeled as a most-similar design, characterized by the researcher’s knowledge about the different outcomes across cases with similar background conditions, but the values for X (democracy assistance) is unknown before the study has been undertaken. (Gerring, Cojocaru, 2016: 395) Limited data on democracy assistance during the 20th century make it difficult to look at cases of regime change after nonviolent campaigns before 2000. I use Pinckney’s combination of the NAVCO 2.1 dataset and Geddes et. al. dataset on autocratic breakdowns and regime change to identify the remaining number of cases within the population of successful nonviolent campaigns with maximalist objectives that resulted in regime
change. From 2000 - 2018, these datasets present a population of 19 cases of countries with regime change initiated by nonviolent campaigns.

Table 1 shows how these cases differ from each other on the dependent variable (the column displaying the EDI scores two years after the regime change).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries experiencing regime change after nonviolent campaign (NVC)</th>
<th>Year of NVC</th>
<th>Score on Electoral Democracy Index the year before NVC</th>
<th>Score on Electoral Democracy Index two years after regime change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The scale 0 - 1 in the Electoral Democracy Index (EDI) represents democracy as a continuous variable, meaning that democracy is not treated as an either/or characteristic, but as something that exists in countries to varying degrees. The index seeks to answer the question: "To what extent is the ideal of electoral democracy in its fullest sense achieved?" (Coppedge et al., 2018) A low score means that a country has little to basically nonexistent electoral democracy whereas a high score means that countries to a greater extent fulfills the electoral principle of democracy. To put this into context, the majority of Western democracies score around 0.7 - 0.9 (1 represents the ideal electoral democracy which no country fully coincides with.)

Gerring and Cojocaru emphasize that the most-similar case design requires consideration of "the status of the chosen cases relative to each other." (Gerring, Cojocaru, 2016: 396) Table 1 helps illustrating how the cases relate to one another on the dependent variable. This is important for my case selection because I want to choose cases that have different outcomes but as similar background conditions as possible in order to control for confounding variables. It is also easier to test my hypothesis when the chosen cases have as much variation on the dependent variable as possible in relation to each other, which makes it logical to focus on comparing cases on the upper and lower end of the scale of EDI scores after regime change. Egypt and Kyrgyzstan have the lowest EDI whereas Peru, Croatia and Tunisia have the highest scores (see column furthest to the right in Table 1). Egypt and Tunisia are logical cases to focus on because they are at opposites sides of the spectrum, and they share relatively similar background conditions in comparison to the other cases in the population. They are industrialized Arab countries that experienced uprisings during the Arab Spring, they have similar EDI scores the year before the nonviolent campaign broke out, and the authoritarian regime in respective country had been in place for decades. There are still important differences between these two countries that need to be addressed in the analysis, but the relative similarities delimit the number of possible confounding variables that can arise from comparing cases in different regions, with different cultures, religions and languages. Focusing on these two countries could therefore contribute to uncovering a potential causal relationship between democracy assistance and democratization after regime change initiated by nonviolent campaigns.
Timeframe and Data Sources

An essential part of investigating causality concerns choosing an appropriate timeframe. This means ensuring that the dependent variable (democratization after nonviolent campaigns) does not influence the independent variable (democracy assistance) during the time-period under study. It is not unlikely that democratization causes an increase in democracy assistance once the process has begun, and this correlation muddles any causal impact democracy assistance may have on democratization. I expect that democracy assistance can positively influence democratization after regime change initiated by nonviolent campaigns if the country received democracy assistance both before the campaign broke out and during the campaign.

Investigating democracy assistance before the outbreak of the nonviolent campaign means that I can fairly confidently surmise that my independent variable is unaffected by the dependent variable, especially when I control for the level of electoral democracy, or absence thereof, in the years leading up to the nonviolent campaign. Investigating democracy assistance during the nonviolent campaign presents more difficulties, and therefore I keep these two time-periods — before and during the nonviolent campaign — separate when I present the empirical evidence and interpret the results. Despite the fact that the causal relationship between democracy assistance and democratization after nonviolent campaigns risks becoming difficult to disentangle, I have chosen to include democracy assistance during the nonviolent campaign because I expect that democracy assistance during nonviolent campaigns can influence how democratic the new regime becomes if it is targeted to promote political participation, civic political culture and enabling environment for civil society.

To get an overview of democracy assistance before and during the nonviolent campaigns in Tunisia and Egypt, I investigate the levels five years before the nonviolent campaign began and two years after the regime change. Two years give the new regimes in respective country some time to become established and stabilize in the Electoral Democracy Index, and thus make it possible to assess whether the
countries democratized following the regime change initiated by the nonviolent campaigns. This means that my timeframe for both countries is 2006 - 2013. The wide timeframe allows me to get a broad overview of democracy assistance to identify patterns, and evaluate what kind of democracy assistance the countries received before and during the nonviolent campaigns.

My data sources on democracy assistance are USAID Foreign Aid Explorer and OECD:s CRS Aid Activity Database which provides information on democracy assistance to recipient countries from all official donors world-wide; this includes DAC countries (members of the Development Assistance Committee), non-DAC countries, multilateral organizations and private donors. USAID only presents data on democracy assistance from the U.S. To make sure that democracy assistance from the U.S. is not reported twice, I exclude the U.S. as a donor in the OECD output. The reasons why I also include USAID as a source is because the U.S. is the world’s largest civil society donor, and USAID provides more detailed information on projects than OECD. For simplicity’s sake, I will refer to the databases as USAID and OECD. Furthermore, data from V-Dem is used to measure democratization and I use NAVCO 3.0 to investigate whether actors reported as active in the nonviolent campaign also received democracy assistance.

A potential data problem is that it is difficult to say for sure that data in USAID and OECD encompass all democracy assistance the countries have received, but they do cover what all official donors and the U.S. — the largest donor of democracy assistance — officially have reported, and I also base my analysis on the significance that previous research attributes to Tunisian and Egyptian democracy assistance’s role in democratization processes.

Structured Focused Comparison Questions

Building on the causal mechanisms between the independent variable and the dependent variable, the following questions will guide the analysis of each case and constitute the backbone of the comparative case study. The questions link the independent variable (democracy assistance) with the dependent variable
(democratization after regime change initiated by nonviolent campaigns) by evaluating to what extent democracy assistance was allocated to support political participation, civic political culture and an enabling environment for civil society.

1. Did the country democratize after the nonviolent campaign?
2. How did the level of democracy assistance fluctuate during the time-period studied?
3. To what extent was democracy assistance in OECD and USAID aimed at promoting political participation and civic political culture?
4. To what extent was democracy assistance in OECD and USAID aimed at promoting an enabling environment for civil society?
5. To what extent was democracy assistance in OECD and USAID allocated to activities that do not coincide with the three causal mechanisms?
6. To what extent did democracy assistance reach actors active in the nonviolent campaign?

These questions help testing the theoretical framework by investigating the data on what kind of democracy assistance Tunisia and Egypt received. I expect democracy assistance supporting political participation, civic political culture and enabling environment for civil society to facilitate sustaining mass mobilization and developing democratic institutions during nonviolent campaigns. If the data show that the countries did not receive the kind of democracy assistance that I expect affects democratization, it cannot explain the variation in democratic outcomes. But if they did receive this kind of democracy assistance, I need to parse out when they received it — before and/or during the nonviolent campaign — and to what extent the country received this kind of democracy assistance. In the analysis, I use the answers to these questions in combination with previous research to discuss whether the hypothesis finds support. Table 2 specifies the indicators determining whether data on democracy assistance to projects and organizations in Egypt and Tunisia coincide with any of the three causal mechanisms.
Table 2. Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causal mechanism</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political participation</td>
<td>Projects/organizations received democracy assistance to increase and/or cultivate some form of political participation and/or support political activists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic political culture</td>
<td>Projects/organizations received democracy assistance to promote and/or disseminate information on democratic principles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enabling environment for civil society</td>
<td>Projects/organizations received democracy assistance to support good governance, anticorruption, independent media, human rights, political rights, gender equality, education and/or political processes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Limitations**

I look at only two cases within the population, which makes it difficult to draw conclusions with high external validity. Using structured focused comparison as a method is intended to strike a balance between internal and external validity, but the small number of cases still limits the degree to which I can be confident that my results apply not only to these two cases, but to the whole population. (Kellstedt, Whitten, 2013: 79) Another limitation, inherent to qualitative analysis, is that the researcher can never be certain that all confounding variables have been addressed and controlled for. In the analysis I will therefore discuss other alternative explanations that could account for the different outcomes in Tunisia and Egypt. If there is a causal relationship, the most-similar design helps controlling for some potentially confounding variables by comparing cases with relatively similar background conditions, the method of structured focused comparison provides a systematic way of investigating correlation and causality, and by clearly separating democracy assistance allocated before and during the nonviolent campaign, it becomes possible to disentangle the temporal order.
In the following chapters, I seek to answer the question: Does sustained democracy assistance explain variation in democratic outcomes in recipient countries that experience regime change initiated by nonviolent campaigns? From the empirical evidence, I expect to find support for the hypothesis that regime change initiated by nonviolent campaigns is more likely to result in democratization if the country received sustained democracy assistance before and during the nonviolent campaign.

