Framing “Gay Propaganda”:
The Orthodox Church and Morality Policy in Russia

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Abstract

The adoption of laws in the Russian Federation prohibiting propaganda of homosexuality and “non-traditional sexual relationships” to minors at the regional and federal levels, respectively, has raised questions regarding the role of the Russian Orthodox Church in politics. This project shall evaluate public statements by clerics and other figures serving in the Orthodox Church from 2011 through 2013, as well as interviews conducted with clerics of the Moscow Patriarchate in order to analyze the strategies employed when arguing against public expressions of homosexuality. Drawing upon the concepts of framing and morality policy, I will argue that secular, rational-instrumental arguments have prevailed over moral-religious and procedural appeals. In addition, I will show that transformative framing by some Church figures points to ambitions for more comprehensive moral and religious changes at the individual level, and religious, societal, and legislative changes at the national level in Russia.

Keywords

Russian Orthodox Church, framing, morality policy, content analysis, LGBT, religion, propaganda

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Introduction

In the years following the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russian Orthodox Church (hereinafter also referred to as the “ROC” and “Church”) has enjoyed a rebirth in terms of adherent numbers, reclaimed property, and an increased public profile, of which the online space known widely as the “Orthodox Internet” is a prominent component. At the same time, debates over the role of the Orthodox Church vis-à-vis the state have become increasingly more rancorous – especially concerning the Church’s role in adoption of legislation impacting the rights of the country’s lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (hereinafter also referred to as “LGBT”) citizens to freedom of expression in public spaces.

Although restrictions on both the Church and the LGBT community were lifted following the decline of Communism, the legacies of the tsarist and Soviet eras continue to impact sexual minorities in Russia on one hand, and the Russian Orthodox Church’s framing of public displays of LGBT identity on the other. The adoption of legislation banning propaganda of “homosexualism,” “muzhlozhestvo” (literally, “man lying with mankind”), and “non-traditional sexual relationships” at the regional and federal levels from 2006 through 2013 was unusual in terms of the level of backlash from Western states and international human rights organizations, but also the open statements of Orthodox Christian identity by Vitaliy Milonov, the author of the St. Petersburg city law, and the prominent role of Church clerics in discussions of the laws via media sources and in public hearings.

This project seeks to shed light on the ROC’s place in the Russian political and social landscape by examining the arguments that prominent figures in the Church make regarding issues they deem important. Theories of framing and morality policy will be used as a lens through which to analyze 1) public statements by clerics and others serving in the Russian Orthodox Church, and 2) results of interviews with clerics regarding attitudes toward homosexuality and legislation restricting public expressions of LGBT identity, in an attempt to pinpoint the Church’s framing strategies – and ambitions for greater religious, social, and political change in Russia.

In doing so, this thesis project is intended as a departure from previous accounts of Church-state relations and the fight over LGBT rights in Russia. Within academia, studies of relations between the ROC and the Russian state have been dominated by either overarching accounts of
cooperation between the Church’s hierarchy and the President, or analyses of the success or failure of lobbying by the Church on certain issues. Instead of attempting to gauge the nature of Church-state relations from the outside, this project will dig deeper into the Church’s argumentation regarding draft legislation in what can be a first step toward further studies and comparisons of framing tactics and results thereof. In doing so, this project seeks to change the approach of studies of the Russian Orthodox Church on one hand, and expand morality policy research to a geographical area neglected in previous works on the other.

This project will diverge from previous scholarly and mainstream media accounts that have largely portrayed the ROC as a monolithic body in partnership with (or service to) the government, and Russian President Vladimir Putin in particular (Bryanski, 2012 and Elder, 2013 are fitting examples from mass media sources). By examining the actual arguments made by Orthodox clerics and others serving in the church and conducting interviews with clergymen regarding their opinions of homosexuality and the anti-propaganda legislation, this project also hopes to debunk misconceptions of the Church as a faceless mass and transcend years of speculation and simplification by academia and the Western media. The resulting case study of morality policy regulation of public expressions of LGBT identity should be of interest to researchers in East and West alike.

In doing so, I will attempt to answer the following questions:

“Which framing strategies do clerics and others serving in the Russian Orthodox Church use when arguing against public expressions of LGBT identity?”

and

“Do these individuals employ transformative frames indicating a desire for greater religious, social, or political change in Russia?”

Outline

First, this paper will delve into the history of the LGBT community before, during, and after the Soviet era, the recovery of the Russian Orthodox Church in the post-Soviet period, clashes between LGBT activists and conservative sentiment, and the adoption of legislation prohibiting propaganda of same-sex or “non-traditional” relationships. Next, an overview of existing
theories regarding framing by social movements and morality policy as a communication strategy will be elaborated as a means of interpreting the Russian Orthodox Church’s statements regarding the aforementioned legislation and filling gaps in previous research of the ROC. Third, methods for qualitative coding, quantitative analysis, and interpretation of morality policy strategies used by clerics and others serving in the Church will be presented. Fourth, the results of said qualitative and quantitative analyses will be presented and discussed. Finally, observations will be made regarding the potential future implications of my findings, and paths for further research.

**Background**

**Russia’s LGBT Community**

In order to apply framing and morality policy theory to Russian Orthodox clerics’ attitudes toward laws banning propaganda of homosexual or “non-traditional” relationships at the regional and federal levels in Russia, one must first understand the history of interactions between the Russian state, the LGBT community, the Church, and the mainstream Russian population. Homosexuality was first classified as a criminal offense under Peter the Great in 1716, when sexual contact between men was included in the *Military Code*, “a law that applied only to active-duty soldiers and that condemned acts, not individuals” (Healey, 2012; Horne et al., 2009, p. 88). A law against *muzhlozhistvo* was included in the civilian criminal code under Tsar Nikolay I in 1835, with special penalties for acts committed with minors, a step “supposedly motivated by reports of vice in the [Russian] Empire’s boarding schools” that set a legal precedent for linking homosexual behavior to the safety and morality of underage citizens (Healey, 2012).

While the law was repealed after the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, during the Stalin era, “sexuality itself became politicized as the state increasingly intervened in the control of desire, sexual expression, and family life,” and a ban on consensual homosexual intercourse between adult men was reintroduced in 1934 under Article 121 of the Soviet criminal code, with homosexual acts between men classified as “crimes against the state” (Essig, 2014, p. 42). Those convicted of consensual contact under Article 121 were sentenced to “up to 5 years of hard
labor” in a prison system in which “they constituted the lowest caste in prison society” (a group known as the opuscheny, or “fallen”), “and were subjected to the most degrading tasks, physical violence, sexual assault, and starvation” (Horne et al., 2009, p. 89). While women were not included in the criminal definition of homosexuality, those found to be “female sexual dissidents” were considered schizophrenic and subjected to treatment that included “electroshock therapy, drugs, inducing diabetic comas, and, if all this proved insufficient, a sex change” (Essig, 2014, p. 43).

Following the fall of the Soviet Union, Article 121 was revoked in 1993 – as liberal Russian academic Igor Kon put it, “exclusively out of political considerations, in order to join the Council of Europe. What motivated the decision was not explained to the public” (2009, p. 45). A similar top-down decision was made in 1999 by the Russian Psychiatric Association, as Russia’s adoption of the World Health Organization’s International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10) brought with it the depathologization of homosexuality and bisexuality; as with the legal reforms, “just why such a terrible ‘sexual perversion’ suddenly became a normal option, was never clearly explained to anyone, even to doctors,” and the continued practice of “forced treatments and psychiatric hospitalizations for same-sex behavior” among underage girls has been reported (Stähle, 2015, p. 52; Kon, 2009, p. 45; Horne et al., 2009, p. 90).

At the grassroots level, Russian public opinion of homosexuality largely reflects the legacy of the tsarist and Soviet legal and medical systems. The year before the events studied in this paper commenced, a survey by the Levada-Center polling organization found that 36 percent of respondents believed that “homosexualism” was a disease or result of psychological trauma,” while 38 percent believed that it was “debauchery, a bad habit”; when asked what should be done with homosexuals, 24 percent recommended “providing psychological and other help,” 21 percent proposed “treatment,” and 18 percent called for them to be “isolated from society” (Levada-Center, 2010).

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1 “Homosexualism” (gomoseksualizm) is a term widely used to describe homosexuality by religious and secular figures quoted in this project. According to Disser (2014), “homosexualism” is “used in place of homosexuality to imply that being gay is an ideological choice, rather than a sexual orientation” (p. 115).
The Russian Orthodox Church

At the same time that negative views of the LGBT community have persisted, another group that was subject to oppression by the Soviet authorities, the Russian Orthodox Church, has experienced a renaissance over the past 25 years. Due in part to lifted restrictions on freedom of religion for Russia’s traditional confessions and the return of property confiscated during the Soviet era, the physical presence of the Church has boomed; between the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the year 2014, the number of parishes grew from 7,000 to 30,000, monasteries from 22 to 800, and seminaries and other theological schools from a mere three to over 100 (Burgess, 2014, p. 38). Estimates of Orthodox adherents vary, from 70 percent among the general population to 90 percent among ethnic Russians (Burgess, 2011, pp. 226-7; Karpov and Lisovskaya, 2008, p. 364). The post-Soviet era coincided with the rise of Internet communications technology, which provided the Church with a new mouthpiece in the form of what Semenova (2013) has described as “an entire system called the Orthodox Internet” – official sites of churches and monasteries, priests’ personal homepages and blogs, and Orthodox internet portals, some of which serve as data sources for this project.

While some (Anderson, 2007; Karpov, 2010; Filatov and Lunkin, 2006) have noted the chasm between the percentage of self-identified members and actual church attendance figures and beliefs, others (Evans and Northmore-Ball, 2012) have warned about the applicability of such traditional measurements of religiosity to Russian reality, stating that “moral conservatism” (“attitudes toward homosexuality, the use of censorship to uphold morality, and whether people believe young people do not sufficiently respect traditional moral values”) may be a better indicator of “values associated with the church” and their meaning for the Russian political landscape (p. 798). In a similar vein, Verkhovskii (2014) warns against non-ROC-affiliated authors seeking “to judge who is more Orthodox than whom” and thus “delud[ing] the reader concerning the role of the Church” and the readiness of the population to back the Church’s leadership on moral issues (p. 54). With this in mind, this project will concentrate on the framing strategies employed by the ROC in a country whose moral landscape reflects both centuries-old religious traditions and the Soviet system of secular law and order.
“Gay Propaganda”

As the Soviet Union fell, the opening of Russia’s borders and new freedoms led to an influx of ideas and goods from abroad – including “pornography, erotica, and talk of sex and sexuality (and homosexuality) [that] flooded the media” (Baer, 2002, p. 502). One phenomenon that arrived alongside *Cosmopolitan* and McDonalds was

...global activism, including a gay international activism that was in fact always a Western one... Even in the 1990s, the homosexual as a species, as a gay or lesbian identity, was already being constructed by state officials and regular folks alike as a foreign import and one that was completely at odds with indigenous Russian values. (Essig, 2014, p. 53)

The mid-2000s marked the beginning of a series of showdowns between a small contingent of openly gay activists and their foreign supporters on one hand, and the conservative views of the Russian majority on the other. In May 2006, LGBT activist Nikolay Alekseyev called for the country’s first gay Pride parade in Moscow (Kon, 2009, p. 55). Although the Moscow City authorities placed a ban on the proposed march and approximately 1,000 riot police were deployed to prevent violence, 50 gay rights protestors and 20 counter-demonstrators were arrested following street battles in close proximity to the Kremlin (BBC News, 2006).

Three days before the first attempt at a Moscow Pride parade, the first regional-level law prohibiting “public activities directed at propaganda of homosexuality (muzhelozhstvo and lesbianism) among minors” was adopted by the Ryazan Oblast Duma (legislative assembly) (*Law of Ryazan Oblast*, 2006). It would be five years before the next law, under which an article stating that “Public activities directed at propaganda of homosexuality among minors will not be allowed” was added to existing legislation on “protection of child morality and health” in Arkhangelsk Oblast (*Law of Arkhangelsk Oblast*, 2011). The Arkhangelsk Oblast law kicked off the adoption of similar legislation in a total of 10 regions of Russia, including the city of St. Petersburg, from 2011 through 2013 (Human Rights Watch, 2014).