I begin with assessing each case independently by describing the background, presenting the level of democracy assistance, and answering the structured focused questions based on the data in OECD and USAID. In the analysis, I compare the countries’ level of democracy assistance and what kind of democracy assistance they have received. I interpret the main results by anchoring the discussion in previous research on nonviolent campaigns and democracy assistance.
Tunisia

Background

When the Jasmine Revolution erupted at the end of 2010 and early 2011, Tunisia had been ruled by President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali for twenty-three years. Ben Ali’s predecessor Habib Bourguiba was removed in a bloodless coup d’état, sometimes also referred to as a doctor’s coup — several doctors issued statements declaring that Bourguiba’s deteriorating health made him unfit to rule, which made it possible for Ben Ali, who was prime minister at the time, to rise to power without violating the Tunisian constitution. (Masri, 2017) In the beginning of his regime, Ben Ali made a constitutional amendment to prevent life-long presidencies, permitted other political parties than the ruling party, Rassemblement constitutionnel démocratique (RCD), to participate in elections, ratified human rights conventions, and vowed to create a more open society. (Ibid: 28) It soon became clear, however, that these changes did not reflect a serious ambition to democratize Tunisia, and the ruling party gradually became ”defined by the president and indistinguishable from the state.” (Ibid: 30)

In 2002, Ben-Ali circumvented his own amendment to be able to remain president for the rest of his life, and used the rise of Islamism as a justification for extending his power. (Masri, 2017: 29) Religious as well as secular dissidents were silenced. Amnesty International reported that people who voiced criticism or were suspected of harboring anti-regime sentiments were arbitrarily arrested, tortured, and imprisoned after unfair trails. (Amnesty, 2003: 3) If they were later released from prison, they struggled to return to society because the regime prevented them from gaining any or full access to health, education and jobs. (Ibid) In 2011, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) undertook an investigation that reported findings that showed how under Ben-Ali’s regime ”trade and student unions, human rights defenders, civil society actors, journalists and political activists were harassed, intimidated, detained, and subjected to torture, cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment.” (OHCHR, 2011: 5) In V-Dem’s Electoral
Democracy Index, Tunisia consistently scored between 0.18 and 0.19 throughout Ben-Ali’s regime.

In 2008, demonstrations, work stoppages, hunger strikes and roadblocks were organized by miners against the state-owned *Compagnie des phosphates de Gafsa*, which was accused of corruption and discrimination. Other workers, students, unemployed, and political activists joined, and the protests spread throughout the Gafsa region and "literally paralyzed the industry." (Masri, 2017: 37) Gafsa had experienced widespread social upheavals during the 20th century, and Ben-Ali violently cracked down on the demonstrators by sending in his national guard and the army. (Ibid) Several workers were killed, and in Tunisia, these riots are seen as being closely linked to the Jasmine Revolution and as marking "the real beginning of the revolution that culminated in the removal of Ben Ali." (Ibid) The Gafsa protests should be understood in the context of high unemployment, inequality and corruption. Tunisia did experience economic growth during Ben Ali’s rule, but only the elite profited from this growth whereas the majority of people experienced little or no positive changes from the country’s overall economic gains. (Cloutier, 2012: 16) Youth unemployment was at 30% in the years leading up to the revolution in 2011. (Masri, 2017: 34) The unequal impact of Tunisia’s economic development and the disparities between regions and within the population were concealed in "misleading averages." (Ibid: 35) Similarly, Cloutier argues that what was sometimes referred to as *le miracle économique tunisien* was disconnected from the everyday lives of Tunisians, and in fact propaganda promulgated by the regime in attempts to safeguard its legitimacy. (Cloutier, 2012: 16)

Almost all accounts of the Arab Spring begin with how street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire on December 17, 2010. Upon discovering that Bouazizi lacked a license to sell vegetables, the police had confiscated his cart and beaten him up. Bouazizi filed a complaint that was rejected and fed up from years of police harassment, he subsequently committed suicide by setting himself on fire outside the governor’s office. He died from his wounds on January 4, 2011. (Al Jazeera, 2011) Bouazizi’s act of self-immolation resonated with Tunisians and the news of what had happened spread quickly through social media, and people took to the streets in cities across the country. As an isolated event, the reactions to Bouazizi’s suicide might be
difficult to understand but against the backdrop of decades of suppressed frustration over poverty, injustices and corruption, the police’s treatment of Bouazizi became the straw that broke the camel’s back. (International Crisis Group, 2011)

Ben Ali simultaneously attacked the protestors and tried to appease the public by promising jobs and political reforms, but the protests grew in size and calls for regime change increased in intensity. (Bayat, 2017: 8) In addition, Signé and Smida argue that a major difference between the Gafsa riots in 2008 and the Jasmine Revolution in 2011 was the refusal of the military to obey Ben Ali’s order to attack protestors. (Signé, Smida, 2016: 38) In Tunis, on January 12, the largest protest was organized, and in the evening, Ben Ali held a televised speech where he recognized wrongdoings committed by his regime and denounced attacks on protestors, but these statements ”proved to be too little and too late.” (Masri, 2017: 48) The following day, Ben Ali and his wife fled to Saudi Arabia.

A precarious balancing act between satisfying demands from secularist and religious movements marked Tunisian politics after the removal of Ben Ali. No one had expected a series of revolutions to erupt in Arab countries that had been ruled by dictators for decades. International Crisis Group summarized the period after the removal of Ben-Ali as characterized simultaneously by ”fear of a return to the past versus fear of a plunge into chaos.” (International Crisis Group, 2011: 2) Protests did not stop after Ben Ali had left. Tunisians continued to gather in public places in response to different measures taken by the interim government. Tunisia’s prime minister Ghannouchi announced that he temporarily would be in charge of the country, but his claim to power was met with wide-spread protests, which made him step aside on February 27, 2011. Public authority and responsibility for managing constitutional reform thereafter lay with the High Commission for the Fulfillment of Revolutionary Goals, Political Reform, and Democratic Transition, led by Yadh Ben Achour, a lawyer and expert on Islamic political theory. (Pickard, 2011: 638) In early March, the commission presented a road map for the future. (Ibid: 639) In October 2011, after Tunisians voted in an election of a National Constituent Assembly, a coalition government called ”Troika” was formed with the election’s clear winner, the Islamist Ennahda party (sometimes spelt An-Nabda), as its leader. (Ibid: 640) Two smaller and secular parties, the Congrès pour la République (CPR) and the Forum
démocratique pour le travail et les libertés (FDTL) were also part of the Troika coalition. Troika’s primary task was to write a new constitution and rule the country until presidential and legislative elections were to be held in 2013. (Schraeder, 2012: 665)

**The Level of Democracy Assistance**

Here I present the level of democracy assistance reported in OECD and USAID. Columns without figures mean that no democracy assistance was allocated to projects or organizations within that category during that year. Table 3 shows democracy assistance reported from all official donors included in OECD 2006 - 2013. Table 4 shows democracy assistance from the U.S. reported in USAID 2006 - 2013. USAID does not report democracy assistance by using the same kind of sub-categories as OECD, and therefore I highlight some project examples in the right column. I discuss the kind of democracy assistance Tunisia has received from the U.S. (and other donors) more in-depth when I answer the structured focused comparison questions. Table 5 summarizes the total level of democracy assistance to Tunisia 2006 - 2013 in OECD and USAID, and presents the level of GDP each year and democracy assistance as a percentage of GDP.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OECD</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic participation and civil society</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>0.445</td>
<td>0.252</td>
<td>0.371</td>
<td>0.216</td>
<td>3.605</td>
<td>5.699</td>
<td>8.149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>4.561</td>
<td>5.712</td>
<td>0.659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislatures and political parties</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>3.434</td>
<td>0.381</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td>0.327</td>
<td>0.338</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.528</td>
<td>0.575</td>
<td>1.813</td>
<td>2.591</td>
<td>4.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal and judicial development</td>
<td>0.817</td>
<td>0.491</td>
<td>8.081</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>2.139</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>6.087</td>
<td>6.476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media and free flow of information</td>
<td>0.285</td>
<td>0.866</td>
<td>0.214</td>
<td>0.153</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>2.206</td>
<td>1.841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's equality organizations and institutions</td>
<td>1.347</td>
<td>1.393</td>
<td>0.150</td>
<td>1.022</td>
<td>0.347</td>
<td>0.508</td>
<td>0.807</td>
<td>0.346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ending violence against women and girls</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-corruption organizations and institutions</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.177</td>
<td>0.302</td>
<td>0.716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralization and support to subnational government</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.248</td>
<td>0.313</td>
<td>0.509</td>
<td>1.437</td>
<td>6.288</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* USD Million
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USAID</th>
<th>Government and Civil Society</th>
<th>Project examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 2006  | $230,981                      | National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Arab Institute for Human Rights  
|       |                               | National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Al-Jahedh Forum for Free Thought |
| 2007  | $612,143                      | National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Moroccan Organization for Human Rights  
|       |                               | National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Arab Institute for Human Rights |
| 2008  | $348,020                      | National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Tunisian Arab Civitas Institute  
|       |                               | National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Centre Mohamed Ali de Recherches d’Etudes et de Formation (CEMAREF) |
| 2009  | $385,645                      | National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Association for the Promotion of Education (APES)  
|       |                               | National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Al-Jahedh Forum for Free Thought |
| 2010  | $678,672                      | Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Program - Civil Society and Media: Working Together for Women’s Political Empowerment in Tunisia  
|       |                               | National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Mohamed Ali Center for Research, Studies and Training |
| 2011  | $3,047,167                    | National Endowment for Democracy Grant to International Republican Institute for Accountability  
|       |                               | National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Search for Common Ground for Human Rights |
| 2012  | $104,943,703                  | National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Center for International Private Enterprise  
|       |                               | National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Chahed Observatory for Monitoring Elections and Supporting Democratic Reform |
| 2013  | $9,887,724                    | Tunisia Transition Initiative (TTI) program  
|       |                               | National Endowment for Democracy Grant to International Republican Institute (IRI) |
Table 5. Total Democracy Assistance to Tunisia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>OECD &amp; USAID</th>
<th>GDP (World Bank)</th>
<th>Democracy assistance as a percentage of GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>$3 149 981</td>
<td>$34 378 000 000</td>
<td>0.009 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>$4 145 143</td>
<td>$38 908 000 000</td>
<td>0.01 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>$8 793 020</td>
<td>$44 857 000 000</td>
<td>0.019%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>$6 032 645</td>
<td>$43 455 000 000</td>
<td>0.013%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>$4 352 672</td>
<td>$44 051 000 000</td>
<td>0.009%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>$22 454 167</td>
<td>$45 811 000 000</td>
<td>0.049%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>$130 165 703</td>
<td>$45 044 000 000</td>
<td>0.288%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>$39 164 724</td>
<td>$46 251 000 000</td>
<td>0.084%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Did the country democratize after the nonviolent campaign?

Yes. In 2013, Tunisia scored 0.73 in the Electoral Democracy Index. Most Western democracies score somewhere around 0.7 and 0.9. While Tunisia still struggles with high unemployment and Islamist extremism, the country underwent a significant political development during the nonviolent campaign from 0.19 to 0.73, which is visually captured in Figure 2.
How did the level of democracy assistance fluctuate during the time-period studied?

There was a sharp increase in democracy assistance to Tunisia in 2011. In 2006 - 2010, the level of democracy assistance never exceeded $8.7 million per year whereas democracy assistance in 2011 amounted to $22.5 million and then a staggering increase to $130 million in 2012.

To what extent was democracy assistance in OECD and USAID aimed at promoting political participation and civic political culture?

There were several projects and organizations that received support reported in USAID and OECD, which were intended to promote political participation and civic political culture, especially among young people and women. Due to the number of projects and organizations in USAID and OECD, it is not possible to account for all
of them, and I will therefore highlight a few examples to give an overview of what kind of democracy assistance Tunisia received before and during the nonviolent campaign.

The majority democracy assistance promoting political participation and civic political culture came during the nonviolent campaign. Before 2011, the small number of projects and organizations that received democracy assistance actually makes it possible to list them all here. In OECD, this kind of democracy assistance is almost nonexistent. The European Union funded projects designed to strengthen the trade union UGTT, and Sweden gave core support to NGOs, private bodies and research institutes. In USAID, the following organizations received democracy assistance before 2011: the Al-Jahedh Forum for Free Thought, the Centre Mohamed Ali de Reserches d’Etudes et de Formation (CEMAREF), Moroccan Organization for Human Rights, Arab Institute for Human Rights, Tunisian Arab Civitas Institute, and Association for the Promotion of Education (APES). To illustrate the kinds of projects USAID funded: the Al-Jahedh Forum for Free Thought received democracy grants with the overarching purpose of strengthening the capacity and build a democratic culture among Tunisian youth. Activities included holding open seminars, weekly discussion groups, establish a youth forum, support cultural projects. The CEMAREF was given support that was primarily designed to educate young Tunisian activists in leadership skills, the Arab Institute for Human Rights trained teachers on how to incorporate civic education methods into their teaching, and the Moroccan Organization for Human Rights supported young Tunisian attorneys in their mobilization of citizens on reform issues. In general, democracy assistance reported in USAID that was designed to promote political participation and civic political culture before 2011 focused on capacity-building among teachers and engaging Tunisian students in workshops on democracy and civic values. With few exceptions, this kind of democracy assistance was limited to one year grants.

After 2011, there was a significant increase in the number of organizations and activities receiving democracy assistance. In OECD, the number of donors also increases and, perhaps most notably, the European Union began to allocate more democracy assistance to projects designed to strengthen civil society, promote
participation in political processes, and support young people’s role in the democratic development. For example, according to the data in OECD, Finland supported a citizenship school for young people in Sidi Bouzid, Germany gave support to Tunisian NGOs to strengthen the democratic development, Spain supported the strengthening of civil society organizations, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) gave support to develop and strengthen workers’ organizations and their dialogue and collective bargaining capacities.

USAID launched the Tunisia Transition Initiative (TTI) to ”support Tunisians in their pursuit of a democratic society by creating viable space for the transition to succeed” and partnered with many newly formed Tunisian civil society organizations to support democratization. USAID data show that the Institute for Human Rights and the Al-Jahedh Forum for Free Thought continued to receive democracy assistance, whereas new organizations (new in the sense that they had not received Tunisian democracy assistance before) appear, such as International Republican Institute for Accountability, Kawakibi Democracy Transition Center for Civic Education, Youth and Skills Association for Civic Education, Association Irtikaa for Effective Women Participation for Political Processes. During the nonviolent campaign, the majority of democracy assistance reported in USAID was allocated to projects and organizations building the capacity of young activists through workshops, seminars and conferences. In comparison to before 2011, democracy assistance reported in USAID is also geared more towards promoting the political participation of women and marginalized groups.

**To what extent was democracy assistance in OECD and USAID aimed at promoting an enabling environment for civil society?**

Democracy assistance reported in USAID is to a greater extent directed to political participation and civic political culture, and to a lesser extent focused on the enabling environment for civil society. This applies to democracy assistance both before and after the nonviolent campaign. According to the USAID data, before 2011, one example is that the Committee for the Respect of Freedom and Human Rights was funded to advocate for an amnesty for political prisoners. During the nonviolent campaign, USAID data show that the Citizen Media Observatory was funded to
promote public debates in media and develop small media outlets’ capacity whereas the International Republic Institute for Accountability was given support to facilitate participation at national and local levels, and to enable civil society organizations to influence the legislative process led by the Constituent Assembly. In general, however, democracy assistance reported in USAID primarily focused on promoting political participation and civic political culture.

Accord to data in OECD, before 2011, Finland gave support intended to promote women’s and children’s rights in Tunisia, Spain allocated resources to human rights organizations to strengthen the rule of law, and Germany gave support to national NGOs to prevent the use of torture by Tunisian law enforcement personnel. UNICEF supported projects intended to promote awareness of the importance of youth participation in political processes. During the nonviolent campaign, the data show that the EU began funding projects aimed at strengthening human rights, supporting Tunisian human rights defenders, educating journalists and boosting independent journalism. Through UNDP, Sweden invested resources in establishing better anti-corruption mechanisms in Tunisia. Switzerland funded activities promoting an inclusive democratization process. The Slovak Republic supported similar kinds of projects, focusing on connecting the state and non-state actors to enable better cooperation. The list goes on, but the general picture in the OECD data is that little more than a handful of donors were engaged in supporting the enabling environment for civil society on a continuous basis before 2011. The data strongly indicate that the outbreak of the nonviolent campaign attracted more investments in measures designed to improve the enabling environment for civil society organizations.

**To what extent was democracy assistance in OECD and USAID allocated to activities that do not coincide with the three causal mechanisms?**

Democracy assistance reported in OECD and USAID, before and during the nonviolent campaign, generally fall within the categories of promoting political participation, civic political culture and/or the enabling environment for civil society. In USAID, there are some examples of democracy assistance being allocated to anti-terrorism assistance and technical assistance to combat economic crimes. The last
one overlaps somewhat with the enabling environment for civil society because it also aims to combat corruption, but the projects are primarily designed to prevent abuse of the financial system, which do not coincide with the theoretical expectations of how democracy assistance affects democratization.

In OECD, reported data reflect a tendency among donors to take a broad development approach to democracy assistance, rather than a narrower political approach. For example, during several years, Canada invested money in Fonds Canadien d’Initiatives Local (FCIL) which was designed to provide funding "for small projects that offer direct social, economic, or technical assistance to local populations.” Finland gave support to develop people’s awareness of environmental questions, UNDP allocated resources to strengthen national, regional and local levels of governance capacity to provide "equitable delivery of public services.” This kind of democracy assistance shows up less in OECD data after 2011.

Finally, it should be noted that several projects descriptions and grants to organizations, reported primarily in OECD, are limited and vague. Democracy assistance can sometimes be described as "core support” to unnamed NGOs, private bodies and research institutes. This is a data problem that makes it difficult to get a full picture of what kind of democracy assistance Tunisia received 2006 - 2013.

To what extent did democracy assistance reach actors active in the nonviolent campaign?