The law “On Amendments to the Law of St. Petersburg ‘On Administrative Violations in St. Petersburg’” was unusual in that its author, Legislative Assembly Deputy Vitaliy Milonov, was a
Russian Orthodox *ponomar* (altar server) at the time\(^2\). Under the law, bans on both propaganda of homosexuality and propaganda of pedophilia were added to an existing law on administrative offenses:

*Article 7.1....Public actions directed at propaganda of muzhelozhstvo, lesbianism, bisexuality, transgenderism among minors will be subject to application of an administrative fine....Note: This article considers public actions directed at propaganda of muzhelozhstvo, lesbianism, bisexuality, [and] transgenderism among minors to be understood as follows: activities for deliberate and uncontrolled distribution of information through public means that is capable of causing harm to the health, moral, and spiritual development of minors, including the formation thereby of a distorted view of the social equality of traditional and non-traditional marital relations...*

*Article 7.2....Public actions directed at propaganda of pedophilia will be subject to application of an administrative fine....Note: This article considers public actions directed at propaganda of pedophilia to be understood as follows: activities for deliberate and uncontrolled distribution of information through public means that is committed with the goal of creating distorted views of the conformity of intimate relationships between adults and minors with social norms. (Law of St. Petersburg, 2012, my emphasis)*

The process of adopting the St. Petersburg law was also notable in terms of the presence of ROC clerics at hearings. Participants in the public hearing on 24 February 2012 prior to the adoption of the St. Petersburg law included Hieromonk Dimitry Pershin of Moscow; Archpriest and psychologist Aleksiy Moroz, head of an alcohol and drug treatment program in St. Petersburg; and Archpriest Igor Aksyonov, Superior of the Church of the Prophet Elijah in the Leningrad Oblast town of Vyborg (YouTube.Com, 2012b). Moroz and Archpriest Nikolay Golovkin of St. Petersburg testified at an additional hearing on 22 June of the same year regarding practical applications of the law (YouTube.Com, 2012f).

\(^2\) By the time that my research was conducted, Milonov had been promoted to *ipodiakon* (subdeacon).
The final step was adoption in 2013 of an amendment to a federal law “with the goal of protection of children from information propagandizing rejection of traditional family values” that added an article in which

**Propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations among minors, in the form of distribution of information directed at creation of non-traditional sexual arrangements, attractiveness of non-traditional sexual relationships, a perverted image of the social equality of traditional and non-traditional sexual relationships, or the imposition of information about non-traditional sexual relationships and creation of interest in such relationships among minors**

would be added to a list of administrative offenses and made punishable by fines for Russian citizens, fines and forced temporary shutdowns of activities for organizations, and fines or up to 15 days in jail followed by “removal” from the country for foreigners and stateless persons (Federal Law of the Russian Federation from 29 June 2013 No. 135-FZ). Framing strategies of Russian Orthodox clerics and others serving in the Church before, during, and following the passage of the Arkhangelsk Oblast, St. Petersburg City, and federal laws will be the primary focus of this project.

**Theory and Prior Research**

**Framing**

One means of examining the actions of the Russian Orthodox Church in relation to the Russian state and LGBT community is analyzing the ways in which they frame issues deemed salient. The study of framing has its roots in social constructivism and the work of Goffman (1974), who first coined the term “primary frameworks” to describe what he called “schemata of interpretation” that endow individuals with the ability “to locate, perceive, identify, and label” events, thus “rendering what would otherwise be a meaningless aspect...into something meaningful” (p. 21). However, it is within the field of social movements that framing truly started to develop, starting with Snow et al.’s (1986) seminal article, which applied the framing concept to “frame alignment” processes used by social movement organizations in order to garner support and active participants. Of the 4 frame alignment processes described by Snow et
al. (1986) (bridging, amplification, extension, and transformation), the one of interest in the context of this project is transformation.

The concept of “transformation,” in which “new values may have to be planted and nurtured, old meanings or understandings jettisoned, and erroneous beliefs or ‘misframings’ reframed” (Snow et al. 1986, p. 473; Goffman, 1974, p. 308) was referred to when coding media sources and hearing transcripts and when preparing questions for and coding responses from the interviews performed as part of this project. While Snow et al. (1986) saw transformation as a tool used “to garner support and secure participants” (p. 473), the definition of transformative frames was expanded in this project to include not only a need for change in terms of beliefs and common “understandings,” but Church and other grassroots efforts to increase Russian society’s awareness of and coherence with traditional moral values, and social and legislative changes beyond those achieved by the anti-propaganda laws.

One issue that has arisen in social movement research is the difference between “frames” and “framing.” Indeed, Entman (1993) noted that in non-scholarly circles, “the words frame, framing, and framework are common…and their connotation there is roughly the same” (p. 52, original emphasis). Ryan and Gamson (2006) isolated the “frame” as “a thought organizer, highlighting certain events and facts as important and rendering others invisible” (p. 13). Entman (1993) defined framing as the act of making certain elements of an issue “more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (p. 52, original emphasis). This project aims to probe the act of strategic framing of a need for anti-propaganda legislation by ROC clerics and personnel in order to pinpoint the dominant frames used.

The Politics of Morality

The concept of “morality policy” has evolved over the past two decades from a substantive category of policy to a type of framing used by actors. Mooney and Lee (1999a) defined morality policy as separate from other “classes” of policy in that it “regulates social norms or evokes strong moral responses for other reasons” (pp. 81, 82). Depending on the country or region being studied, morality policy may include policies governing abortion rights, alcohol and drugs, pornography, homosexuality, prostitution, gambling, school prayer, euthanasia, gun control, and
the death penalty. However, it is not so much the policy outcome as the subject of conflict that typifies morality policy. Morality policy debates have been characterized as centering around so-called “first principles,” or the basic values surrounding life, death, sex, and other topics that are put forth (Mooney and Lee, 1999a; Mooney and Lee, 1999b; Mooney and Schuldt, 2008; Mucciaroni, 2009; Knill, 2013).

The emotions involved in morality policy debates mean that redistribution efforts and other “compromise solutions rarely attract any support” or are merely unfathomable, as the characterization of a certain practice as “sinful” or “evil” leads to zero-sum thinking (Haider-Markel and Meier, 1996, p. 334). The resulting salience level typical of morality policy carries with it a heightened sense of threat, including that posed by those who may be targeted for prosecution under new laws and can be “widely regarded as sinful and reprehensible” (Euchner et al., 2013, p. 372). The comparative openness of public debates over morality policy issues to Biblical and other religious references means that religious groups “are frequently significant players in morality politics” due to their belief in “explicit moral codes” that they may promote before both politicians and the general public (Haider-Markel and Meier, 1996, pp. 337-8).

**Morality Policy as Framing**

As attention has focused on the types of arguments made in morality policy debates, questions have been raised as to how “moral” these discussions truly are. Studlar (2008) floated the concept of “blended issues” that “take on different dimensions” depending on how they are framed, concluding that “morality policy appears to be more of a continuum” than a static policy category (pp. 393, 406-7). When examining gay rights debates, Mucciaroni (2009) took exception to the fact that “the morality politics perspective assumes that moral arguments are of paramount importance…without undertaking a systematic examination of the arguments that advocates actually put forward” (p. 13). In response, he divided morality politics issues into those defined by “deontological principles,” “social consequences,” and “procedures,” depending on whether they involved “intrinsically wrong” behaviors, a positive or negative impact on society, or calls for state authorities to intervene, respectively (Mucciaroni, 2009, pp. 13-14).

Morality policy thus becomes a matter of strategy, in which actors “choose how to define issues” and “may perceive morality definitions as less effective politically than consequence-based or
procedural definitions”; Mucciaroni ultimately found that opponents to LGBT rights put more emphasis on “consequences and the procedural aspects of issues” (2009, pp. 14, 49). While Mucciaroni claimed that it might be easier to reach compromises if one chose to “deemphasize” morality frames based on deontological principles in favor of social consequences or procedural frames, I argue that this is not necessarily the case, especially if said “consequences” are framed as harming children or society at large (2009, p. 52).

Mucciaroni (2011) is considered seminal in the field of morality policy framing due to his expansion upon his previous concepts of deontological, consequence-based, and procedural frames. In doing so, he declared that “morality policy is not so much a policy as a strategic approach to framing public policy issues” in which “different types of morality policy frames exist, depending on what kind of behavior – private, social, or governmental – is the target of moral judgement” (2011, p. 211). While LGBT rights are often seen as an ideal type of morality policy issue, “gay rights opponents typically do not frame the issues in terms of the immorality of homosexuality or religious proscriptions against it at the federal and state levels of government” (Mucciaroni, 2011, p. 211). Instead, Mucciaroni’s findings indicated that gay rights opponents employed so-called “rational-instrumental” frames “calling attention to the negative consequences for society, or some important part of it” (such as children and families), or “procedural terms” regarding “how policy makers should make decisions” (2011, p. 211).

Mucciaroni was quick to state that “when we say that opponents are ‘strategic’ in how they frame issues, we do not mean that they are being disingenuous about the arguments that they give for opposing gay rights” (2011, pp. 211-212). While rational-instrumental or procedural frames “have the best chance of persuading a crucial mass of audience members,” there should be no conflict of interest between frames used strategically and a group’s “deep-seated beliefs” (Mucciaroni, 2011, pp. 212, 209). In the case of arguments by Russian Orthodox Church actors against propaganda of LGBT identity to minors, the contention that homosexuality is a gateway to dire consequences for Russian society may not employ explicitly religious framing, but is not inconsistent with their personal convictions.
**Filling Gaps**

This project represents a departure from the origins of framing literature, with its focus on attempts to recruit and mobilize followers by organizations that do not have the adherent numbers or authority that the Russian Orthodox Church possesses as a social institution. Samson et al. (2011) achieved a breakthrough for framing theory by applying it to fundamentalist actors in the Catholic Church, reasoning that “fundamentalist groups are social movements” (p. 279). However, the clear anti-conservative slant displayed by the aforementioned authors, who cited use of “supposed scientific evidence” by anti-abortion groups and characterized a “horror scenario” described by Catholic writer Gabriele Kuby as appearing “outlandish and paranoid” to their readers, makes inappropriate assumptions regarding readers’ religious beliefs at best, and risks alienating a large share of the potential audience for such research at worst (Samson et al., 2011, pp. 281, 285, 286).

In addition, while prior research has addressed framing of homosexuality by Western religious actors (Miceli, 2005; Samson et al., 2011) and (Western) Christians in Sub-Saharan Africa (Baisley, 2015), included analyses of non-Western religious groups (Karagiannis’s [2009] study of Hezbollah and Snow et al.’s [1986] inclusion of sects such as the Hare Krishnas and Japan’s Nichiren Shoshu Buddhist movement), and touched upon the Russian media’s representation of the Orthodox Church (Lukyanova, 2015), the ROC has been largely neglected by social movement literature until now. By taking a more neutral stance toward the Church than that displayed toward conservative Catholics by Samson et al. (2011) and delving into the activities of a religious group beyond the geographic scope of previous framing analyses, this project intends to promote application of social movement theories in a way that will be replicable in future research in non-Western settings.

In the field of morality policy, while others (Knill 2013; Euchner et al., 2013; Ferraiolo, 2013, 2014, 2016) have applied Mucciaroni’s (2011) morality policy framing, their case studies and Mucciaroni’s seminal work are confined to the West, and the United States in particular. Euchner et al. (2013) aptly noted that this is problematic, as “policies that are often labelled as ‘moral’ in the American literature are not coherently framed that way in the European countries we analyzed,” and some “were never discussed as morally wrong” (p. 386). It should be noted that Euchner et al. (2013) are not without reproach in this regard; the authors’ study of morality
policy framing over a period of 60 years in the Netherlands and Germany, for example, excluded data from the German Democratic Republic and, by extension, a historical legacy that could have contributed significantly to their understanding of the German political landscape. Considering the role of audiences and how they influence framing strategies (Ferraiolo, 2013), it would behoove researchers in the field of morality policy to cast their nets beyond the West – something this project aims to achieve.