This is difficult to answer because money is hard to trace and protestors are often not identified as members of official organizations. NAVCO 3.0 includes information on organizations that were active during the nonviolent campaign, but activists are summarized as unspecified protestors/demonstrators. It is not possible to rule out that these protestors were connected to civil society organizations that received or were exposed to projects funded through democracy assistance, but it is very difficult to establish a direct connection. I have only managed to find a few examples. In USAID, Arab Institute for Human Rights is reported receiving democracy grants in 2006, 2007 and 2011. Khalil, who discusses women’s participation in the Jasmine revolution, writes:
One of many public forums that took place was organised by the Arab Institute for Human Rights in Thela, Kasserine province, on 23 July 2011. At this forum, a group of women testified to their experiences as mothers of those shot by the security forces during the Tunisian revolution. (Khalil, 2014: 188)

However, this is a rare example of a direct connection between democracy assistance and a recipient organization active in the nonviolent campaign. I did also find that in 2008, the European Union gave support to the largest trade union UGTT with the aim of strengthening Tunisian trade unions on regional and local levels. In the same year, Spain launched a training program for young leaders of Tunisian trade unions to improve their leadership abilities. Considering that many protestors were young, it is also worth emphasizing that democracy assistance in OECD and USAID, especially after 2011, was often geared towards promoting political participation among young people, but this is, of course, a far less direct connection.

To summarize, I found few examples of democracy assistance being allocated to organizations that were active during the nonviolent campaigns. It is difficult to draw any conclusions based on this scarce number of examples. Many observers and scholars who have identified civil society organizations as important, if not essential, to Tunisia’s democratization, rarely mention more than a handful of specific civil society organizations. They are instead often grouped together, becoming representations of Civil Society, but this abstraction obstructs investigation into which and what kind of organizations that were most active. By extension, this hampers analysis into whether these organizations also received democracy assistance before and during the nonviolent campaign.
Egypt

Background

The nonviolent campaign that removed Hosni Mubarak marked the end of a regime which had lasted almost exactly thirty years. Mubarak came to power in October, 1981; he stepped down in February, 2011. In the beginning of his reign, Mubarak released renowned political prisoners and invited them to one of his presidential palaces, giving the impression that he was "apologizing for the uncivilized behavior of his predecessor [Anwar Sadat]." (Amin, 2011: 4) In comparison to Sadat, who was assassinated by Islamist extremists during a parade in Cairo, Mubarak initially appeared more diplomatic towards the political opposition, and restrictions on freedom of expression became less severe. (Ibid: 5) This gave rise to some cautious optimism, which dissolved as Mubarak’s rule unfolded and no real economic or political developments occurred. (Ibid: 6) Amin describes how Egypt in the following decades developed into a "soft state", a term coined by economist and sociologist Gunnar Myrdal, which encapsulates the workings of "a state that passes laws but does not enforce them." (Ibid: 8) The soft state is characterized by widespread corruption, and elites enacting rules that only apply when it suits them. (Ibid)

In the second term of his presidency, Mubarak tightened his grip over Egypt by extending the state of emergency, refusing to initiate constitutional reforms, and excluding opposition parties from decision-making processes. (Lesch, 2012: 18) Almost without interruption since 1967, and throughout Mubarak’s regime, emergency laws were in force in Egypt, which bestowed the executive branches of the government the right to forbid demonstrations and hold people in detention for unlimited time-periods. (Human Rights Watch, 2011: 10) The Egyptian government justified the continued state of emergency with references to terrorist threats. (Ibid) Human Rights Watch released a report in 2011 that outlines decades of routine use of torture by Egyptian police and security forces, quotes testimonies by victims, and describes the widespread impunity of perpetrators. In V-Dem’s
Electoral Democracy Index, Egypt scored between 0.18 and 0.23 throughout Mubarak’s regime.

Among protestors in the anti-government demonstrations in 2011, there were “three areas of dissatisfaction” (Jumet, 2017: 25) most commonly cited as reasons for why they participated: economic grievances, anger over police brutality, and frustration with corruption. (Ibid) Following the financial crisis in 2008, the International Monetary Fund ”projected a relatively positive outlook on the Egyptian economy” (Ibid: 27) but Egypt was plagued by inflation and high unemployment. These problems were exacerbated by the high number of young people who were unable to find employment; in 2006, it was estimated that 80% of unemployed Egyptians were under the age of 29. (Ibid)

In 2010, massive public outrage broke out in Egypt following the murder of Khaled Said, a 28-year old blogger, who was dragged out from an internet café in Alexandria and beaten to death by two police officers. Said’s family said they believed the police arrested him because he had circulated a video that exposed police corruption. (Human Rights Watch, 2011: 20) Photographs of Khaled’s face and body, disfigured by the torture, were published online and widely circulated, which led to the creation of a Facebook page called ”We are all Khaled Said.” (Lesch, 2012: 37) Hundreds of thousands of people began following the page, and pictures of Khaled Said were used as profile photos on Facebook. New York Times wrote, ”if there is a face to the revolt that has sprouted in Egypt, it may be the face of Khaled Said.” (NY Times, February 2011)

The Jasmine revolution in Tunisia began in early January 2011, and a few weeks later, protests broke out in Egypt. The news of what was happening in Tunisia was received by Egyptian activists ”with great excitement.” (Bayat, 2017: 9) There had already been plans for organizing protests by the moderators of the ”We are all Khaled Said” Facebook page and the April 6 Youth movement, but the organizers of the protest, as well as the police forces, were astounded by the tens of thousands of people who marched from different neighborhoods in Cairo to the Tahrir Square on January 25, 2011. (Bayat, 2017: 9) During the following days, protests spread to other cities. The police tried to quell the demonstrations with violence, and the
government blocked websites to prevent organization online. (Masri, 2017: 49) Protestors occupied Tahrir square, and when the police retreated, the military ”took to the streets but signaled neutrality.” (Bayat, 2017: 9) The fact that the Egyptian military abandoned Mubarak was ”essential to his downfall.” (Kandil, 2012: 175) Mubarak subsequently said that he was willing to make some concessions, but he was not prepared to step aside. During the Battle of the Camels on February 2, armed thugs riding camels and horses tried to disperse the gathering at Tahrir Square, and several people were killed and injured. (Bayat, 2017: 9) Wide-spread labour strikes broke out across the country on February 8, which some argue constituted a major tipping point. (Bishara, 2012: 85) Three days later, on February 11, Mubarak resigned.

The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) was left in charge of the country. Mubarak’s downfall had opened the way for constitutional reform and democratization, and Egyptians were celebrating ”with ecstatic jubilance.” (Bayat, 2017: 9) The regime had for a long time relied heavily on the police, and as a result of the police’s privileges, relations between the regime and the military had soured over the years. (Maswood, Natarajan, 2012: 238) Gamal Mubarak, whom Mubarak had groomed to become his successor, was viewed by the military as the personified threat posed by the ascendancy ”of powerful civilian elite businessman.” (Ibid) Maswood and Natarajan argue that the outbreak of protests was ”in some ways welcome to the military establishment” because it enabled them to prevent the Mubarak family from imposing future limitations on their power. (Ibid)

The SCAF officially declared that they would ”withdraw from politics after a six-month transition period” (Kandil, 2012: 193) which would end in the election of a new regime. But while the military had been supportive of the revolution, they were still ”hesitant to conquer, dismantle, and restructure the security forces.” (Ibid: 196) The oppression was viewed as a tool to contain domestic instability, and Kandil argues that when the military was faced with the overwhelming task of reforming the security apparatus, the SCAF became reluctant to follow through on far-reaching reforms. (Ibid) This resulted in cosmetic changes; while Mubarak was removed, large parts of his power base remained basically intact.
The Muslim Brotherhood won the first parliamentary election, Mohamed Morsi became president, and Islamic *sharia* was identified as the main source of law in Egypt. The politics of the Muslim Brotherhood provoked liberal groups, and in 2013, protests broke out. International Crisis Group attributed the crisis to a combination of economic issues, the Muslim Brotherhood’s dismissiveness of the political opposition, and wide-spread propensity to use street actions to resolve complex political differences. (International Crisis Group, 2013) On July 3, 2013, the SCAF ousted president Morsi in a military coup and, once again, power resided with the military.