By drawing upon framing and morality policy theory, this project seeks to break from previous attempts by Russia scholars to determine the role of the ROC vis-à-vis the state and Russian society. These have primarily consisted of descriptive works attempting to analyze or trace changes in relations between the ROC and the Soviet and Russian states, and have mostly depended on comparisons of statements by Patriarchs and bishops with the texts of legislation and references to the Church in official speeches by Russian President Putin and other high-level political figures (Feodorov, 1998; Kostiuk, 2003; Basil, 2005; Krindatch, 2006; Davis, 2008; Mitrokhin, 2009; Papkova, 2011). While Anderson (2007) noted that the Russian state and Church “have a shared concern with the future of the traditional family and a distaste for homosexuality” (p. 196), citing prohibition of gay pride parades in Moscow and a speech by Metropolitan (now Patriarch) Kirill, the limited ability of researchers to access the upper echelons of either religious or secular institutions means that attempts to pinpoint the true level of influence of the Church on the state based on the above evidence are tenuous at best.

Second, just with Samson et al.’s (2011) treatment of anti-abortion groups and Catholic author Kuby, some studies of Church-state relations in Russia are colored by bias against the Orthodox Church and rigid ideas regarding the most desirable path for the Russian state, religion, and culture. Research of the ROC often uses language that might be deemed unacceptable if applied to other faiths: Kostiuk (2003) remarks that “it is obvious that the Church ‘has lost its way in the past’ and has transferred to the contemporary period, together with Holy Scripture, the rubbish of obsolete ideas, often betraying its prophetic mission” (p. 75, my emphasis).

Davis (2002) turns the relationship between the Church and democracy into a zero-sum proposition, in which
Given Russia’s history, the Russian Orthodox Church might expect to have a dominant cultural role long into the future, but it is the Russian people, in democratic course, who must ultimately deny the church the preferred legal position it seeks for itself. Their decision is key to the advance, or decline, of freedom in the new Russia. (p. 670, original emphasis)

Marsh (2005) is guilty of similar thinking. Quoting Davis (2002), the author estimates that “if given the opportunity to make democratic choices, the Russian people are not only likely to support such a cultural role [for the Church], but perhaps a system that gives preferential treatment to the ROC as well,” but went on to say that “From the perspective of Western liberal democracy and the prospect of it taking root in Russia, the good news is that Russians themselves would prefer for such a preferential status to exist only within certain prescribed limits” (Marsh, 2005, p. 561, my emphasis).

In contrast, this project seeks to refrain from assumptions regarding a preferable path for Russia’s political, religious, and cultural development, as well as value judgements regarding the appropriateness of statements by religious and political figures in the context of “universal” standards for public behavior and human rights. Instead, it is hoped that an in-depth analysis of statements by clerics and others serving in the ROC will focus on the nature of the messages being conveyed, not aspirational visions of what the Church and Russia could become.

A key aspect of framing and morality policy research that is barely touched upon in prior research is the language used by the Church and politicians in Russia when speaking about religion. The main exception is Blitt (2008), who claimed that “the ROC has made a concerted effort through its public communications to redefine ‘politically relevant concepts’ such as ‘spirituality,’ ‘morality,’ ‘worldview,’ and ‘culture,’ infusing each term with a definitive Christian Orthodox meaning” (p. 756). While the phenomenon of such “borderline” terms and coding thereof will be discussed further in the methodology section, Blitt (2008) did not address clerics’ use of language that is unabashedly secular – what Mucciaroni (2011) would consider “rational instrumental” or “procedural” terms.

Papkova (2009) applied social movement research to the ROC in an analysis of the perceived failure of the Church in lobbying the state at the federal level and the public regarding the
inclusion of courses on Orthodox culture in school curricula. However, Papkova did not focus so much on the “before” in terms of the Church’s framing of the need for an Orthodox culture curriculum as the “after” of judging whether the Church and affiliated activists fulfilled Tilly’s (2002) criteria of being perceived as WUNC (“worthy, united, numerous, and committed”) by the Russian state and society (Tilly, 2002, p. 120).

One area of Papkova’s (2009) work that is of special interest to this project is pinpointing the definition of what exactly is meant by “the Church” and its place within social movement research. Papkova deliberately separated the administrative structure of the “Moscow Patriarchate” from the clergymen and parishioners of the “ROC,” stating that “by separating the statements and actions of the ecclesiastical leadership from those of active parishioners, parish clergy, and even individual bishops, one can begin analyzing the OPK [Foundations of Orthodox Culture curriculum] phenomenon in social movement terms” (2009, pp. 293-294).

This project considers “the Church” and the “Moscow Patriarchate” to be social institutions, and includes statements and publications by those delegated to speak for the Moscow Patriarchate (notably Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin, chairman of the Synodal Department for the Cooperation of Church and Society of the Moscow Patriarchate at the time of the events being analyzed), but also focuses on arguments by individual clerics and others serving in the Church who spoke and wrote via media outlets and testified before state authorities (in the analysis of online media sources and hearings), and those who spoke with me (in the analysis of interview data). The variety of opinions expressed is intended to help those studying religion in Russia break free from the concept of the Church as a monolithic institution, and acknowledge the wide range of clerics’ approaches to topics such as homosexuality by examining individual argumentation strategies.

**Expectations and Hypotheses**

Due to the inductive nature of the analysis of public statements by and interviews with Russian Orthodox clerics in this study, it was difficult to make concrete predictions of which morality policy framing strategies would be the most prominent – religious-moral, instrumental-rational, or procedural. However, a pilot sampling and analysis of statements by ROC clerics before and after the passage of the Arkhangelsk Oblast anti-propaganda law in September 2011 (Chaplin,
2011; PravMir News Service, 2011) resulted in a tie between religious-moral and rational-instrumental framing, with procedural framing a close second. In addition, there were strong indications from some clerics regarding the need for a greater moral transformation of society. Based on these preliminary findings, my initial hypotheses were as follows:

**H1: Because of strong support from but low religiosity of the general population, the ROC will depend on rational-instrumental and procedural frames when advocating against propaganda of same-sex relationships among minors.**

**H2: Although the ROC will primarily refrain from religious-moral framing activities, there will be some religious-moral frames present that will point to longer-term, transformative ambitions for changing individual and societal approaches to morals in Russia.**

The first hypothesis was based on Mucciaroni’s (2011) assertion that those opposed to LGBT rights opt for rational-instrumental or procedural framing strategies over religiously based arguments (p. 211). Although Mucciaroni’s data concerned federal and state legislative debates in the United States, his arguments regarding the prominence of non-religious frames make sense in the case of post-Soviet Russia, a country recovering from years of forced secularism. I noted the relatively low percentage of Orthodox Christians who attend religious services on one hand (Anderson, 2007; Karpov, 2010; Filatov and Lunkin, 2006), versus a potentially much larger contingent sympathetic to what Evans and Northmore-Ball called “moral conservatism” on the other (2012, p. 798). However, it was unclear if the “moral” part of this formula would be based on religion alone, or a combination of religion, traditional culture, and the legacy of the Soviet legal system.

The knowledge that one’s audience is socially conservative but has not integrated the Church into their lives (a process known as “in-churching,” or votserkovlenie) is a factor that could affect clerics’ strategies when addressing a public whose knowledge of religion may be shaky – particularly via mainstream media outlets and public hearings. The fact that one of the actors to be studied, then-St. Petersburg Legislative Assembly Deputy Vitaliy Milonov, is an outspoken, practicing Orthodox Christian serving in the Church presented a puzzle to me in terms of what framing strategy he would use in religious and secular settings. As for transformational framing,
it was my expectation that a desire for greater “in-churching” of the population would motivate religious-moral sub-frames, particularly within the Orthodox Internet, where the audience might be more receptive to the incorporation of religion and traditional morals into daily life.

**Methodology**

In order to determine which frames figure prominently in ROC communicators’ morality policy strategies, this project consisted of a case study of framing utilized in reference to the anti-propaganda laws passed in Arkhangelsk Oblast, the city of St. Petersburg, and at the federal level in the Russian Federation. The study utilized both qualitative content analysis and quantitative calculation of framing strategies employed by ROC clerics and others serving in the Church in the following materials: articles and public statements in religious and secular online media sources; television broadcasts; legislative hearings; and responses to interviews that I conducted.

**Selection of Materials and Delimitations**

First, I conducted a pilot search in August 2016 for materials regarding the passage of anti-LGBT propaganda legislation in Russia from 2006 through 2013 using the “Orthodox Internet” portal highlighted by Lomagin (2012), Pravoslavie i Mir (“Orthodoxy and the World”). It was determined that while a law banning propaganda of “muzhelozhstvo and lesbianism” had been passed in Ryazan Oblast in 2006 (Law of Ryazan Oblast, 2006) and several laws banning propaganda of homosexuality were passed in Russia between September 2011 and June 2013, the legislative acts that received the most coverage via the Pravoslavie i Mir portal were as follows: those passed in Arkhangelsk Oblast in September 2011 (Law of Arkhangelsk Oblast, 2011), the city of St. Petersburg in 2012 (Law of St. Petersburg, 2012), and at the federal level (Federal Law of the Russian Federation from 29 June 2013 No. 135-FZ). Due to the difficulty of acquiring information about debates surrounding anti-LGBT propaganda laws in some regions, it was decided that ROC actors’ framing of these three laws would be the focus of this project’s analysis.

The decision to concentrate primarily on the Church’s framing through online sources draws on Mucciaroni (2011) and Euchner et al.’s (2013) desire for and Ferraiolo’s (2014) stated goal of transcending a traditional focus on framing by legislators, and Rohlinger and Brown (2013) and
Johnson’s (2012) predictions regarding the increasing importance of the Internet and blogosphere for “capturing the potential for framing taking place” due to an expansion of the range of frames available for investigation (Johnson, 2012, pp. 1074-1075). While Mattoni and Teune (2014) referred to “an assumed split between commercial and public mass media on the one side and alternative media on the other” due to a perceived need by actors to “create counter-publics to challenge the distorted coverage of what is referred to as ‘mainstream media’” (pp. 878-879), a pilot search for materials on the Pravoslavie i Mir portal found that there was significant spillover in terms of use of materials from mainstream news pages. For this reason, I decided to use both “Orthodox Internet” and secular Web sites.

A keyword search and snowball sampling techniques were utilized, starting with searches on the Pravoslavie i Mir portal and the Pravoslavie.Ru Russian Orthodox server, and branching out to smaller or regional pages such as the Web site of the Arkhangelsk Eparchia (http://arh-eparhia.ru/) when such links were found within the Orthodox Internet. The search range spanned two years up to and including the passage of the Arkhangelsk Oblast, St. Petersburg city, and federal laws, respectively. Initial search query terms were as neutral as possible (including “gay propaganda,” “propaganda of homosexualism,” and “LGBT propaganda” instead of simply “Sodom,” for example) in order to capture a full range of potential frames, followed by more targeted searches based on terminology used by actors. A short list of Orthodox clerics identified as prolific commentators was compiled, and their names were combined with the aforementioned query terms in a search of Web pages of secular newspapers and online news sites located using a ranking of national-level mass media sources from February 2012 and June 2013, the months that the St. Petersburg and federal anti-propaganda laws were adopted, respectively.

An additional search was conducted on YouTube.com for televised appearances by Orthodox clerics, resulting in a data set that ranged from the Russian Orthodox Soyuz channel to primetime debate shows on Russian state television. A random sample of sources for each law was performed, with sources of less than 300 words or repetitive sources rejected, resulting in

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3 While attempts were made to find materials using the query “propaganda of homosexuality,” the term “homosexualism” prevailed in searches of both Orthodox and secular Web sites.

4 The Medialogiya Informational-Analytical System, found at http://www.mlg.ru/ratings/federal_media/2547/2013/6/. The ratings dating from the passage of the Arkhangelsk Oblast law were not used due to the fact that a rating of Internet sources was not yet included.
samples of seven sources for Arkhangelsk Oblast, nine for the city of St. Petersburg, and sixteen for the federal level, respectively.

The next step was a search for recordings and transcripts of the legislative hearings held regarding the Arkhangelsk Oblast, St. Petersburg, and federal laws. The St. Petersburg anti-LGBT propaganda law was of particular interest due to the fact that the author of this legislation, Legislative Assembly Deputy Vitaliy Milonov, serves in the Church. Mucciaroni (2009) and Ferraiolo (2014) made claims about differences between legislative and non-legislative actors’ morality policy arguments and the notion that lawmakers’ “strategies reflect their institutional perspectives [and] defuse controversy” (Mucciaroni, 2009, p. 29). However, the lines between “legislative” and “non-legislative” viewpoints are particularly blurred in the case of the St. Petersburg law, which was authored by an individual serving in the Church, and supported by testimony during public hearings by multiple clerics; for this reason, these legislative proceedings were included in the analysis of the ROC’s framing strategies. The varied formats of the media sources and videos used were of special relevance, as I wished to establish if the variation in frames utilized depended heavily on the genre and intended audience of the broadcast or forum in which Church figures made their arguments about the anti-propaganda legislation.

Finally, in-person interviews were conducted in Russia with 17 clerics of the Moscow Patriarchate over a period of two weeks in October 2016. The interviewees were located through a targeted search and snowball approach in which I sought to locate clerics who had authored or figured prominently in articles regarding the anti-propaganda laws and/or other social issues such as abortion or pedophilia on Orthodox or secular Web sites. The initial cohort of clerics was contacted via social media or in person with a request to interview them regarding the Church and anti-LGBT propaganda efforts; more potential interviewees were then located through further networking.

Those interviewed served in churches, monasteries, or ROC institutions in the cities of Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Ivanovo, and the regions of Moscow Oblast and Leningrad Oblast. While attempts to locate respondents from Arkhangelsk Oblast were unsuccessful, the fact that the most active commentators regarding the Arkhangelsk Oblast law hailed from Moscow and Moscow Oblast (Chaplin, 2011; PravMir News Service, 2011), one of the leading Church figures called to
testify at the hearings for the St. Petersburg law (Hieromonk Dimitry Pershin) serves in Moscow, and two of the respondents served in a city and province within the Northwestern Federal District (in which Arkhangelsk Oblast is located) leads me to believe that regional representation is not a problem in this analysis. Basic information on the respondents and the codes by which they are identified in the in-text citations can be located in Appendix II.

The semi-structured interviews included open-ended questions about the nature of homosexuality and definitions of “propaganda of homosexualism and non-traditional sexual relationships,” the role of the Russian Orthodox Church, the responsibilities of state authorities before the Russian people, and future goals for Russian society. They also contained open-ended and more specific questions regarding the respondents’ opinions of and levels of satisfaction with the anti-propaganda laws (See Appendix III).

**Feasibility**

While Miceli (2005) and Baisley (2015) in particular have produced stellar comparisons of opposing movements and their respective framing strategies in disputes over LGBT rights, those within the field of morality policy (Mucciaroni, 2011; Ferraiolo, 2014, 2016) often elect to go into greater detail when examining the framing strategies of one side of a debate. In the case of this research project, the latter option was the most feasible, particularly in terms of networking and scheduling meetings with potential interviewees. At the time of writing, one of the most publically vocal LGBT activists from the time period studied (Masha Gessen) had left Russia, and a second (Nikolay Alekseev) was rumored to be living abroad. Social media posts indicated that both were highly transient. A third activist, Aleksey Davydov, died in 2013 of kidney failure (YouTube.Com, 2014). The small number of vocal LGBT activists remaining in Russia and the difficulty of locating potential interviewees indicated that it would not be possible to give both sides of the debate adequate attention within the scope of this project and time available (in comparison, although two of the authors of Horne et al. [2009] had previously “been consultants with GLBT groups in Russia and the former Soviet Union for several years,” the combined authors conducted only 10 interviews with LGBT individuals [p. 91]). For this reason, I decided to focus on the Russian Orthodox Church’s strategies in what could become a pilot for larger, longitudinal analyses of debates over LGBT activism and other morality policy issues in Russia.
Content Analysis and Coding

Entman (1993) declared that “the major task of determining textual meaning should be to identify and describe frames,” warning that unlike those coders who “simply tote up all messages they judge as positive and negative and draw conclusions about the dominant meanings…content analysis informed by a theory of framing would avoid treating all negative or positive terms or utterances as equally salient and influential” (p. 57). Frames in text “are manifested by the presence or absence of certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information, and sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgements” (Entman, 1993, p. 52). With this in mind, and following in the steps of Euchner et al. (2013), Ferraiolo (2013), and Ferraiolo (2014), an inductive, qualitative approach was used for the initial coding of morality policy frames in which Russian Orthodox and secular media content, transcripts of the hearings for the St. Petersburg anti-propaganda law, and the interview transcripts were searched for text indicating modified versions of the moral, rational-instrumental, and procedural framing strategies put forth by Mucciaroni (2011), and the transformative frames described by Snow et al. (1986).

Within Mucciaroni’s (2011) morality frame category, there is an important differentiation between private, social, and governmental morality. Private behavior morality frames encompass behaviors affecting “only the individuals who engage in the behavior and anyone else with whom they participate in consensual relationships,” which opponents declare to be “sinful or unnatural” and thus worthy of total bans or other constraints (Mucciaroni, 2011, p. 194). This places them in contrast to “social behavior morality frames” that “define issues in terms of individual or group behavior that violates important moral principles or cherished values by the way that they treat other individuals or groups, usually without the latter’s consent,” and “governmental morality frames” that “portray the actions (or inactions) of public officials and agencies as right or wrong, good or bad, when they promote or impede substantive moral principles like justice, fairness, freedom, equality, order, and security” (Mucciaroni, 2011, p. 194).

For the purpose of this analysis, I departed from Mucciaroni’s (2011) concept of private behavior as a separate territory of morality framing; rather, a combined “religious-moral” framing category was defined as framing of both private and public religion and morality, expressed
through references to Biblical and other religious themes, individual sin, and public morality standards. Likewise, while Mucciaroni sees “rational-instrumental” frames as “emphasizing the effects of public policy for society” and thus separate from the “private” realm covered by pure morality frames, this project views both religious-moral and rational-instrumental framing as crossing the public-private divide (Mucciaroni, 2011, p. 195). Thus religious-moral frames can apply to religious and moral strictures on the private lives of individuals as well as public spaces and social life, while rational-instrumental frames applied not only to society-level issues, but to material issues as applied to private individuals’ lives – areas such as genetics, psychology, and medicine in the context of homosexuality. Meanwhile, calls for morality on the part of state officials were considered “legislative responsibility” arguments (Ferraiolo, 2013, p. 228), placed within the “procedural” frame category along with commentary regarding state officials’ work and calls for future legislative action.

I initially believed that transformative framing would point solely to religious matters. However, during the first stages of coding frames used in media sources and legislative hearings, it became clear that transformative framing was also rational-instrumental (in terms of non-religious references to Russian society) and procedural (calls for legislation that would further restrict public or private morality, or fundamental changes to Russia’s Constitution). With this in mind, the structure of the content analysis was changed, and the media sources, legislative hearings, and interview transcripts were coded as shown in Figure 1.
Thus, all text coded as “religious-moral,” “rational-instrumental,” or “procedural” was double-checked for “transformative” framing (Snow et al., 1986; Goffman, 1974) indicating a desire for more comprehensive changes in individual and societal moral values, social practices, or support of further morality initiatives by the state. Transformative frames were of special importance when coding clerics’ responses to interview questions, particularly as sufficient time had passed to determine if the current legislation prohibiting LGBT propaganda would be deemed adequate. Calls for stronger legal restrictions (such as the return of Soviet-era criminal penalties for homosexual acts), social activism, or greater incorporation of religion into individuals’ lives (“inchurching”) would signify a transformative frame.

As the qualitative content analysis was performed, keywords and sub-frames (such as child welfare, national security, and demographics) specific to certain framing strategies were identified and noted, and overall frames for sentences and clauses (the latter due to the length of sentences in spoken and written Russian) were entered. A list of keywords identified in the analysis can be found in Appendix IV. One issue that arose was that of “borderline” terms applicable to two or more framing strategies, depending on the overall context of the sentence. For example, one word that appeared several times in the interview section of this analysis was the word “treatment” (lecheniye); during the second interview, the subject spoke of treatment for
homosexuals, but then made clear that this referred to religious counseling and prayer for LGBT individuals, not the Soviet-style psychiatric and medical procedures described earlier in this paper. The ability to pinpoint and code borderline terms appropriately is one of the benefits of an inductive approach in such settings.

**Quantitative Analysis**

The next step in evaluating the morality policy frames utilized by clerics and others in the ROC was quantitative tallying of frames employed. First, for every piece of material analyzed, the number of times that each frame (religious-moral, rational-instrumental, and procedural) was used was totaled in order to determine which frame was dominant. It was also noted if a transformative frame was employed, and if so, what type. The dominant frames for each piece were then summed to create the grand total of frames and transformative sub-frames for each law passed. The interviews performed were transcribed, and a qualitative and quantitative analysis identical to those applied to the media sources and hearings was performed in order to determine the dominant frame employed by each interviewee, the presence or absence of transformative framing, and the leading frames and transformative sub-frame types employed among all interviewees.

**Findings**

**Arkhangelsk Oblast**

For Arkhangelsk Oblast, a sample of 7 online articles was examined (5 from Russian Orthodox sites, and 2 from secular Web pages). Within the sample, the majority of overall frames used were rational-instrumental, followed by religious-moral frames. Contrary to Hypothesis 1, none of the articles sampled had a dominant procedural frame. Three of the 5 articles from the Orthodox Internet had an overall rational-instrumental frame (Arkhangelsk Eparchia Press Service, 2011; Chaplin, 2011a; Chaplin, 2011c) one had a tie between religious-moral and rational-instrumental frames (Chaplin, 2011b), and one had a religious-moral dominant frame (Russkaya Liniya, 2011). The secular publications were as follows: one with a religious-moral dominant frame (Remizov, 2011), the other with a rational-instrumental frame (Interfax-Religiya, 2011).
Prior to the passage of the Arkhangelsk Oblast anti-propaganda law, rational-instrumental framing by Church figures focused primarily on a sub-frame of child protection in the face of interest in underage citizens by LGBT activist groups. Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin (at the time, chairman of the Synodal Department for the Cooperation of Church and Society of the Moscow Patriarchate) stated that “Propaganda of homosexualism presents a particular danger for children and youth, who are…particularly susceptible to influence. It is known that this propaganda is directed first and foremost at youth and teenagers” (Chaplin, 2011b). Debates over the draft law against propaganda of homosexuality coincided with controversy over texts authored by a professor in the city of Arkhangelsk, Gennadiy Deryagin, who was quoted as writing that pedophiles’ efforts to acquire legal rights mirrored those of the early LGBT rights movement, and that “teenage boys often engage in voluntary sexual activity with adults” (Chaplin, 2011c). The ROC balked at reports that the texts were used within the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ higher education institutions, with Chaplin declaring that “this upsetting material contains demands for the legalization of homosexual relationships with children, [and] propagandizes pedophilia, considered around the world to be one of the worst crimes” (Interfax-Religiya, 2011).

While there were appeals to universal revulsion at pedophilia on one hand, another prominent rational-instrumental sub-frame indicated that LGBT activism was an aggressive product of foreign influence: Bishop Daniil (Dorovskykh) of Arkhangelsk and Kholmogorsk was quoted as
stating that “financing of propagandistic events is carried out with means from foreign funds, the
goal of which is the spiritual and moral decay of Russian society” (Arkhangelsk Eparchia Press
Service, 2011). In contrast, the Russian public was portrayed as home to a moral majority;
Chaplin stated that “the majority of Russian citizens do not accept in any way the propaganda of
sexual perversion that certain external forces and certain very small – but aggressive – groups
within our society are trying to force upon us” (Chaplin, 2011a).

Two of the articles in the sample included transformative frames (Chaplin, 2011a; Chaplin,
2011c). Unlike the dominant frames for the Arkhangelsk Oblast sample, the transformative sub-
frames were equally balanced between religious-moral, rational-instrumental, and procedural
elements. Statements by Chaplin demonstrate the ways in which all three framing types could be
combined: while calling for authorities to heed the voice of the people, he opined that “we will
hope that Gospel morality…will become an eternal and unchanged element of the life of the
country, her way of acting, her way of thinking. This is independence, this is sovereignty”
(Chaplin, 2011a). There was also a procedural and religious-moral call for grassroots action:
“The role of law enforcement must be great, but this is not enough…people must care about the
preservation of their churches, their church communities, and their shrines…look this threat
straight in the eye, giving her serious resistance, and protecting that which we must protect as
Christians” in the hopes that “we can start to live an entirely different life” (Chaplin, 2011c).