**The Level of Democracy Assistance**

This section follows the same structure as the presentation of data in the Tunisian case. I first present three tables depicting the level of democracy assistance reported in OECD and USAID, and thereafter I answer the six structured focused comparison questions.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OECD</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elections</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.202</td>
<td>7.234</td>
<td>9.682</td>
<td>1.981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislatures and political parties</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.184</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.611</td>
<td>0.998</td>
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<tr>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td>0.599</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>5.308</td>
<td>4.122</td>
<td>3.268</td>
<td>5.904</td>
<td>3.342</td>
<td>5.757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal and judicial development</td>
<td>1.341</td>
<td>1.449</td>
<td>0.501</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.489</td>
<td>1.402</td>
<td>1.296</td>
<td>1.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media and free flow of information</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.266</td>
<td>0.848</td>
<td>0.958</td>
<td>0.367</td>
<td>1.743</td>
<td>2.801</td>
<td>1.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's equality organizations and institutions</td>
<td>2.353</td>
<td>5.305</td>
<td>2.037</td>
<td>4.012</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>3.318</td>
<td>1.892</td>
<td>3.696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ending violence against women and girls</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-corruption organizations and institutions</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.662</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>2.579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralization and support to subnational government</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>0.335</td>
<td>0.758</td>
<td>2.523</td>
<td>1.315</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*USD Million*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>USAID</th>
<th>Government and Civil Society</th>
<th>Project examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td></td>
<td>$18,255,915</td>
<td>Democracy &amp; Governance Program, Egyptian Decentralization Initiative (EDI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
<td>$28,788,929</td>
<td>Administration of Justice II, Egyptian Decentralization Initiative (EDI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
<td>$63,928,131</td>
<td>Fiscal Policy, Justice System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
<td>$49,409,030</td>
<td>Egyptian Decentralization Initiative (EDI), Combating Violence against Women and Children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
<td>$45,627,953</td>
<td>Media Freedom and Freedom of Information, Civic Participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td></td>
<td>$35,471,560</td>
<td>Combating Violence against Women and Children, Justice System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td></td>
<td>$49,778,772</td>
<td>Egyptian Transition Support, Broaden Democratic Participation in Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td></td>
<td>$21,830,635</td>
<td>Political Processes Support Project (PPSP), Egyptian Transition Support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8. Total Democracy Assistance to Egypt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>OECD &amp; USAID</th>
<th>GDP (World Bank)</th>
<th>Democracy assistance as a percentage of GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>$30 246 915</td>
<td>107 484 000 000</td>
<td>0.028%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>$46 494 929</td>
<td>130 479 000 000</td>
<td>0.035%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>$78 208 131</td>
<td>162 818 000 000</td>
<td>0.048%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>$68 591 030</td>
<td>188 982 000 000</td>
<td>0.036%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>$61 716 953</td>
<td>218 888 000 000</td>
<td>0.028%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>$69 141 560</td>
<td>236 002 000 000</td>
<td>0.029%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>$83 941 772</td>
<td>279 373 000 000</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>$51 168 635</td>
<td>288 586 000 000</td>
<td>0.017%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Did the country democratize after the nonviolent campaign?

No. 2006 - 2010, Egypt scored between 0.21 and 0.23, experienced a drop to 0.16 in 2011, and then a rise to 0.28 during 2011 and 2012, followed by another drop to 0.21. Egypt never reached, or came close, to embarking on a democratization process, before, during or after the nonviolent campaign. Figure 3 shows the changes in Egypt’s EDI scores during this time-period.
Figure 3. Egypt in the Electoral Democracy Index

How did the level of democracy assistance fluctuate during the time-period studied?

The level of democracy assistance fluctuated between $30 million and $84 million. There was a gradual increase in democracy assistance, but it was irregular; an increase in one year was sometimes followed by a decrease the following year. Between 2008 - 2011, democracy assistance amounted to around $78 million and $69 million, and then rose to $84 million in 2012, which was also the biggest increase in democracy assistance during this time-period. In 2013, the level decreased to around $50 million — a lower level of democracy assistance than three years before the nonviolent campaign.
To what extent was democracy assistance in OECD and USAID aimed at promoting political participation and civic political culture?

There were several projects and organizations reported receiving democracy assistance intended to promote political participation and civic political culture in both OECD and USAID, but this kind of democracy assistance did not make up the majority of Egyptian democracy assistance. Before 2011, data in OECD show that Sweden gave core support to (unnamed) NGOs, other private bodies, PPPs and research institutes, and UNDP promoted political participation through civil society organizations, voluntary associations, trade unions, political parties, and private sector organizations. Denmark supported projects designed to empower community leaders to encourage democratic behaviour, the European Union allocated resources to projects that promoted participatory democracy by strengthening local communities, and Germany supported the institutional set up of the Federation of Youth NGOs. Palpably often, however, democracy assistance reported in OECD that was designed to promote participation was geared towards promoting development participation, not political participation. For example, OECD data show that Finland gave support to programs focused on improving the capacity of local NGOs to carry out sustainable development work, and that Germany invested resources in six communal development agencies in rural areas to enhance participation in local development processes.

The development approach is not as present in USAID. Before 2011, data in USAID show that several organizations and projects promoting political participation and civic political culture received funding. For example, the data show that the Andalus Institute received support 2006 - 2011 to educate young people on democratic theory and advocacy work, and to raise awareness of the working methods of the parliament. The Ibn Khaldun Center received support 2009 - 2010 to disseminate information on civil society and democratization in the Arab world and to hold weekly seminars on these topics. The Cairo Liberal Forum was funded to promote democratic ideas among young people and to build the capacity of youth-led NGOs. The Solidarity Center received a one-year grant to support advocacy work of workers’ unions, and the Mogatamaana Association was funded to engage citizens in
local decision-making processes and form local youth committees to serve as community organizers.

In OECD, after 2011, the data show that democracy assistance promoting political participation and civic political culture became less development-oriented. For example, Canada invested resources in projects building young women’s leadership skills, and Belgium supported a three-year program intended to increase the political participation of women as voters and candidates by building the capacity of government bodies, female candidates, and political parties. Denmark allocated resources to projects intended to empower civil society organizations, media organizations, social movements and governmental bodies, European Union launched a democratic transition program, and Norway funded Egyptian party-building projects. Moreover, during the nonviolent campaign, the International Labour Union began to give democracy assistance to strengthen the institutional capacity of worker’s organizations, and Sweden and Spain also funded projects intended to build the organizational and advocacy capacities of independent trade unions. Supporting participation and civic political culture among young people also emerged as a more dominant theme in democracy assistance reported in OECD after 2011. For example, the data show that Germany allocated resources to provide a meeting place for young people interested in democratic change, the European Union invested money to promote democratic values among marginalized young people in rural areas, Switzerland supported a project aimed at engaging young students and activists, and the UK gave support to democracy student unions.

During the nonviolent campaign, USAID data show that the Salam Institute received democracy assistance to hold workshops designed to help building a cadre of Egyptian imams to serve as advocates for tolerance, pluralism and democratic reform. The National Association for the Defense of Rights and Freedoms was reported receiving support to strengthen women’s political participation and empowerment through workshops and a grass-root advocacy campaign. The Rural Development Association received support to train 90 youth leaders in Minofiya on the workings of local governance, and the Fares Foundation was funded to promote democratic ideas and encourage political participation in rural areas of Daqahliyah. In 2011, USAID also launched the Egyptian Transition Support program which was
designed to help increase participation in elections and political processes. It is important to emphasize, however, that the largest sums of democracy assistance reported in USAID were allocated to USAID’s partners such as AmidEast, AECOM, Chemonics International, American Bar Association, Management Sciences for Development, PricewaterhouseCoopers, etc. It is not unusual for donors to have implementing partners, but it is still noteworthy that millions of dollars labeled as democracy assistance to Egypt was first allocated to international organizations with headquarters in Western countries, often in Washington D.C. and London, and these flows of money are very difficult to trace.

To what extent was democracy assistance in OECD and USAID aimed at promoting an enabling environment for civil society?

Democracy assistance to Egypt, reported in both OECD and USAID, was to a large extent designed to improve the enabling environment for civil society, both before and during the nonviolent campaign. Due to the number of projects in both databases, I can only give a general overview. Before the nonviolent campaign, data in OECD show that Canada supported projects designed to strengthen gender equality, the International Development Association invested resources in projects intended to improve the quality of and accessibility to secondary education and also promoted sustainable development of rural villages. The European Union gave democracy assistance geared towards the rule of law: to projects aimed at raising the awareness of human rights among the Egyptian public and to the creation of an Ombudsman Office at the National Council for Human Rights. The OECD data also show that the development emphasis is still salient. For example, Canada funded projects that were designed to provide employment opportunities to marginalized groups, Denmark gave support to civil society organizations to improve living conditions of poor and marginalized groups, and Italy allocated resources to projects aimed at reducing poverty and social exclusion.

In USAID, one of the biggest projects reported receiving support was called Administration of Justice, and investments amounted to around $39 million 2006 - 2010. The project was designed to improve the capacity and sustainability of the justice sector. Before 2011, USAID data also show that resources were allocated to
anti-corruption reforms and projects promoting good governance and transparency. Another large program that received funding for several years was designed to combat violence against women and children by strengthening local capacities to advocate for policy change. Overall, democracy assistance reported in USAID did not have the same development approach as democracy assistance in OECD — instead, the emphasis was on supporting projects aimed at strengthening rule of law and promoting political rights.

During the nonviolent campaign, there is a continued development emphasis reflected in the data in OECD, with similar kinds of projects receiving support as before 2011, but promotion of independent media and human rights also became more common, both in USAID and OECD. For example, OECD data show that Canada gave support to Egyptian journalists through capacity-building projects and Finland funded human rights projects especially targeted to young people. The European Union supported a project promoting the distinction between state governing legal principles and religious convictions, and Norway funded a project building the capacity of civil servants in the Egyptian government, NGOs and CSOs to facilitate dialogue. In USAID, there are several examples of projects funded to promote freedom of information and freedom of association. Organizations like United Journalists Center, the Roya Center, El-Hak Center were given support to strengthen independent media. USAID also launched the Political Processes Support Project (PPSP) in 2012 and 2013 to provide technical assistance and information on electoral systems, processes and administration.

To what extent was democracy assistance in OECD and USAID allocated to activities that do not coincide with the three causal mechanisms?