St. Petersburg

For the city of St. Petersburg, a combination of online articles, televised debate programs, and
videos of hearings (the public hearing on 24 February 2012 prior to the adoption of the law, and
the 22 June 2012 hearing regarding practical applications of the law) were analyzed. Of the 7
online articles, 3 were from the Orthodox Internet, while 4 were from secular Web pages. Both
of the two televised debates that were transliterated and analyzed took place in secular programs.
As with the media sample prior to the passage of the Arkhangelsk Oblast law, and contrary to the
prediction of Hypothesis 1, none of the articles or broadcasts in the St. Petersburg media sample
had a dominant procedural frame, and rational-instrumental frames were in first place (albeit by
a greater margin than in the Arkhangelsk Oblast sample).
Of the 3 articles from the Orthodox Internet, only one had a purely religious-moral dominant frame (Romanov, 2011), another had a rational-instrumental dominant frame (Zaytseva, 2012), and the third had a tie between religious-moral and rational-instrumental framing (Borisova, 2012). The 4 articles from secular Web pages all had dominant rational-instrumental frames (Dobrokhotov, 2011; Sopova, 2012; Rosbalt.Ru, 2012a; Rosbalt.Ru, 2012b). Of the 2 debates on secular television broadcasts, both had dominant rational-instrumental frames (NTV.Ru, 2011; YouTube.Com, 2012a).

As with the arguments made before the adoption of the Arkhangelsk Oblast anti-propaganda law, a rational-instrumental child protection sub-frame was prominent: in one of the televised debates, Deputy Milonov asked the audience, “Do you want your children to be attacked by all manner of LGBT movements, who use the fact that they [children] are not yet sufficiently psychologically independent?” (NTV.Ru, 2011). Hieromonk Dimitriy (Pershin), who participated in the first round of St. Petersburg hearings, was quoted by the Pravoslavie i Mir Orthodox Internet portal as contending that “In childhood and adolescence, impressions of norms for family relationships are not yet clearly formed, a child’s psyche is unstable, and it is possible to cause serious trauma with consequences for the rest of their life” (Borisova, 2012).
Another rational-instrumental argument that carried over from the debates concerning Arkhangelsk Oblast was that of a Russian majority versus ideological interlopers funded from abroad. While Hieromonk Dimitriy (Pershin) supported the idea that “the rights of children and teenagers must prevail over the rights of any minorities” (Zaytseva, 2012), Deputy Vitaliy Milonov stated that “the first thing that the opponents of the law did was not to approach us, the deputies, but to skulk around [foreign] consulates and file complaints about us” (Rosbalt.Ru, 2012b).

Russia was both compared to other countries that defended children’s rights, or posed as an opponent to an aggressive West. Hieromonk Dimitriy (Pershin) noted that “in a number of American states, the rights of the child in terms of propaganda of any sort of sexual practices and perversions are under far stricter protection than that which the deputies of the St. Petersburg Legislative Assembly are proposing” (Sopova, 2012). He went on to blend rational-instrumental and religious-moral framing, declaring that

Since [US Secretary of State] Hillary Clinton has announced that gay rights are human rights...and all the Sodomites of the planet are under the protection of the USA, there is one thing left for us to do: take all the children on Earth under our protection, and stand up for their right to grow up and be raised in normal families...the Church, until the end of its days, will defend the rights of every little one to not be dragged into sin. (Borisova, 2012)

A rational-instrumental connection was also made between defense of children, the country’s demographics, and a unifying “national idea” for Russia: Hieromonk Dimitriy told the Blagovest-Info Orthodox portal that “the job of all people of good will is to say that our national idea is our children,” while “homosexualism, unfortunately, is a place of death – children are not born there” (Zaytseva, 2012).

One rational-instrumental frame that was not cited in the Arkhangelsk Oblast case but rose to prominence in the run-up to the St. Petersburg law’s adoption was that of protection of LGBT activists. Hieromonk Dimitry (Pershin) exercised rational-instrumental and religious-moral framing when maintaining that the St. Petersburg law would protect LGBT activists who chose
to target schools and other children’s facilities from vigilantism by enraged parents, stating that it would

specifically protect individuals, who have defiled themselves with Sodom’s vice, from the risk that they bring upon themselves by encroaching upon underage Russians’ ways of thinking and acting, [minors] whose parents may resort to mob rule. (Sopova, 2012)

Only one of the articles analyzed (an interview with Deputy Milonov on an Orthodox Internet site) included transformative framing; while the dominant frame of the article was religious-moral, the transformative sub-frames were religious-moral and procedural. Milonov quoted former State Duma Deputy Vitaliy Savitskiy, who died in a car accident under suspicious circumstances in 1995, as remarking that “No reforms, no completely healthy transformations and genius ideas will be able to change our country, if they don’t concern the most important thing – the rebirth of spirituality in society” (Romanov, 2011). Milonov himself declared that the Church was “an institution that will never be won over” and that “the state must become the Church’s spiritual child” and “support her as the most important, most active and reliable spiritual institution in our society. And then, probably, something will change” (Romanov, 2011).

In the sample of videotapes of the St. Petersburg hearings (one of the 24 February hearing, and three of the 22 June hearing), three had dominant rational-instrumental frames (YouTube.Com, 2012b; YouTube.Com, 2012d; YouTube.Com, 2012e), and one had a dominant religious-moral frame (YouTube.Com, 2012f); no dominant procedural or transformative frames were found. Rational-instrumental sub-frames of prioritizing the needs of a moral majority and child protection persisted; Deputy Milonov stated that Russia was “a sovereign country that must act on the interests of citizens, the people, living within the Russian Federation” (YouTube.Com, 2012b), while Hieromonk Dimitriy (Pershin) asked those assembled (a group that included LGBT activists) “Can you really not cope without accosting minors with propaganda of homosexualism and other perversions?” (YouTube.Com, 2012b). A rational-instrumental sub-frame of a link between homosexuality, demographics, and Russia’s future as a nation was a continuation of previous references to Russia’s “national idea.” Archpriest Aleksiy Moroz spoke of a “reproductive instinct” among human beings at the hearings, stating that “contradiction
thereof is perversion, pathology” and that “the problem of homosexuality in the population, homosexuality of youth, is a problem of national security” due to a demographic crisis among Russia’s Slavic population (YouTube.Com, 2012b).

Figure 4. St. Petersburg, Public Hearings, Dominant Frames Employed (Number of Times)

When the morality policy frames from the media sources and public hearings were combined, the majority of framing strategies were rational-instrumental, with religious-moral framing a distant second, and no dominant procedural frames found.

Figure 5. St. Petersburg, Total Dominant Frames Employed (Number of Times)
**Federal Level**

For the federal law, a sample of 16 online articles, blog posts, secular televised debates, and religious broadcasts were analyzed. Of the articles selected, 4 were from the Orthodox Internet, and 7 were from secular news pages. Of the 5 video materials transcribed and analyzed, 3 were secular television broadcasts, one was a broadcast by the Orthodox Christian television channel Soyuz, and one was a video post from an Orthodox multimedia blog run by Archpriest Dimitry Smirnov of Moscow.

**Figure 6. Federal Level, Media Sources, Total Dominant Frames Employed (Number of Times)**

![Chart showing the distribution of frames](image)

As in the cases of the Arkhangelsk Oblast and St. Petersburg anti-propaganda laws, the overall frames employed in the sample were mostly rational-instrumental, with religious-moral framing taking a distant second. Unlike the previous two samples, however, the federal sample included one dominant procedural frame.

Of the 4 articles from the Orthodox Internet, half had combined religious-moral and rational-instrumental dominant frames (PravMir News Service, 2012a; Zaytseva, 2013), while half had purely rational-instrumental overall frames (PravMir News Service, 2012b; Milonov and Interfax-Severo-Zapad, 2012). Of the 7 articles from secular pages, 5 had purely rational-instrumental dominant frames (NewsRu.com, 2012; Gazeta.Ru, 2012; Regions.Ru, 2012; Chyornikh and Tumanov, 2012; Fetisov, 2013), one had a combined religious-moral, rational-
instrumental frame (Runkevich, 2012), and one had a combined religious-moral, procedural frame (Tutina, 2013), respectively. In the case of the article by Fetisov (2013), the fact that the dominant frame is rational-instrumental is particularly interesting due to the fact that it was featured in a secular business news site, but penned by an Orthodox priest. Of the secular television broadcasts analyzed, all three had purely rational-instrumental dominant frames (YouTube.Com, 2012c; YouTube.Com, 2015; YouTube.Com, 2013). Both the Orthodox television broadcast video (YouTube.Com, 2012d) and video blog post (Multimedia Blog of Archpriest Dimitriy Smirnov, 2013) had a dominant rational-instrumental frame.

In addition to rational-instrumental warnings about potential threats to children (Priest Dimitry Fetisov of Ryazan warned of a slippery slope by which “the simple and convincing thesis that ‘if you really want something, it’s permitted’ can continue in any direction – for example, into pedophilia”), the argument that the law represented the views of a moral majority of Russian citizens became especially prominent (Fetisov, 2013). Protodeacon and missionary Andrey Kuraev of Moscow viewed anti-propaganda legislation as a step away from a democratic deficit that favored the LGBT community, declaring that “all expansions of the rights of these homosexual minorities in Western countries were carried out in a non-democratic way…this was a certain consensus of liberal elites who imposed their will,” and indicated that the American Psychological Association’s decriminalization of homosexuality as a mental disorder was the result of “terror” and “intense pressure” against academia (PravMir News Service 2012b). Kuraev’s democracy sub-frame was backed by St. Petersburg Deputy Vitaliy Milonov, who stated that “no country has ever said in a referendum ‘we want to destroy our values and make a norm out of that which was once a sin’” (Milonov and Interfax-Severo-Zapad, 2012).

Foreign and domestic criticism of the St. Petersburg anti-propaganda law became a driving force behind rational-instrumental framing in support of federal legislation, as the specter of aggressive Western states and LGBT activists supported by American and European funding was framed as proof that such laws were necessary. In a question-and-answer session broadcast by the Orthodox Soyuz television channel, Mitropolit Pavel (Ponomaryov) of Ryazan (the city where the country’s first anti-propaganda law was adopted) called US Government criticism of the existing laws “shameless intervention in a sovereign state,” and asked the audience to
Look at the democracy that the USA is trying to impose upon us. Where does their democracy lead...look at Yugoslavia, look at Libya, look at Iraq...Do you want this to happen in Russia? It didn’t work out for [the US] there, now they’re trying to impose their ideas on another front. (Soyuz, 2012)

On a similar note, St. Petersburg Deputy Milonov called foreign protests against the anti-propaganda laws “A violent, literally forcible intervention in our internal sovereignty” and stated that for activists, protesting against the laws was “a serious source of income. We know about the [monetary] figures that are sent here every year for support of these foundations” (YouTube.Com, 2013; YouTube.Com, 2015).

The protests that erupted in response to regional laws banning propaganda to children were framed in rational-instrumental terms as evidence of an unhealthy connection between homosexuality and pedophilic tendencies, and a need for further restrictions. Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin remarked that

I’m very surprised [that] homosexual organizations, which are composed primarily of people who negate the connection between homosexualism and pedophilia, are also the ones who are so up in arms against these laws, protesting their adoption in all sorts of ways. (NewsRu.Com, 2012)

The protests were also seen as a sign of the need for legislation that would shut them down: Hieromonk Dimitry (Pershin) used a combined rational-instrumental and procedural frame when declaring that

The determination that representatives of sexual minorities have displayed, and their intention to protest yet again outside of facilities for children show how timely the adoption of the regional [St. Petersburg] law was, which, without delay, should be given federal status – but this is already a job for [parliamentary] deputies. (PravMir News Service, 2012a)

As in the case of the St. Petersburg law, the idea of LGBT activists at risk of physical retaliation from irate parents was used in rational-instrumental framing of anti-propaganda laws as a means of protecting such protestors from vigilante violence. When informed that LGBT activist Nikolai
Alekseyev planned to picket schools in response to the St. Petersburg law. St. Petersburg Deputy Milonov warned that

> Of course we can’t recommend that anyone physically resist them – that’s illegal. But...how can a person stand back, if a pervert approaches his children and starts holding these types of protests...it’s the very same as coming to a gunpowder storage facility with lit matches. (Milonov and Interfax-Severo-Zapad, 2012)

Priest Dimitriy Fetisov posed LGBT individuals as worthy of sympathy, but issued a warning for those who participated in public protests:

> I feel immensely sorry for those few people who suffer from such deviations. But my pity and desire to help won’t contradict righteous fury paired with legal charges or other, ruder means if such a sufferer can’t limit their promiscuity and starts to ecstatically tell my children about same-sex love. (Fetisov, 2013)

One rational-instrumental frame that first appeared during debates over the St. Petersburg law but bloomed in the run-up to adoption of the federal anti-propaganda legislation was that of a connection between homosexuality, the country’s demographic situation, and a unifying “national idea.” Archpriest Dimitriy Smirnov of Moscow opined that

> There are often discussions about our country not having a national idea. It’s completely clear that this is stupidity. Our national idea is giving birth to and raising children. (Tutina, 2013)

Smirnov cautioned that

> Soon young people will have nobody left to marry. There will only be same-sex families, in which (by the way, according to American data) children grow up to be more unhappy, cruel, and prone to violence and suicide. (Tutina, 2013)

St. Petersburg Deputy Milonov applied a combined procedural, religious-moral, and rational-instrumental frame to his own work and the future of Russia, stating that
As a People’s Deputy, I don’t have the right to allow lust and sin to be legalized and made a norm, because that will be the final year of our country’s existence. (YouTube.Com, 2013)

Discussions of a federal anti-propaganda law were particularly notable in that they were the first to include a dominant procedural frame. In addition to Milonov’s references to his responsibilities as a deputy, Mitropolit Pavel of Ryazan praised the work of those deputies who “in the name of the people, try to do everything possible to turn off this spigot of filth [and] nastiness, so that [it] won’t enter our Russian land” (Soyuz, 2012). However, there also were protests against those politicians who objected to the idea of adopting federal-level anti-propaganda legislation. Archpriest Dimitriy Smirnov remarked that

It would seem that [the law] is an obvious and most necessary document. So? A huge number of civil servants, deputies, even those who are obligated to protect human rights as part of their jobs are speaking against it for some reason!...Why is the fate of such a serious law being decided by a cluster of those in power?...In Switzerland, for example, referendums are held for the most trivial matters, but here, even serious problems are not subject to public debate. (Tutina, 2013)

Of the sample for the federal law, two of the sources containing transformative frames were published on the Orthodox PravMir portal: one article with a religious-moral transformative sub-frame (PravMir News Service, 2012a), and one with a procedural sub-frame (PravMir News Service, 2012b). A third source was a secular debate program on Russian state television; the transformative frame in this case was rational-instrumental (YouTube.Com, 2015). While Hieromonk Dimitriy (Pershin) used a religious-moral frame when opining that the anti-propaganda law would be cause for LGBT individuals and pedophiles to reevaluate “the moral dimension of their life here and in eternity” (PravMir News Service, 2012a), St. Petersburg Deputy Milonov made a rational-instrumental appeal for a return to Russia’s historical and cultural roots:

Where is our society going? It will either go down the path of degradation, or the path of true Russian renewal based on our traditions. (YouTube.Com, 2015)
In conclusion, when the dominant frames from each stage of the analysis (Arkhangelsk Oblast, St. Petersburg, and the federal level) were totaled, rational-instrumental dominant frames held a clear lead, with religious-moral and procedural frames a distant second and third. In contrast, transformative framing was more equally distributed between religious-moral, rational-instrumental, and procedural sub-frames.

**Figure 7. Total Dominant Frames Employed (Number of Times)**

![Bar chart showing total dominant frames](image)

**Figure 8: Total Transformative Sub-Frames Employed (Number of Times)**

![Bar chart showing total transformative sub-frames](image)
Interview Results: Framing

When tallied, the majority of overall frames employed by the clerics interviewed were rational-instrumental. Religious-moral overall frames were in second place (albeit by a narrower margin than the total overall frames tallied for the online media sources and hearings), and no overall procedural frames were found, in defiance of Hypothesis 1. Of the 17 interviewees, four used religious-moral overall frames (I9; I10; I11; I16), 9 used rational-instrumental overall frames (I2; I4; I5; I6; I8; I13; I14; I15; I17), and the remaining respondents used combined religious-moral and rational-instrumental overall frames (I1; I3; I7; I12).

Figure 9. Interviews, Total Dominant Frames Employed (Number of Times)

One of the areas in which religious-moral and rational-instrumental frames were paired was the act of describing homosexuality. Fourteen of the 17 respondents described homosexuality as a sin, while those describing homosexuality as a genetic predisposition took a distant second with 7 responses. In all, rational-instrumental frames of homosexuality (describing it as a genetic predisposition, illness, result of trauma or molestation, product of external influences, or form of addiction) outnumbered the religious-moral frame of “sin” with a total of 19 individual frames. Only 4 of the respondents identified homosexuality solely in religious-moral terms (I1; I2; I3; I16).
One aspect of morality policy framing touched upon by Mucciaroni (2011) and the interview respondents (but not addressed in the online media sources or during hearings for the St. Petersburg anti-propaganda legislation) was the difference between private orientation or sin and public behavior. In cases where respondents felt that genetic predisposition was a root cause (or suspected cause) of homosexuality, they were nonetheless against public promotion or discussions of LGBT identity, particularly when children were present. One respondent identified homosexuality as having a “biological, genetic component” but went on to state that such an orientation was “something that should not be declared, broadcast, and so on…it must stay a secret between this person, their spiritual father (duhovnik), and God” (I9). Another opined that while homosexuality was the result of congenital or external factors for which homosexual individuals were “not to blame, this cannot be considered a norm,” and while “homosexuals must have the ability to gather,” this should not happen via gay pride parades and other initiatives visible to the general public, as “they should not impose their orientation on those around them” (I5).

The concept of homosexuality as an illness was an area where religious morality, secular science, and ideas regarding moral and material threats to the public from dangerous information collided. Two of the respondents (I12; I14) compared homosexuality to other illnesses such as
tuberculosis – conditions subject to treatment, not promotion. One declared that “we must relate to those who are ill with forgiveness, but this illness needs to be treated…we need to look for ways to treat this ailment, and not justification thereof” as “propaganda of homosexualism paves the road into society for this sinful illness” (I12). Empathy for the feelings of LGBT individuals in Russia was notably distinct from sympathy for public displays of LGBT identity; one respondent acknowledged that homosexuals in Russian society were open to “mockery” if they declared their orientation, but stated that “this situation cannot be resolved through a counter-movement, that is, open propaganda of homosexuality in magazines, books, television…” (I15).

While the rational-instrumental child protection sub-frame pinpointed through the analyses of media sources and hearings was present in the interviewees’ responses, a link arose between perceptions regarding the origins of homosexuality and a need to keep propaganda of homosexuality away from minors. One archpriest worried that propaganda of homosexuality would “lead to its spread among those who do not have this type of psychological problem or predisposition” (I4). Another saw propaganda of homosexuality as part of a cycle of abuse:

\[\text{[Homosexuality]} \text{ may be, in rare circumstances, caused by some kind of natural causes, tendencies of human nature. But more often, we see that this is the result of violence that took place, not necessarily physical, but emotional violence toward a child at a young age, when such homosexuals enlighten him, and sometimes pervert or molest him. Then this broken person replicates this model in their own life. This law helps by allowing him to be restrained.} \text{ (I8)}\]

Mental health issues among members of the LGBT community were part of a rational-instrumental frame in which the Church and believers were framed as collectively responsible for spreading warnings about homosexuality to the greater public or the state:

\[\text{We have to speak the truth about the homosexual community. This truth is known to priests, parents and teachers know it. And the truth is that these people are deeply unhappy, and often completely broken by 35-40 years of age. People who often feel that they have reached a dead end in life, prone to suicide, alcohol, and}\]

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5 This respondent was unusual in that they consistently used the term “homosexuality” as opposed to “homosexualism” in speech.
drug abuse. This truth is carefully concealed in the politically correct West under the influence of a state lobby, but we need to state this truth in cultural spaces, schools, and mass media sources. (I13)

Another rational-instrumental child protection sub-frame utilized on multiple occasions promoted the right of minors to a childhood without certain influences, followed by self-determination upon reaching adulthood. One respondent opined that “I feel that one must first give a child the chance to grow up, then give them complete freedom” (I6), while another stated that “Children are not yet formed and are in a stage of development, and for this reason, to point them in a direction that is not the norm would be incorrect” (I9).

A sub-frame that carried over from the analyses of media sources and hearings and contained strong religious-moral and rational-instrumental elements was the idea of democracy and a moral majority of Russians that opposed propaganda of homosexuality. Feedback from the respondents in this direction included the following:

-I believe that in modern society, the fight for minority rights has exceeded all reasonable limits...and as a result, the majority loses their rights to live how they deem fit. (I17)

If we take into account that the majority in Russia think sufficiently negatively of this type of lifestyle and behavior...our country is a democracy, and democracy is the power of the majority. I don’t think that it would be right to subject the feelings of the majority of the population of Russia to such a trial...even if you don’t respect yourself, respect other people...If the majority of the population feels negatively [about this], why cause these people pain? (I8)

I agree that there is a certain element of discrimination [against homosexuals in Russian society]...but on the other hand, this constituent preference of society in relation to a ban on such advertisements, propaganda serves to benefit society overall...This law...is important as a sign of the government’s and society’s position. In this case, the state directly performs its role as an instrument of the moral majority....We believe that, of course, especially in a case when the overwhelming majority of citizens speak out against [homosexual propaganda],
that collective rights have priority...Free societies do not necessarily mean the dominance of liberalism and liberal paradigms. (I15)

Rational-instrumental framing of public expressions of LGBT identity involved, as in the online media analysis, references to foreign influence and aggression by activist groups. In addition, LGBT activism in foreign countries was held up as an example of what Russia should avoid:

*I believe that the issue that arises and is inflated in connection with LGBT community rallies is an issue brought to Russia from the outside. If we look at who speaks about this more than anyone, it’s the Council of Europe...and the United States of America. (I6)*

*The pendulum has swung too far, toward excessive support of minorities...But we see this, and probably we wouldn’t want to repeat this mistake, especially if it is destructive, especially under conditions wherein we see that these liberal-democratic instruments have become a means of interfering in the domestic affairs of other countries. (I15)*

*The modern era stands out in that, for a significant part of the so-called civilized world, homosexualism is confirmed as a norm of life that is sufficiently aggressive toward other forms and norms of relationships between people...homosexualism was promoted at first as the right of minorities to exist, and today has gone from acknowledgement of this right, to legalization, to the beginning of discrimination against those who are not in agreement with this position. We already see this in an entire series of countries as a legal norm...when there is persecution of people – whether ideological or legal – who are not in agreement with these concepts, these are the fruits of that very same propaganda that started with the defense of the small and weak. (I4)*

LGBT activism was viewed as not only a sign of meddling by outsiders, but hostility toward Christianity:

*They don’t just propagandize the fact that they’re different, that this is natural and normal, but, for example, they attack Christian values. (I3)*
One theme that carried over from the discussions of the St. Petersburg and federal-level laws was that of protecting LGBT activists from vigilantism by parents and other members of the public.