Data on Egyptian democracy assistance reported in OECD and USAID encompass large number of projects and organizations, but direct democracy assistance to Egyptian-based organizations rarely amounted to more than $25,000 per year, and many projects only received one-year grants. In USAID, the data show that one program labeled Fiscal Policy was implemented in partnership with the Egyptian Government and Deloitte Limited to support efficient fiscal policies, and received around $22 million between 2008 - 2010. In USAID, several projects working against
Trafficking and terrorism and programs on monetary policy and financial enforcement are also reported receiving funding, and together these investments amounted to around $17 million 2006 - 2013. In OECD, data show that there are some examples of projects that were intended to promote good relations between a donor country and Egypt, but above all, it should be noted that several reported projects and organizations focus heavily on development-related issues, rather than political participation, civic political culture and enabling environment for civil society.

To what extent did democracy assistance reach actors active in the nonviolent campaign?

In NAVCO 3.0, actors in the nonviolent campaign have vague classifications such as unspecified activists, anti-government activists, striking workers. This makes it difficult to establish a connection between democracy assistance and actors in the nonviolent campaign. Important actors such as the April 6 Youth Movement and the Coalition of the Revolution Youth are included in NAVCO, but I have not found any proof of that these movements received democracy assistance before or during the nonviolent campaign. The problem is two-fold: news articles, reports and academic essays rarely name specific organizations, but data in OECD and USAID are also limited in the sense that the projects and organizations, which received democracy assistance to train activists and journalists — often targeting young people — are anonymous in the project descriptions; with good reason considering the political climate in Egypt, but it makes it difficult to evaluate whether people exposed to programs reported in USAID and OECD were active in the nonviolent campaign. The closest connection between democracy assistance and actors in the nonviolent campaign is the support that independent labour unions received after 2011 — labour unions were important during the nonviolent campaign, but although they received some democracy assistance, it was a very small share of the overall democracy assistance allocated to Egypt.
Analysis

Who Were the Actors in the Nonviolent Campaigns?

The nonviolent campaigns in Tunisia and Egypt shared similarities that coincide with theoretical concepts in previous research on nonviolent campaigns. The political jiu-jitsu effect is illustrated in how the regimes’ violent responses backfired and created more intensified opposition, thereby instigating "the processes that enables nonviolent action to be more effective than violence." (Martin, 2015: 160) The Tunisian and Egyptian militaries’ withdrawal of support highlight the regimes’ dependence on pillars of support; if the military withdraws consent, the regime is likely to crumble. (Shock, 2013)

Despite these similarities, including the successful removal of the old regime, the outcomes in Tunisia and Egypt are very different. In the previous section, I presented data on democracy assistance in OECD and USAID to Tunisia and Egypt, but before I analyze the empirical evidence to investigate whether democracy assistance can account for some of the variation in outcomes, I will outline who the major actors were in the nonviolent campaigns. I have already touched upon limitations in the data, pertaining to vague project descriptions and the difficulty of tracing money flows, and I will return to this issue, but one way to partly circumvent the data limitations is to approach the cases from a different angle. My theoretical argument is that democracy assistance promoting political participation, civic political culture and enabling environment for civil society, before and during the nonviolent campaign, can help actors sustain mass mobilization and develop democratic institutions after the old regime has been ousted. An important step towards establishing or discarding a causal connection between democracy assistance and democratization is to first outline who previous research identifies as major actors, and then proceed to analyzing whether there is any empirical evidence that these actors benefitted from democracy assistance, before and/or during the nonviolent campaigns.
At the beginning of the nonviolent campaigns, mobilization in Tunisia and Egypt shared several characteristics. Chenoweth and Stephan explain the success of nonviolent campaigns by emphasizing how nonviolent tactics lower the barriers to participation, making it more likely that diverse groups of people will join the protests, and thereby rendering it difficult for the regime to delegitimize the protestors. (Chenoweth, Stephan, 2011) In line with this argument, the Tunisian and Egyptian nonviolent campaigns mobilized different groups in society, and in both countries, young people were at the forefront. However, Bayat argues that a common feature in all the Arab Spring revolutions was the absence of a radical political vision; protestors gathered around "broad issues of human rights, political accountability, and legal reform" but did not articulate ideological trajectories like young revolutionaries had done in other parts of the world during the 20th century. (Bayat, 2017: 11) After the removal of the regime begins the "black box" period during which sustained mass mobilization and low street radicalism are essential to the establishment of a new democratic regime. (Pinckney, 2018) It is during this time-period that marked differences between Tunisia and Egypt emerged.

Tunisia's democratic outcome is described in previous research as dependent on "vigilant civil society organizations, a powerful trade union movement, and a prudent post-Islamist current." (Bayat, 2017: 12) Ben-Hassine argues that Tunisia would not be where it is today unless civil society organizations had contributed to mitigating political tensions and "reconnected the relationship between citizens, the state and society in a transitional period." (Ben-Hassine, 2018) El Amrani emphasizes, "Tunisia was fortunate to have civil society leaders who recognized the gravity of the moment" and helped prevent the country from collapsing into a power vacuum. (El Amrani, 2018) The nonviolent campaign had been initiated by the working class and young people, many of whom were unemployed university graduates. (Hanaﬁ, 2011) Thirty-five percent of the protestors were younger than twenty-four. (Masri, 2017: 42) However, Masri contends that many young Tunisians lacked organizational capacity "to lead the political discourse or provide a viable alternative path." (Ibid: 54)
Deep-seated suspicion between secular and religious groups, disagreements over what role religion should play in politics, fueled by frustration among Tunisians over lack of economic development, resulted in a political crisis in 2013. (International Crisis Group, 2011) In response, UGTT, the largest trade union, took the initiative to form the National Dialogue Quartet with Union tunisienne de l’industrie, du commerce et de l’artisanat (UTICA), La Ligue tunisienne pour la défense des droits de l’homme (LTDH), and Ordre national des avocats de Tunisie. These civil society groups were later joined by several political parties. Masri summarizes the role played by civil society in 2013, with UGTT at the forefront, as ”once again, […] as the situation was spiraling into crisis mode, civil society stepped in to save the day.” (Masri, 2017: 66) The National Dialogue Quartet was able ”to steer Tunisia away from the path to conflict and towards political compromise.” (The Guardian, 2015) While young activists were united in calls for reforms and regime change, they were not necessarily in agreement on what kind of new regime they wanted. (Masri, 2017: 54) The cultural scene around hip-hop and rap had established platforms where anti-regime sentiments grew increasingly vocal during the campaign, but young people were largely disconnected from traditional forms of political organization and belonged to loose networks. (Ibid: 46) By contrast, the four main civil society organizations in the National Dialogue Quartet had strong organizational infrastructures, and dated back to the 1970s and 1980s, with the exception of UGTT, which was established in 1946. (Deane, 2013) UGTT had been able to grow palpably powerful, sometimes co-opting the regime, sometimes challenging the regime. (Ibid) According to Chayes, its members included more than half a million — roughly 5% of Tunisia’s total population in 2014. (Chayes, 2014) Chayes also argues that while loosely organized movements can put important pressure on regimes, internal infrastructure is vital ”when detailed settlements must be crafted.” (Ibid) Tunisia had these forms of well-organized civil society organizations, which together with active youth movements, were able to push the country towards democratic development.

In Egypt, three main group of actors came together against the Mubarak regime: youth movements, labor movements, and marginalized political parties. (Shehata, 2012) Egyptians had managed to remove Mubarak, but now a central question was ”what specific changes to implement and how to do so.” (Saleh, 2017: 49) Saleh describes the challenge in shifting from ”the phase of oppositional mobilization” to
holding strategic negotiations with Mubarak’s successors. (Ibid) Saleh argues that movements like the ”We are all Khaled Said” and the April 6 Youth had big street presences, but weak internal infrastructure that made it difficult to articulate political agendas. (Ibid) At the other side of the spectrum were SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood; both actors with ”efficient decision-making structures” (Ibid: 50) that held less democratic values than the aforementioned movements. This asymmetry in organizational capacity created a dynamic where SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood became the main actors who made politics to which ”liberal groups reacted with demonstrations and sit-ins.” (Ibid: 52) Like in Tunisia, young people organized ”largely outside existing parties and movements” (Shehata, 2012: 117) but unlike Tunisia, Egypt did not have an equivalent to UGTT, and following the removal of Mubarak, ”the youth coalition began to disintegrate.”(Ibid: 121) Gerbaudo argues that the ”exceptional space of encounter” which young people had created dissolved after Mubarak’s resignation. (Gerbaudo, 2012: 70) One activist is quoted saying that many ”enclosed themselves in a comfortable activist-only internet world.” (Ibid: 74) Egyptians workers mobilized outside the Trade Union Federation (ETUF) which due to close links to the Mubarak regime had become disconnected from its membership base. (Bishara, 2012) Very few independent labor organizations existed before the nonviolent campaign, and they had limited organizational capacity, which made large-scale mobilization through these organizations almost impossible. (Shehata: 2012) In other words, previous research underscores that diverse groups came together to remove Mubarak, but there seemed to be little organizational infrastructure among civil society organizations to capitalize on, which made sustained mass mobilization and development of democratic institutions very difficult.
Comparing Democracy Assistance as a Percentage of GDP

Table 9. Democracy assistance as a percentage of GDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006:</td>
<td>0,009 %</td>
<td>0,028%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007:</td>
<td>0,01 %</td>
<td>0,035%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008:</td>
<td>0,019 %</td>
<td>0,048%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009:</td>
<td>0,013 %</td>
<td>0,036%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010:</td>
<td>0,009 %</td>
<td>0,028%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011:</td>
<td>0,049 %</td>
<td>0,029%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012:</td>
<td>0,288%</td>
<td>0,03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013:</td>
<td>0,084%</td>
<td>0,017%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One important difference between Egypt and Tunisia is the size of their populations: According to the World Bank, Egypt had a population of around 85 million 2006 - 2013, whereas Tunisia had a population of around 11 million. To reach as many people as possible, democracy assistance would need to be higher to Egypt than to Tunisia, which makes comparisons between the level of democracy assistance as a percentage of GDP more logical than between monetary terms.