Two respondents viewed the law as a step toward mutual protection in a combination of religious-moral, rational-instrumental, and procedural framing:

*If in our culture, our society, the majority of people do not accept homosexual relationships, this means that the state is obligated to protect homosexuals on one hand, and protect society from their expression on the other. (15)*

*We as a Church believe that [homosexuals] are people, and this is very important. Because of this, we believe that it [was] very important to adopt this law, because these people were in a risky position, they were threatened with lynching, vigilantism...When legal and moral regulations don’t work, when values are lost, when some group loses their understanding of these deep moral rules, values, archetypes, that which society has accepted by default, that’s when legal mechanisms are put to work...the law exists in order to resolve conflicts with the language of logic, argumentation, in a calm setting, under the supervision of the state and society. And for this reason, the law is necessary, in order to save sexual minorities from lynching. (18)*

Thus the Church was posed as a supporter of Russia’s LGBT community – but with the expectation that homosexuals would reform their lives in line with society’s moral norms, in a combination of procedural and religious-moral transformational framing:

*The Church is for this law, because [it] is on the side of minorities, so that they won’t be hurt, and so they will understand that they are wrong, and, perhaps, they will change their lives...in this situation, [the law] was the maximum that was possible to accomplish, and it worked. (18)*

An additional combined religious-moral and rational-instrumental sub-frame that carried over from the online media analysis and St. Petersburg hearings was that of links between homosexuality, the country’s demographic situation, and Russia’s sovereignty under a unifying “national idea” in which
No family equals no society. If you want to be abnormal, go ahead, [but] if you want to be normal, have a family, children, grandchildren, then stay far away from [homosexuality]. (I3)

One respondent approached this question from a scientific perspective:

We understand that [for] the human body, by its very nature, these relationships are for biological reproduction. If there is no [reproduction] this is an aberration, abnormal, a form of illness. (I9)

Others viewed it in terms of maintaining social consensus through child-rearing:

They can’t give birth to their own children, and, unfortunately, cannot teach them about good behaviors and norms or provide them with a normal example of such. (I8)

In the end, this is the ruin of man, because homosexuality does not presuppose giving birth to children, and it also provides a negative example to other people, especially the younger generation...Propaganda of homosexuality only contributes to the problem of a fall in the birth rate. (I12)

The ban on expressions of LGBT identity to minors was tied to a larger struggle against outside influence in favor of Russia’s cultural self-determination, with strong religious-moral, rational-instrumental, and procedural elements:

History knows prominent examples when allowing this sin [homosexuality] led to the death of civilizations...When we start to fancy others’ ideas, we lose our own, we lose our legacy. Russia was a sufficiently conservative country for centuries, and she became a fairly large empire. And although we don’t have this anymore, nevertheless, our territory is fairly large, and preserving all of this is possible only through preservation of our identity. And for Russian culture, homosexualism is unacceptable. (I12)

Our society, 21st Century Russian society, has managed to preserve her historical traditions, her Christian roots, and protect her tradition, her values, and the most
valuable thing that society has is children, because they are the future of society. This is the direct responsibility of society, and this responsibility has been delegated by society to the state. (17)

One respondent viewed children as not only the centerpiece of a rational-instrumental “national idea” for Russia, but the basis for future procedural demands on the state:

In my view, we are still trying to find a national idea...my view is that this idea of ours is very simple, the only idea we have is our children. There will be children, there will be families, we will ask our parliamentary deputies regarding how well they are working, implementing laws, fighting corruption, providing jobs. Children are probably the greatest motivation...it’s possible to build a nation around the theme of childhood. (18)

When asked their opinions of the existing anti-propaganda laws and the possibility of future restrictions on the LGBT community, the wide range of responses (mostly in the form of procedural and rational-instrumental framing) showed that the Church is far from a monolithic institution. For some, the federal-level legislation was not ideal, but a step in the right direction:

I think that this draft law was a compromise in general, and perhaps is the maximum that is possible today. (113)

I am satisfied that lawmaking activities are taking place, and that the will of the people is manifested not through empty conversations, scandals...but in the actions of our lawmakers, adoption, implementation, enforcement, and, later on, analysis of results of laws...the process in itself is beneficial. (114)

However, one of the respondents expressed doubts about the actual goals and effectiveness of the legislation on one hand, and the wisdom of the ROC’s involvement on the other, using procedural and religious-moral frames:

I am against propaganda of any kind of sexual immorality, not necessarily homosexualism, but any kind of sexual immorality...but I don’t really understand what has been adopted through this law, what this law is trying to achieve, and what it has in mind. The statements that have arisen from representatives of the
government...have a very scandalous character, and quite often the Church is presented in an ugly way...[homosexuality] is a sinful illness, and the Lord calls for treating sinners with mercy, with the goal that the sinner will mend their ways...and I don’t see this idea of persuading people to repent, bringing them back to life, love, and the desire for salvation in this law or the people who are trying to associate themselves with it, unfortunately. (111)

A number of the other respondents expressed misgivings about future Church-state collaboration. One respondent leaned toward religious-moral framing when they opined that

*Comparing the Church to some kind of civil institution is incorrect. The Church is not of this world, a society of those seeking a heavenly Fatherland. It is not correct if the Church acts out, the Church is founded for other things. (1I)*

Views of the Church’s functions before state authorities varied greatly – some saw lobbying regarding social issues as the Church’s right, but defense of the interests of the Church and believers was a cause that united multiple respondents in blended religious-moral and rational-instrumental framing:

*The Church participated in lobbying for [the anti-propaganda legislation]...In general, I believe that if the Church is a part of society, it must protect its interests and lobby for the law, there’s nothing wrong with that. (1I17)*

*The Church has a different inherent line of action, that of a defender...the idea of the Church is to witness to truth. If this truth is violated by the state, the Church must witness to the state...but the Church has not and must not have correctional-court functions by any means. (17)*

Another saw Church-state cooperation as an opportunity for the ROC to promote religious-moral and rational-instrumental family values for the sake of the majority – and the future of the state:

*The Church tries to utilize support on the part of the state when possible...in order to strengthen socially healthy models of family...The basis of the state is a strong family...In this case, the Russian Orthodox Church is acting not as some*
kind of lobbyist who is in the minority and demanding support of minority interests, but rather as representatives of a moral majority. (I15)

One of the respondents not only spoke at length about Church cooperation with the state on relevant matters, but described potential rational-instrumental and procedural morality policy framing strategies by the Church:

[The Church can] find arguments, convincing arguments, and they don’t have to be moral, by the way. There can be arguments in the sphere of demography – that the country is dying out. There can be arguments in the sphere of politics...These arguments can be posed to [parliamentary] deputies, many of whom are not Christians in terms of lifestyle, many are not even baptized. But they understand the elementary basis of things, we agree on these points, we are in solidarity. (I8)

**Interview Results: Transformative Framing**

While the framing strategies employed by the interviewees were skewed entirely in favor of rational-instrumental followed by religious-moral dominant frames, with no procedural dominant frames found, transformative framing by the interview subjects was radically different: religious-moral and procedural transformative frames tied for first place, leaving rational-instrumental transformative frames a distant third. This pattern also differed from the transformative frames used in the analysis of online media sources, in which transformative frames were comparatively equally distributed between religious-moral, rational-instrumental, and procedural sub-frames.
Owing to Russia’s mixed religious and (forced) secular past, religious-moral transformational sub-frames in the interviews differed from Snow et al.’s (1986) concept in which “new values may have to be planted and nurtured, old meanings or understandings jettisoned” (p. 473). Rather, they were a rejection of “misframings” (Goffman, 1974, p. 308) of the liberalizations of the post-Soviet era as well as the enforced secularism of the more distant Soviet period, in favor of in-churching through which the nominally Orthodox would return to their pre-1917 religious roots:

*This is a question of returning to religious roots...returning to recognition of religion in society. Ridding oneself of those misconceptions and deviations that penetrated man’s conscience, not during the last 10 years, but the past hundred years. (I14)*

In-churching was seen as a prophylactic measure against propaganda of LGBT identity (and, subsequently, homosexuality) – and a means of defense where state authorities fall short:

*If moral feelings will be cultivated in society, and the sanctity of the family, a traditional family will find roots and be palpable, and children are raised in complete families, families that are based around a moral tradition, such unnatural phenomena will not find a niche or sustenance in this society...Laws are a barrier, directions, hurdles, that provide a safe life for society and human*
coexistence, but human coexistence…is completely different. A moral law must live in a person’s heart, and only this can be the basis for the effectiveness of execution of the law. (I7)

Laws ban propaganda of homosexualism, but they don’t talk about how to resolve this problem…the overwhelming majority of people carry Orthodox culture with them, even if they aren’t aware of it…If a person is occupied with healthy ideas…holy ideas, then it won’t occur to him to entertain himself with something non-traditional in terms of [sexual] orientation…for this reason, for society, the main goal is spiritual-moral upbringing, bringing in traditional values…the solution lies in in-churching of the people. We say that 7 percent [of people] go [to church], [but] 70 percent consider themselves Orthodox….if they started to go to church, participate in the sacraments of confession and communion, they would attain some kind of internal self-control. (I12)

In addition to calls for in-churching, there was a combined religious-moral and rational-instrumental push for grassroots involvement in morality policy debates and improved methods of arguing the Church’s position:

The Church is not just a structure consisting of clergy, but a large number of people, laypeople first of all. I believe that primarily Orthodox laypeople should speak out, unite in associations, propose their draft laws, and in some cases, go out on the streets to speak the truth about those agents, including government authorities, lobbyists and the pedophile mafia, and the mafia of “artists” that promote [homosexuality]…because this must be civil action first and foremost, connected with open speeches and proposals directed at the authorities. (I13)

I think that the moral majority in Russia should learn how to put forth their moral stance…not from the position of victory through force, but the power of persuasion…The role of the Church here should not be a dialogue from the position of power, but a dialogue from the position of convictions. (I15)

In the analysis of transformative procedural framing, only one respondent was firmly in favor of a return of the Soviet-era Article 121, which would reinstate criminal responsibility and prison
sentences for homosexual activity between men (*muzhelozhstvo*) to the Russian Criminal Code, stating that

*This indicates that society is healthy...a healthy society is one that sees illnesses, faults, perversion...[if] a society does not see all this, moreover, if it tries to instill it, how can we speak of [society’s] health?* (I16)

Another respondent answered that they did not know whether criminal penalties should be reinstated, but that it “must be viewed as abnormal and morally condemned by society” (I13); the remainder of the respondents expressed opposition to criminal penalties for homosexual acts.

One prominent transformative procedural sub-frame identified was that of a desire to cement the idea of marriage as an exclusively heterosexual institution in law, and introduce other restrictions related to family life:

[I want] for the family as a union between a man and woman to be firmly locked into Russian legislation and protected...and no other forms of cohabitation, including between people of the same sex, or polygamous unions, or zoophilic [unions] can ever be considered equal to it...so they cannot have any effect in terms of the law or rights...Of course [I am] absolutely against the possibility of people of homosexual orientation having the opportunity to adopt children, participate in surrogate motherhood procedures, and so on...In this case, it may be preferable for there to be more detailed legislative initiatives in order to clearly assign liability if such things will take place. (I4)

*It would be completely natural in our country, taking our traditions into account, at the level of the basis of the state, not federal law, but the basis of governance...at the level of the Constitution, to write that marriage can be recognized only as a union between a man and woman...Then everything will be clear. If this is a family, everything else is not a family. No partnerships, cohabitation, or same-sex [unions] amount to anything.* (I7)

*In principle, at the level of legal and political declarations, it should be said that real family life, and real sexual relationships are [in] a family founded by a man*
and woman, and legal and political declarations of such would be beneficial.

(I13)

A second transformative procedural sub-frame that emerged was that of a need for controls over materials available to underage persons via mass media sources – and, in some cases, to adults as well. This was often paired with calls for strict implementation of the federal anti-propaganda law, or, in one case, an upgrade of said law that would declare LGBT propaganda to be a criminal offense (as opposed to the current administrative offense resulting in fines for Russian citizens and organizations):

In terms of protective measures, we must not only ban propaganda to schoolchildren, but ban any public performances that would represent homosexualism in principle. That means no gay parades. No [TV] shows in which [homosexuality] is shown, even for adults. And especially, and first and foremost, even if this measure seems very harsh: strict control over the Internet...So that there would be no immoral texts concerning sexual perversion in particular...Block propaganda of all this immorality via the Internet, and hand down serious [prison] terms for such propaganda...Right now the [anti-propaganda] law is too weak, [resulting in] some fines, this is not correct. Criminal penalties are needed. (I12)

The most important thing is that [the anti-propaganda law] be strictly enforced. Especially [for] the Internet...It is difficult to go out on the street and stand next to a school with propaganda of homosexualism. But in the Internet, there is quite a lot of such propaganda, and, of course, this needs to be fought. I think that the one real way of fighting this is a refusal of anonymity for the Internet. The sooner this happens, including at the level of law, the better. (I13)

I would consider legislative norms concerning mass media sources. Mass media sources can be viewed as part of the surrounding environment. I would approach these problems on the whole as [a matter of] decency in the media...This is the sovereignty of the people...and is related to the sphere of the nation’s sovereignty. (I14)
In light of the general crisis in terms of self-identification of modern people, when a person doesn’t understand...who he is (that which was resolved easily in traditional societies), this is always a tough question for a teenager. And when we storm the sphere of his sexuality with some kind of propaganda...because of this, it seems to me that this theme should be removed from the field of information.