Table 9 shows that democracy assistance was higher in Egypt than in Tunisia before 2011. While Tunisia's level of democracy assistance increased 2011 - 2013, Egypt's
level of democracy assistance increased very little 2011 - 2012, and then dropped in 2013. Egypt received higher levels of democracy assistance before the nonviolent campaign than after, whereas the opposite happened in Tunisia. The hypothesis that sustained democracy assistance before the nonviolent campaign makes democratization more likely in recipient countries experiencing regime change after nonviolent campaigns does not gain support based on these figures. Before the nonviolent campaign, Egypt received higher levels of democracy assistance in relation to GDP, but did not democratize, whereas Tunisia had lower levels of democracy assistance in relation GDP, but did democratize. Things get more complicated 2011 - 2013 because Tunisia received higher levels of democracy assistance than Egypt during the nonviolent campaign. The question is how to interpret this change. Neither Tunisia nor Egypt scored high on the Electoral Democracy Index in 2011, but Tunisia began moving upwards, which indicates that donors invested more democracy assistance when signs of democratic development in Tunisia became promising.

The level of democracy assistance, measured as a percentage of GDP, scratches the surface of an investigation into whether the theoretical framework holds up, and I will now focus on what kind of democracy assistance the countries received before and during the nonviolent campaigns.

**Democracy Assistance to Tunisia and Egypt**

The data in OECD and USAID give overviews of the kinds of organizations and projects in Tunisia and Egypt that received democracy assistance 2006 - 2013. The answers to the structured focused comparison questions confirmed that both Tunisia and Egypt received the kind of democracy assistance that I have argued might explain variation in democratic outcomes after nonviolent campaigns. This is a step towards establishing or discarding causation, but it is not enough in and of itself, especially since it is not clear whether actors active in the nonviolent campaigns also received or were exposed to democracy assistance through participation in workshops, seminars, lectures, etc. Other scholars have attributed the difficulties of investigating the effects of democracy assistance to limited data, which hamper
detailed analysis into the nature of this support. (Selim, 2015: 77) But the difficulties are not limited to data. Bush, whose book *The Taming of Democracy Assistance* is one of few empirical studies trying to trace money flows, notes the “scant literature that investigates the allocation of democracy assistance” (Bush, 2015: 9) and discusses the numerous challenges she faced — many of which stemmed from the fact that practitioners were afraid to discuss their work: “They fear for their livelihoods and for their organizations.” (Ibid: 17) While information from donors give indications to what kind of democracy assistance Tunisia and Egypt received, these sources are biased because donors and partner organizations have vested interests in framing their contributions as important; donors do not want to appear as wasting money; partner organizations want to continue receiving money. It is therefore important to anchor the analysis in how previous research describes democracy assistance’s effects.

Donors of democracy assistance to Tunisia and Egypt were with few exceptions European, American and Canadian, and previous research also focuses on American and European donors.

Starting with Tunisia, I showed in the previous section how scarce democracy assistance was before the nonviolent campaign and how it increased after 2011. The regime change seemed to attract external actors ”interested in implementing their activities in a burgeoning democracy” (Abderrahim, 2015: 3) and USAID set up an office in Tunisia in May 2011 and focused on providing ”technical and financial endowment for the […] economy, security, and civil society.” (Ibid: 4) In a report on EU democracy assistance, Balfour et. al. outline how the EU has ”nominally targeted more resources to supporting democracy movements” (Balfour et. al., 2016: 3) and Tunisian civil society after 2011. Mouhib describes how the EU adjusted its democracy assistance following the removal of Ben-Ali, but contends that no major changes occurred. (Mouhib, 2014) Mouhib writes that EU’s democracy ambitions had always been overridden by ”desire to maintain cordial relations” (Ibid: 358) in line with strategic interests and respect for sovereignty. The EU’s decision to allocate more democracy assistance was a function of the democratic ambitions of the new regime; not vice versa. (Ibid: 360) In 2009, Powel also argued that rather than promoting democracy in Tunisia, EU and the U.S. were more interested in promoting stability, and shared a belief in democracy assistance ”as a means of ensuring security.” (Powel, 2009: 63) Two years before the nonviolent campaign began, Powel
writes that Tunisian initiatives funded through democracy assistance were "very limited in the context of a wider democratization process." (Ibid: 64) The absence of large-scale commitments is interpreted as indicative of external actors’ commitment to only "very slow and gradual reform." (Ibid) This can also explain why I found in the data that many donors, especially European ones, took a broad development approach to democracy assistance by funding projects that were designed to improve social and economic conditions. Powell notes that despite having considerable economic leverage over Ben-Ali, the EU did not activate conditionality clauses when Tunisian authorities hindered implementation of European reform programs. (Ibid: 65) Pinfari writes that there is scarcely any evidence that the nonviolent campaign was influenced by any form of EU support. (Pinfari, 2012) Shahshahani and Mullin similarly contend that American democracy assistance "often functioned as a means to maintain, rather than challenge, the status quo.” (Shahshahani, Mullin, 2012: 81)

In 2014, Abderrahim interviewed anonymous Tunisian activists who had worked for civil society organizations that received primarily American democracy assistance. Interestingly, the activists portray democracy assistance in more positive light than scholars do. One activist explains the scarce external support before 2011 and says, "before the revolution, there was no space for civil society activism.” (Abderrahim, 2015: 9) Several activists emphasized the regime's strict control over money flows, which made it dangerous, and sometimes not even possible, for activists to approach foreign donors. (Ibid) As a result, democracy assistance before 2011 rarely supported organizations or projects that dealt directly with democracy and human rights, but some activists implied that USAID supported a few associations that addressed these issues in implicit ways. (Ibid) The interviewed activists recognized that donors "certainly have intentions and interests [...] but there are no conspiracies.” (Ibid) They observed significant changes in the activities of American donors after the regime change, which had resulted in a sharp increase in civil activism. (Ibid: 10) Schroeder references Tunisian lawyer Syrine Ayadi who reported that at the beginning of 2011, the number of civil society organizations "had increased nearly five-fold.” (Schraeder, 2012: 78) The activists whom Abderrahim interviewed said that these organizations needed funding, and many of them noted that American donors dedicated significant efforts to reinforcing them. This is also reflected in the long list of newly formed organizations in the Tunisia Transition Initiative, which is
included in USAID. One activist said, ”we wouldn’t have survived for three years if it were not thanks to NED [National Endowment for Democracy].” (Abderrahim, 2015: 11) American donors also seemed to understand that the lack of experience with donors made writing grant proposals a daunting task, and one activist said that NED therefore ”distributed fewer amounts of money to several associations.” (Ibid: 12) By contrast, the interviewed activists describe European donors as much more bureaucratic and inflexible. (Ibid)

This amounts to a rather conflicted depiction of Tunisian democracy assistance. My interpretation of the data in OECD and USAID, in combination with previous research and statements from activists, is that any potential causal link between democracy assistance and democratization may be found after the regime change in 2011, but the temporal order is difficult to disentangle. Democracy assistance before 2011 was allocated on such a small scale and unsustained basis that even though its aims coincided with the three causal mechanisms, it is unlikely that it had any causal impact.

One notable difference that Tunisian activists identified between Egypt and Tunisia is that stakes are lower in Tunisia compared to Egypt, which is larger and more influential. (Abderrahim: 9) Some activists described Tunisia as a ”laboratory where different actors are being active” to create a successful model of democratic transition. (Ibid) Scholars also emphasize the strategic importance of Egypt, especially to the U.S., not least because of Egypt’s peace deal with Israel. (Al-Sayyid, 2000: 56) By extension, this affects the allocation of democracy assistance because donors prioritize a stable Egypt more than a democratic Egypt. (Selim, 2015: 91) The strategic importance of Egypt offers an explanation to why democracy assistance allocated to promote political participation and civic political culture in OECD and USAID constituted a smaller share than democracy assistance to the enabling environment for civil society emphasizing development issues. Some scholars argue that Egyptian democracy assistance was actually designed to ”forestall disruptive mass uprisings, not to encourage them.” (Carapico, 2012: 201)