In the final stage of the analysis, the total overall frames and total transformative frames from the analyses of online media and hearings were combined with the total overall and transformative frames from the interview analysis. For the overall frames, rational-instrumental overall frames held a clear lead, with religious-moral frames and procedural frames a distant second and third.

**Figure 12. Total Overall Frames (Media Sources, Hearings, and Interviews, Number of Times)**

For the transformative frames found in the combined total, religious-moral and procedural sub-frames held a clear lead, while rational-instrumental frames lagged behind in a distant third place.
Discussion

Due to the dearth of framing and morality policy studies conducted in Russia or with Orthodox Churches in general, this project was highly inductive, with the hopes of identifying potential issues with definition and measurement of key concepts and adjusting the coding for the content analysis accordingly. While the definitions of religious-moral, rational-instrumental, procedural, and transformative framing may differ from those used in prior research, I believe that this was a necessary step in ensuring the validity of the results of this and future surveys.

While the results of the analysis of online media sources regarding the Arkhangelsk Oblast, St. Petersburg, and federal anti-propaganda laws (and in the case of St. Petersburg, hearings) were consistent with the part of the Hypothesis 1 that stated that rational-instrumental framing strategies would be prominent, the near absence of dominant procedural frames came as a surprise. While some could argue that the use of media sources (articles, televised debates, and other broadcasts) could influence the outcome, the fact that there were no dominant procedural frames found in the St. Petersburg hearings (the setting in which one would most expect procedural framing strategies to be utilized) is a sign that the Church’s framing tactics before state authorities may contradict prior research – and are thus worthy of further study. The fact that religious-moral framing was higher in the interview stage may reflect the setting of the
interviews and the fact that not all of the interviewees were prominent media personalities (i.e., accustomed to speaking to mainstream audiences in secular environments), but the primacy of rational-instrumental framing and fact that there was an absolute lack of dominant procedural frames shows that overall patterns of expression were consistent.

On the other hand, the types of transformative frames shown in both the analysis of online media sources and hearings and the interview analysis went far beyond the calls for greater “inchurching” of the Russian population that I had anticipated in Hypothesis 2, and evidence that the definition of transformative framing as containing rational-instrumental and procedural sub-frames was justified. The fact that religious-moral and procedural sub-frames were prominent against almost non-existent rational-instrumental sub-frames in the analysis of transformative framing by the interviewees is a puzzle that deserves further exploration, but may also be a product of an interview setting in which respondents were more likely to speak in terms of that in which they are most interested: religious matters and demands for future policy action. While the final tally of dominant frames was consistent with the results of both the online media/hearings analysis and the interview analysis, the tally of transformative frames was clearly affected by the comparatively low number of rational-instrumental transformative frames in the interview analysis.

Although the use of rational-instrumental framing in secular media sources can be expected (even in articles authored by clerics such as Fetisov, 2013), the fact that the majority of the materials culled from the “Orthodox Internet” had dominant rational-instrumental frames came as a surprise. The fact that rational-instrumental framing prevailed even in a sphere of the media dedicated to the Church, in which the authors and majority of the audience are Orthodox Christians, is a sign of the power of secular language in post-Soviet contexts and merits further exploration.

While rational-instrumental sub-frames of homosexual propaganda as a threat to children and product of foreign influence could be expected, considering the content of the law being discussed and the prominent role of foreign support both in the arrival of LGBT activism in Russia and subsequent public manifestations, other sub-frames were less anticipated. The idea of having and rearing children as Russia’s “national idea,” linked not only to the country’s demographics but a larger picture of national security was both novel and remarkable in that it
was voiced in the media analysis, hearings, and interviews, and could be used in framing of a number of other issues, from abortion to demands for increased government support of families. The notion of the Russian Orthodox Church as on the side of the LGBT community and the anti-propaganda laws as an attempt to protect activists from vigilante reprisals (voiced prior to the adoption of the St. Petersburg and federal laws, and in the interviews) may not appear credible in the eyes of the Church’s detractors, but is a potent counter-argument to portrayals of the ROC as uniformly hostile to homosexuals.

One element that I found surprising was the number of times in which clerics referred to science when speaking about homosexuality – first in the St. Petersburg hearings, and even more so during the interviews. The fact that acceptance of the notion of homosexuality as caused by a genetic predisposition did not preclude support of anti-propaganda legislation deserves further exploration, as it shows that beliefs in sexual orientation as immutable (at least for a percentage of the LGBT community) will not necessarily lead to greater acceptance of homosexuality or public expressions thereof.

Another aspect of the interview process that I did not anticipate was the fact that not only did the overwhelming majority of the respondents not support a return of the Soviet-era penalties for homosexual activity, but they referred to other transgressions (such as cohabitation) in addition to homosexuality when arguing for changes to the Constitution that would further cement the concept of marriage as an exclusively heterosexual union. This and the dissent voiced by one of the respondents regarding the anti-propaganda legislation and the Church’s role and image in public discussions thereof contradict notions of the ROC as a monolithic anti-LGBT body.

For future analyses of the anti-propaganda laws, I recommend conducting analyses of media sources and transcripts of hearings (where available) and interviews for all of the regions in which anti-propaganda laws were adopted from 2006 through 2013, as this would increase the geographic spread of the data to include the Southern, Volga, Siberian, and Far-Eastern Federal Districts of the Russian Federation. Efforts should be made to conduct interviews in urban areas, smaller towns and settlements, and rural areas, including the monasteries and churches that are known both as pilgrimage sites and as locations where respondents may have stricter views about public morality than those expressed by the majority of interviewees in this project.
Conclusion

This project intended to pinpoint the framing strategies employed by clerics and others serving in the Russian Orthodox Church. By doing so, I hoped to apply framing theory to the ROC, expand morality policy research beyond its traditional home in the West, and introduce a new approach to attempts to understand the interactions between Church and state in Russia that would dispel the concept of a monolithic religious institution and transcend speculation by delving deeper into what was actually said about legislation banning propaganda of homosexuality. In the process, it became apparent that previous definitions of morality policy frames and transformational framing had to be adjusted to fit the context of Russian religion, politics, and society. I also found that the results of content analysis of media sources, recordings of public hearings on the law, and in-person interviews with Church clerics were markedly different from her initial hypotheses. All of these factors form a strong argument for inductive research of the ROC and other religious and social institutions and groups that have puzzled researchers in the West until now, in order to create a robust research design before launching larger-scale analyses.

The process of creating new definitions of morality policy and transformational frames that suit the Russian context and the Orthodox Church was particularly important to me, as this project is intended as a pilot for future studies of morality policy disputes involving the Moscow Patriarchate, ROC clerics, and Orthodox activist groups within the Russian Federation and other countries within the former Soviet Union. These include my planned dissertation project on the Church’s morality policy framing of bioethics issues (the HIV/AIDS epidemic, abortion, and assisted reproductive technology).

In addition to examinations of issues that clearly fall within the bounds of morality policy such as abortion and religious education courses within the state school system, I believe that the framing strategies found within morality policy research can be applied to problems such as land-use disputes over the construction of new churches in Moscow and the status of existing Church properties. While the nature of governance in Russia means that gleaning the exact nature of Church-state relations may be next to impossible for researchers who have not been embedded in ROC affairs for decades, longitudinal studies of fluctuations in morality frames used over time regarding different issues and a comparison of outcomes may yield clues as to which argumentation strategies have worked in the Church’s favor. Morality policy and content
analysis may also assist with other areas of inquiry related to religion and politics in Russia, such as examinations of tolerance levels for individual behavior (for example, comparing morality policy frames used when discussing homosexuality with respondents’ attitudes toward reinstatement of Soviet-era criminal penalties).

I am aware of (and open to) the idea that the results of this thesis project may be used by Orthodox Churches, individual clerics, religious activists, and other non-governmental organizations in Russia and elsewhere in the former Soviet Union, both in research and when preparing for hearings before state authorities and media appearances. Whatever the readership or future use of this project may be, it intends to draw analyses of Church-state relations in Russia out of the realm of elite speculation, and into a new era where the voices, concerns, and aspirations of the Church’s leadership, clergy, laypeople, and activist groups will be given the attention and analysis that they deserve, to the benefit of all involved.
Works Cited


Appendix I: Content Analysis Sources


**Appendix II: List of Interviewees**

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Appendix III: Interview Form

Thank you for taking part in my thesis project!

The goal of this project is to conduct an analysis of argumentation by those serving in the Russian Orthodox Church regarding non-traditional relationships and bans of propaganda of non-traditional relationships among minors.

Благодарю Вас за то, что Вы участвуете в моём дипломном проекте!

Цель данного проекта – проведение анализ аргументаций священнослужителей РПЦ по отношению к нетрадиционным отношениям и запретам пропаганды нетрадиционных отношений среди несовершеннолетних лиц.

Name/ Имя:

Age/ Возраст:

City/ Город:

Church (Parish)/Приход:

Church Title/ Священный Сан:

Does the interviewee wish to remain anonymous? Y/N

Хотите ли Вы остаться анонимным? Да/Нет

Do you consider yourself to be liberal, conservative, or somewhere in between (for example, in Church affairs)?

Считаете ли Вы себя либералом, консерватором, или где-то в середине (например, по церковным вопросам)?
Questions:

1. What do the terms homosexuality/LGBT/gay/homosexualism/non-traditional sexual relations mean to you? Is this a sin, psychological disorder or illness, natural genetic condition, congenital pathology, criminal phenomenon, and/or something else?

Please explain.


Пожалуйста, мотивируйте свой ответ.

2. What role does the ROC have in relation to homosexual people/people with a non-traditional orientation?

Какая роль имеет РПЦ по отношению к людям гомосексуальной/нетрадиционной ориентации?

3. What does the term “propaganda of homosexuality/LGBT/gay/non-traditional sexual relations” mean to you? Please explain.

Что для Вас обозначает термин «пропаганда нетрадиционных сексуальных отношений среди несовершеннолетних»?

4. What is your opinion of the laws against propaganda of homosexualism/non-traditional sexual relations passed in 2011-2013?

(Note: In the event that the interviewee is a resident of Arkhangelsk Oblast or St. Petersburg City, the first and second terms will be used; if they are from other provinces, only “non-traditional sexual relations” will be used)

Каково Ваше мнение о законах против пропаганды гомосексуализма и пропаганды нетрадиционных сексуальных отношений среди несовершеннолетних, который приняли с 2011 по 2013-им годам на региональном уровне и в 2013-ом году на федеральном уровне?
5. Do you believe that the federal law is sufficient/ too strict/ not strict enough? Please explain.


6. In your opinion, should the ROC testify before the state regarding this issue and/or other moral issues?

По Вашему мнению, должно ли РПЦ ходатайствовать перед государством по этому вопросу и/или другим вопросам, связанным с моралью?

7. In your opinion, does the state bear responsibility before the people in regards to this issue and/or other moral issues?

По Вашему мнению, имеет ли государство обязанности перед народом по этому вопросу и/или другим вопросам, связанным с моралью?

8. Would you like to see other changes to legislation that would influence propaganda of non-traditional relations among minors or adults, or other laws that would influence homosexuals/LGBT individuals or the general moral condition of society? If yes, please explain which.

Хотели бы Вы видеть другие изменения в законодательстве, которые влияли бы на пропаганду нетрадиционных отношений среди несовершеннолетних или взрослых, или другие законы, которые бы повлияли на гомосексуалисты/ЛГБТ лиц или на общее моральное состояние общества? Если да, пожалуйста, объясните, какие именно.

9. Would you like to see other, more global changes to the general moral condition of society? If yes, please explain which.

Хотели бы Вы видеть другие, более глобальные изменения в общем моральном состоянии общества? Если «да», пожалуйста, объясните, какие именно.

10. Any further comments?

У Вас остались каких-то комментариев?
## Appendix IV: Content Analysis Keywords

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