3 NED is funded by USAID.
Al-Sayyid argues that external actors have failed to support civil society due to unwillingness to engage with Islamist actors — who are at the heart of Egyptian civil society. (Al-Sayyid, 2000) Karakir also identifies this as a major shortcoming that is explained by that Western policymakers conceptualize civil society in narrow secular terms. (Karakir, 2014: 38) This argument is somewhat contradicted by what I found in USAID and OECD that showed that American Islamic Congress, New Horizons Association, and Salam Institute received democracy assistance to encourage religious tolerance and hold workshops for Egyptian imams, although it was a small share of the overall democracy assistance. Karakir and Al-Sayyid might highlight a failure to engage fully with Egyptian civil society, and Selim describes this as American and European donors’ selective approach, which targets democracy assistance to "a relatively narrow constituency of liberal civil society groups" (Selim, 2015: 86) that excludes the broader Egyptian civil society. This suggests that in addition to constituting a small share, democracy assistance promoting political participation and civic political culture reached a very limited number of Egyptian civil society organizations. Selim states that while democracy assistance increased the number of Egyptian civil society organizations, "there is virtually no indication to suggest that such programmes positively influenced the cause of democratization.” (Ibid: 89) According to Carapico, donors in Egypt "tended to favor the stability of the regime over activities that would rock the boat" (Carapico, 2012: 205) which meant that labor activists also were largely excluded from democracy assistance. While Carapico recognizes that some American and European donors probably did fund "activities relevant to Egyptians’ mass protests in 2011”, she contends that it is overshadowed by that democracy assistance in general was non-confrontational. (Ibid: 208) Gómez also notes that EU’s democracy assistance tend to be depoliticized, as if democracy assistance "was a merely technical exercise rather than an ideological endeavour" (Gómez, 2017: 4) and argues that efforts to preserve stability in Egypt prevailed over democracy. (Ibid) Furthermore, when Gallup asked Egyptians in 2008 whether they thought the U.S. was "serious about encouraging the establishment of democratic systems of governance in the [Arab] region”, 75% of Egyptians disagreed with this statement. (Gallup, 2008) This indicates that at least American democracy assistance was viewed with suspicion by Egyptians, and Selim writes that, "foreign funding was not sought nor even desired by many Egyptian civil society groups.” (Selim, 2015: 95)
Democracy Assistance — Explaining Variation in Outcomes After Nonviolent Campaigns?

Figure 4 illustrates the outcomes after the regime changes initiated by the nonviolent campaigns in Tunisia (red) and Egypt (blue). The countries have similar EDI scores before 2011 — although Egypt scores slightly higher than Tunisia — but after 2011, their scores begin to diverge markedly.

**Figure 4.** Tunisia and Egypt in the Electoral Democracy Index

![Electoral Democracy Index](image)

Can democracy assistance explain this variation in outcomes? Based on data reported on democracy assistance in OECD and USAID, in combination with previous research, the short answer is that it seems unlikely that democracy assistance had the kind of significant impact that could explain the different outcomes in Tunisia and Egypt.
Before the nonviolent campaign, data reported in OECD and USAID showed that Tunisia received democracy assistance promoting political participation, civic political culture and enabling environment for civil society, but this democracy assistance was given on such a small scale that it is unlikely that it helped activists sustaining mobilization and developing democratic institutions. It is noteworthy that OECD data showed that UGTT received democracy assistance from the EU in 2008. But UGTT had been established since the 1940s; it was certainly not democracy assistance that enabled UGTT to shoulder organizational responsibility during the nonviolent campaign. Many of the projects reported in OECD and USAID targeted young people, and it cannot be ruled out that this kind of democracy may have reduced street radicalism during the nonviolent campaign, but there is not enough empirical evidence connecting democracy assistance and activists, and considering that previous research describes young activists as lacking organizational infrastructure, democracy assistance does not seem to have contributed to facilitating sustained mobilization or developing democratic institutions. During the nonviolent campaign, the data showed an increased influx of democracy assistance designed to promote political participation, civic political culture and enabling environment for civil society. Interviews with activists indicated that this kind of democracy assistance, especially from American donors, made it easier for some newly formed civil society organizations to keep being active, but it is difficult to estimate to what extent it had an impact on democratization. There is no evidence in data or previous research that the civil society organizations in the National Dialogue Quartet received sustained democracy assistance, which means that it is hard to make a convincing argument that Tunisian democracy assistance played a significant role in the democratic outcome. This is coupled by the fact that previous research also underscores that donors were more interested in promoting stability than democracy — both in Tunisia and in Egypt.

Data reported on Egyptian democracy assistance in USAID and OECD, in combination with previous research, suggest that while Egypt received higher levels of democracy assistance before the nonviolent campaign compared to Tunisia, Egypt did not to any great extent receive the kind of democracy assistance I argue could impact democratization. During the nonviolent campaign, I observed a shift in the
data from democracy assistance emphasizing development to democracy assistance targeted more to independent media, human rights, and women’s political participation. Although Egypt received more of the kind of democracy assistance that coincides with the three causal mechanisms after the regime change, the level of democracy assistance as a percentage of GDP decreased. It is questionable whether democracy assistance promoting political participation, civic political culture and enabling environment before and during the nonviolent campaigns was enough to reach more than a very small share of Egypt’s population of 85 million. This interpretation is underpinned by the fact that previous research argues that democracy assistance was targeted to a narrow section of Egyptian civil society. By extension, it seems unlikely that this limited kind of democracy assistance would have facilitated sustained mass mobilization and development of democratic institutions after the removal of Mubarak.

The theoretical implications of this analysis do not necessarily refute my hypothesis. The analysis shows that although these countries received democracy assistance before and during the nonviolent campaigns, they did actually not receive the kind of sustained democracy assistance to the extent that I hypothesized could impact democratization. This is a limitation in using a most-similar design as a case selection strategy where the value for the independent variable is unknown beforehand (Gerring, Cojocaru, 2016), but this research design did still help me answer the research question in the cases of Tunisia and Egypt. I have contributed to addressing a research gap in the understanding of variation in democratic outcomes after nonviolent campaigns by fusing together claims made in research on nonviolent campaigns, democracy assistance and democratization. This theoretical framework could be further developed and tested by conducting more empirical research on how donors agendas’ affect allocation of democracy assistance, and interviewing activists in nonviolent campaigns if and when they would have benefitted from democracy assistance.

One alternative explanation to the variation in outcomes is the strength of some civil society organizations in Tunisia and the absence of similarly strong civil society organizations in Egypt. How and why some civil society organizations were able to grow strong under the authoritarian regime in Tunisia, and if labor unions are
especially well-positioned to do so, are interesting topics for future research. Moreover, considering the amount of money invested in democracy assistance, it is striking how little empirical research exists that actually studies how these programs are implemented and how global partner organizations like AmidEast, AECOM, Chemonics International, use the money. Another alternative explanation to the different outcomes is the role of the military. Whereas Tunisia seemed to have benefitted from a combination of strong civil society organizations and a marginalized military (International Crisis Group, 2011), Egypt had a more loosely organized civil society and a strong military that was left in charge when Mubarak was removed. Some scholars argue that this presented “a seminal obstacle” to establishing a new democratic regime. (Maswood, Natarajan, 2012: 223) Feeding into the assessment of previous research that democracy assistance is often designed to promote stability, the Egyptian military had for decades enjoyed close ties with the U.S in the form of substantial economic support and provision of weaponry systems, and many high-ranking Egyptian military officers had trained at military colleges in the U.S. (Selim, 2015: 99) In future research, it would be interesting to investigate whether close links between external actors and the military pillar of support affect long-term outcomes of nonviolent campaigns.

A final important note concerns the implications for policymaking. Previous research on Egyptian and Tunisian democracy assistance have highlighted how donors’ technocratic approaches coupled with strategic considerations limit the effects that democracy assistance potentially could have on democratization in recipient countries. Making strategic adjustments to how democracy assistance is allocated would require donors to actually prioritize democratization, but implicitly, then, democracy assistance is not inherently ineffective — its effectiveness should reasonably depend on how it is conceptualized and allocated, and in my theoretical framework, I outlined the kind of democracy assistance I argue could impact democratization. Previous research on why nonviolent campaigns promote democratization can contribute to designing more strategic democracy assistance by focusing on how to target support to building organizational infrastructure among grass-root actors, which could facilitate sustained mass mobilization and development of democratic institutions if/when maximalist nonviolent campaigns break out in the future.
Conclusion

I have answered the following research question: Does sustained democracy assistance explain variation in democratic outcomes in recipient countries that experience regime change initiated by nonviolent campaigns?

Previous research have found that nonviolent campaigns are conducive for democratization, but variation in democratic outcomes has remained a puzzle. I have addressed this research gap by analyzing whether democracy assistance that promotes political participation, civic political culture, and enabling environment for civil society before and during nonviolent campaigns can help explain why some countries democratize after regime changes initiated by nonviolent campaigns while other countries do not democratize. I have argued that sustained democracy assistance could help maintain mass mobilization and build democratic institutions after the old regime has been removed. By using the method of structured focused comparison, I investigated what kind of democracy assistance Tunisia and Egypt received before and during their nonviolent campaigns. I found that neither Tunisia nor Egypt to any great extent received the kind of sustained democracy assistance I hypothesized could impact democratization. Therefore, I conclude that it seems unlikely that democracy assistance had the kind of significant impact that could explain the variation in democratic outcomes in Tunisia and Egypt. However, I argue that this does not completely refute the hypothesis that sustained democracy assistance potentially could contribute to strengthening democratization processes after nonviolent campaigns if policymakers targeted more resources to promoting political participation, civic political culture and enabling environment for civil society, and took cue from findings in research on nonviolent campaigns on how to support nonviolent resistance.
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